| Campo DC | Valor | Idioma |
|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Carvalho, André Borges de | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Ribeiro, Pedro Floriano | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-26T11:30:50Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-03-26T11:30:50Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-10-20 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | BORGES, André; RIBEIRO, Pedro Floriano. Presidents, prime ministers and legislative behaviour : the conditional effect of presidential legislative powers on party unity. Government and Opposition, [S.l.], v. 58, n. 2, p. 227-248, 20 out. 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.45. Disponível em: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/presidents-prime-ministers-and-legislative-behaviour-the-conditional-effect-of-presidential-legislative-powers-on-party-unity/ABA0DE833FAC4D0F77A53D93F2D7D2B9#. Acesso em: 23 março 2024. | pt_BR |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repositorio2.unb.br/jspui/handle/10482/48032 | - |
| dc.language.iso | eng | pt_BR |
| dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | pt_BR |
| dc.rights | Acesso Aberto | pt_BR |
| dc.title | Presidents, prime ministers and legislative behaviour : the conditional effect of presidential legislative powers on party unity | pt_BR |
| dc.type | Artigo | pt_BR |
| dc.subject.keyword | Presidencialismo | pt_BR |
| dc.subject.keyword | Poder Executivo | pt_BR |
| dc.subject.keyword | Semipresidencialismo | pt_BR |
| dc.subject.keyword | Partidos políticos | pt_BR |
| dc.subject.keyword | Poder Legislativo | pt_BR |
| dc.rights.license | © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creative commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | pt_BR |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.45 | pt_BR |
| dc.description.abstract1 | This article proposes a novel theoretical framework to account for the combined effects of regime type and patterns of executive authority on legislative party unity. We argue that broad presidential legislative powers favour coordination between the president and legislative parties under pure presidentialism, whereas under semi-presidentialism, strong presidents increase the potential for intra-executive conflict, submitting parties to crosscutting pressures. We expect higher levels of legislative authority to increase party unity under presidentialism but decrease under semi-presidentialism. Moreover, when presidents are endowed with limited legislative authority, semi-presidentialism produces higher levels of party unity than presidentialism, but for sufficiently high levels of legislative authority there should be no difference across regime types. Our analyses of 1,586 pooled observations for 72 democracies from all regions of the world using the V-Dem measure of party cohesion demonstrate that presidential legislative authority, in combination with regime type, is indeed a key predictor of party unity. | pt_BR |
| dc.identifier.orcid | https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2129-8091 | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | University of Brasília, Department of Political Science | pt_BR |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | Federal University of São Carlos, Department of Social Sciences | pt_BR |
| dc.description.unidade | Instituto de Ciências Políticas (IPOL) | pt_BR |
| Aparece nas coleções: | Artigos publicados em periódicos e afins
|
