Condicionantes internacionais e domésticos : o Brasil e o G-20 nas negociações agrícolas da rodada Doha

Abstract

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes Brazil's performance during the agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round, considering the implications of domestic backing for the country's credibility vis-à-vis the G-20 and the coalition's contribution to increasing Brazil's bargaining power in relation to pressure from the United States and the European Union. The study investigated the positions of agribusiness interest groups, G-20, United States, and European Union in distinct negotiating phases. The theoretical framework used here was the two-level game model. The following observations emerged: domestic backing evolved over the course of the Doha Round; the G-20 helped increase Brazil's bargaining power; and the intensification of disagreements between agribusiness and the negotiations and clashes between agricultural exporting countries and net food importers inside the G-20 eroded Brazil's capacity to act via the coalition and shifted it away from the group in 2008. The study explores the consequences of Brazil's decision for the partnership between Brazil and India.