University of Brasilia - UnB
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LEGITIMACY OF USING FORCE TO KEEP PEACE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLUE HELMETS' PERCEPTIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF ROBUST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

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To Ana Cláudia, with love.

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ABSTRACT

Since the United Nations Security Council started, in the late 90s, authorising peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to use "all necessary means" to accomplish their mandates, the legitimacy of using force to keep peace has become a critical issue. Concurrently, some military units have been performing poorly in these so-called "robust" PKOs, mainly when the tasks imply confronting armed spoilers. Such failures compromise peacekeeping effectiveness and constitute a serious problem for the United Nations (UN). Albeit there are indications that, in several cases, the below-average performances are linked to motivational deficiencies, the overall circumstances of this phenomenon remain scantily understood. Against this backdrop, the present thesis demonstrates how the UN mission legitimacy of using force motivates the blue helmets and consequently contributes to the performance of peacekeeping units in risky tasks. The research comprised an in-depth theoretical and empirical examination of the relationship between the legitimacy to use force to keep peace, the soldiers' individual motivations and military performance in UN robust PKOs. Initially, the dissertation analyses the aspects that grant the UN the legitimacy to use force to keep peace and operationalises the definition of such a concept. Then, it ascertains the relevance of military tasks for the success of robust PKOs, discusses the impacts of military units' underperformance on the efficiency of UN military components, and considers the need to fight in robust PKOs in light of combat motivation theories. Following, the central argument is verified theoretically and through evidence from a qualitative case study. Ultimately, the thesis underscores that individual legitimacy perceptions are relevant to enhancing military units' performances and, by extension, improving peacekeeping missions' prospects of success.

Keywords: United Nations, robust peacekeeping operations, use of force, legitimacy, performance and underperformance.

RESUMO

Desde que, no final dos anos 90, o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas começou a autorizar operações de manutenção da paz (OMP) a usar "todos os meios necessários" para cumprir seus mandatos, a legitimidade do uso da força para manter a paz tornou-se uma questão crítica. Ao mesmo tempo, algumas unidades militares têm tido desempenhos que deixam a desejar nas chamadas OMP "robustas", principalmente quando as tarefas a cumprir implicam contrapor-se a grupos armados contrários ao processo de paz. Tais falhas comprometem a efetividade da manutenção da paz e constitui um sério problema para a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). Embora existam indícios de que, em vários casos, esses desempenhos abaixo da média estejam ligados a deficiências motivacionais, as circunstâncias gerais desse tipo de fenômeno permanecem pouco compreendidas. Nesse contexto, a presente tese de doutorado demonstra como a legitimidade da missão da ONU ao usar a força motiva os capacetes azuis e, consequentemente, contribui para o desempenho das unidades de manutenção da paz em tarefas de risco. A pesquisa compreendeu um aprofundado exame teórico e empírico da relação entre a legitimidade do uso da força para manter a paz, as motivações individuais dos soldados e o desempenho militar em OMP robustas da ONU. Inicialmente, o trabalho analisa os aspectos que conferem à ONU legitimidade para usar a força para manter a paz e operacionaliza a definição desse conceito. Em seguida, verifica a relevância das tarefas militares para o sucesso das OMP robustas, discute os impactos do baixo desempenho de unidades militares na eficiência dos componentes militares da ONU, e considera a necessidade de combater em OMP robustas à luz das teorias de motivação para o combate. Na sequência, o argumento central é verificado tanto teoricamente quanto por meio de um estudo de caso qualitativo. Por fim, a tese enfatiza que percepções individuais da legitimidade são relevantes para aprimorar o desempenho das unidades militares e, por extensão, melhorar as perspectivas de sucesso das missões de manutenção da paz.

Palavras-chave: Nações Unidas, operações robustas de manutenção da paz, uso da força, legitimidade, desempenho e falta de desempenho.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS[1]

A4P	Action for Peace (programme)
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AU	African Union
APC	Armoured personnel carrier
BRABAT	Brazilian battalion
CAR	Central African Republic
CPAS	Comprehensive Performance and Assessment System
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EPON	Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network
FAdH	Armed Forces of Haiti
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FPU	Formed police unit
HNP	Haitian National Police
HSU	Helmut Schmidt University
ICISS	Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive device
IFOR	Implementation Force
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IREL	International Relations Institute
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MIF	Multinational Interim Force

[1] In the thesis, some acronyms receive a small "s" at the end to indicate the plural. Also, some abbreviations are based on French or German designations.

MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
M23	March 23 Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
OIOS	Office of International Oversight Services
PKO	Peacekeeping operation
REBRAPAZ	Brazilian Research Network on Peace Operations
R2P	Responsibility to protect
ROE	Rules of engagement
SE&A	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SFOR	Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOWI	Institute of Social Sciences of the Federal Defence Forces of Germany
SRSG	Special representative of the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop contributing country
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNIBAM	United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

UNITAF	United Nations Task Force
UNMIN	United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WWII	World War II

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INTRODUCTION

Should national societies commit their military to campaigns they do not regard as relevant? Should soldiers accept the burden of killing or put their lives on the line for causes they do not consider meaningful?

These are crucial questions for domestic and international politics, and the answers are not difficult to envisage. In any survey investigating such topics, the vast majority of citizens would respond negatively. In democracies, engaging the armed forces in situations requiring soldiers to risk their lives is a decision that must be justifiable and patently legitimate. Even in authoritarian regimes, where governments usually make decisions without public scrutiny, people would not think very differently from their counterparts in democracies when the issue is sending soldiers into wars or hazardous operations. In modern states, soldiers stem from and identify themselves with the society, which considers their sacrifice a matter of utmost importance. Besides, as historians and military practitioners worldwide know, notions of legitimacy and relevance of the cause constitute important motivators for soldiers in wars (OETTING, 1990; WYATT; GAL, 1990). Consequently, they impact the result of battles directly.

Since World War II (WWII), the armed conflict has changed significantly, and the role of the military has extended far beyond conventional war operations. In recent decades, soldiers of dozens of nations have increasingly engaged in multinational peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations (UN) and regional organisations in several countries or regions. In most cases, such operations deal with recently terminated internal conflicts, where violence still remains and constitutes a grave problem in several cases. Consequently, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has authorised some peace

operations to use military force to fulfil their mandates, bringing them to considerations similar to *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum*[2].

The shift towards the use of force in peacekeeping was prompted by the massacres in Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia (Srebrenica, 1995), where the UN troops on the ground failed to protect targeted populations. As a result, the UNSC started to consider those kinds of crimes and situations in which armed groups endanger vulnerable civilians as threats to international peace and security and bring them into its field of action. The Council began to provide peacekeeping missions curbing violent armed groups with significant military capabilities, authorising them to use "all necessary means" to deter or neutralise threats. Such missions became known as "robust" peacekeeping operations (PKOs)[3].

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established in 1999 with authorisation to take the necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, was the first robust peacekeeping mission. Since then, thirteen UN PKOs have fit the model. At the time of this writing, ninety-five per cent of all peacekeepers are deployed in the following robust PKOs[4]: UNMISS (South Sudan), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo - DRC), MINUSMA (Mali), MINUSCA (Central African Republic - CAR), UNISFA (Abyei) and UNIFIL (Lebanon)[5]. In these missions, deployed in areas still affected by some sort of conflict, the blue helmets have to be assertive and often use force to accomplish their tasks[6].

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[2] *Jus ad bellum* refers to the legitimacy of the war itself, whereas *jus in bello* concerns the legitimacy of war actions. The first concept relates to such aspects as the justice of the cause, the adequacy of the war objectives and whether the military actions are a last resort. In turn, *jus in bello* concerns the need to protect non-combatants (civilians) and use means of destruction compatible or proportional to the intended actions.

[3] The UN defines "robust peacekeeping" as the use of force by a peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorisation of the UNSC to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008). The use of expressions such as "all necessary means" or "all necessary actions" in UNSC resolutions presents to the PKOs their range of options to fulfil their mandates and constitutes a clear indication of robustness. Such references may be accompanied by mentions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter or not.

[4] As of 31 May 2022, according to the United Nations Peacekeeping homepage (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2022b).

[5] The acronyms refer to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Note that some acronyms correspond to the mission's name in French.

[6] The present thesis uses the term "blue helmet" to refer to members of military units under UN service. The broader term "peacekeeper" is applied to all military, police and civilian members of UN peacekeeping missions and, among the military, it includes troops (military units or contingents), headquarters staff members and unarmed military observers.

Peace operations and wars are fundamentally different. However, when the use of military force becomes necessary in PKOs, they come closer to war regarding the prominence of legitimacy issues. Notwithstanding, the abstract notion of legitimacy needs to be tailored to serve each particular situation or object of study. In this sense, Habermas (1976) advises against the proliferation of imprecise approaches to the concept of legitimacy in the literature. In the same vein, Suchman notes that the question "what is legitimacy?" often overlaps with the question "legitimacy for what?" (1995, p. 573). In our view, the latter question is more important than the former since context is essential to understanding and defining legitimacy. Thus, heeding the authors' advice and being specific, the present study focuses on the legitimate use of military force by an international organisation —the UN— with the particular aim of keeping peace.

The legitimacy of using force in robust PKOs relates to a series of issues and sensitivities, such as the UN overall legitimacy, the subjective and objective conditions for using force, and the perceptions of different audiences on the theme, particularly the military. The issue concerns the blue helmets explicitly because they constitute the "force" and, as such, the UN's legitimate use of force corresponds to the legitimacy of their role.

Problem

Robust PKOs are challenging for UN forces because they occur in areas where armed groups threaten the local governance and defy the peace process. In such settings, the blue helmets are required to accomplish ambitious tasks, such as ensuring stability, maintaining secure and stable environments, restoring the rule of law and public order, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Thus, the UN military components must be ready to use force and fight armed spoilers whenever they put the mission's mandate at risk. Entailing preparedness to fight, the context requires determination and appropriate motivations.

However, although national causes have an aura of legitimacy and motivate soldiers to fight for them, the UN legitimacy to use force in PKOs may appear blurred in the eyes of the blue helmets and lose its motivational power. Such an effect tends to hamper the performance of the contingents that troop contributing countries (TCCs) commit to the UN. The circumstance becomes even more serious if the member state deems using force in peacekeeping as controversial or inadequate, as many still do.

Since the inception of robust PKOs, several peacekeeping units have turned in below-average performances. In some cases, the failures are gross, as usually occurs when it comes

to maintaining the rule of law or protecting civilians under attack. Some episodes of poor performance severely compromise the missions' reputations and impact the prospects for their success. Addressing the UNSC in 2018, the UN Secretary-General reported the Secretariat's concern with security and safety issues involving peacekeepers and his intent to improve peacekeeping forces' preparedness and response capacity. António Guterres (2018) highlighted the need to enhance the performance of peacekeeping missions' uniformed components. He also referred to the so-called Santos Cruz Report (2017), which analysed UN troops' failures and made recommendations to reduce fatalities[7]. The report concludes that despite various reasons for disappointing performances, such as missing equipment and lack of training, leadership deficiencies and attitudes of omission prevail in risk situations.

In a context where robust PKOs have been so important to prevent countries from collapsing and protect people, performance failures are worrisome. All in all, we express the problem as follows[8]:

> Episodes of military underperformance that occur in several robust PKOs negatively impact the reputation of those missions and their chances of success.

This situation is serious and requires a proper and timely solution. However, how to eliminate or mitigate such a complex and many-sided problem? Given the criticality of using force in the international arena, the present study seeks to contribute to the solution by investigating the relationship between legitimacy to use force to keep peace, military motivation and performance in UN robust PKOs.

Hypothesis

The literature on UN peacekeeping operations is consistent and, in recent decades, has evolved in successive waves (FORTNA; HOWARD, 2008). The first and least fruitful wave refers to the period of the Cold War and deals, in most cases, with the maintenance of peace between belligerent states. The second wave took place shortly after the end of the Cold War,

[7] In 2017, the UN Secretary-General tasked a group of experts, led by Brazilian Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, to analyse the causes of fatalities due to violent acts and make recommendations to improve protection and enhance efficiency in PKOs. The Santos Cruz report presents the result of the group's work.

[8] Despite being the only author in this work, I use the so-called "royal 'we'" in many passages. I did so to avoid the current use of the personal pronoun in the first person ("I"), considered inadequate by some journals in Latin America and Europe, or to prevent the excessive use of passive voice. However, "I" is used when I describe personal experiences as a retired military officer and former peacekeepers and deem it necessary to leave no doubt that the action was carried out by me personally.

motivated by a rapid and substantial increase in peacekeeping missions. It critically considered the UN peacekeeping system, highlighted failure cases, and macro-analysed them. The third wave is the broadest and extensively covers the wide application of peace operations. In this wave, which continues to the present day, a more critical and systematic analysis applies to peacekeeping as a specific "tool", pointing to its limitations and proposing improvements.

However, the number of books, articles and even open debates about the legitimacy of PKOs is still limited. The literature and academic discussions fail to propose adequate legitimacy criteria to conduct peacekeeping operations and pay little attention to the implications of this concept for mission success. Equally important, they overlook how different audiences, particularly the blue helmets, perceive the legitimacy of UN missions in using force and its consequent impacts on the peace process.

Therefore, this study contributes to bridging such a gap by exploring the relationship between blue helmets' perceptions of the UN legitimacy of using force to keep peace and the robust peacekeeping missions' chances of success. Our thesis' main argument is that the blue helmets' positive perceptions of legitimacy contribute to the mission's prospects of success, as they increase the soldiers' motivation and consequently improve their military units' performance in risky tasks. The model in Figure 1 depicts the basic assumption of the study.



Fig. 1 – Theoretical model of the study's hypothesis

Given the dynamics that the formal model illustrates, we elaborated the following central hypothesis to guide the study and the thesis formulation:

> The blue helmets' positive perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force contribute to their military units' effective performance in risky tasks. Conversely, negative perceptions of legitimacy tend to hamper effective performances[9].

We subject this hypothesis to theoretical and empirical scrutiny. As proposed, the blue helmets' perceptions of legitimacy impact their motivations to accomplish risky tasks, affecting the performance of the units they integrate. Therefore, according to our research design, the individual perceptions of legitimacy constitute the independent variable, and the performance of military units in risky tasks constitutes the dependent variable. Also, because personal motivations are seldom due to a single factor, efforts to understand and isolate the influence of extraneous variables are part of the research design (KUMAR, 2014; MOURA; FERREIRA, 2005).

It is important to note that we do not seek to establish a causal relationship between the variables. Military performance is a multi-causality phenomenon, and analyses of single factors rarely produce consistent and reliable causal explanations[10]. Instead of causality, we intend to ascertain the existence of a relationship or association between two aspects of the problem —the blue helmets' perception of legitimacy and the performance of their military units.

To facilitate the communication with interviewees and questionnaire respondents and eliminate possible ambiguities and misunderstandings, we operationally define the concept of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs" (CRESWELL, 1994; KUMAR, 2014; SHAUGHNESSY; ZECHMEISTER; ZECHMEISTER, 2012). Chapter 1 presents the operational definition.

The meanings of "risky task" and "effective performance" adopted in this work should also be clarified. Risky tasks are tasks that subject or are likely to subject the blue helmets to

[9] The following terms will be used interchangeably: "UN robust peacekeeping operation", "robust peacekeeping mission" and "robust peace mission"; "legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force" and "legitimacy of the blue helmets' role"; and "effective performance" and "above-average performance".

[10] Beyond individual motivations, various other factors influence unit performance, such as the commander's professional skills; staff planning methodology; adequate means, equipment, and training; and efficient logistics.

violent, hostile acts, like adverse fire and the hazards of mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In turn, effective performance is understood as satisfactory performance in risky tasks. It implies that the peacekeeping unit carries out the tasks determined by the Force (or sector) headquarters in an acceptable manner, independent of the risks. Thus, effective performance entails taking bold actions such as deterring armed groups, moving promptly to hot spots as required, efficiently protecting civilians under threat or attack, and sustaining combat as allowed by the unit's military capabilities.

Objectives

The general objective is to theorise on the relevance of the blue helmets' perceptions about the legitimacy of UN missions in using force and the impacts of such perceptions on the performance of peacekeeping units. Further, we aim to explain the consequences of the phenomenon for the chances of success of robust PKOs.

Specifically, the work has the following objectives:

1) To propose a definition of UN legitimacy focused on the use of military force in robust PKOs;

2) to describe how the perceptions of the mission legitimacy of using military force work to motivate or demotivate the blue helmets; and

3) to explain the relationship between the blue helmets' perceptions of mission legitimacy and the performances of their military units.

The achievement of these objectives and the consistency of our thesis are founded on two essential premises: the consideration that military tasks are relevant for the peace processes in robust PKOs and the fact that failures of peacekeeping units on risky tasks compromise the efficiency of military components. In chapter 2, we demonstrate both premises.

Theoretical framework

Throughout history, social scientists, scholars and politicians have studied and theorised about legitimacy. The concept has drawn attention from philosophers of the Enlightenment (e.g. Montesquieu, Rousseau, Locke) to contemporary philosophers and scientists (e.g. Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Keohane, Richard Falk). Legitimacy is the object or foundation of relevant works in philosophy, sociology and political science. In this context, scholars, civil society organisations and citizens have often examined, analysed and challenged political regimes, governments and political institutions in view of the legitimacy of their being, decisions and actions. However, apart from brief theoretical explorations and works covering the application of law to armed conflicts, analyses of

international events in light of legitimacy remain limited in the literature. Most scholars insist on Realism, paying considerable attention to states' interests and overlooking the legitimacy of their deeds or the criteria for considering their interests acceptable. Despite modern societies' growing interest in the legitimacy of governmental decisions and actions, that view holds up.

Working for the interests of the international community of states, the UN values legitimacy as an essential condition for success in all its undertakings. In peacekeeping, legitimacy is one of the greatest assets of the UN missions and a precondition for them to attain necessary credibility. The terms "legitimacy" and "legitimate" are so important that they appear twenty-eight times in the UN capstone doctrine for peacekeeping operations, despite the synthetic format of the text[11]. Equally important, several documents from the Secretariat, the Security Council and the General Assembly refer to the UN principles and values, primary sources of the world organisation's legitimacy.

In contrast, regarding the blue helmets' motivations to face risks and fight, references in the literature are minimal. The few works that examine the issue do so only indirectly and superficially, and most deal with a single nationality. The debate has focused on such issues as risk aversion of national societies and political authorities, peacekeepers' inadequate training, and motivations to volunteer for peacekeeping missions, rather than motivations to engage in risky tasks once in the mission area. Consequently, our research drew on theories of combat motivation that psychologists, sociologists, and the military have developed since World War II. By covering the motivations to master fear and fight on the battlefield, these theories are unanimous in mentioning the legitimacy of the cause as one of the most relevant motivators during wars. Therefore, departing from combat motivation theories, we sought knowledge about the blue helmets to present a consistent view on their motivation by legitimacy and its effects.

As the title of the work indicates, peace enforcement falls out of scope. This alert is necessary because several scholars confuse robust peacekeeping operations with peace enforcement operations, calling the former "enforcement operations". For instance, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) refer to peacekeeping missions authorised by the UNSC to use force as "peace enforcement operations". The Council's recent practice of referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in resolutions giving mandates to peacekeeping operations and the false understanding

[11] The manual "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" contains the doctrine and provides the UN basic thinking on PKOs (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008).

that using force beyond self-defence only fits peace enforcement are the chief causes of those misleading approaches[12].

The present work relies on the prevalent understanding of the UN doctrine, according to which the use of force in peacekeeping differs from the use of force in peace enforcement operations on both level and scale. Peace enforcement means using force strategically after all political negotiations have run out or the circumstances recommend immediate action. The UNSC authorises the operation without any consent from the government of the target state. In such situations, the UN military apparatus must be powerful and well supported in expectation of an engagement with the opposing state's armed forces. On the other hand, decisions on peacekeeping operations are made by consensus and they restrict the use of force to the tactical level, i.e. to actions limited in time and space (DPKO's concept note on robust peacekeeping of 2010, *apud* Aoi, de Coning, Karlsrud 2017, p. 15).

Research design

The research is structured around the verification of the central hypothesis. In order to increase the study's cogency and strength, we examine the consistency of the hypothesis in a twofold process. Firstly, we verify the theoretical consistency considering secondary-source textual evidence gathered during the research. Then, we conduct a multiple case study to obtain empirical evidence and corroborate the theoretical proof. In reality, the case study proved to be much more helpful than merely corroborating the theoretical examination of the hypothesis. It allowed a series of additional, in-depth inferences about the blue helmets' attitudes regarding the need to use force.

We describe the theoretical and empirical investigations in the two initial parts of the dissertation. Part I is a logical sequence of conceptual and notional arguments intended to test the hypothesis theoretically. Parts II comprises a multiple, small-n case study and its findings. The final part (part III) is dedicated to the discussion of the study's overall findings, the final verification of the hypothesis and the advancement of our thesis.

Overall, the research followed a fourfold design (A to D):

A – Theoretical approach to the hypothesis

1) Operationalising an understanding of legitimacy applicable to UN robust PKOs.

[12] The UNSC resolutions on peacekeeping that invoke Chapter VII of the Charter leave no room for doubts; they textually refer to "peacekeeping operations". In reality, nothing in the UN Charter indicates that the application of Chapter VII provisions is exclusive to peace enforcement.

2) Establishing the relevance of military tasks for the success of robust PKOs.

3) Appreciating the impact of military units' underperformance in risky tasks on the efficiency of military components.

4) Reviewing combat motivation theories and discussing the legitimacy to use force as a critical motivator in robust PKOs.

B - Theoretical verification of the hypothesis

C – Empirical approach to the hypothesis

- Case study: investigating among members of the military units the perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force and respective degrees of motivation to carry out risky tasks.

D – Discussion, final verification of the hypothesis and thesis advancement

The main sources of data are indicated in table 1.

	Literature	Interview (questionnaire)
Operationalisation of an understanding of legitimacy applicable to UN robust PKOs	X	X
Relevance of military tasks for the success of robust PKOs	X	X
Impact of military units' underperformance in risky tasks on the efficiency of military components	X	X
Combat motivation and legitimacy to use force as a motivator in robust PKOs.	X	
Case study: Perceptions of mission legitimacy to use force and respective degrees of motivation.		X

Table 1 – Data sources

As exposed, the research has drawn on both secondary and primary sources. The bibliographic research included UN documents, books and academic articles. Very importantly, interviews and questionnaires allowed for gathering information not yet available in the literature. The study covers the period in which the UN has conducted robust PKOs, i.e., from the activation of the first mission of that type in 1999 to the present.

Methodology

To date, there is no theory on the influence of UN legitimacy to use force on the effectiveness of robust PKOs. Furthermore, research on blue helmets' motivations and their relation to military performance in peacekeeping is sparse and insufficient. Consequently, we decided on a qualitative study to explore the issue. At the current stage of scientific knowledge on the subject, quantitative research would be difficult to carry out and inadequate for academic progress. On the other hand, the qualitative approach allows for investigating the blue helmets' beliefs, values, attitudes, and motives concerning the legitimacy of their role in robust PKOs and theorising on their consequences regarding operational efficiency.

The case study utilises peacekeeping units and contingents as cases. We selected four units and one contingent from different countries. Four cases were qualitatively studied, whereas one was built using quantitative research from the literature. However, we interpreted this latter case qualitatively.

The methods to raise and analyse data were comprehensive. The data collection included consultation of the literature, semistructured interviews with peacekeeping experts and semistructured interviews and questionnaires by members of the military units selected as cases[13].

The cases were analysed through small samples of interview and questionnaire respondents. Disaggregation, comparison and cross-reference were used to interpret responses and generate results. Then, information was reassessed, reinterpreted and correlated[14].

The interviews and questionnaire questions were prepared according to data that the different research steps required. Before each interview, I explained the context and aim of the study, data usage, relevant concepts and ethical considerations to the respondents. The questionnaire forms presented this information on the initial pages.

Depending on the intended purpose and target audience, I used two types of interviews and corresponding questionnaires. Type I interviews aimed to support the theoretical steps of the research and were conducted with peacekeeping experts. Type II interviews were applied to military unit members and supported the case study. I tested the interviews and questionnaires prior to administering them. The test indicated that the questions were well

[13] The questionnaires used in the research replicated the semistructured interviews. However, conducted through written questions forms for the respondents to complete, they did not allow for follow-up questions.

[14] The cases being studied are described and analysed individually. The comparison of the cases is not necessary for the purposes of the thesis and is beyond its scope.

understood and allowed a few improvements, mainly aimed at making the communication more concise.

Type I interview (Annexe A) was flexible and provided relevant in-depth information. It comprised open questions and allowed the insertion of follow-up questions to probe the participants for additional data. This interview occurred between March 2020 and December 2021 with military personnel (generals and officers), retired and active duty, and civilians. For the retired military, we sent the invitation to participate in the research directly to the interviewee. In the case of civilians and active duty military, the invitations went to the respective institution or ministry of defence. In Brazil, the invitation was addressed to the Army General Staff. In total, 56 people from several countries agreed to participate in interview type I, including the test phase[15].

Type II interview (Annexe B) sought to assess values, perceptions and motivations. It comprised closed and open questions formulated with the same wording for all participants. I conducted this type of interview with members of the military units selected as cases in the study. In some situations, if the participating country preferred it or for practical reasons, the responses were collected through self-administered questionnaires mirroring the interview (MOURA; FERREIRA, 2005). A total of 83 individuals responded to this type of interview (questionnaire), including testers[16].

Interviews with peacekeeping experts from various countries allowed for scrutinizing personal opinions in a universe that mirrors the multinational composition of UN peacekeeping operations. The participants were questioned as specialists in the UN peacekeeping doctrine and procedures, not as interpreters of any particular view of their respective countries. They were appointed by the countries that participated in the project, indicated by Brazilian military observers from their networks, and selected from my acquaintances, including the contacts made during field visits.

Tables 2 and 3 indicate the total of interviewees or questionnaire respondents, including the test phase, separated by nationality and category of participants (military/rank or civilian).

[15] In the study, we took advantage of the information generated in the test of both type I and type II interviews/questionnaires.

[16] The testers of type II interviews/questionnaires were surveyed as peacekeeping experts.

Nationality	Type I (including test)	Type II – test	Type II - proper	Total
Argentina	2	1	--	3
Brazil	30	8	32 (*)	70
Canada	1	--	--	1
Chile	1	1	--	2
Germany	10	--	--	10
India	1	--	--	1
Indonesia	--	--	21	21
Ireland	1	--	--	1
Morocco	1	--	--	1
Netherlands	1	--	--	1
Nigeria	2	1	--	3
Norway	1	--	--	1
Peru	--	2	--	2
Portugal	1	--	--	1
Sri Lanka	1	--	--	1
Uruguay	3	2	15	20
Total	56	15	68	139

(*) The figure includes two BRABAT 1 interviewees.

Table 2 – Interviewees and questionnaire respondents by nationality

Category	Total of interviewees or questionnaire respondents
Generals	14
Officers	79
Non-commissioned officers	37
Enlisted	7
Civilians	2
Total	139

Table 3 – Interviewees and questionnaire respondents by category of participants

We initiated the selection of empirical cases by pooling countries to be invited to the study. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994) recommend for studies with few cases, the pooling was not random but based on criteria to maximise the quality of the evidence. At the same time, adopting well-defined criteria prevented the potential adverse effects of selectivity and bias (THIES, 2002). In this sense, we listed countries to reflect the wide geographical distribution of UN TCCs and focused on relevant troop contributors to robust peacekeeping operations. Besides, we prioritised countries where Brazil has an embassy to facilitate contacts and discussions with local authorities. The selection criteria are explained in more detail in chapter 4 (subsection 4.1.1. Selection of cases).

Brazil, Uruguay, Indonesia and Germany agreed to participate in the study. Each of the first three countries appointed one battalion with effective performance for the survey[17]. Germany provided information but declined to appoint a peacekeeping unit to be surveyed. Consequently, we selected from the literature a German contingent in the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) as a case of above-average performance[18]. Also, a second Brazilian battalion served as a case in which performance remained below expectation. This battalion is a "special" case as its lack of assertiveness in facing armed opponents was not due to individual deficiencies of the blue helmets but to an erroneous interpretation by Brazil and MINUSTAH's leadership, in the start-up phase of the mission, about the legitimate use of force[19]. Since our hypothesis centres on military units, those, and not the respective countries, constitute the cases[20].

I personally communicated with participants and managed interviews and questionnaires to ensure the standardisation of procedures and to better explore potential contributions (SINGLETON JR.; STRAITS, 2012). In most cases, the responses required the recall of feelings and memories of participation in PKOs that occurred years before; hence, the interviewees and questionnaire respondents received the question forms in advance. To ensure better feedback, I used face-to-face or video-audio interviews whenever possible (JAMES;

[17] We left it to the invited countries to select units with effective performance, considering that TCCs' attention to the UN policies on performance and the Secretariat's feedback allow them to classify their peacekeeping units correctly. In our correspondence to the TCCs, we asked for peacekeeping units with performance ranging from "very good" to "outstanding".

[18] SFOR was an UNSC-authorised, NATO-led robust PKO in the Balkans. It was active between 1996 and 2004.

[19] MINUSTAH is the French acronym for UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, a robust PKO deployed in that Caribbean country from June 2004 to October 2017. Brazil was the main troop contributor and retained the position of force commander during the whole mission time.

[20] For the conceptualisation of "case", see Ragin (1992).

BUSHER, 2012; SINGLETON JR.; STRAITS, 2012). To interpret the results, I applied content analysis to identify explicit and implicit meanings and compared the responses to seek valuable data beyond the information descriptively conveyed (TAYLOR, 2013).

I undertook fieldwork in Brazil and Germany. In Brazil, I visited the Ministry of Defence, the Brazilian Army General Staff and the Land Operations Command. In Germany, I had the opportunity to visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the following organisations of the Federal Defence Forces, the so-called *Bundeswehr*: the German Command and Staff College (*Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*) and the United Nations Training Centre of the *Bundeswehr*[21]. I could also interact with members of the Centre for Inner Leadership (*Zentrum Innere Führung*). In those ministries and organisations, I requested contributions of military units for the survey and conducted interviews with specialists and peacekeeping experts.

The fieldwork in Germany occurred during a doctoral stay at the Helmut-Schmidt University (HSU) in Hamburg, funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). During this stay, which took place from 1 January to 31 December 2021, I could access several works by German authors in the original language, such as books and essays by Jürgen Habermas on power, the evolution of ethical systems and legitimacy. I could also consult sources exclusively available in German, such as articles and reports on German peacekeepers in NATO and UN operations.

The research project hypothesised the expected result that perceptions of peacekeeping missions' legitimacy to use force influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the performance of blue helmets and, therefore, the prospects for mission success. This result was confirmed, as the present dissertation exposes.

Structure of the dissertation

The three parts of the dissertation mirror the argumentative logic guiding the research. Part I —Theoretical approach— is divided into three chapters and is dedicated to premises and arguments that are foundational to the hypothesis verification and thesis formulation. After part I, in a brief methodological interlude, the central hypothesis is assessed in view of the theoretical data gathered in the study. Part II —Empirical approach—, with one chapter, aims to present the case study and respective results. Part III — Final verification of the hypothesis and thesis advancement— has a chapter to discuss the case study findings and another to

[21] This work will refer to the Federal Defence Forces of Germany with the German designation "*Bundeswehr"*.

complement the verification of the hypothesis, formulate the thesis and present the validation of the study. A conclusion finalises the work.

A brief description of each chapter follows.

Chapter 1 —Legitimacy to use force in UN peacekeeping operations— aims at analysing the aspects that grant the UN the legitimacy to use military force and, ultimately, to operationalise an objective and straightforward understanding of legitimacy applicable to robust PKOs. It starts with an overview of the theme and explores the foundations of using force in the international arena. Then, we discuss the implications of international law and state consent and consider the use of force to protect people. Against this backdrop, we focus on the legitimacy of using force to keep peace, including procedural and substantive aspects of the decision and the act of using force. We also stress the host country's consent for the PKO and the blue helmets' impartiality in using force. Besides, we highlight aspects such as key audiences to legitimate the use of force by the UN and the relevance of having and keeping credibility on the ground. Then, we explore the philosophical and moral values of peace and the capacity of peace, as a cause, to justify the use of force and blue helmets' sacrifices. In the end, we propose an operational definition of "UN legitimacy to use force to defend the peacekeeping mission's mandate".

Chapter 2 —Military tasks and underperformance— aims to explicate two essential premises of the thesis: the relevance of military tasks for the success of robust missions' peace processes and the impact of episodes of peacekeeping unit's underperformance in risky tasks on the efficiency of the UN military component as a whole. It discusses several PKO indicators of success, proposes basic criteria for success and considers how the accomplishment of military tasks supports them. After that, it analyses the relevance of military efficiency to sustaining mission credibility, which is also a requirement for success. Lastly, the chapter discusses the harm caused by underperformance episodes.

Chapter 3 —Motivation to fight in robust PKOs and the legitimacy factor— connects the need to be willing to fight in robust PKOs with the theories about combat motivation. The chapter starts with a review of traditional combat motivation theories. Then, it explores the context that leads the blue helmets to use force and fight, discusses combat motivation factors in PKOs, and highlights the role of the cosmopolitan sense. Next, the chapter discusses the motivational power of UN legitimacy to use force, considers the relevance of legitimacy's different elements, and highlights the critical circumstances that may render the concept elusive. This chapter closes the theoretical approach to the central hypothesis.

Interlude —Theoretical verification of the hypothesis— assesses the central hypothesis in light of the theoretical data gathered during the research.

Chapter 4 —Case study: presentation and results— aims to provide empirical evidence. It details the methodology of the case study and presents and analyses the cases. For each case, we carefully consider the perceptions of the mission legitimacy of using force, the levels of individual motivation they generate and the impacts on the performance of military units.

Chapter 5 —Discussion— explores the case study findings and discusses them thoroughly.

Chapter 6 —Final verification and thesis advancement— utilises the empirical information revealed in the case study to establish the relationship between levels of legitimacy perception and performance of military units, thereby corroborating and expanding the theoretical demonstration of the hypothesis. Following, the chapter formulates and explicates the thesis. In the end, it presents the study's strengths, limitations, validity and generalisability.

The conclusion summarises the implications of the blue helmets' perceptions of UN legitimacy to use force for the missions' chances of success and makes recommendations to the UN and the TCCs.

PART I

THEORETICAL APPROACH

Chapter 1

LEGITIMACY AND THE USE OF FORCE TO KEEP PEACE

Realists maintain that states look first and foremost to their own interests and, therefore, they would hardly commit significant resources to help vulnerable states or foreigners under threat. Even in supporting endangered people, states' real motivations would be masked national interests rather than multilateral efforts or humanitarian considerations. On the other hand, liberals privilege actions for peace and international cooperation. They recognise states' intentions to reach out to foreigners in need, which are strengthened by the concertation of international organisations. In a similar vein, constructivists argue that seeking the realisation of the state's particular interests is not a sufficient cause to move in the international arena. National citizens want to believe that ethical principles drive their country's policies towards other nations.

From this yet unresolved confrontation among International Relations theories, the UN emerges as a collective institution acting for the good of humanity and calling up its members to support elevated initiatives. Despite suspicions that the UN agenda consists of exercises that the great powers dictate, the organisation remains broadly recognised as an entity dedicated to peace and humanitarian objectives. The ideals and principles consubstantiated in the UN Charter —a treaty of universal validity— and the authentic gestures of the Secretary-General to realise them are expressions of the organisation's legitimacy to represent and act on behalf of the peoples of the world.

In this sense, Liberalism is the starting point for studying the legitimacy of the UN using force to keep peace. However, the theoretical underpinnings of modern peacekeeping are both the liberalism that guides UN's political actions and the realism with which the organisation must deal with threats to peace. The use of force by the UN is essentially a

measure based on Realism and grounded in the consideration that no other way exists to resolve the conflict and enable peace to thrive.

Another school of thought that contributes to the issue of peace and the use of force is Critical Theory. Fascinating in this regard is Andrew Linklater's (2007) work on harm in international relations. The scholar maintains that, among other achievements, the modern society of states succeeded in adopting "harm conventions" to regulate the use of force. Although states do not readily agree on initiatives of cooperation and welfare to share within the world community, they usually agree on harms to avoid. Consequently, the liberal doctrine led to restraints on the use of force and the regulation of its multilateral use by international law. Furthermore, since the foundation of the UN and especially in recent decades, the defence of peace and fundamental rights has become a discourse consistently ingrained in national societies.

Nevertheless, the concept of legitimacy regarding the international use of force still requires enhancement. As Coleman argues, "practitioners of world politics are quick to assert the importance of international legitimacy but often struggle to define the term" (2007, p. 72). The concept seems to have been captive in the domains of sociology and political theory, and its use remains concentrated in theoretical discussions, to characterise political systems and explain political orders (GRAFSTEIN, 1981; LOOMIS, 2013). Specifically, the literature lacks an objective and concise definition of UN legitimacy to use force in defence of peacekeeping mandates.

This chapter sets out to operationalise such a definition. However, as Sartori clarifies, "operational definitions implement, but do not replace, definitions of meaning" (1970, p. 1045). Consequently, as recommended by that author, we prepare the terrain through a broader conceptualisation of the theme.

1.1. A brief overview of the legitimacy to use power

Moral and political philosophers, social scientists, political theorists and legal experts have always dealt with and discussed legitimate power. With the advent of the modern states system, the theme became central to political science, focusing on the legitimacy of governments and their right to exercise authority. In this vein, politics progressively became not only a struggle for power but also a contest over legitimacy (CLAUDE, 1966).

In the domain of philosophy, being legitimate implies being morally justifiable or rightful. Besides, a legitimate power should also have a connotation of justice or rationality

(LEVI, 2004). Among the thinkers who theorise on the legitimate application of power, Grotius, Hobbes, Rosseau and Weber fundamentally contribute to the concept of righteously resorting to armed violence. Such contributions gradually strengthened the principle of consent as a requisite for rulers' legitimate exercise of power.

According to Weber, a political actor's legitimacy requires belief or faith (*Legitimitätsglaube*) in the validity of that actor or the regime it represents: "The basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige" (WEBER, 1964, p. 382). With this approach, Weber indicates that the legitimacy of a ruling power derives from people's appreciation of it and its actions. In this sense, legitimacy appears as a "concession" by those whom the authority or its activities affect. Although politics is the primary realm for applying the concept of "legitimacy", it denotes a typical social phenomenon.

However, the Weberian approach does not exclude the possibility that beliefs have grounds in values or ethical and moral parameters. Weber understands that politics results from the struggle of social and political values, implying the relevance of legitimacy "as the pragmatic meeting point between political effectiveness and the need for moral consensus" (HURRELL, 2002, p. 202).

Further explicating legitimacy through the bonds between the ruling authority and the people under its rule, and underscoring the moral implications of that relation, Habermas argues that legitimacy is the state of recognition (*Anerkennungswürdigkeit*) of a political order:

> Legitimacy means that the claim of a political order to be recognised as right and just should have good arguments for itself; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means that a political order is worthy of recognition (HABERMAS, 1976, p. 39, translation is ours)[22].

Neither Weber's nor Habermas's exposed thoughts constitute a comprehensive definition of legitimacy. However, they advance the idea of "belief" or "recognition" as a *sine qua non* for legitimacy. Also, leaning towards a normative concept, Habermas understands that the political authority must be able to justify its position to be socially recognised as legitimate. Then, envisaging the benefits of being legitimate, the ruler seeks the condition through interaction with the ruled. Unlike Weber's descriptive approach to legitimacy, which neglects

[22] In relation to this empirical definition, Habermas points to the fact that, albeit applicable to social sciences, it is unsatisfactory because it abstracts from the weight of the motives and justifications or, in other words, of grounds for validity.

second-order beliefs, the normative framework considers the evaluation of the actual righteousness of the regime and its justifiability by the people. Conscious consent becomes essential in this process of legitimation.

Several authors further explore the sociological character of legitimacy. Fonseca Júnior (2005) highlights that favourable appreciation of a regime is crucial to its acceptance and, by extension, people's conformity to its norms. Beetham (2013) defends that claims of authority only stand if power is justified by moral considerations and exercised in view of general interest, rather than the interest of the powerful alone. He argues that "a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be 'justified in terms of' their beliefs" (BEETHAM, 2013, p. 11). In a similar vein, Coleman (2007) argues that legitimacy arises if actors and actions gain social recognition as good, proper or commendable. In her view, there is a "thin notion of international society in which a logic of social action, rather than either a deep normative consensus or purely instrumental reasoning, induces states to value international rules and hence international legitimacy" (COLEMAN 2007, p. 20). Finally, exploring legitimacy in the framework of organisations, Suchman proposes that it is a "generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (1995, p. 574). As such, legitimacy would be a product of the thoughts and sentiments of the organisation's members. This approach reflects congruence between the actions of the entity and the shared (or assumed shared) beliefs of the social group.

Political legitimacy has several prerequisites, such as democratic approval, consent, public reasons and the beneficial character of governmental actions (PETER, 2017). Building on these conditions, George (2006) argues that the legitimacy of a policy or political action depends on both a normative-moral component and a cognitive basis. The former implies the policy's compatibility with fundamental national values or contributions to their enhancement. The latter spells the ability of a political leader to convince stakeholders that he has the expertise to execute the policy and can raise the necessary means. In George's words, "the normative component establishes the desirability of the policy; the cognitive component, its feasibility" (2006, p. 18).

At this stage, the efforts governments make to justify their actions and gain legitimacy require better explanation. Analysing legitimation in the modern state, Habermas (1976) proposes a theoretical articulation of the relationship between "legitimation" and "legitimacy". In his view, "what is accepted as a reason and has a consensus-building and thus motivational power depends on the level of justification required in each case" (HABERMAS, 1976, p. 42,

translation is ours). So, legitimation arises as a process based on the exposition of motives and justifying arguments, through which political entities attempt to win legitimacy. Depending on their communicative abilities and the complexity of the issue in discussion, different political actors will have different levels of convincing power to "achieve" legitimacy. Nonetheless, as a concept, legitimacy must be the basic parameter of the legitimation process. It should not be confounded with the communicative efforts and arguments of the ruler, who may try to present as legitimate something that is not.

Legitimacy lies in the beliefs and genuine aspirations of a society. It is something acceptable and appropriate in the circumstances. Something that does not violate customs, morals or common sense. The association of such conditions as "good", "just", "proper" and "desirable" with legitimacy, as Habermas (1976), Coleman (2007) and Suchman (1995) suggest, provides the concept with a core meaning that may be expanded for each specific application. Complemented with features proper to each particular context, such as state self-defence or peacekeeping, the core meaning of legitimacy becomes a specific, fine-tuned definition. Although such a definition remains generally subjective, the articulation of its various attributes attenuates the subjectivity. Together, these diverse elements of legitimacy provide a reliable picture of the actor's or the action's overall legitimacy.

1.2. Foundations of the use of force in the international arena

People have used violence in an organised manner since the first human civilisations, and attempts to control the use of force are not much newer. However, this study will consider the issues of war and peace from 24 October 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations— the main body of international law to curb violence and promote peace— came into force.

The UN Charter and the customary international law that followed prohibit wars and the use of force in small-scale confrontations, both external and internal to states, except in self-defence. However, concerns about non-compliance with international law prompted the international community to come together under the UN umbrella and develop mechanisms to prevent such crimes[23]. In this regard, the central organising principles are the observance of rules governing the use of power and the achievement of international legitimacy by acting

[23] This work uses the notion of "international community" consistent with the meaning the English School of International Relations adopted, i.e. as a group of states, conscious of common interests and values, joining each other in a society with a common set of rules and institutions supporting their relations (BULL, 1977). Due to its quasi-universal membership, the UN has a superior claim to represent the international community (COLEMAN, 2007).

through relevant international institutions (BEETHAM, 2013; WOODHOUSE; RAMSBOTHAM, 2005).

1.2.1. The legal basis for the use of force

The regulation of the use of force in the international arena implies the articulation of two opposite dimensions: the restrictions on using force and the circumstances under which such use is authorised or even recommended.

Both international law and customary international law prohibit the use of armed force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force between states by proclaiming that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" (UNITED NATIONS, 1994)[24]. In the field of International Relations, debates persist about the scope of the word "force", particularly whether it includes forceful actions other than military actions, such as economic pressures and boycotts. However, that debate is beyond the purposes of this study, which is focused on military force.

Article 2(4) should be read in conjunction with two other topics in the UN Charter: Article 2(3), which proclaims that all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means; and Article 51, which sets the right of individual and collective use of force in self-defence against an armed attack. Furthermore, Chapter VII of the Charter deals with actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. In this sense, it sets another exception to the use of force in the international arena, namely, actions for collective security.

Articles 2 and 51 address interstate conflicts, but they do not tackle intrastate threats to the peace. However, internal conflicts come to the scope of the Charter through Article 1(1), which establishes the purpose of the UN as maintaining international peace and security and, to that end, taking collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. In this sense, the language of Article 1(1) remits to Chapter VII, which is not limited to interstate conflicts. Chapter VII empowers the UNSC to authorise the use of force in the name of collective

[24] The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States has a broader scope than the UN Charter. It binds even non-UN members to the prohibition of the use of force (UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1970).

security, to counter any type of threat to the peace or breach of the peace, including situations like intrastate conflicts and acts of international terrorism (DINSTEIN, 2005).

The responsibility to assess conflict situations and determine their impacts on regional or international security falls exclusively to the UNSC, primarily responsible for international peace and security (Article 24). Moreover, according to Article 39, the Council should determine the existence of threats to the peace, breaches to the peace and acts of aggression and make recommendations or decide on measures to maintain international peace and security. The Charter grants such legal ability to the UNSC with the rationale that it acts for the sake of all UN member states and, as such, represents the international community as a whole (COLEMAN, 2007).

The UNSC authorisation of Operation Desert Storm, in1990, was an emblematic use of Chapter VII. The peace enforcement operation that the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom and other willing countries launched to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion gained broad support in the international community. Since then, the Security Council has invoked Chapter VII also in cases of intrastate conflicts, to tackle situations with the potential to spill over borders with both peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Examples of the former case are the operations to restore security and ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief, e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air operations to enforce peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994-95) and the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) led by the USA in Somalia (1992). In the same vein, the Council has authorised regional organisations and coalitions of states to use force to stabilise situations and protect civilians in such countries as East Timor (1999, Australia-led coalition INTERFET) and Afghanistan (2001, NATO operation ISAF)[25]. To establish peacekeeping missions in conflicted regions, the UNSC has invoked Chapter VII of the Charter in relevant resolutions to indicate its firm resolve to tackle the causes of violence, define the robustness of the enterprise and frame the powers it entrusts to the UN mission.

Article 2(7) of the Charter precludes UN intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. However, it establishes that such "principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (UNITED NATIONS, 1994, p. 3). Contemporarily, two situations give room to UN interventions by force in sovereign states, namely, a government's oppression against its own people and severe

[25] INTERFET and ISAF stand for International Force East Timor and International Security Assistance Force, respectively.

violations of human rights. These cases constitute *prima facie* crimes against humanity and may lead the UNSC to authorise military actions.

Crimes against humanity still occur, and attacks against human groups are frequent. This grim reality justifies humanitarian interventions in moral terms, albeit the complexity of some situations and the lack of reliable information sometimes make consensus difficult. Consequently, essential conditions for states or coalitions to intervene are the state of urgency and the existence of a clear humanitarian intention (BELLAMY, 2004). The limitation of the objective and the absence of political prerogatives have served as criteria for the international community to accept interventions. For instance, in 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected the USA's argument that it had employed force against Nicaragua to ensure respect for human rights (INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 1986). The operation clearly supported the "Contras", and the UNSC did not authorise it. Consequently, the intervention was deemed illegal[26].

Besides the UNSC, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) also has a role relating to international peace and security, though not an executive one. Article 11 of the UN Charter states that the Assembly may discuss international peace and security issues and make recommendations. However, the paralysis of the UNSC by vetoes owing to great powers' rivalries led the UNGA in 1950 to pass the *Uniting for Peace Resolution*. According to the resolution, the organisation could call emergency meetings in the event of UNSC failure to decide on international security issues and make recommendations, including for the Secretariat and member states to take action. Since the resolution's approval, the UNGA has deliberated twelve times on international peace issues. The most notorious were the cases of the Korean War (1951), to circumvent Soviet vetoes, and the Suez Crisis (1956), to move forward despite British and French vetoes in the UNSC. On the latter occasion, the Assembly decided to establish the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Middle East[27]. Nevertheless, the increase in member states made deliberations on international peace and security at the UNGA more complex, rendering it unsuitable for the task. Besides, unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly does not have the power to impose obligations on member states, and its decisions are not legally binding on the parties to a conflict.

[26] Even to prevent genocides in line with the Genocide Convention, unilateral or multilateral interventions may only occur if the UNSC authorises them, as per the UN Charter (DINSTEIN, 2005).

[27] The ICJ appreciated the procedure and, based on the rationale that the UNSC has the primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, upheld its legality (INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 1962).

Another UN body that contributes to the considerations on the legality of using force is the ICJ. All UN member states are parties to the Court's statute and undertake to comply with its decisions (Articles 93 and 94 of the Charter of the United Nations). As Dinstein argues, the ICJ, "not being hampered by political constraints or by motivations of expediency is fully qualified to bring legal yardsticks to bear upon the armed conflict in a dispassionate fashion" (2005, p. 319). To a certain extent, the UNSC and the ICJ have concurrent competencies regarding international peace and security. However, the Court pronunciations tend to be apolitical and, therefore, exempt from power influences. In this sense, it establishes jurisprudence on the use of armed force[28].

1.2.2. The issue of consent

The consent of the ruled to the ruler's adequate exercise of power is recognised as a primary source of political legitimacy. However, a recurrent difficulty in this regard is to gauge the consent to the government's decisions of thousands or millions of citizens. In most cases, obtaining an actual consensus of all citizens is impossible. Reflecting on such problems, Habermas considers the observance of democratic practices and procedures a requirement to ensure legitimacy. For the German philosopher, political legitimacy is only viable within the framework of the democratic constitutional state, in which it is ensured by the rationality of the legislative process (BRUNKHORST; KREIDE; LAFONT, 2009). In the same vein, Linklater (2007) notes the origin of the idea of consent from the notion of "human equality", a principle of legitimacy assimilated since the foundation of the states-system. Therefore, just as the consent of a society is essential for a government to carry out actions or negotiations that can affect people's lives, states or international organisations have to consider the position of local societies when promoting interventions that impact their lives.

A basic principle of international law is that a state's consent to another state's commission of an act precludes that act's wrongfulness in relation to the sovereignty of the state granting consent. Among other modalities of operations, that principle opens the way to military assistance from states or international organisations against non-state actors in the country getting help. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not forbid such actions because there is no inter-state clash. However, this kind of external support may raise discussion of the possibility that the opposing party has the same right. In such a scenario, foreign states might

[28] For considerations on the possibility of concurrent or consecutive competence of the UNSC and the ICJ, and whether the Court can invalidate Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, see Dinstein (2005, p. 318–325).

intervene in support of either party to the conflict, transforming an intrastate conflict into an interstate one (DINSTEIN, 2005). In any case, requests for help in situations of unrest or against armed groups destabilising the country require careful consideration by governments or organisations willing to assist. The categorisation of violence as conflict tends to raise such questions as whether it would be "local unrest" rather than incipient civil war, or whether issues of self-determination are involved. Therefore, the general rule is that military actions of support, including for humanitarian purposes, should be carried out under the broadest possible international support and the due authorisation of the UNSC (GRAY 2018).

As Article 43 of the UN Charter envisages, the international use of force to preserve peace and security should occur with troops and military means made available to the UNSC under special agreements. However, no member state has ever signed such an agreement with the UNSC, the reason for the Council adopting a twofold strategy. For forceful interventions in states, including peace-enforcement operations, the UNSC authorises member states or regional organisations to use force "in sharply defined situations on a voluntary basis" (DINSTEIN 2005, p. 310). On the other hand, for peacekeeping actions, the Council delegates to the UN Secretariat the tasks of inviting member states to participate in the enterprise and organising the operation (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008).

The recent interest of the international community in acting to defend fundamental human rights has led the UNSC to task peacekeeping missions to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" wherever armed groups threaten them. In complex intra-state conflict environments, the UN always seeks the broadest concurrence possible of the different parties with the peace process. However, the continuation of human rights violations and attacks against vulnerable civilians by armed groups damage peace negotiations to the point of making them infeasible.

1.2.3. Responsibility to protect

The Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") concept appeared in the aftermath of the massacres of Rwanda and Srebrenica. The Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), created under the auspices of the Canadian government and composed of representatives of several countries, articulated the initial steps. The commission identified actions to address crimes involving atrocities and proposed reshaping the meaning of sovereignty. During the 2005 World Summit, one of the largest

gatherings of heads of state and government in history, the UN member states committed to the doctrine. The Summit outcome document included the R2P principles in its articles 138 and 139 and, in a normative shift concerning the principle of non-intervention referred to in the UN Charter (2(7)), the UNGA adopted the document (UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2005)[29]. In 2006, the Security Council dedicated a resolution to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, reaffirming the provisions of the World Summit (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2009; UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2006a).

R2P is a political commitment establishing states' responsibility for protecting populations at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. If a state fails to act, the international community has the responsibility to protect the endangered people. The international community's range of actions includes diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means based in Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter and collective action referred to in Chapter VII. However, resorting to armed force must occur through the UNSC and in accordance with the UN Charter (UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2005). In this context, the international community's protective actions in Darfur (2005), Libya (2011) and Côte d'Ivoire (2011), all of them supported by the UNSC, occurred to the detriment of the host governments. In the latter cases, the governments of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire had contributed to the killings of civilians. On the other hand, the NATO intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (former Yugoslavia) in 1999 constitutes an ambiguous example. It happened when the R2P concept was still on the rise, and NATO took protective actions without the necessary vote for action in the UNSC (FALK, 2012, p. 22).

At this stage, we pause to appreciate the relationship and the differences between the protection of civilians in the UN peacekeeping doctrine and the R2P doctrine. Both emerged at the beginning of the millennium to protect vulnerable populations and, to a great extent, reinforce each other (RHOADS; WELSH, 2019). However, clear distinctions between them exist. The scope of protecting civilians in UN missions comprises actions to tackle a broad set of threats in conflict and post-conflict environments. These include protective actions against humanitarian disasters, gender-based and domestic violence, diseases like HIV/AIDS, and protecting civilians against armed attacks, the latter being the most critical. Also, in

[29] Article 138 of the Summit outcome document affirms the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Article 139 of the document outlines a collective responsibility on the part of states to assist each other in fulfilling this responsibility and declares their preparedness to take action when national authorities are "manifestly failing" to protect their populations (UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2005, p. 30).

peacekeeping, the host country concurs with the international presence and protective actions, mainly because it cannot adequately protect the people. On the other hand, R2P applies exclusively to cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In extreme situations, it may be invoked without consent, especially when the target state fails to provide the necessary protection (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS, 2019). Being a direct intervention, R2P tends to become politicised and, therefore, more complicated to implement. In contrast, the protection of civilians in PKOs consists of a more consensual and practical mechanism at the international community's disposal.

1.3. The legitimacy of using force to keep peace

After reviewing the foundations for legitimately using force in the international environment, we should concentrate on the specific use of force to keep peace. In this sense, it is appropriate to discuss first the overall legitimacy of the chief actors in the peace process. These are the UN itself and two of its central bodies, namely, the UNSC and the Secretariat. As a whole, the UN is the most influential international organisation dealing with war and peace. At the same time, the UNSC and the Secretariat, the latter together with the peacekeeping missions, are respectively the highest-level decision-making body and the executive instances of peacekeeping. Those elements constitute a legal-rational system of authority in the Weberian sense, managing a varied sort of means aiming to promote peace[30].

Onuma (2010) understands that the UN enjoys the highest degree of legitimacy in international society. Such legitimacy is, first and foremost, granted by its Charter, a multilateral treaty with universal validity. In this context, the UN legitimacy derives from the recognition of the authority stemming from the Charter by states and international and regional organisations. The fact that the UN works on behalf of the international community and is responsible for acting for the peoples' well-being contributes to its acceptance and legitimacy.

The legitimacy of the UNSC resides in the role the UN Charter assigns to it. Sometimes, tensions between the USA, Russia and China or great powers' particular interests frustrate or delay peace initiatives, impacting the Council's credibility as a promoter of peace.

[30] Max Weber considers three types of authority (*Herrschaft*) that can be legitimate: traditional, charismatic and "legal-rational". Regarding the latter type, he states that it is "authority by virtue of 'legality', by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal statutes and factual 'competence' based on rationally established rules" (WEBER, 1926, p. 9, translation is ours). However, the German sociologist recognises that pure types of authority are rarely found in the real world.

Recent cases occurred when the USA sequentially opposed draft resolutions regarding the Palestine question, Russia (mainly) and China successively opposed decisions relating to the civil war in Syria, and Russia vetoed draft resolutions condemning the annexation of Crimea and, following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, demanding it to stop the attack and withdraw its forces from that country[31]. However, the permanent members mostly "agree that peace is a collective good; stable, open markets are effective drivers of development; and domestic and global institutions should work to curb violent extremism and terrorism", which are crucial conditions for preventing fragile states from collapse (HOWARD et al., 2020, p. 127). Besides, in domestic security crises, the consensus becomes easier when concerned member states approach the UNSC with significant national support and consistent proposals.

The Secretariat's legitimacy derives from its functions set out in the UN Charter. Such a condition is enhanced by the high intentions of the Secretary-General and, to a great extent, the adequate management of the peace process and efficient accomplishment of the UNSC resolutions regarding peace.

1.3.1. Definition of the use of force in PKOs

Broadly speaking, force is used when a party wants to impose its will over another party. The use of force typically involves an initiative, a reaction and further actions: one side uses force, the other reacts, and the cycle continues. However, the use of force by the UN in PKOs has peculiarities. It is defined in a relevant Secretariat guideline as the use, or threat of use, of physical means in self-defence and to execute mandated tasks in appropriate situations (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2017). As self-defence, force can be used to protect the blue helmets themselves, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons associated with the UN or under its direct protection (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2003). Beyond that, when the UNSC expressly authorises it, force may also be used to fulfil the mandate —for instance, to deter or impede spoilers threatening or harming civilian populations or derailing the peace process[32].

[31] The veto power was first used in 1946 by the Soviet Union. Since then, as of 15 April 2020, it has been used 115 times by URSS/Russia, 81 times by the USA, 29 times by the United Kingdom, 16 times by France and 15 times by China (SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT, 2020).

[32] According to the peacekeeping terminology, spoilers are individuals or groups that may profit from the spread or continuation of violence or have an interest in disrupting the resolution of a conflict in a given setting (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008).

The use of force evolved through successive generations of peacekeeping. The first missions operated under the strict understanding of self-defence as defence of UN troops and UN-associated personnel against violence and attacks. Then UNEF II was established in 1973 with the recommendation to use force in self-defence, which included resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the UN military component from carrying out its tasks (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 1973). Technically, this meant that the UN troops occupying the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel as former belligerents could keep their ground and resist attempts by either party to overtake them. Lastly, the UN adopted the model of robust PKOs, which implies the use of force to ensure the fulfilment of the mandate in tasks such as protecting local civilians against armed attacks and preserving law and order.

Robust PKOs occur in environments where armed spoilers jeopardise the fulfilment of tasks fundamental to peace and must therefore be curbed. However, an important share of the UN legitimacy to use force depends on how diligently the structure of the organisation seeks peaceful solutions. As political enterprises, peacekeeping missions must maintain an ongoing dialogue with the parties and exhaust all available non-violent means in any specific event before resorting to force. Moreover, two other procedures are crucial to the UN's legitimate use of force: the UNSC's indication of the tasks for which force may be used; and the observance of opportunity, appropriateness and balance in using force[33].

1.3.2. Criteria and aspects of using force in PKOs

1.3.2.1. Procedural and substantive aspects

Some authors refer to “types” of legitimacy, e.g. procedural, pragmatic or moral legitimacy. However, such a typology does not refer to different “legitimacies” but to specific aspects of the conformation of legitimacy. To be legitimate, governments and ruling organisations should observe appropriate procedural and substantive conditions in their decisions and actions, meet legal and moral requirements, and comply with efficiency standards.

To better understand the concept of legitimacy, it is particularly interesting to consider the issue through the lenses of procedural and substantive aspects. Procedural aspects relate to the ethical and normative character of the political actor, its decisions and respective implementations. These remit to the legitimate character of the decision-maker or implementer

[33] Since the use of force in self-defence is not in discussion, from this point on, mentions of the UN’s legitimate use of force will exclusively refer to the use of force to carry out mandated tasks.

and whether the process respects shared principles and ethical and moral norms. On the other hand, substantive aspects refer to the essence of the action and whether it may be deemed legitimate. Hence, while the procedural aspects link to questions like "who" and "how", the substantive aspects imply questions like "what" and "why".

From the procedural point of view, the legitimacy of a decision depends on the conditions of the actor making it and circumstantial aspects of the decision itself. Legitimate decisions are made by duly authorised and capable agents and must be carried out by suitable officials, staff officers or troops, in an acceptable manner. Ideally, the public should consider both the decision-maker and its decision and respective implementation legitimate. However, legitimate actors may make illegitimate decisions, and illegitimate actors may produce legitimate decisions. Either way, the illegitimacy of a decision-maker always casts doubt on and may severely damage a decision.

Regarding the timing of the procedures that can legitimise decisions, Habermas's concept of "presumption of legitimacy" (*Vermutung der Legitimität*) provides some clarification. In a democracy, the society is theoretically the "author" of the laws. However, since people representatives exercise that authorship, the law counts only on the presumption of legitimacy upon coming into force. Complete legitimacy only materialises when the law, once applied in the "real world", is considered appropriate by the citizens. In any case, the initial validity of the law is ensured by the presumption of legitimacy that the legislative process guarantee (HABERMAS, 1992)[34]. In peacekeeping, the legitimacy of the actions the UN mission takes on the ground is presumed, at the outset, from the two-level process for managing PKOs, involving decision-makers, implementers and supporters. At the political-strategic level, the process takes place at the UN Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York. It formally involves the UNSC, the Secretariat and the effective or potential troop and police contributors[35]. At the local level, the process occurs in the mission area and involves the mission's relevant staff and components, authorities of the host country, and the parties to the conflict. At both levels, the questions of who decides on the peace process and how peace will

[34] Regarding the legitimacy of decisions, Habermas argues that form and procedures are crucial to ensuring the presumption of legitimacy: *(Entscheidungsprozesse) müssen gewährleisten, dass alle form- und verfahrensgerecht erzielten Ergebnisse die Vermutung der Legitimität für sich haben* (HABERMAS, 1992, p. 161).

[35] According to Coleman (2020), there is a hierarchy in peacekeeping decision-making at the UNHQ level, which may be formal, informal or hybrid. For instance, membership in the UNSC guarantees a formal, high prerogative in the decision-making process, particularly to the five permanent members. On the other hand, although the major financial contributors have a significant influence on PKOs, it is informal, i.e., not recognised in UN policies. The hierarchy is hybrid in the case of troop and police contributors, which are formally consulted on peacekeeping issues, but the more significant influence of the top contributors is not formally recognised.

be promoted are crucial indicators of legitimacy, which will only be wholly granted when the international community and the host country's citizens —the "real world" in Habermas's words— consider the process appropriate.

At the political-strategic level, observance of the UN Charter confers legitimacy on the UNSC and the Secretariat in dealing with peacekeeping. The UNSC is responsible for establishing and ensuring PKO continuity. The Secretariat advises the Council on the matter, provides elements for the elaboration of mandates and manages the operations. As an essential condition of legitimacy, decisions to establish PKOs or modify their mandates follow consultations and, sometimes, extensive negotiations with parties to the conflict, neighbouring states, other regional actors and potential contributing countries. The negotiations ensure coordination among relevant actors and concurrence with the criteria for using force. This broad, formal process guarantees that the peacekeeping mission corresponds to the host country and UN interests while observing the rules that the international community acknowledges (COLEMAN 2007).

The stances of member states regarding PKOs also impact the UN legitimacy to use force. The decision to provide troops to a peacekeeping mission theoretically entails the tacit agreement with the mandate issued by the UNSC and the Secretariat's policies and guidelines on the use of force, adding legitimacy to the enterprise (VILLA; JENNE, 2020). However, differences still exist within the UNSC and among TCCs regarding the use of military means. In a 2014 report evaluating the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates, the UN Office of International Oversight Services (OIOS) revealed that,

> in interviews, some Council members emphasized the 'need to understand the need to use force to protect lives' and expressed disappointment at the lack of willingness to do so and continuing 'passivity' in the face of attacks on civilians (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 13).

According to the OIOS report, the different views on the use of force in PKOs affect the protection of civilians by creating a gap between the mandates that the UNSC issues and their implementation on the ground. The underperformance of peacekeeping units is the most visible expression of such a breach.

The basic principles of peacekeeping —consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate— are of fundamental importance to granting legitimacy for UN missions to use force. Regarding the latter principle, the peacekeeping doctrine prescribes that even required force should be limited

to the minimum necessary to fulfil the mandate (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008). In this regard, Porto and Costa (2014) point to the vicious circle that arises when security forces, striving to meet society's demands, increasingly resort to violence[36]. Even when the troops' intention is to be efficient in ensuring law and order, excesses tend to undermine the legitimacy of their actions.

UNSC mandates mirror the peacekeeping principles and constitute essential instruments to achieve legitimacy. In robust PKOs, sound, well-tailored mandates have the property of justifying the use of force as a method to achieve peace and committing the international community and relevant stakeholders to the peace process. For actors such as the host country's authorities and civil society, parties to the conflict, and police and troop contributors, the UNSC mandate is decisive in supporting the peace initiative.

To be effective, mandates must be clear and achievable, with well-defined tasks and an indication of how to fulfil them. However, crafting peacekeeping mandates involves some complications. If the UNSC focuses on building broad political consensus, the result tends to be ambiguous mandates. On the other hand, if the Council focus on what is operationally necessary and admits the approval of mandate resolutions with less than unanimity to circumvent resistance, the commitment of key stakeholders tends to be weaker (BRAHIMI, 2000). Although nine votes in the UNSC are sufficient to establish a PKO or extend its mandate, anything less than unanimous backing may weaken the mission legitimacy in the eyes of governmental authorities, parties to the conflict and the local public. Furthermore, the lack of unanimity in the UNSC may also encourage spoilers.

Regarding their genesis, there are two types of UNSC mandates: those based on previously worked peace agreements and those based on negotiations conducted by the UNSC, the Secretariat, or member states as brokers. Clear and objective mandates are easier to obtain in the former case and more difficult in the latter. Indeed, if there is no peace accord, the mandate itself shapes the peace arrangements. The mandatory political compromises for the peace process to take place become "part" of the mandate and, if such compromises prove not to be realistic, the mandate will incorporate this weakness.

[36] The authors refer specifically to the police, but the conclusion fits in the argumentation of this article. In many situations, military forces in robust PKOs conduct police-type operations.

In any case, priority setting is crucial for realistic, achievable mandates. Mandates of multidimensional PKOs list many tasks, and there should be an order of priority among them so that the mission calibrates its means and efforts to timely achieve the most relevant goals.

In this sense, tasks crucial for the peace process, such as creating a secure environment, protecting civilians under threat of attack and strengthening state institutions, should receive special attention. On the other hand, the UNSC, advised by the Secretariat, should not prescribe implementation details. Mandates should provide guidance at the political-strategic level but give room for the mission leadership to decide on the best operational and tactical actions.

In recent years, the idea of sequenced mandates has gained traction. This model implies that the peacekeeping mission receives an initial mandate with an overall political goal and a limited number of priority tasks and, at a particular stage of the peace process, this mandate is updated and complemented with additional tasks (RAMOS-HORTA, 2015). Sequenced mandates allow for faster deployment of PKOs and concentration of efforts on the most relevant political-strategic objectives at the outset, leaving less urgent and ancillary tasks to be included later, after evaluating the initial results and consulting local stakeholders.

The peacekeeping mission must be perceived as legitimate by the host country's civil society to preserve its chances of success. Generally, peacekeeping missions start with legitimacy built at the political-strategic level, based on the UNSC deliberations and the Secretariat negotiations for the mission's deployment. Then, such initial legitimacy should be consolidated through appropriate interactions with the host government, the parties to the conflict, and the local population. The professional relationship of the UN head of mission[37] with the country's head of state and the observance of the UNSC mandate from both sides are necessary conditions for legitimising the use of force[38]. Equally important is the appropriate behaviour of UN staff members and military and police personnel. For a UN mission to advocate the virtues of good governance and set the tone for security and stability in the country, its personnel should not depart from fundamental values. Moreover, the missions must show knowledge, adequate competencies and "fair procedure" in making decisions and during day-to-day dealings and interactions (BEETHAM, 2013, p. 293).

[37] In most PKOs, the head of mission is a civilian, appointed by the UN Secretary-General as his special representative. UNIFIL, where the Force Commander is also the head of mission, is an exception.

[38] Both the military and police components in a UN robust PKO have the capacity to use force to accomplish their tasks. This work focuses exclusively on the military.

Another important procedural aspect is the negotiation the mission conducts in support of the peace process. In this regard, the mission's efforts to dissuade rebel groups from resorting to violence are *sine qua non* to legitimising the use of force. The proceedings usually start when UN officials and, depending on the case, representatives of friend nations interested in the process meet with the parties to set the road map for peace. However, if the results are not satisfactory at the outset, the negotiations must continue after the deployment of the peacekeeping mission to commit the refractory parties to the peace process. Military actions aimed at reducing the rebel groups' leeway and pressuring them should not represent the closure of political-diplomatic attempts for peace.

The multinational composition of the peacekeeping force offers a unique element of legitimacy. It expresses the universality of the enterprise and downgrades the distrust that the presence of a single country or a small coalition of countries might create (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, 2008). According to Doyle and Sambanis, "[the] multilateral impartiality […] embedded not only in the Charter but deep in UN's ethos and composition" makes the UN presence tolerable and effective (2006, p. 318). Furthermore, since the host country is a UN member, the peace operation is conducted by a familiar organisation rather than an alien entity. In conjunction with the host country's consent and the Secretariat's practice of negotiating the configuration of the mission with the local government, the multinational composition of the UN Force invalidates the postcolonial criticism, according to which peacekeeping has a western hegemonic character.

After discussing the procedural aspects, we should address the substantive questions of the legitimate use of force in PKOs. These questions comprise the essence of the UN mission's mandate and the reasons why force should be used to keep peace. Generally, peacekeeping missions aim at a collective good, namely, the pacification of a country or region following the host government's and international community's interests. Such circumstance is the foundation of a UN mission's legitimacy to act and use force as necessary to accomplish its tasks. Moreover, UN missions contribute to preserving the identity and values of national societies, which further reinforces their legitimacy in resorting to force[39].

The purposes of the UN and the goals of the organisation's initiatives justify the use of means that the UN Charter prescribes, including military force. The Charter advances relevant aims, such as the defence of peace, the maintenance of international peace and

[39] According to Habermas (1976), preserving a normatively determined identity of a society is a necessary condition for the respective government to achieve legitimacy. We extend this consideration to the UN missions, which work with local governments to preserve the norms and identities of host countries' national societies.

security, the faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity of the human person, and the promotion of better living conditions for all the peoples. The Agenda for Sustainable Development, which the UNGA approved in 2015, expresses the member states' determination to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies, free from fear and violence (UNITED NATIONS, 2015)[40]. Besides, the humanitarian character of peacekeeping, as opposed to the national geopolitical objectives that in many cases contaminate peace enforcement interventions, lend substantial legitimacy to PKOs (SABROW, 2017).

Theorising on citizenship and humanity, Linklater (2007) identifies five varieties of harm against which the international community should develop efficient conventions: deliberate harm in relations between states, deliberate harm caused by governments to their own citizens, deliberate harm by non-state actors, unintended harm and negligence. The third type—deliberate harm by non-state actors—encompasses the violence that rebel groups, mercenaries and criminal organisations have been display in robust peacekeeping mission areas. The actions of such harmful groups should be theme of international security debates and constitute the focus of UN strategies to protect civilians in vulnerable countries.

In subsection 1.3.4. (The value of the cause), we address other substantive issues related to PKOs.

1.3.2.2. Legality as a precondition

For Max Weber, legality is a precondition for legitimacy. In his words, "to-day [*sic*] the most usual basis of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure" (WEBER, 1964, p. 131). Most legal experts and several scholars in political science and international relations follow this approach, taking legality as a kind of "legitimizing principle" (CLAUDE, 1966, p. 368). Conversely, other authors argue that legitimacy founded on moral considerations is a condition that underpins legislative processes and legal actions. Still others view legality and legitimacy as separate requirements since "disputes about the legitimacy, or rightfulness, of power are not just disputes about what someone is legally entitled to have or to do" (BEETHAM, 2013, p. 4).

Dealing with such complexity, Habermas (1992) puts the weight on the notion of "rightful" rather than "legal". He maintains that enacted law cannot be legitimate simply

[40] The understanding in this work is that the consensus obtained in a universal forum, such as the UNGA, excludes cynicism and hypocrisy and, therefore, represents the genuine wishes of the peoples represented therein.

through legality since it would leave motives that should emanate from the genesis of the law up to the addressees. Hence, law and morality intertwine in a context in which a claim is only legitimate when it is morally correct. Habermas supports the contention that legal systems should be legitimate to be valid but also suggests that legitimacy through legality is only possible if a moral core is preserved:

> While values claim relative validity, justice [*Gerechtigkeit*] makes an absolute validity claim: moral commandments claim validity for each and every one. Moral norms also embody values or interests, but only those that can be generalised in view of the respective subject matter (HABERMAS, 1992, p. 190, translation is ours).

Two examples illustrate the relationship between legality and legitimacy of using force internationally, namely, the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999 without UNSC authorisation and the sanctions on Iraq that the Council imposed from 1991 to 2003. Regarding the NATO intervention, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo considered it illegal but legitimate (THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, 2000). Of this episode, Coleman notes that the development of codified international law benefits from legitimate actions considered illegal because they constitute precedents that contribute to the evolution of the law. Despite the existence of discrepancies, legality and legitimacy may coincide again in the future (COLEMAN, 2007). The second example refers to situations in which legality is present but legitimacy not. The sanctions the UNSC imposed on Iraq were unequivocally legal because they were established in accordance with international law. However, the measure was seen as illegitimate in many quarters, due to the suffering it brought to innocent civilians (POPOVSKI; TURNER, 2012).

The approach this work espouses is that the contemporary body of international law is consistent enough to ensure the right of self-defence and safeguard collective interests. Furthermore, the legal application of coercive measures must be continuously assessed against their aims and possible collateral effects. In this context, rules and laws remain standards against which the legitimacy of international actors or actions is evaluated (COLEMAN, 2007). The case of peacekeeping is paradigmatic because PKOs are not only founded on international law but also must comply with the disposition of peace agreements and observe the laws and customs of the host countries (SMITH, 2007)[41].

[41] The Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed between the UN and the host country, are based on international standards, and define rights, duties, privileges and immunities of the UN personnel.

The UN Charter lays down the legal basis of peacekeeping, particularly in its chapters VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and VII (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression). Traditional PKOs settle disputes between willing parties committed to establishing peaceful relations. On the other hand, robust PKOs are more complex and must also deal with actors that intentionally disturb the peace process through armed violence. Consequently, based on Chapter VII, the UNSC issues for these operations mandates that constitute legal authorisations to use force.

To promote confidence in the peace process and define an important element of legitimacy from the outset, the UNSC often invites host countries' representatives and other relevant stakeholders to participate in the discussions to elaborate the mandates of peacekeeping missions. In addition, the UNHQ issues guidance that details the use of force by PKOs, which must strictly comply with international law and principles, including international humanitarian law and human rights norms[42]. The rules of engagement (ROE), approved by the Secretariat to prevent excess and distortions in using force, are an efficient regulation in this regard. Those rules provide operational commanders and military personnel direction on the circumstances under which to use force. They prescribe the use of force commensurate with the threat and consistent with the principles of gradation, necessity, proportionality, precaution and accountability (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2017). In this sense, the ROE function like deontological codes, mirroring the values and principles of the organisation (PORTO; COSTA, 2014). Such guidelines and rules impose ethical and professional standards of conduct on the UN military components, so that the tactics and procedures of the regular military training are adjusted to the specific situations in the peacekeeping mission area.

Peace and cease-fire agreements enhance the PKOs' legal frameworks. Such mechanisms terminate pre-existing armed conflicts or suspend hostilities, thereby serving as legal parameters for UN peace processes (DINSTEIN, 2005). The parties can reach cease-fires informally or in writing, with or without the support of a broker or a UNSC determination. However, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) understand that broadly supported peace treaties and formal agreements are important for the success of the peace process. Such arrangements outline political solutions and points of an acceptable compromise, paving the way for more

[42] Such requirements are prescribed in the Secretary-General's bulletin on observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 1999).

consistent participation of political and social actors, the local population and other stakeholders. Consequently, they contribute to a broader perception of the UN mission legitimacy.

Lastly, we turn our attention to the legal aspects regarding the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence. As a reaction to UN failures to prevent the massacres of Tutsis by the rival Hutus in Rwanda and Muslim-Bosniaks in Srebrenica, the UNSC passed Resolution 1296 (2000), considering ways to provide for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The resolution establishes, among other provisions, that deliberate targeting of civilian populations and systematic violations of humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflicts may constitute a threat to international peace and security (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2000). On that basis, the Council authorises several peacekeeping missions to use force to prevent such aggression. However, more than an endorsement of the use of force, the UNSC authorisation creates a legal requirement for those missions (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014).

1.3.2.3. Consent of the host country and main parties

Subsection 1.2.2. discusses the consent of a state for the deployment of foreign military forces in its territory. Now the analysis focuses on consent for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission.

Unlike the forceful interventions the UNSC determines, PKOs must always have the host countries' consent. In some cases, this materialises in peace agreements or formal cease-fires. In others, due to the emergency of the crisis or peculiarities of the situation, consent may be given without a written agreement.

The peacekeeping chronicle records some emblematic cases regarding the consent of the host country. One of them happened in 2006, during the negotiations to upgrade UNIFIL's mandate. As the host country, Lebanon had a decisive say in the process and did not want that the UNSC resolution mentioned Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was agreed upon by the Council (MURPHY, 2012; TARDY, 2011). That was a harsh stance by Hezbollah, then a member of the Lebanese government, which mistakenly regarded such a mention as granting foreign powers the right to intervene in the country. Another situation took place in 2007 in Sudan. At that time, a lengthy negotiation preceded the deployment of the peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region, mainly because of President Omar al-Bashir's serious objections

to the UN presence. His resistance was only overcome and the formal consent obtained by agreeing that the African Union (AU) would take part in the enterprise, creating a hybrid operation. Still, the host government's concurrence never translated into cooperation, and the UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) faced political and logistical obstruction for years (MAMIYA, RALPH; HANSEN, 2020)[43]. However, the formal consent, crucial for the mission upholding its legitimacy, was never withdrawn.

Ideally, consent should be universal, i.e., given by all parties to the conflict. However, based on its recent experiences in internal conflicts, the UN concluded that achieving universal consent is almost impossible. In most cases, the parties agree with the peace process, but not all of them, or not all the time. Besides, armed groups may emerge after the start of the process to take advantage of the situation, or a party may consent to UN presence to gain time and withdraw the consent when it feels ready to resume hostilities. Furthermore, regardless of faction leaders' commitment to the peace, fighting forces may split into groups that decide not to comply with peace provisions[44]. Consequently, the UN capstone doctrine for peacekeeping operations stipulates that, albeit the consent of all parties to a conflict is desirable, the concurrence of the main parties is sufficient for deploying a PKO with chances of success (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008).

Non-participation and outright sabotage of the peace process by armed groups have been common in robust PKOs. In many missions, such groups challenge the rule of law, attack vulnerable communities and intimidate local citizens. Some factions are criminal in character and do not deserve to qualify as a party to the conflict. This is currently the case in the DRC and the CAR, as well as in Haiti during MINUSTAH. In the DRC, the conflict is fuelled by disputes over access to resources and land, illicit financial flows and criminal activities, all in an environment of almost total absence of the rule of law and in which armed groups abound (NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019). In Haiti, the threat to peace came from gangs committing crimes like kidnappings and extortions, in connection with political corruption or not (SCHUBERTH, 2015). In the CAR, the chief aim of several armed groups is profiting from illicit activities, such as illegal exploitation of natural resources, robberies and land

[43] UNAMID, a robust PKO, operated in Darfur, Sudan, from July 2007 to December 2020.

[44] This is a common situation in the DRC. According to Novosseloff and her colleagues, "some of the armed groups have disintegrated into factions, while others integrated into the FARDC only to reappear with another name when a new round of DDR [disarmament, demobilization and reintegration] was on offer" (NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019, p. 89).

expropriation. According to a report by the Human Rights Office in that country, distinguishing between rebel fighters, common criminals and civilian supporters directly participating in the hostilities is difficult (UNITED NATIONS. MINUSCA HEADQUARTERS, 2018a).

Thus, in the case of intra-state conflicts, the consent of the host country's government and the concurrence of the main opposing party or parties are considered sufficient. However, the host country's consent is twofold and, in this sense, differs from the consent of other parties. As head of state, the president or prime minister conveys the national acceptance of international peacekeepers to the UN. Besides, his (or her) government should concur with the peace process as a party to the conflict. In this sense, the host government's consent is, in normative terms, a *sine qua non* of a PKO, whereas the consent of other parties to the conflict is a matter of processual viability. Also, while the definitive withdrawal of consent by the host country prompts the mission to depart and the main parties' severe lack of cooperation tends to paralyse the peace process, negotiations can usually overcome other forms of disagreement. Examples are resistance to demobilising per agreed-upon timetables or denying the UN complete freedom of movement.

Lastly, the connection between the host country's consent and the people's stance calls for exploration. In most countries where robust PKOs are deployed, the population comprises communities of different ethnicities, religions and ideologies with distinct interests. Hence, ascertaining what most citizens think is difficult, and the UN must rely on the local government's consent to infer nationwide acceptance of the peacekeeping mission. However, if the host government lacks representativeness, its consent has little value. Moreover, if the representativeness is questioned, the government's capacity to foster compromise among groups as a condition for lasting peace is severely undermined (GUÉHENNO, 2015, p. 147)[45].

1.3.2.4. Impartiality

According to the UN capstone doctrine, PKOs must implement their mandates without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is a fundamental aspect of peacekeeping because it preserves the missions' claim to authority, helps maintain the cooperation of different actors and contributes to UN personnel security. However, impartiality should not be confused with neutrality. As Rhoads (2019) puts it, the former allows for pre-established rules to guide judgement, whereas the latter requires withholding judgement. In this sense, peacekeepers

[45] By the way, presidential and parliamentary elections help the UN assess the acceptance of the peace process. For instance, the election of leaders supportive of the UN presence is a clear indication of popular support.

should be impartial in dealing with the parties to the conflict but not neutral in executing their mandate. For example, if a party is clearly in breach of the terms of the UN Charter or works against the peace process, it cannot receive the same treatment as the parties that proceed adequately (BRAHIMI, 2000). In this regard, an apt comparison is to a referee in a sports match, who is impartial but penalises infractions.

After the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the UN decidedly looked for ways to conduct effective peacekeeping in hostile settings and deal with the "tension between impartiality and effectiveness", as Gray names it (2018, p. 300). The organisation progressively came to understand that impartiality should be considered from the perspective of protection, which means that UN forces cannot idly stand by while armed aggressors attack civilians and violate human rights (KARLSRUD, 2015).

Currently, most robust peacekeeping missions have such tasks as supporting the rule of law, protecting civilians and preventing severe human rights violations. Consequently, the fulfilment of their mandates excludes impartiality for perpetrators of acts against the rule of law, the safety of civilians and fundamental human rights. Supporting this idea, Berdal reasons that, in robust PKOs' complex settings, peacekeepers must differentiate between "major disputants, loosely defined as political and militarily significant actors, and more marginal spoilers, distinguished by their predatory agendas and, crucially, their lack of local legitimacy" (2019, p. 127).

On the other hand, the use of unnecessary force may undermine the mission's reputation for impartiality and consequently erode its legitimacy. In this regard, recent UNSC decisions on MONUSCO and UNMISS often become examples of cases in which the use of force approached the limit of impartiality. In MONUSCO, due to the presence in the DRC of strong-armed groups disrupting the peace process and attacking vulnerable communities, the UNSC created the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to reduce violence. The brigade's task was preventing the expansion of armed groups, neutralising them and, for such purposes, conducting targeted offensive operations as necessary, either unilaterally or jointly with the armed forces of the DRC. Recognising the risks of the measure, the UNSC stated that the FIB was established "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping" (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2013, p. 6). In UNMISS, a serious stalemate between the mission and the Government of South Sudan ensued from the crisis of December 2013. On occasion, President Salva Kiir accused the vice-president of a *coup d'etat*, leading to divisions in the armed forces and widespread ethnic and political violence. The UNSC reacted to the government troops' violence against civilians by

changing the UNMISS's mandate. It removed all the tasks in support of the local government and changed the mission's focus to protecting civilians and supporting the human rights (RHOADS, 2019).

Stabilisation-type missions often face challenges regarding impartiality[46]. Such missions are mandated to support the host countries in maintaining the rule of law, which usually implies assisting national security forces in training and logistical or operational support. In most missions, the UN troops also participate in joint operations with the local forces. Nevertheless, in such situations, the excessive use of force, as well as abuses and crimes committed by the national military or police against the local population, may seriously damage the UN image of impartiality or, even worse, implicate the organisation in grave violations of international law (RUDOLF, 2017). To prevent this, the Secretary-General approved the so-called "Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces" to be observed by all UN entities, and advised all member-states about the measure. The policy defines procedures to be adopted by the whole UN system to ensure consistency between any support for state and non-state forces and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws. In this regard, the policy stipulates that before extending any assistance, every concerned UN agency —including peacekeeping missions— will assess the potential risks to the UN of the recipient entity committing grave violations of human rights (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2013).

In any case, sustaining the peacekeeping missions' claim of impartiality requires meeting an important condition, namely, providing clear information on the "rules of the game" to all concerned. The mission must make its mandate clear, particularly the conditions for the use of force, so the population acknowledges and the armed groups understand that the UN will not tolerate attacks on vulnerable civilians and serious violations of human rights.

1.3.3. Legitimacy in whose eyes? Audiences as criteria to define legitimacy

Political considerations, legality and endorsement acts are important elements to legitimise the use of force in UN peacekeeping. However, no less important is the Weberian

[46] Examples of stabilisation missions are MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, MINUSCA and MINUSMA.

criterion, according to which the participants in a relation of power should believe in the good title and intentions of the authority. To be legitimate, the UN's efforts for peace and its methods must be considered just and fair by several actors and make sense in the public view. As far as public appreciation is concerned, the diverse and often contrasting positions in PKO's host countries imply that there is no escape from the democratic principle: the UN legitimacy stems from the majority of people affected by the peace process[47].

1.3.3.1. Key audiences and the relevance of credibility

We should now explore the notion of "audiences", the question of credibility and their relevance for UN legitimacy to take effect. Beetham (2013) argues that in modern states, the national society constitutes the ultimate audience for the government achieving legitimacy, whereas, in the international arena, the states are the key subjects. Further, Clark (2003) proposes a more comprehensive and (regarding UN peacekeeping) more helpful approach when he argues that international organisations have different "constituencies" in becoming legitimate, such as citizens, stakeholder groups, governments or the peoples of the world. In this sense, the standpoints and perceptions in some states and groups of people are key for the UN to achieve and maintain legitimacy in PKOs. Highlighted among these audiences are, at the state level, relevant UN financial contributors, TCCs and the mission host country. Further, the parties to the conflict, the host country's society and national societies in the TCCs stand out as crucial groups of interest.



Fig. 2 - Use of force in robust PKOs and key audiences involved

[47] Clark (2003) argues that global governance (like the UN's) implies networks of organisations, interest groups and forms of authority dealing with issues of common interest and, as such, practically reduces legitimacy to democracy. For the UN, principles like popular sovereignty, representation of minorities and periodical elections are not only crucial for achieving sustainable peace but also for making the peace process viable and acceptable.

The backing of societies for the peace process is particularly relevant. As the allusion to the "peoples of the United Nations" in the preamble of the UN Charter indicates, the world organisation's affairs are fundamentally people's affairs. In the case of peacekeeping, these are people who pay taxes for the respective governments to fund PKOs, consent to the engagement of their military in UN missions, or are the direct beneficiary of peace processes.

The circumstances of the peace process and the purposes of the peacekeeping mission are relevant information for national societies to endorse the country's participation in PKOs and agree with the engagement of their soldiers. In democratic countries, the endorsement is usually materialised by parliamentary authorisation for the deployment of troops. In PKO's host countries, the role of the national society is even more crucial. The ultimate purpose of peacekeeping is to provide better living conditions for the population, which will only be achieved with people's satisfaction.

Focusing on relevant audiences also raises the question of credibility. To be legitimate, it is not enough for an actor to publicly state his intentions and objectives and have the concerned people accept them first-hand. People must believe in the actor's honesty, transparency and capacity to reach the proposed goals. In this sense, the peacekeeping mission's capacity and perceived ability to deliver contribute directly to legitimacy (HOWARD et al., 2020).

UN peacekeeping actions must be coherent, founded in reality and effective. These are conditions for the local population to believe in the mission's ability to deliver the collective goods the UNSC mandate to the PKO envisages. Credibility tends to enhance the mission's acceptance on the ground and boost its chances of success. Conversely, credibility deficits hamper mission effectiveness, since its activities begin to be "perceived as having weak or frayed legitimacy and consent may be eroded" (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT 2008, p. 38).

The peacekeeping mission's appropriate relationship with the local population and external observers contributes to its credibility, confers legitimacy and generates good political momentum for peace (HOLT; TAYLOR, 2009). In order to manage such a relationship, peacekeeping missions keep public information offices in their headquarters, with the goals of garnering support among civil society, maintaining the cooperation of the parties to the conflict, and securing broad international support for the enterprise (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008). In addition, the peacekeeping doctrine prescribes that peacekeeping missions prepare and implement communication strategies to specific audiences, particularly

at the local level. Nonetheless, belief in the mission is subject to highs and lows, and legitimacy usually varies over time. As a rule, peacekeeping missions enjoy initial credibility, but it may fade over time. In some cases, legitimacy is gained, lost, and recovered or rebuilt back during the PKO's lifecycle (WIHARTA, 2009).

1.3.3.2. The preponderance of the local level

Achieving legitimacy at the political-strategic level is necessary to ensure the international community's support for the peace process. However, the success of peacekeeping missions in countries affected by internal conflicts depends mainly on circumstances and developments at the local level. At this level, standpoints and attitudes of the population or specific communities, in particular, are key to defining legitimacy (COLEMAN, 2007; VON BILLERBECK, 2017; WHALAN, 2017). Moreover, positive perceptions and support on the ground are unique assets of a peacekeeping mission. According to Whalan,

> when local actors perceive peacekeepers to be legitimate, they are more likely to support and enable the peacekeeping mission rather than resisting and undermining it. This local legitimacy empowers peacekeepers because it provides reasons for local actors to comply and cooperate (WHALAN, 2017, p. 7).

In the mission area, the role that political actors, local institutions and organisations, the media and citizens play in the peace process depends on their interaction with the UN local structure. Neither the UN's international status nor the existence of a UNSC legal mandate can sustain the peacekeeping mission legitimacy if difficulties on the ground hamper or blur the peace dividends. In the host country, people tend to consider the political deliberations in New York too far away and with very little significance for their lives and interests. In reality, they see the UN much closer: The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the mission components and staff represent the UN structure and its actions for peace in the eyes of the local public.

The peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force to keep peace acquires a crucial socio-centric connotation at the local level. Unlike legality, which can be secured in New York at the UNHQ, the broader notion of legitimacy has roots in the domain of society and public morality (POPOVSKI; TURNER, 2012). Indeed, legitimacy depends on people's judgement, and this relational character makes it a sensitive strategic requirement (KARLBORG, 2015).

Furthermore, the peace mission's credibility or, as Wiharta (2009) refers to it, its moral authority depends on the behaviour of its personnel, in particular their adherence to

international norms and standards. Peacekeeper wrongdoing and misconduct provoke resentments, affect mission credibility and result in negatively impacting their legitimacy. In recent decades, scandals of sexual exploitation and abuse (SE&A) by peacekeepers have severely damaged the image of the UN in several peacekeeping missions. As an illustration of this topic, the following graph provides information on the numbers of SE&A allegations in field missions reported to the UN, involving uniformed and civilian personnel.

Fig. 3 - Total numbers of SE&A allegations in UN field missions. Source: UN (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2022a)

The UN mission's fairness in fulfilling the mandate, including the moderation in the use of force, the appropriate conduct of its personnel and their respect for local customs and laws have a direct impact on legitimacy. Alternatively, the unpopularity of the host country's government and the commission of abuses and human rights violations by local security forces may also have serious consequences for the UN presence. Peacekeeping implies cooperation with the local government, and legitimacy deficits on its side adversely impact the UN. Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, former MINUSTAH Force Commander, mentions an episode that exemplifies this effect. During a violent demonstration against MINUSTAH in Port-au-Prince, Santos Cruz, present on the scene, spotted an angry citizen voicing slogans against the UN. The Force Commander asked his aide-de-camp to call the man. When he came, Santos Cruz asked him why he was insulting the peacekeeping mission. The answer revealed a clear logic: "We are against the government because it is bad. You are in support of this government, so we are against you too" (SANTOS CRUZ, 2018).

Local populations' expectations of the UN peace process are always high. This situation is challenging for managing peace since gaps between expectations and what

peacekeeping missions can do negatively impact perceptions of UN legitimacy. Because of that, the missions must administer local conjectures, neutralise rumours and disinformation, and make sure that the host population and other key actors understand the mandate and mission objectives. If the objectives and methods of the mission are clearly laid out and explained to the local people and other critical audiences, misunderstanding will be reduced, and spoilers' actions to discredit the UN and damage the peace process through untruth and disinformation will be minimised (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2008). Thus, according to the UN peacekeeping doctrine, integrated communication campaigns should inform the public and relevant stakeholders about the mission's mandate, principal tasks and how it intends to fulfil them[48]. In addition, missions must regularly share information with local communities to update their achievements and thereby counter negative messages from rebels (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2017).

Notwithstanding, shortcomings in dealing with local expectations have occurred, mainly concerning the task of protecting civilians. An emblematic example of such a problem occurred in South Sudan in 2016, when the blue helmets failed to protect local civilians against rebel attacks in Malakal and Juba. Besides a series of tactical and operational shortcomings, the board of inquiries that investigated the incidents concluded that UNMISS had failed to adequately inform local leaders and communities about its strategy to protect civilians and the operational and logistic limitations. The Malakal board of inquiry strongly recommended that UNMISS strengthened its public information (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2016).

The dissemination of the mission's strategy to the local audiences should occur through a well-planned information campaign, reaching and working with political authorities, religious leaders, community leaderships, civil society organisations, representatives of minorities and local media. The mission staff (public information, political affairs and civil affairs personnel) and the uniformed components are the dissemination vectors. Due to their widespread presence in the mission area, blue helmets and military observers are especially appropriate for sending messages to far-flung, small communities and gathering relevant information. UN troops have regular contact with community leaders and members during their patrols and can gather opinions and feelings. In this regard, women in particular are a source

[48] The most important stakeholders of PKOs are national and local authorities; the host country's population; external partners, including the diplomatic community, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and international and national non-governmental organisations; and the members of the peace operation themselves.

of good, reliable information. Lieutenant General Ricardo Augusto Costa Neves, former Force Commander in MONUSCO, reports a personal experience:

> The leadership of women in communities [in the DRC] is impressive. After some time in the mission, I instructed my officers: "Do you want to know what's really going on? Go there and talk to the women, as they are among the people who suffer most from the violence of armed groups" (COSTA NEVES, 2021, translation is ours).

1.3.3.3. Efficiency as determining factor

The notion of efficiency is not new to the legitimacy debate. In his essay "Of the Original Contract", David Hume presents objections to the idea of consent. However, as an alternative to achieve legitimacy, he proposes the justification of political authority because of its beneficial consequences (*apud* PETER, 2017). Other philosophers and social scientists, such as Bentham and Stuart Mill, later explored the idea and related it to the utilitarian principle[49]. More recently, Levi (2004) proposed the connection between efficiency and legitimacy by arguing that the ability of a political power to perform its essential functions (e.g. security, defence, socio-economic development) justifies its existence and constitutes the basis for its public acceptance. Although critics argue that legitimacy would only be acknowledged through utilitarianism by the beneficiaries of the relation to power, it leaves no doubt that a ruling power would hardly appear legitimate if it could not reasonably deliver collective goods.

Concerning the legitimacy of international institutions, Buchanan and Keohane (2006) maintain that organisations are morally justified when they do not contribute to grave injustices, if there is no obvious alternative that would perform better and if they respect their own guidelines and procedures. The first and, particularly, the second condition evoke the idea of efficiency and demand that PKOs attain expected behaviour standards and efficiently accomplish their mandates. In this sense, peacekeeping strategies and missions' *modus operandi* should be enhanced to exclude any other better option. Indeed, UN missions draw legitimacy primarily from what they achieve, i.e., whether and to what extent they deliver on key mandated tasks (VON BILLERBECK, 2017).

Protection of civilians against physical violence is undoubtedly the most critical task in PKOs. It implies protecting vast populations, spread over extremely vast areas, by

[49] Utilitarianism rests on aggregate utility. As such, the moral value of an action depends on the utility it aggregates to fulfil an actor's interests or needs. For instance, in light of utilitarianism, an action that causes death and suffering to innocent people may be accepted, provided that it prevents a situation that would generate death and suffering on a considerably greater scale (HERMANN, 2011, p. 171).

confronting armed groups opposing peace arrangements and preying on vulnerable communities. For instance, in the DRC, MONUSCO strives to protect civilians in the eleventh largest country in the world, where dozens of armed groups operate[50]. In South Sudan, 1.9 million internally displaced people live in vulnerability and require UN protection. While the protection actions bring relief to millions of people in UN mission areas, they create huge expectations of peacekeeping missions. When a mission fails to provide adequate protection, civilians often become highly critical of its performance, deeply damaging the UN reputation (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014). In this regard, the armed factions have a kind of leverage over the mission legitimacy, as they choose where and when to attack civilians and, in doing so, render protection actions ineffective and degrade the public perception of UN efficiency.

In the DRC, local communities often express frustration with MONUSCO's efficiency. Demonstrations against the UN presence and stoning of blue helmets patrols and bases have occurred several times in recent years (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2018). A 2016 political opinion poll in the country revealed that the UN mission was unpopular, particularly in the East, where most of its troops were deployed. Countrywide, the survey indicated the following results[51]:



Fig. 4 - Perceptions of MONUSCO. Source: Stearns (2016)

[50] In 2018, some sources referred to more than 120 armed groups present in the DRC, although a number of them have been inactive for a long time (NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019).

[51] The *Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et Consulting International* and the Congo Research Group at the Centre of International Cooperation conducted a nationally representative political opinion poll across the DRC. Between May and September 2016, researchers interviewed 7.545 people in face-to-face interviews (STEARNS, 2016).

Although the opinion poll is dated 2016, recent episodes of dissatisfaction and hostility towards UN troops indicate that those results generally prevail. In November 2019, the population of North Kivu promoted violent demonstrations against the UN, claiming that the peacekeepers were an ineffective presence since they did not protect the people as their mandate promises (AL JAZEERA, 2019). At that time, alluding to the sensible and complicated bonds between MONUSCO and local communities in the DRC, the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON), an initiative of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, reported that "there is a 'love and hate' relationship between the UN mission and the Congolese (the Government and the people)" (NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019, p. 80). In July 2022, violent anti-UN protests raged again across the DRC's eastern region, with locals accusing the peacekeeping mission of failing to do enough to stop a rise in deadly attacks by armed groups and calling for the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. During the two weeks of turmoil, protesters vandalised and set fire to UN buildings in several cities in country's eastern frontier provinces. Thirty-six people died, including four peacekeepers, and about 170 were wounded (PRINCEWILL, 2022)[52].

Of course, there are plenty of examples of cases in which efficiency contributed to legitimacy perception in PKOs. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, reports that during the operations to disband gangs in Port-au-Prince, MINUSTAH troops had to invest densely populated slums and, at one point, were blamed for civilian casualties. The impact of the accusation on the mission legitimacy was minimal because "the people of Haiti who were directly affected by these operations had for a while a better image of the mission (since) their daily lives improved" (GUÉHENNO 2015, p. 262). A similar conclusion results from accounts of Brazilian Battalion 6 (BRABAT 6) members. They report that the appreciation of the Haitian people increased exponentially by March 2007, after the unit cleansed the Cité Soleil of the armed gangs and criminals that infested the slum. Colonel Holczik, a captain at that time and intelligence officer on the battalion's staff, recalls that the appropriate and efficient attitude of the troops contributed to their legitimate presence:

> On several occasions, communal leaders came to the battalion to express their agreement with the robust actions conducted by the unit and share their understanding that the operations contributed to protecting vulnerable people. [...] In a very significant episode, a foreign nun in charge of a small school in Boston, a district of Cité Soleil, came to the battalion's base of operation to thank the soldiers for having arrested a gang leader, who used to terrorise the people in the school's

[52] According to Burke (2022), at least some protests were organised or encouraged by political actors seeking to mobilise popular opinion against the UN Force.

> neighbourhood. Such recognition and appreciation of our work touched us all (HOLCSIK, 2021, translation is ours).

1.3.4. The value of the cause

According to the Cambridge Dictionary, a "cause" is a socially valuable principle or aim that some people strongly support (CAMBRIDGE, 2020). In this sense, causes are amalgams of cognitive and affective ideas that, transformed into arguments and reasons for action, involve people—communities, societies, nations—in struggles for rights, common goods or other collective aspirations. The use of the term traditionally relates to wars, to indicate the reason why nations and their military should make efforts in times of crisis. Causes inspire people to accept deprivations and make sacrifices, to an extent that governments' unemotional statements of interests and strategies could not evoke.

The moral arguments and cognitive strength of a cause are not in its basic idea but rather in its motives, justifications and claims. Through them, causes may appear as relevant and legitimate and, thus, engage people beyond their self-interests and awaken collective strengths. Hence, valid causes are usually laced in society's ethical and moral realms since political elements of decisions, juridical considerations or envisaged material gains can hardly lead to open and disinterested engagements. As Habermas notes, moral argumentation (*moralische Diskurse*) is a necessary and relevant step in constructing the collective will (HABERMAS, 1992).

Peace is a universal value and a permanent cause, preached by religions, elevated by philosophies, desired by populations. People want an environment of peace for themselves and their loved ones, their society and their country. Furthermore, contrary to the realistic view of international politics, an increasing number of people find no satisfaction in living comfortably in peaceful countries within a world of inequality and violence.

Founded on elevated ideals and ethical principles, the UN translates the ideal of a peaceful world. In its preamble, the UN Charter highlights the saving of generations from the scourge of war, the reaffirmation of faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person, and the promotion of social progress and better standards of life in greater freedom as the parameters within which the organisation works for peace (UNITED NATIONS, 1994). Acting under such motivations, the UN functions as a depository of international idealism and works with a clear moral inspiration that all the signatories of the Charter formally and publicly share (THAKUR, 2012).

UN peacekeeping facts and figures provide the dimensions of the international cause of peace. More than one million men and women have served such a cause under the UN flag since 1948, when the first PKO was deployed in the Middle East[53]. At the time of this writing, 119 countries contribute over 70.000 military and police personnel to peacekeeping missions (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2022b). At the end of their tour of duty, the peacekeepers win the UN medal with the symbol of the organisation and the suggestive legend "in the service of peace" on its faces. Then, the Secretariat addresses the TCCs to thank them for their contributions to peace, provided in line with the Charter to which all of them adhere. Furthermore, several countries contribute troops to PKOs based on principles and values enshrined in their constitutions or basic laws[54].

Some people try to reduce peacekeeping to mere steps in the power game of international politics. Nonetheless, attempts to place UN actions for peace in amoral contexts fail because of the cynicism that the agents involved would have to admit. As Srinivasan, Mayall and Pulipaka (2019) assert, national societies sincerely expect the enunciation of some values-based guidelines to justify the decisions of their governments. Hence, based on the cosmopolitan ideal the UN Charter expresses, the cause of peace is the primary justification for UN peace efforts, including resorting to force when necessary.

1.4. Operational definition of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs"

The present chapter aims to analyse the aspects that grant the UN the legitimacy to use force in robust PKOs and, ultimately, to operationalise a definition of such legitimacy in an objective and straightforward fashion. In this sense, the chapter started with a brief elaboration on legitimacy as philosophers, sociologists and political scientists view it. Then, the argument focused on the use of force in the international arena and the condition for the legitimate use of force by the UN. Regarding this point, we analysed the parameters of the UN Charter, UN official documents and the prescriptions of the UN capstone doctrine for

[53] The first PKO was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), established in 1948 to monitor the armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

[54] This is, for instance, the case of three countries whose peacekeeping units illustrate the case study in this work. In Brazil, the Constitution establishes, among the guiding principles for the country's international relations, the defence of peace, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the prevalence of human rights and the cooperation among peoples for the progress of humanity (BRAZIL, 2020). In the Republic of Indonesia, the Constitution defines, in its preamble, that the government shall cooperate to establish a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice (INDONESIA, 2022). In Germany, the Constitution values and sets world peace, human dignity and human rights as some of the basis for the country's stance and actions on the world stage (GERMANY, 2021).

peacekeeping operations and considered them in conjunction with impressions on the matter that scholars and peacekeeping experts raised. As subdimensions of legitimacy, the notions of credibility, efficiency and public perception received due attention.

According to Sartori, in their attempt to reduce ambiguities, operational definitions of concepts typically imply the cutting down of meanings that do not comply with the "operationist requirement" (1970, p. 1045). Although such curtailments entail losses in conceptual richness and explanatory power, they allow the objective expression of the conditions for verifying the concept.

Another aspect to consider when operationalising definitions is the role they should play. The first idea that comes to mind is that operational definitions should work as descriptions of things or notions, so that people may positively relate the definition to the concept being defined. However, in the case of complex concepts, a descriptive definition is very tough to achieve, and even if crafted, it would be of little use. In such situations, definitions should have an evaluative character, i.e., they should work as parameters or criteria against which to appraise the notion. Regarding this point, Kratochwil examines the term "legitimacy" given the functions its definition may assume. The author concludes that

> legitimacy is badly understood when it is treated as a descriptive term rather than one of appraisal. While it may seem that 'legitimate' functions like a term that is supposed to ascertain a 'property' of a decision or law – perhaps analogously to colour terms in the case of objects – our discussion […] showed why such an inference is mistaken. Reducing the operations involved in appraising to one of describing is likely to engender the same difficulties that we encounter in the ascription 'goodness' if we treat the latter as a simple 'property' of an object or action (KRATOCHWIL, 2006, p. 305).

Therefore, this work treats the operational definition of the UN legitimacy to use force in robust PKOs —a multifaceted and complex concept— as a term of appraisal. It presents an objective expression of the conditions for verifying legitimacy rather than describing it as a peacekeeping mission's property. In a given context, our operational definition functions as a parameter against which to assess the legitimacy of each particular UN PKO.

1.4.1. Features and indicators

This study uses the method suggested at the end of section 1.1. to operationalise the definition of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs". Initially, we consider the UN legitimacy to use force holistically and broadly contextualised it. Then we analysed the concept through its different facets and peculiar aspects. Lastly, we elaborated a

tentative operational definition. During the interviews and questionnaire completion, we shared the definition with peacekeeping experts and blue helmets, who endorsed it.

The proposals of Habermas (1976), Coleman (2007) and Suchman (1995) to understand legitimacy as something "good, just, proper, and desirable", as well as Merquior's (1980) allusion to the qualities of "right or proper" of legitimate rulerships, offered a solid basis for operationally understanding the legitimate use of force in peacekeeping. Although the authors discuss such conditions in the theoretical-philosophic realm, relevant UN diplomas and documents justify the international community's intentions and actions on these terms, granting them concreteness.

In this sense, the operational definition starts with a mention of the UN values and principles and the relevance of the cause of peace. Given its wide acceptance, peace constitutes an elevated human value, and its genuine pursuit by the UN, not compromised by selfish interests, contributes substantially to the legitimacy of the organisation's undertakings. Then, the definition encompasses aspects of legality and validity at the two-level process (i.e. political-strategic and local) to authorise and manage PKOs. The almost universal adherence to the UN Charter and the broad participation of states in the organisation's peace initiatives add to peacekeeping legitimacy. Finally, we consider procedural and structural aspects that legitimise the UN peacekeeping actions.

Although the present study focuses on the legitimacy of an action, i.e., the use of force, some qualities and conditions of the UN and peacekeeping missions as actors are important to operationalise the definition. Moreover, in line with the notion that legitimacy is a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing affair (BEETHAM, 2013; ONUMA, 2010), we consider the legitimacy of using force in robust PKOs as a set of objective and subjective aspects that the missions must continually pursue, manage and maintain.

Two additional considerations aid in better understanding the proposed definition. First, legitimacy's defining aspects have different grades of relevance. Some are essential because the UN cannot legitimately use force in peacekeeping without them. This group includes aspects such as the legal foundations for the use of force, host country's consent for the peace mission, local population's acceptance of the mission, and the cause of peace as the primary reason for the undertaking. Conversely, several aspects are instrumental. They may temporarily lack and, even so, allow "partial" legitimacy[55].

[55] These aspects were frequently mentioned during the interviews with peacekeeping experts (type I interviews).

The second reason is related to regularity. Aspects such as "moderation in the use of force", "peacekeepers' standard of conduct" and "efficiency" imply that legitimacy depends on every single action. However, a series of correct uses of force may grant the mission a reputation for legitimacy, rendering isolated failures exceptional cases.

Table 4 presents, separated into specific fields, the features that indicate the legitimate use of force by the UN to keep peace in robust operations. The organised disposition of arguments helps understand the correlations between the different aspects of the concept.

Moral /ethical	Legal	Structural	Procedural
- UN's universal values and principles	- UN Charter - UNSC mandate	- Host country's status as a UN member state	- Observance of the UN Charter's rites
- The cause of peace	- Peace accord or cease-fire agreement	- Consent of the host government and the main parties to the conflict	- Political efforts for armed groups to abdicate violence
		- Universality (UN Force's multinational composition)	- Impartiality
		- Goals (coherence of peacekeeping mission's objectives)	- Moderation in the use of force
			- Peacekeepers' standard of conduct
			- Efficiency
			- Public acceptance of the UN mission

Table 4 – Features and indicators of UN legitimacy to use force to keep peace

The systematic steps we followed in the research allowed the formulation of a concise definition of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs", applicable to the academy, peacekeeping institutions, outsiders and laypeople. This definition follows.

1.4.2. Operational definition

<u>UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs</u>

The legitimacy of the UN to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs is a specific condition ensured by the conformity of the UN structure, in general, and the

peacekeeping mission, in particular, with a series of aspects that render the use of force right, just and appropriate. First and foremost, such condition is founded on the fact that the UN represents all the nations of the world and has, as enshrined in its Charter, high values and principles, such as the defence of peace, faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity of the human person, and promotion of better living conditions for all the peoples.

A solid legal basis legitimises the peace missions' existence and activities. The UN Charter, a fundamental element of international law, establishes that it is the United Nations Security Council's responsibility to identify threats to peace and decide on measures to be taken. Thus, based on the Charter and in observance of its rites, the Council determines the establishment of peacekeeping missions and issues relevant mandates and instructions for them, including aspects regarding the use of force. In addition, the host country's participation in the UN as a member, the host government's consent to the PKO and the observance of the peace agreement by the peacekeeping mission complement the legal requirements. Also meaningful, the consent of the main parties to the conflict for the UN presence and the mission's peaceful, continuous efforts for armed groups to abdicate violence consolidate the UN legitimacy to use force.

Universality, impartiality, adequate attitude and efficiency are other elements adding to the legitimate use of force to fulfil the mandate. The multinational composition of the peacekeeping mission, particularly its military component, symbolises the international community's joint effort to support peace and the host nation. The peacekeepers' impartial attitude, without implying tolerance of breaches of the UN Charter terms or actions against the peace process, makes their presence and activities trustable and fair. The blue helmets' high standards of conduct and restraint in using force contribute to the acceptance of their presence. Equally relevant, the correspondence between the mission's objectives and the genuine wishes of the host country's population, along with the mission's efficiency in fulfilling the mandated tasks, ensure credibility in the eyes of the local public and legitimise the PKO's *modus operandi*.

Finally, the cause of peace shall be highlighted as the most relevant aspect in legitimising the PKO and the use of force. The UN mission and its appropriate actions are legitimate because the objectives of achieving and maintaining peace, as well as supporting and protecting vulnerable people are good, desirable and widely recognised.

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In the next chapter, we will explore the relevance of military tasks for the success of robust PKOs and the impact of episodes of peacekeeping units' underperformance on the efficiency of UN military components.

Chapter 2

MILITARY TASKS AND UNDERPERFORMANCE

Since the end of the Cold War, threats to international peace and security have been mainly intra-state conflicts. As a result, most UN PKOs are deployed to achieve peace in single host countries, where they must address complex conflict and post-conflict issues with political, social and economic roots. To be effective and set the basis of sustainable peace, modern PKOs became multidimensional and endowed with flexible structures. Most missions have a mixture of military, rule of law, political affairs, elections, human rights, gender and other components or offices. Thus, contrary to what many people think, modern peacekeeping is far from an essentially military enterprise. Nonetheless, the UN military components remain responsible for critical tasks in the peace process.

In the present chapter we intend to demonstrate that the performances of peacekeeping units, particularly in risky tasks, become crucial for the success of robust PKOs.

2.1. Relevance of military tasks for the success of robust PKOs

The UNSC provides peacekeeping missions with troops when it deems them necessary to fulfil specific tasks in the mandate. During the operations planning phase, the UN Secretariat assesses the nature of the envisaged tasks and the situation in the host country to propose the required military capabilities to the Council. As a rule, when the security situation on the ground is precarious or volatile, core capabilities like command, control and communication; firepower; mobility; force protection; logistics; and tactical information are improved. Consequently, in robust PKOs, military components are strong and possess more enhanced capabilities than in traditional operations. They are unique in dealing with critical tasks of the peace process, directly supporting the mission's strategic concept and final goals.

Lieutenant General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz, former Director for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership in DPKO, considers that

> without the UN Force and the adequate accomplishment of the tasks attributed to the military, robust peacekeeping missions would not sustain themselves. Were the troops not necessary, the UN would spare a great deal of money conducting PKOs. The blue helmets are there because they are crucial for success (PAUL CRUZ, 2021, translation is ours).

However, while there is broad agreement that the presence of troops is necessary for robust PKOs, the exact dimension of such relevance is not easy to ascertain. The conditions of effectiveness and success of PKOs, which are crucial to gauging how important the contribution of the troops is, remain the subject of confusion and debate in both the policy and academic communities (MAMIYA, RALPH; HANSEN, 2020; PETER, 2016). Therefore, this study addresses the issue of peacekeeping indicators of success to better understand the relevance of military tasks in the broad context of robust PKOs.

Before setting out to identify realistic, effective indicators of success, we should explain how the term "task" is used in the present work. The peacekeeping doctrine uses the word with two different, yet associated, meanings: tasks determined by the UNSC in relevant resolutions, and tasks carried out by the mission components per SRSG guidance or orders from the components' heads. For instance, "protection of civilians" is a task the UNSC establishes for the mission at the political-strategic level. Nonetheless, such a highly strategic task is accomplished by completing tactical tasks at the ground level. Regarding the military, they protect civilians against armed threats through tasks the Force headquarters assigns to subordinate units, such as launching patrols and checkpoints, conducting cordon and search operations, interposing themselves between communities and armed groups and, in critical situations, directing military actions against rebels (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2012, p. v.1, 100). Therefore, the tasks at the tactical level are instrumental for accomplishing the tasks determined by the UNSC.

This chapter deals both with UNSC-mandated tasks and the military tasks the UN Force headquarters orders the peacekeeping units to implement.

2.1.1. PKO indicators of success

Robust peace operations are complex and, therefore, difficult to assess. Besides, because the evaluation of PKOs involves perceptions, missions can be considered successful

by some actors and not by others. To deal with these and other problems, Bratt (1996) proposes four ways to judge whether a PKO has been successful: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties. However, the scholar recognises some complications in applying these or any other indicators. One of these difficulties occurs when the operation under assessment produces mixed records, succeeding in some respects and failing in others: In this case, should it be overall assessed as success or failure? There is also the question of the duration or sustainability of the outcomes. For example, once violence is controlled and the environment is secure, how long should law and order prevail to consider the PKO successful? Still, problems with missions' timeframes complicate the evaluation further: Would reaching a milestone with significant delay mean success or failure? Such issues are context-dependent and, therefore, subjective.

An analysis of the method Bratt proposes reveals that, in reality, the last three criteria converge on the first one, i.e., on mandate performance. Although the scholar singles out "facilitation of conflict resolution" and "conflict containment" as specific criteria for assessing success, the mandates of modern PKOs include actions for both aims. For instance, the UNSC-mandated tasks of creating a secure and stable environment, monitoring and observing cease-fires, and facilitating a political process lead all to conflict containment and resolution. Moreover, the "limitation of casualties" usually results from mandated tasks that aim to reduce violence and, thereby, casualties. The tasks of protecting civilians against physical violence and creating a secure and stable environment are the best examples in this regard, but extending state authority, disarmament and demobilisation, and security-sector reform also contribute to limiting casualties.

Recently, the EPON proposed, in a series of reports, a methodology to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. The network defines effectiveness as "the overall strategic impact of a peace operation, understood as reducing conflict dynamics in the area of operation over a particular period of time, in the context of its mandate and resources" (MAMIYA, RALPH; HANSEN, 2020, p. 29). Interestingly, the EPON clarifies in this definition that effectiveness only makes sense in the context of the mission's mandate and availability of resources. Using the effectiveness definition as a starting point, the network's reports follow a flexible methodology, rooted in the mission's mandate, to offer comprehensive evaluations. The method comprises eight dimensions to analyse the effectiveness of PKOs: protection and stabilisation; people-centred approach; legitimacy and credibility; political primacy; national and local ownership; women, peace and security; international support;

coherence and partnerships. These dimensions have the advantage of organising the mission's evaluation, including its short- and long-term impacts[56].

The UNSC mandate is paramount to a peacekeeping mission's functioning. Most member states —financial, troop and police contributors— link their commitment to PKOs to the mandate's content. In the UNHQ, the Secretariat sticks carefully to the UNSC mandates when elaborating peacekeeping strategies, managing PKOs and measuring their outcomes. On the ground, the missions' staff and components take actions based on guidance and instructions derived from the mandate. Furthermore, as a standard procedure, the Council requests the Secretary-General to report regularly on the situation of each PKO and the status of mandate implementation. The structure and organisation of such reports follow the UNSC-mandated tasks and observe the Council's guidance regarding timeframes and required feedback. To mitigate the subjectivity of the textual presentation of results, the Secretariat uses detailed technical descriptions of the mission components' activities and resorts to statistics whenever possible.

For all those reasons, recent studies consider the mission's mandate a mandatory guide for gauging success (PETER, 2016). Nevertheless, sometimes mandates result to be vague, imperfect or unrealistic at the outset, complicating the peace process and making the missions' evaluation difficult. Thus, the UNSC must strive to issue clear, objective and achievable mandates to PKOs. On the other hand, establishing parameters to evaluate a peacekeeping mission other than the goals expressed in the mandate is misleading and dysfunctional. The mission staff and components tend not to acknowledge such "unofficial" requirements. Besides, the PKO would not be equipped or provided with funds to achieve them since the basis for force generation and the formulation of the mission's budget is the UNSC mandate. For instance, many people insist that peacekeeping missions should bequeath a future of peace and prosperity to conflict-torn countries, without considering that they have neither the task nor the budget to promote socio-economic development[57].

Therefore, this study adopts the accomplishment of the tasks the UNSC determines to the PKO as the parameter to evaluate its performance and indicate success. In this sense, a peacekeeping mission's complete or partial accomplishment of such tasks denotes full or partial

[56] The EPON issues reports on specific PKOs regularly. Among the robust operations, reports on MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSCA and MINUSMA were available on https://effectivepeaceops.net/ at the time of writing.

[57] As per the UN capstone doctrine, PKOs are not a tool for the socio-economic development of host countries, which should be supported by the Peacebuilding Fund or through bilateral cooperation with member states and regional organisations. Accordingly, the peacekeeping budgets do not comprise expenditures for that purpose.

success in the respective operational area. Conversely, the failure to accomplish a task indicates a sectoral failure. The following tasks, common in robust PKOs' mandates, are indicators of success:

- protect civilians,
- create a secure and stable environment,
- facilitate the political process by promoting national political dialogue and reconciliation,
- monitor and observe peace agreements and cease-fires,
- disarm, demobilise and reintegrate (DDR),
- support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance,
- provide electoral assistance,
- provide operational support to national law enforcement agencies,
- facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance,
- promote and protect human rights, and
- support the restoration and extension of state authority.

2.1.2. The relevance of military components

Scrutiny of robust PKOs' *modus operandi* indicates that UN military components participate in almost all tasks the UNSC determines. In some of them, the UN troops are the only or most significant provider; in others, they support other missions' components.

Protecting civilians is a priority task in robust peacekeeping and often represents the yardstick by which the international community and the host country's population judge the peacekeeping mission's worth (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2012). Consequently, the UN Secretariat directs the missions to concentrate efforts on protection activities, which implies coordinated actions of several mission components. However, the blue helmets retain a prominent role in protecting civilians from the threat of armed violence. Although political engagement with the parties and such actions as disarmament and demobilisation contribute to reducing violence and indirectly lead to security and protection, only the military can carry out preventive and neutralising actions.

Creating a secure and stable environment is also a crucial task in PKOs. The UNSC determines it for two fundamental reasons. First, it establishes a "peaceful" setting and thereby fosters confidence in the peace process. Second, it allows the unarmed mission components and the civilian agencies to move freely and work efficiently. A series of peacekeeping

activities and goals depend on a secure environment, such as the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the cantonment and disarmament of former combatants and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Also, the personnel in charge of institution-building, monitoring and promotion of human rights, and preparing and monitoring elections depend on security to do their jobs. To a great extent, establishing a secure and stable environment means realising peace, which makes even the complex task of protecting civilians considerably easier.

Establishing a secure and stable environment is the military's primary function. The blue helmets carry out this task through a visible deterrent presence on the ground and, as necessary, tactical military operations to control movement through checkpoints, provide armed escorts to convoys, conduct cordon and search operations for criminals or to confiscate weapons. By establishing and keeping the environment secure and stable, the military component's capabilities provide space and opportunity for the political process to be smoothly implemented, without the disruptions of security crises (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2003).

Other tasks in robust PKOs imply the use of force and consequently the engagement of missions' military components. For instance, the restoration and extension of state authority usually require the use of force, but the level of military involvement depends on each specific case. In Haiti, MINUSTAH troops had to fight to recover large parts of the country's capital and main cities to state control, a strategy that proved essential for the peace process. However, in other cases, the extension of state authority over the territory may depend mainly on strengthening state institutions. Also, the task of supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance may require the blue helmets to escort convoys and secure distribution sites. Still, such actions depend on the formal request of humanitarian actors.

Robust PKOs are deployed in post-conflict and conflict environments, where armed groups still threaten communities and local governments cannot ensure security. Consequently, the UN equips such operations with adequate military means to deal with the difficulties of their mandates. A concrete indicator of the UN Forces' relevance in such operations is the amount of money the world organisation spends to deploy and support strong military components. Table 5 shows the total budget of robust PKOs and the cost of the respective uniformed components, overwhelmingly consisting of military units. The information refers to the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022.

(US Dollars)

	MINUSCA	MINUSMA	MONUSCO	UNIFIL	UNISFA	UNMISS
Military component's strength	**11.992**	**12.299**	**12.712**	**9.829**	**2.045**	**13.679**
Police component's strength	2.593	1.730	1.626	------	42	1.411
Military and police personnel costs	**576 938 400**	**485 350 500**	**522 261700**	**331 053 600**	**125 665 200**	**527 924 600**
Mission total budget	**1 036 595 600**	**1 171 612 500**	**1 042 728 900**	**476 842 000**	**260 445 300**	**1 115 633 900**

Table 5 - Military and police costs in robust PKOs in comparison to missions' total costs. Sources: Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 (UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2022a) and United Nations Peacekeeping homepage (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2022b)[58].

2.1.3. Military tasks and peacekeeping mission credibility

To succeed, PKOs must have the support of a series of stakeholders. Among them, local authorities and citizens are particularly relevant because their perceptions of the peace process's meaningfulness and the UN's efficiency in conducting it may separate success from failure. For instance, civilians cannot be considered protected against armed violence if they understand that threats persist, and the country is not secure if people in villages and towns live there in fear. Hence, deployed in regions where people are tired of living amid violence and crave peace and normal life, robust missions must show the locals that they can protect them and keep the environment secure. Failures to meet justified expectations may cause a peacekeeping mission to become a focus of widespread dissatisfaction or even active opposition (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2012).

Even though credibility is fundamental for missions' success, examples of failures threatening UN local credibility abound. In almost all cases, the problems relate to security and, therefore, concern mainly the uniformed components of the peacekeeping missions, particularly the military. Currently, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSCA and MINUSMA

[58] The figures under "military and police personnel costs" represent only the reimbursements to TCCs. The expenses will be higher with the inclusion of supplies, facilities, infrastructure and transportation provided by the UN.

provide telling episodes of how failures to deliver security lead to people's mistrust and consequently adversely impact the peace process.

In the DRC, MONUC started with high credibility due to its role in reunifying a country whose territorial integrity was under threat. In 2010, having transited to MONUSCO, the mission faced a serious credibility crisis after the M23 seized Goma in late 2012 but bounced back months later with the FIB offensive to liberate the city. However, MONUSCO's tactic of patrolling across extensive areas has proved insufficient to protect the many villages and IDP camps against the attacks of armed groups. As a result, the mission has suffered from negative public perceptions in recent years, accused of inactivity and incapacity to deliver the mandated tasks (ILUNGA, 2019; NOVOSSELOFF et al., 2019). Among the several crises that impacted MONUSCO's credibility are the Ituri massacres in 2003, the Bukavu crisis in 2004, and the crisis in Kasai in 2016. More recently, in 2019, another security crisis delivered a renewed blow to MONUSCO's credibility. On 30 October, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (*Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* - FARDC) launched a military offensive against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) militia in the area north of Beni, after concentrating thousands of troops in the town and its vicinity. Although the FARDC succeeded in taking over several strategic positions, the ADF rebels launched a series of deliberate attacks against civilians to undermine the offensive, with a spike occurring at the end of November. Armed rebels killed more than 80 civilians, including many women and children. As a result of these attacks, a series of violent protests broke out against MONUSCO and the insecurity in the country. In the most critical development, an angry crowd stoned and set fire to the UN premises in Beni to protest the mission's failure to prevent the deadly attacks against civilians (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2019; UNITED NATIONS, 2020).

In South Sudan, the episode of Malakal and the crisis in Juba were typical cases of failure to protect civilians having a profound adverse impact on a UN PKO's image (DAY et al., 2019). In February 2016, despite clear indications that the situation was deteriorating in Malakal, UNMISS remained passive and did not deploy reinforcements to the area. Then, communal violence within the UN protection compound triggered the Sudan People's Liberation Army's forces to attack, and the mission responded late and weakly. As a result, 30 civilians were killed, over one hundred were wounded, and a third of the camp was set ablaze (WELLS, 2017). In the investigation of the incident, the UN admitted the blue helmets' inaction and even refusal to intervene (TANZA, 2016). A few months later, in July, more severe fighting took place in South Sudan's capital. The violence in Juba spread swiftly and led once more to

attacks against the civilian populations. On occasion, the refusal of some peacekeeping units to get engaged frustrated the reaction of UNMISS. The UN troops stayed on their bases, and Chinese peacekeepers withdrew from their posts at a civilian protection site where thousands of people had sought safety. Although Ethiopian blue helmets helped evacuate casualties and returned fire when the civilian camp was targeted, they did not risk their lives outside their camps (BURKE, 2016). About the episode, the report of an independent investigation ordered by the UN Secretary-General concludes that

> the lack of preparedness, ineffective command and control and a risk averse or "inward looking" posture resulted in a loss of trust and confidence, particularly by the local population and humanitarian agencies, in the will and skill of UNMISS military and police to be proactive and show a determined posture to protect civilians under threat, including from sexual violence and human rights violations (CAMMAERT, 2016, p. 6).

In the CAR, the series of clashes in and around the town of Batangafo between 30 October and 6 November 2018 harmed MINUSCA's credibility. On occasion, members of the Ex-Séléka armed group and anti-Balaka associated militias conducted a series of actions against each other, most directed against civilian populations and IDPs believed to support the opposing side. The results of the clashes included the killing of 11 civilians and injury of other 37, vandalised schools and churches, and the looting and torching of thousands of huts. The blue helmets did not intervene during the assaults, not even when a victim was shot when drawing water from a public well, not far from the wall of their camp. This inaction caused the locals and political and religious leaders to severely criticise MINUSCA for the lack of military action to stop the attacks (UNITED NATIONS. MINUSCA HEADQUARTERS, 2018b). A few days later, on 15 November, violations and abuses of human rights erupted again, this time in Alindao. An armed group called Unity for the Peace in Central Africa (*Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique*) and anti-Balaka associated militias carried out the violent actions. The attacks, which lasted two days, resulted in the deaths of 112 persons, many of them women and children, and several civilian injuries. The incidents caused the population in the area to lose confidence in MINUSCA's capacity to protect them. On 22 November, members of the IDP population living around the MINUSCA camp opened fire on the blue helmets' sentry post, leading to an exchange of fire that lasted over thirty minutes. On occasion, IDP leaders claimed that the attack was a protest against the UN troops' inaction during the mid-November attacks on the IDP population (UNITED NATIONS. MINUSCA HEADQUARTERS, 2018a).

Regarding MINUSMA, at the outset, the mission enjoyed high levels of credibility. The population and essential stakeholders appreciated its contribution to the restoration of the constitutional order and the security in some important towns, as well as the re-establishment of state authority across the country. However, the performance shortcomings of some military units, the mission's absence in the central regions of Mali and the rebels' uninterrupted attacks against small villages erased the local's positive perception of MINUSMA. In addition, the association of MINUSMA with the government and Malian armed forces damaged the mission's credibility in areas where those actors were repudiated. As a result, MINUSMA has been facing decreasing support and protests against its presence have become frequent (LIJN et al., 2019). Patz reports the deficient appreciation of MINUSMA by Mali's population on the following basis:

> According to a recent survey of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation of 2018, 59% of the respondents evaluate that MINUSMA 'did not protect the population against the violence of armed groups and terrorists', while 31.6% see MINUSMA as 'accomplice of the armed groups' […] and 21.7% see the mission concerned, above all, with its own protection (PATZ, 2019, p. 358, translation is ours)[59].

The situation in UNIFIL and the evolution of its credibility followed a peculiar path. Initially, UNIFIL's inability to deter Israeli interventions in the south of Lebanon has contributed to the Lebanese's distrust of its impartiality and effectiveness. Since its creation and until the 2006 reformulation, the mission could neither prevent actions against Israel from the Lebanese territory nor repel Israeli invasions. However, with the upgrade determined by the UNSC in Resolution 1701 (2006b), the UN stationed up to 15.000 troops in the south of Lebanon, and UNIFIL started a new phase. Since then, the mission has dealt with two critical issues regarding credibility. First, the dilemma that the mandated task of disarming armed groups represents. Among these groups is Hezbollah, which has a political role in Lebanon and whose armed wing has earned some reputation for protecting the local population. Due to the group's popularity, proactive actions against it would not be supported by a significant part of the population. The second issue is the crucial task of ensuring full respect for the Blue Line, which is the demarcation line between Lebanon and Israel. Although complex, this decisive task assumes a key function in defining the mission credibility.

[59] MINUSMA does not have a counter-terrorism mandate. However, many civilians do not distinguish between the attributions of international organisations and assume that they all work together. Consequently, it is difficult for the mission to dissociate its image from counter-terrorism, which is a great expectation of the public (LIJN et al., 2019, p. 82).

In recent years, UNIFIL progressively recovered its credibility, which has been helping the mission accomplish the mandate and deal with the challenges it has on the ground. According to Newby (2018), since 2006, UNIFIL has prevented outbreaks of violence in its area of operations, located in the South of Lebanon. The mission stabilised the "buffer zone", kept the separation of the parties to the conflict and avoided an overt presence of armed groups, especially Hezbollah[60]. In the scholar's view, UNIFIL has allowed the recovery of conditions for economic development in Lebanon with such achievements. Moreover, the mission assists the Lebanese Armed Forces —the most respected and trusted institution in the country— in deploying and taking control of the area south of the Litani River, which further contributes to its credibility.

Peacekeeping missions that effectively achieve a safer environment ensure credibility among the local citizens and, as a result, improve their chances of success. That happened with MINUSTAH after a series of robust operations to repel and defeat the criminal gangs that controlled large portions of Port-au-Prince and other main cities in Haiti. In the country's capital, the criminal's strongholds fell progressively under the blue helmets' control but at the cost of intense fighting. One by one, the areas of Bel Air, Cité Militaire, Martissant, Carrefour and Cité Soleil were cleared from criminals and recovered to the government's control. Secured by MINUSTAH troops, with the additional presence of UN police and the HNP, the Haitians in those areas recovered a peaceful routine and the right to live without fear and threats. Consequently, the mission enjoyed significant support from the population and local authorities. Referring to the actions against the armed gangs in 2006-07, Dziedzic and Perito report the beneficial impacts of these successful operations on the mission credibility:

> Sentiment toward MINUSTAH has improved dramatically as a result of the crackdown on gangs. In the United States Institute of Peace survey, 67 percent of those polled credited the UN mission for the improvement in their security situation, and 17 percent attributed the improvement to President Préval. […] Perhaps in anticipation of a more robust HNP presence, both surveys also found that almost three-fourths of Cité Soleil residents expect to be more secure in the months ahead (DZIEDZIC, MICHAEL; PERITO 2008, p. 6)[61].

[60] The area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, which corresponds to UNIFIL's area of operations, functions as a buffer to separate the parties to the conflict, namely the states of Israel and Lebanon, which remain technically at war. In addition, it is also a space free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon. As such, it cannot be utilised for hostile activities of any kind.

[61] MINUSTAH's mandate tasked the mission to assist in the restructuring and reform of the HNP. At the time Cité Soleil was recovered from gangs' control, the HNP operated under the mentoring of the mission's police component and jointly with the military component, which sustained the brunt of the actions against armed spoilers.

Lieutenant General Santos Cruz led the MINUSTAH military component from 2007 to early 2009. During his command, the mission concluded, in Cité Soleil, the pacification of Port-au-Prince. Santos Cruz understands that assertive military operations play a relevant role in robust PKOs. According to him, in Haiti,

> at the end of 2006, beginning of 2007, the street gangs were very bold, the crime of kidnapping had a very high incidence and the gangs' freedom of action was a factor that undermined the mission's concept and prestige. MINUSTAH's initiative in taking forceful actions against the gangs and their (false) belief, due to a long time in control of the area, that it was possible to defend their strongholds and engage in large-scale combat with UN troops, was fundamental to the mission's success (SANTOS CRUZ, 2018, translation is ours).

Four years later, Lieutenant General Santos Cruz took over command of the UN Force in MONUSCO. With this new experience as Force Commander, he consolidated the notion that assertive military operations make the difference to preserving credibility and, ultimately, granting success to robust PKOs. Santos Cruz points to the Goma crisis, when, after having attacked the provincial capital, the M23 subjected the city to a siege. The episode had national and international repercussion and left the UN mission completely demoralised since the 1.500 blue helmets present in the town did not react as expected[62]. The crisis was only overcome with the arrival of the FIB in mid-2013.

> The fight to liberate Goma started in late August, with the UN forces supporting the FARDC. Both sides' casualties were high, but the rebels lost three times as many fighters as the Congolese Army. Having been defeated in Goma and later on in Rutshuru-Kiwanja and Tchanzu, the rebels tried to destroy their ammunition, set the vehicles on fire overnight and retreat to Uganda, because the positions were only 7 km away from the border. The defeat of the M23 [in October] caused some 5.000 rebels from other smaller groups to surrender and join the DDR program. Definitely, 2013 was a year in which MONUSCO military component was crucial to restoring the mission's prestige and success (SANTOS CRUZ, 2018, translation is ours)[63].

2.2. Impacts of underperformance on the efficiency of military components

Episodes of poor military performance often occur in robust peacekeeping operations, negatively impacting UN mission plans and prospects. To put the problem in proper

[62] The M23 rebels met little resistance from the FARDC and the UN, leading protesters to burn UN properties in the north-eastern city of Kisangani, to vent their fury over Goma's fall (BBC NEWS, 2012).

[63] After years of inactivity, the M23 resumed its actions in 2017, with isolated attacks against the FARDC. These attacks ramped up from November 2021, when the rebel group staged several raids in the area just west of the Ugandan and Rwandan borders and culminated with the control of the Rutshuru territory, north of Goma (CONGO RESEARCH GROUP; EBUTELI INSTITUTE, 2022).

perspective, most peacekeeping units perform satisfactorily, but some perform below average and their failures compromise the efficiency of their missions' military components. Such damage occurs in three ways:

1) Reducing the efficiency of coordinated military actions;

2) compromising the image of the military component in the eyes of the population due to gross failures in carrying out tasks; and

3) reducing the Force's flexibility by decreasing the number of reliable units the Force Commander counts for critical operations.

2.2.1. Performance and underperformance in robust PKOs

The technological revolution of the last decades has generated significant advances in defence systems. In several areas, the use of electronic and cyber systems, uncrewed aerial and ground vehicles, and artificial intelligence became significant and, for many armies, a matter of operational routine. As a result of such innovations, soldiers became expendable, and troops have been replaced by technological means in several military tasks. However, such changes have only a partial impact on peacekeeping. Although new technologies have been increasingly applied in PKO, they are used in support of the military actions, not to replace the blue helmets. The reason is that PKOs require boots on the ground and close "human" contact with local communities to succeed.

Therefore, infantry battalions and autonomous infantry companies continue to be the most important military outfits in PKOs[64]. Due to their possibility of operating in any terrain (e.g. savanna, jungle, mountain and riverine areas), either by foot, with "soft skin" vehicles or armoured personnel carriers (APCs), these combat units can carry out a wide range of tasks. The UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) prescribes the missions, evaluation parameters and performance expected from blue helmet battalions in a series of operational tasks (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2012).

According to the UNIBAM, battalions and companies must perform all prescribed tasks efficiently, following the peacekeeping norms and mission standard operating procedures. For example, the task of "patrolling" is considered successful if it effectively maintains the UN forces' freedom of movement, creates a safe and secure environment for

[64] Infantry battalions are constituted of three or four infantry companies, which operate under the coordination of the battalion staff. However, infantry companies may be detached from battalions to be directly subordinated to the higher command (brigade commander, sector commander or force commander). This type of company is named here "autonomous" company.

providing humanitarian assistance, reassures and protects threatened communities and deters potential spoilers and human rights violators (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2012, v. II, p. 27-29).

The release of the UNIBAM was a UN Secretariat effort to standardise the performances of peacekeeping units. The manual enables TCCs to properly train battalions to accomplish tasks in peacekeeping mission areas. Besides, the Secretariat took other actions to enhance blue helmets' performance, such as the policy on operational readiness assurance and performance improvement, the standard operating procedures for force and sector commander's evaluation of subordinate military entities in PKOs, and the guidelines on the use of force by military components in PKOs, launched in 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2016; UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT, 2017; UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2015). The policy and the standard operating procedures are complementary. While the former set institutional direction for strengthening the operational readiness of military units deployed in UN PKOs, the latter describes a process by which force and sector commanders should monitor, evaluate and improve subordinate units' performance. In turn, the guidelines on the use of force are a more specific document. It aims to provide precise orientation, mitigate hesitations in using military force and improve peacekeeping troops' performance.

In 2019, the UN Secretariat launched the programme Action for Peace ("A4P") as a comprehensive tool to consolidate all actions aiming at improving performance (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2019). In this sense, the A4P programme includes instruments to evaluate and improve the mission's overall performance, such as the Comprehensive Performance and Assessment System (CPAS), and establishes a military performance evaluation task force to pay pre-deployment visits to peacekeeping units prepared by TCCs.

However, despite the efforts so far, the UN Secretariat could not eradicate the problem of military underperformance. During interviews conducted for this study, most of the peacekeepers acknowledged the incidence and seriousness of the problem. Many officers indicated that they had personal experience with military units' failing in their tasks or had known about such failures through reliable sources during their tours of duty in robust PKOs.

Most cases of underperformance relate to the protection of civilians. As the OIOS report reveals, blue helmets' performances significantly vary regarding taking risks to accomplish their tasks (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT

SERVICES, 2014). Although problems such as poor mobility, insufficient force protection and inadequate logistics have negatively impacted performance, in many cases the failures are due to lack of initiative, omissions and even refusal to follow force commanders' orders, signalling an unwillingness to take risks. According to the report, regarding attacks on civilians,

> response from missions was generally passive. Force was not used when Goma was invaded […], when Likuangole was destroyed […] or when Mai Mai Cheka rebels constantly harassed the population of Pinga, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the presence of United Nations troops on site and the existence of significant risk to civilians. Only four missions indicated that they had ever fired a warning shot, and only three indicated that they had ever fired a shot with lethal intent (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 11).

The number of attacks on vulnerable civilians and serious violations of human rights in conflict and post-conflict areas is very high, considering that such crimes should not happen at all. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), since 1989, 281 armed actors have been active in one-sided violence, with a yearly average of 33. In 2019, for instance, 31 armed groups operated by targeting civilians. These groups killed over 4.900 vulnerable people, most of them in Africa, where the trends point to an increase in killings (PETTERSSON; ÖBERG, 2020). Among the countries where the UN currently deploys robust PKOs, the problem remains particularly severe in the DRC and Mali. In 2020 alone, there were 1.961 and 481 civilians victims of armed attacks in these countries, respectively (UPPSALA UNIVERSITY. DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, 2021)[65].

According to the 2014 OIOS report, some peacekeeping missions came to be recognised for the succession of failures in protecting civilians. The document reveals that MONUSCO admitted failures concerning several critical incidents. In turn, UNMISS became renowned for a pattern of non-intervention when civilians were threatened by imminent attack or under attack (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014).

An interesting point that the literature has not yet explored is the possible relationship between performance in peacekeeping and nationality. Although a 2014 study conducted in UNIFIL by Ruffa (2014) indicates that different armed forces display typical operational behaviours, it did not focus on the performance parameter. So, to ascertain the possible

[65] The figures consider only victims of one-sided violence, excluding deaths in clashes between armed groups.

relationship, we surveyed 30 peacekeeping experts from different countries[66]. We presented them with the following question: "In your opinion, is the performance of peacekeeping units in risky tasks linked to nationality so that different contingents from the same country tend to show similar performances?" The following table indicates the survey result.

Categories of answers	Number of respondents	Percentage
Performance is generally related to nationality, though exceptions occur.	26	87
Performance is not related to nationality.	4	13
	30	100%

Table 6 – Relationship between performance and nationality (survey result)

The large number of responses associating performance with nationality is quite significant, particularly considering that the interviewees are professional military and know the required skills in robust PKOs. Some respondents opined that performance would be linked to nationality due to cultural and political reasons, which would signal difficulties in reducing underperformance. However, most of the respondents emphasised deficiencies in training, equipment and support of the troops as the chief reasons for poor national performances. Additionally, two interviewees stated that cultural barriers and low social identification with locals in the peacekeeping mission area —aspects intimately associated with nationality— might lead soldiers to show limited interest in their tasks. Regarding these points, Captain Nardi, then a Brazilian military observer in UNMISS, explains that

> the performance of troops from the same country in risky tasks tends to be the same, although there may be small differences in the training level between different battalions. This performance constancy is due to the soldiers' sociocultural condition in a given country, directly influencing troop motivation. […] Currently, there are in UNMISS preconceived impressions, negative or positive, about the troops of each contributing country, as a result of the consistency of their behaviours (NARDI DE SOUZA, 2020, translation is ours).

[66] At the survey time, the respondents were current or former military peacekeepers (UN military observers, headquarters staff members and members of military units), with individual ranks ranging from captain to lieutenant general.

Sociocultural, ethnic and religious circumstances influence combativeness in several ways. One is by "filtering" the notion of legitimacy of the mission to be accomplished. In this respect, two interviewees mentioned examples. A Canadian colonel, formerly a UN military observer in UNPROFOR, recalled that the Egyptian troops in the mission were reluctant to execute their tasks when they had to use force against Muslim armed factions[67]. Changing the theatre, a Brazilian Lieutenant Colonel, formerly a UN military observer in MONUSCO, recounted that, in a conversation with an African blue helmet about the tasks of his unit, he heard from him that he and his compatriots were not in the DRC "to kill African brothers", referring to members of armed groups suspected of attacking local civilians.

Finally, we should consider the issue of "caveats", i.e., the imposition by TCCs of operational restrictions on the UN using their troops and instructions for contingents to limit themselves to reactive attitudes. Such restrictions result from reluctance to hand over full command of national forces to foreign commanders and, to a greater extent, intentions to avoid national troops' exposure to dangerous situations and mitigate soldiers' risks (DOYLE, MICHAEL; SAMBANIS, 2006; NOVOSSELOFF, 2016). Examples of caveats in PKOs are the deployment of units to safe areas, suspension of operations during dark hours, limitations on positioning military assets and even restrictions regarding postures on the ground (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014). According to Major General Patrick Cammaert, former DPKO Military Advisor,

> there is unfortunately in a lot of missions with several contingents a "risk averse" attitude of military leaders in peacekeeping operations. They might be informed by their political/military leaders at home to be less proactive and remain reactive and don't take any risk. Avoiding casualties is leading here (CAMMAERT, 2020).

Caveats are not unusual in multinational operations. However, their imposition in PKOs in a way that impairs the very need for which the Secretariat requests troops signals a lack of commitment to the UN goals. Some of the restrictions TCCs use are very serious because they compromise the force commanders' flexibility to employ subordinate units in crises and emergencies, particularly when the circumstance requires the protection of civilians. Thus, such caveats risk damaging the mission's efficiency and credibility on the ground. Moreover, member states' attitude of imposing caveats or, worse, sending troops to PKOs with "hidden" caveats harms the peacekeeping mission's aura of legitimacy in the eyes of the

[67] UNPROFOR is the acronym for "United Nations Protection Force", a peacekeeping operation deployed between 1992 and 1995 in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the aftermath of the Yugoslavian wars.

military themselves[68]. Such attitudes signal to the blue helmets that their countries have restrictions on the UN's strategy and peacekeeping objectives[69].

In such a context, the UN troops tend to perform poorly, regardless of how courageous and well trained, equipped and supported they may be. Limitations determined through the chain of command not only impede effective actions but also convey to the blue helmet the idea that the cause at stake does not justify risk-taking. As the OIOS report states,

> Troop-contributing countries, unwilling or unable to accept all the risks associated with the use of force, regulate and limit the response of their contingents. Under their control, contingents may choose not to carry out some assigned tasks (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 21).

2.2.2. Impacts on military components' efficiency

Peacekeeping units' poor performances compromise the performance of the UN military components as a whole. In an attempt to establish an order of magnitude of such harm, we asked ten experienced peacekeepers to assess the impact of units' underperformance in accomplishing risky tasks on the efficiency of the military component in their missions. Five considered the impact very high, while four rated it as high and one as moderate. In addition, we asked five generals who served in MINUSTAH, MONUSCO and MINUSCA as force commander, deputy force commander or chief of staff how they assess the impact of the military component's efficiency on the respective peacekeeping mission's chances of success. They all indicated that the impact is high or very high.

A more accurate estimate of the damage caused by underperformance on military components' efficiency would depend on the disaggregated evaluation of parameters like the number of units available, the number of units performing below average, operational demands on the military component in general and the units with below-average performance in particular, force multipliers available and the strength of the Force's reserve. Nonetheless, for the goals of this study, it is enough to consider that the harm to military components is directly linked to the number of units presenting weak performance.

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[68] In opposition to "open caveats", which are negotiated with the Secretariat before the member state commits troops to a UN PKO, "hidden caveats" are restrictions not expressed during the negotiations (UNITED NATIONS, 2018, p. 47). One deleterious effect of hidden caveats is the denial of unit commanders to follow force commander's orders to intervene in dangerous situations, stating the prohibition of the respective national governments to doing it. Such attitudes seriously disrupt the efficiency of missions' military components.

[69] The Secretariat has been tolerating caveats due to the limited number of TCCs willing to deploy contingents to dangerous mission areas (UNITED NATIONS, 2018). Nevertheless, this attitude creates a vicious circle, in which troops are provided for dangerous robust PKOs with operational limitations on performing, and below-expected performances prevent the peacekeeping missions from achieving more secure environments.

The protection of civilians against physical violence is a task that requires military components to be as efficient as possible. As the OIOS report argues, the demand to protect probably makes peacekeeping "the only area in which organisational performance can literally mean the difference between life and death for a civilian in a conflict zone" (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014). On the other hand, it is the activity in which soldiers face the highest levels of risk. Consequently, the task of protection of civilians constitutes a "benchmark" to measure the performance of PKOs and, as such, it requires troops with all the qualifications and the determination to perform well (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 20).

The UN strategic approach to protecting civilians prescribes four action phases: prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation. Prevention is a long-term action, applied when no clear threat to civilians has been identified, while pre-emption takes place where likely threats are identified and attacks against civilians are anticipated. On the other hand, response is a critical action launched when threats to civilians are imminent or are already occurring (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS, 2019). The main criticism in the OIOS report of the implementation of protection of civilians in robust PKOs is that the UN missions focus on prevention activities, insufficient to ensure effective protection. Concerning this point, the report states that,

> while no mission can be expected to protect all civilians all the time, each can reasonably be expected to provide protection in areas of highest risk. […] Successes in prevention do not, in the opinion of civilians, offset failures to intervene when they are under attack (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 7).

In reality, prevention and pre-emption actions are as crucial as responses to attacks. If those actions worked well, fighting armed groups to protect civilians would not be necessary. Nevertheless, to achieve good results, prevention and pre-emption, to the same extent as critical response actions, require hard work and assertive attitudes of the missions' uniformed components. Peacekeeping units' resolute postures and assertive attitudes are very important since they generate a decisive deterrent effect on armed opponents. Conversely, spoilers perceive hesitations and omissions on the part of blue helmets as fear and weakness, encouraging them to defy the UN Force.

Regarding this latter topic, Lieutenant General Costa Neves reported that one of his constant preoccupations as MONUSCO Force Commander was to encourage his soldiers to go beyond the bare minimum and be more dedicated to the tasks of creating a secure environment

and protecting civilians. During the briefings he received in his initial visits to the peacekeeping battalions, he used to defy the commander and unit's staff with a sudden question: "How many troops do you have now in the camp and how many are patrolling out there?" In the face of answers that indicated that most of the troops were in the barracks, he emphasised that he wanted exactly the opposite: Most of them should be on patrols, day and night, to reassure and protect the population (COSTA NEVES, 2021).

2.3. The need to foster good performances and the role of individual motivations

In their article on the quality of UN troops and its impacts on the protection of civilians, Haass and Ansorg conclude very appropriately that troop quality "is a critical ingredient for successful peace operations" (2018, p. 756). Peacekeeping missions with adequate military capabilities and well-prepared troops can deter violent armed groups and significantly contribute to the accomplishment of challenging mandates. On the other hand, even the best trained and equipped units will not perform appropriately if the soldiers are afraid or unwilling to take risks[70]. Therefore, individual motivations to fight are crucial for good performances in robust PKOs.

The concept of "combat power" helps understand the contribution of motivation to the performance of combat units in PKOs. This concept, fundamentally important in the doctrine of all armed forces, means the capacity of a military force to carry out an assigned combat task. Combat power results from the military outfit's capabilities in terms of manoeuvre elements, combat support (e.g. artillery, aviation, engineering, intelligence), logistical support, command and control, mobility, training and preparation, leadership, and last but not least, combat motivation. Thus, the combat power of a unit falls into three basic components: physical (i.e. the human and material means to fight); conceptual (encompassing the doctrine, military knowledge and training that allow the most effective use of the fighting force); and moral (values, the quality of the leadership and troops' will to fight). The troops' will to fight is an aggregative dimension: Each soldier's motivation to fight directly contributes to the unit's combat power. When members of a combat unit get motivated to fight, the unit's combat power increases in proportion to the number of motivated soldiers in the outfit (OETTING, 1990).

[70] In the insecure and volatile environments where robust PKOs take place, the risks are never entirely eliminated by force protection measures. The blue helmets must frequently expose themselves to some level of risk to perform appropriately.

At this point, we recall that, besides meaning capacity and efficiency to fight, adequate combat power also contributes to avoiding the need to fight. A unit's combat power has a deterrent effect that stems from the arms and equipment the troops display and the combat-prone attitude of the soldiers bearing these means. The expression of courage and determination that adequate motivations confer to soldiers can dissuade possible hostile actions.

Psychology broadly studies the connection between individual motivations and group performance, making it unnecessary to delve deeper into the theme in the present work. However, recalling some aspects relating individual motivations to organisational performance is convenient. As social and organisational psychologists maintain, the productivity of groups and organisations depends not only on physical inputs and individual capacities but also on attitudes, beliefs and motivations. Regarding this point, Ruch (1994) developed a model that, among other features, associates the individual effort that attitudes and beliefs generate with the organisation's productivity. According to that author, individual effort is a function of thoughts and beliefs and, therefore, comprises the cognitive characteristics of the individual that motivate productive behaviours (RUCH, 1994, p. 113).



Fig. 5 - A conceptual model of individual productivity. Source: Ruch (1994, p. 112)

Going further in this vein, Jordan, Feild and Armenakis (2002) investigated the relationship of group process variables, performance and organisations' productivity. They used a field setting to conduct a comprehensive quantitative study among the US military on the effects of social cohesion, team-member exchange and group potency on small group's performance. The scholars' conclusion on group potency, i.e. the collective belief by members of a team that the team can be effective across tasks, is particularly interesting. Group potency is associated with collective mental and physical abilities and, as such, strongly influences performance. In comparison with social cohesion and team-member exchange, it is "the group process variable that explained most unique differences in how the teams performed" (JORDAN; FEILD; ARMENAKIS, 2002, p. 144).

Motivation is an intrinsic process observable through cognitive, affective and behavioural responses. Researchers often use behaviour to infer motivation and capture its strength, mainly through the extent to which one's action is consistent with a focal goal (TOURÉ-TILLERY; FISHBACH, 2014). In this vein, military psychologists and practitioners argue that when soldiers recognise the goal of their respective groups or teams, individual motivations contribute significantly to the efficiency of the military unit. Such an effect occurs because combat tasks are fulfilled by teams, and the positive attitude of each team member contributes synergistically to the performance of the unit (KELLET, 2013; OETTING, 1990; SHAMIR et al., 2000). For instance, in UN PKOs, tasks are fulfilled by infantry battalions (850 soldiers), which usually employ, in each action, two or three of their four infantry companies. In turn, each company (165 soldiers) engages its platoons (32 soldiers), and these employ their ten-soldier sections[71]. Thus, in the dynamics of military operations in robust PKOs, when soldiers get motivated, they contribute better to their section's performance, whose efficiency adds value to the platoon, and so on, successively, up to the battalion level[72].

In a March 21 video, co-hosted by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Department of Peace Operations to mark three years since the launch of the A4P initiative, the UN Secretary-General presented the core agenda to make PKOs more efficient and impactful, highlighting the still-present need to improve performance (UN SECRETARIAT AND THE

[71] See the UNIBAM for the detailed structure and composition of the peacekeeping infantry battalion (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2012, v. I, p. 129). In the US Army, sections are called "squads".

[72] Groups in which soldiers have frequent contact —usually sections and platoons— are considered face-to-face or primary groups. Larger outfits, like the battalion, are secondary groups. The motivations generated by the recognition of the group's goal improve efficiency in any military group, but in the primary ones, such motivations are reinforced by the affective ties between the members (GOULART, 2012).

NETHERLANDS, 2021). In his speech, Guterres referred to the Declaration of Shared Commitments of UN Peacekeeping Operations, proposed by the Secretariat in August 2018, to strengthen peacekeeping and improve performance. In the same event, the Under-Secretary-General, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, presented the highest priorities of the current phase of the A4P initiative, among them the joint work with member states to ensure that PKOs have the right capabilities and assets, as well as the improvement of accountability for peacekeeper performance and UN recognition of good performances.

The preoccupations of the UN officials in charge of peace operations are largely justified. The robust operations of today are the most complex and challenging mechanisms in the entire peacekeeping history. No wonder; they are under the constant scrutiny of the UNSC, relevant financial contributors, host states and their respective citizens. Complaints and pressures against bad performances regularly come from different quarters. In this context, in working to preserve international peace and security, the UN faces a dilemma: either it keeps focus on situations in which all armed actors are willing to adhere to the peace process and turns a blind eye to situations where illegal groups hinder peace initiatives and perpetrate atrocities; or it addresses the latter case and strives to achieve peace, protect people oppressed by armed violence and prevent states' collapse, despite the hardships of the undertaking. Given the benefits that robust PKOs have already proved able to generate, the trend is to keep them as a useful UN tool.

Consequently, fostering effective performances is indispensable to enhancing the robust PKOs' chances of success. For such a purpose, attention should turn to the blue helmets' motivations in the peacekeeping mission areas.

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The next chapter will address the individual motivations that contribute to peacekeeping units' effective performance in robust PKOs, focusing on the UN legitimacy to use force to accomplish mandated tasks.

Chapter 3

MOTIVATION TO FIGHT IN ROBUST PKOs AND THE LEGITIMACY FACTOR

There are two basic steps to reach the objectives of this study. The first is to evaluate the blue helmets' perceptions of their peacekeeping missions' legitimacy to use military force. The second is to determine the impacts of such perceptions on the performance of peacekeeping units in risky tasks. To follow these steps, an incursion into the field of motivation to fight is necessary.

Motivation is the link that connects perceptions and behaviours through a psychological process. Thus, individual motivations mould personal conduct and, by extension, group performance and achievements in all human ventures. Armed combat, in any of its forms, is probably the most critical activity in this regard. A recent and eloquent example of the relevance of motivational issues in combat may be taken from the war in Ukraine. Two months after the Russian invasion in February 2022, the USA and its European allies changed the course of the war by providing massive military aid to Ukraine. Such support only occurred due to the clear demonstration by the Ukrainians that they would fight for their freedom. Conversely, the Kremlin had to adjust its campaign plan due to a series of military setbacks caused, among other factors, by Russian soldiers' unwillingness to risk life in a war whose meaning they did not understand well (KAGAN et al., 2022).

3.1. Combat motivation theories and motivation factors

In the first quarter of the last century, the advent of the machine gun and modern howitzers led the fire to a position of supremacy on the battlefield[73]. This technical evolution

[73] "Fire" is used here with the military meaning, i.e., the shooting of projectiles from weapons like rifles, machine guns, mortars and howitzers.

sealed the fate of massed infantry formations, the combat tactic used until then. The distance between men in combat increased, and tactical actions became decentralised to subunits, platoons or even smaller fractions. The soldiers began acting on the battlefield according to orders received previously, and, in most cases, they performed during the fight without the supervision of officers. Immersed in the harsh reality of battle and having to proceed alone or in small groups of buddies, the combatant saw himself subjected to divergent reasons and drives, some leading him to fight, others pulling him towards yielding to fear. Whether he fought assertively or absented himself and avoided exposure to fire and the burden of killing lay mainly on his conscience[74].

The new, dispersed battle order led defence ministries and military services worldwide to relinquish rigid, in some cases draconian discipline, and focus on combat motivation to keep soldiers fighting. They acknowledged that in a context in which the motives for sparing and saving oneself are many, the combatants had to perceive cogent reasons for resisting fear and chaos, observing their orders and moving forward. Attentive to this fact, social scientists, psychologists and military practitioners began to study the individual soldier's motivations to fight.

Samuel Stouffer (1949) and his team of researchers conducted the most relevant work on combat motivation, in terms of depth and volume of empirical data, with the United States (US) Army's sponsorship, during WWII. Drawing on data the War Department's Information and Education Division collected among more than half a million combatants in the theatres of operations of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Pacific, Stouffer and his colleagues scrutinised aspects of the soldier's way of living from joining the army until the return to civilian life. The sociological and psychological analyses of the questionnaires and interviews and the conclusions the researchers raised were condensed, in 1949, into four volumes entitled "The American Soldier". The second volume, "Combat and its Aftermath", became a reference for the study of combat motivation. Based on western culture and widely held military values, its findings and conclusions reveal facts about the motivations influencing combatants' behaviours in the USA and abroad.

According to Stouffer, soldiers fought mainly to hasten the war's end and not disappoint their comrades. Faced with the question of why they kept fighting, a group of

[74] In combat, soldiers deal with two basic hindrances, both requiring strong motivations to overcome: the fear of being killed or wounded and the natural resistance to killing other human beings.

enlisted infantrymen from a veteran division that faced action in two Mediterranean campaigns responded:

- Ending the task (thoughts of getting the war over or getting relief or rest) - 39%;
- Solidarity with the group (cannot let the other fellows or the outfit down, sticking together, "buddies depending on me") - 14%;
- Thoughts of home and loved ones (involving both the desire to shorten the war and to behave in an honourable way) - 10%;
- Sense of duty and self-respect (personal pride, self-respect, "doing my part, my duty") - 9%;
- Self-preservation (fighting not to die, "kill or be killed") - 6%;
- Idealistic reasons (making a better world, "belief in what I'm fighting for", protecting our people and their freedom) – 5%;
- Vindictiveness (revenge, "fighting spirit") - 2%;
- Leadership and discipline – 1%;
- Other less-mentioned answers, such as military tradition, esprit de corps, lack of any alternative action and even indifference.

In the decades following WWII, several scholars and military researchers deepened, with renewed interest, the studies on individual motivations to successfully face combat. New works incorporated the motivations to fight in low-intensity conflicts, such as counterinsurgency campaigns and counterguerrilla operations, and added other nationalities to the research. The result of this surge is a consistent literature on combat motivation, from which the works of Gabriel and Savage (1978), Dinter (1986), Gal (1986), Shalit (1988), Oetting (1990) and Kellet (2013) are highlights. In most of these studies, the central theme is the soldiers' motivations in campaigns to defend their home countries or respective national interests. Nevertheless, the researchers clearly put the chief function that motivation has in any type of war. To perform successfully, the soldier should be not only "able to fight" but also "willing to fight". Possessing adequate motivations makes a huge difference in both conventional battlefields and asymmetric areas of operations.

Scrutiny of the specialised literature allows identifying a significant number of combat motivation factors. Among them are the sense of duty, sense of honour, patriotism, ideology, legitimacy of the cause, leadership (leader's influence and action), *esprit de corps*, unit cohesion, comradeship, self-affirmation, spirit of sacrifice, love of glory, discipline, fear of punishments, social pressure, recognition and rewards, logistical efficiency, confidence in the

system of rotation and substitution, hope of victory, hatred of the enemy and need of self-preservation. The list contains quite diverse motivating factors, some based on military values, such as duty, honour, comradeship, spirit of sacrifice; others representing coercive motivations, such as social pressure, discipline and punishment. Some factors are circumstantial, resulting from intrinsic needs, either biological or generated by the combatant's environment, such as self-affirmation and self-preservation. Others have a structural character, with a basis on social or institutional *stimuli*, such as patriotism, a cause the nation embraces, social recognition and institutional rewards. Also, some factors on the list appear to have great motivating power, capable of energising the combatant to bear the highest levels of risk. Others cannot support him beyond the point where his concerns about his physical integrity come to predominate (GOULART, 2012).

According to Kellett (2013), the primary combat motivators are group cohesion, *esprit de corps*, leadership, beliefs and values, recognition, adequate human resource policies and discipline. In his turn, Oetting (1990) proposes a smaller set of relevant factors. By compelling the literature and isolating the most mentioned motivators, the author suggests group cohesion (around the objective), the leadership of the immediate commander, legitimacy of the cause and efficiency of one's own armed force as "essential" motivating factors.

Some scholars suggest that financial remuneration (salary or pay) can motivate soldiers to take risks during the fight. In this regard, we appropriately refer to the work of Frederick Herzberg and his colleagues (1959). Studying motivation in professional activities, Herzberg classified the factors that influence motivation into two groups: hygiene factors and motivators. Hygiene factors are related to conditions around the job, like workplace conditions, relationship with the boss and colleagues, working hours and remuneration. On the other hand, motivators refer to the characteristics of the task and the job itself, such as freedom to act, the possibility of taking the initiative and using one's potential, responsibility, and organisational recognition.

For Herzberg, once fulfilled, the hygiene factors avoid dissatisfaction but do not guarantee substantial and lasting satisfaction. Conversely, motivators are essential to inspiring professional performance. About salary, the author argues that it has more potency as a job dissatisfier than as a job satisfier. As he explains,

> salary and wages are very frequently at the top of the list of factors describing answers to the question, 'What don't you like about your job?' in morale surveys. They are at the middle of the list of answers to the question, 'What do you want from your job?' (HERZBERG; MAUSNER; SNYDERMAN, 1959, p. 116)

In military operations, troops must have appropriate support since the motivation to fight becomes impaired if soldiers feel helpless. In this sense, conditions like appropriate and opportune orders, adequate logistics, air and fire support and availability of reinforcements become crucial in combat. However, the importance of military pay is only circumstantial on the battlefield. Adequate financial remuneration is necessary for the armed forces to obtain and keep adequate human resources and for the military to remain motivated to serve. Nevertheless, soldiers would hardly risk their lives thinking of their pay because money does not compensate for the possibility of death or maiming. Moreover, in contrast with jobs in which better performance leads directly to higher remuneration, those in the military who take fewer or no risks receive the same financial benefit as those who risk their lives.

Lastly, we consider the soldiers' connection to the national society. The individual's intimate group —the relatives and close friends— exert the most relevant social influence on him, providing him with a "link" to the society at large. Thus, soldiers filter, absorb and consolidate societal perceptions about the crisis through family and friends and formulate their ideas and convictions under their influence. According to Little (1964), more than the military indoctrination and notions of patriotism taught in the barracks, soldiers' motivations to fight stem from what they hear and learn from people whose assessments of their behaviours —as good or bad— have great significance for them.

3.2. Military challenges and the need to fight in robust PKOs

UN military components have several tasks in modern peacekeeping. Combat units, such as infantry battalions and companies, reconnaissance units and convoy escort elements perform most of them and the most critical ones. In carrying out their operational tasks, the blue helmets of such units often have to deal with rebel armed spoilers in encounters that may unexpectedly lead to firefights[75]. Therefore, even without fighting, they always operate under such risk.

Protection of civilians requires UN military components to deter, prevent or repel armed groups that threaten or attack communities or groups of civilians. In several regions where robust PKOs are underway, civilians become targets for political, ethnic or ideological reasons. In some cases, such motives as territory control, land tenure and transnational crime exacerbate the violence. In Africa, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSCA and MINUSMA

[75] Examples of those escalations are armed attacks against civilians, attacks against UN premises and humanitarian convoys, aggressive rule of law violations and forceful attempts to go through UN checkpoints.

operate in large countries, where several active armed groups engage in illegal actions. Even considering that UNSC mandates restrict protection to troop deployment areas, the peacekeeping units are still responsible for vast and populous territories. MONUSCO and MINUSMA are remarkable cases because they deal with extremist rebels and organised criminal groups that regularly target civilians, either through direct attacks on villages and towns or indirectly with mines and IEDs. The presence of acknowledged terrorist groups in Mali makes the situation in MINUSMA even grimmer.

Protecting civilians is the most critical task of military components regarding fighting readiness. However, in UNIFIL such a task is peculiar compared to the robust PKOs in Africa. The Security Council created the mission in March 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in restoring its effective authority in the area. Since then, UNIFIL's mandate was adjusted three times to match realities on the ground. The most profound change occurred in 2006, after Israel's war against Hezbollah militia in south Lebanon. Only then the UNSC provided the mission with a robust mandate, authorising it to take all necessary action to ensure that its area of operations is not utilised for hostile activities, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and humanitarian workers, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2006b). However, albeit a large portion of the population in the mission area is poor, people are not dependent on humanitarian assistance. The major threats civilians face are outbreaks of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, which the mission strives to deter (MURPHY, 2012). Besides, the developments in Syria's civil war make the prospects of the security situation in Lebanon uncertain. If the situation worsens in the neighbouring country, the pressure of refugees will remain. On the other hand, the war's end will bring thousands of Hezbollah warriors back to Lebanon with renewed combat experience.

Keeping the environment secure and stable is another military task that implies confronting violent spoilers and armed groups. Accomplishing the task requires blue helmets to deal with problems like lawlessness, violence against or among the population and lack of capacity or willingness of local governments and respective security forces to reinstate the rule of law. An excellent example in this regard is MINUSTAH, the first UN peace operation named a "stabilisation mission". After the transition from the UNSC-authorised Multinational Interim Force (MIF) in June 2004, the UN mission had to face the grim reality of Haiti's law-and-order crisis. Armed gangs controlled extensive urban areas in Port-au-Prince and other major cities,

and the military component engaged in a wide variety of activities, from humanitarian aid support to major military operations against armed opponents. After an initial period of adjustments in the military strategy, from 2005 onwards, the blue helmets launched a series of operations that succeeded in regaining control of the situation.

In Africa, MONUSCO, MINUSCA and MINUSMA are also stabilisation missions. They strive to deal with several armed groups, some with well-established strongholds, others with relative control of the areas of operations. The case of MONUSCO is especially interesting due to the extreme measure the UNSC took after the fall of Goma to the *Mouvement du 23 Mars* (March 23 Movement - M23), a Rwanda-backed armed group, in November 2012. This significant incident severely impacted the UN's reputation and led the UNSC to create the FIB. The brigade proved a vital asset for the contingencies of that moment. It released Goma from the siege of M23 and provided MONUSCO with an option to act against powerful armed groups.

All in all, the context of modern PKOs points to the need to prepare UN troops to fight in order to fulfil the mandate. Complex political situations on the ground, the high numbers of active armed groups and the variety of their motivations —in many cases exclusively financial and illicit— practically exclude the possibility that they all respect peace agreements or negotiations all the time. As a result, civilians continue to be victims of armed violence and have increasing humanitarian needs. On the other hand, the deterrent effect of the military components in robust PKOs has functioned only partially. For instance, in MONUSCO, the Secretariat's reports issued to the UNSC in 2020 alone referred to more than 40.000 patrols, 41 standing combat deployments and 13 temporary operating bases that the mission launched or established. Even so, at the end of that year, the Secretary-General expressed to the Council his concerns over the deterioration of the human rights situation in conflict-affected provinces of the country, marked by an increasing number of human rights abuses and violations, attributable not only to armed groups but also to national defence and security forces (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2020).

3.3. Motivation to fight in PKOs

The UNSC mandates for robust PKOs demand that UN military components use force as necessary to accomplish their tasks. On the other hand, either as a consequence of such orientation or because some troops do not impose themselves on their opponents, blue helmets have been facing adverse actions that cause deaths and injuries. In the last decade (2010–2019)

alone, 268 UN soldiers died, and several others suffered injuries as victims of malicious acts during peacekeeping missions (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, 2020). The kind of tasks they carry out and the condition of their employment lead to the conclusion that, besides having adequate preparedness, UN troops must be motivated to face risks and fight.

Lay people may imagine that to keep their ground under attack or advance towards the enemy, soldiers only need clear orders, good discipline and efficient logistical support. However, deliberately facing death and injuries is too unnatural for the question to be put so simply. There are many ways to be in combat without fighting, i.e. without exposing oneself to risks. Soldiers may omit themselves, refuse to return fire, desert or disband. Groups of soldiers may decide not to follow orders, avoid dangerous areas when on patrol or deliberately not arrive in time to face the aggressors against civilians. Furthermore, the search for national "authorisation" to fight, despite clear orders from the UN force commanders, is not exceptional in robust PKOs (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014).

For strategists who make campaign plans, combat is an activity crucial to military success, no matter the type of conflict. From the point of view of those who fight, combat is an extreme action, whether in wars or international peace operations. Nevertheless, most combat motivation books and articles refer to the engagement of armed forces in national wars or in conflicts where national interests are at stake. Only a few works deal with motivations in multinational peace operations. Yet, most of the latter focus on peacekeepers' motivations to join the mission rather than face life-threatening situations once in the mission area. Consequently, this work expands on the issue of combat motivation in PKOs.

3.3.1. Combat motivation factors in PKOs

The definitions of combat motivation in the literature do not differ much from each other. They consider the harsh circumstances of war and the threats that weigh on the combatants to arrive at the individual dispositions to fight the enemy. Nonetheless, Gal's definition is unique in its conciseness and straightforwardness: "Combat motivation is the impulse that compels the individual soldier to face the enemy on the battlefield" (1999, p. 2). This interesting approach focuses on the fighting itself, not the course of an entire war or military campaign.

Analogous to the definition of combat motivation in wars, combat motivation in peacekeeping would be the impulse that leads the individual blue helmet to face armed opponents in the mission area (GOULART, 2020). However, due to the specific contexts in which they apply, three significant differences exist between combat motivation in wars and PKOs.

First, in wars, combat is inevitable and occurs regularly, and combatants are expected to fight in every contact with enemy forces. In robust PKOs, combat occurs much less frequently, but it may happen at any time. Besides, patrolling territories where armed groups operate freely or moving through roads that may be trapped submits the blue helmets to situations as stressful as combat. As a result, in PKOs, combat motivation is not only a requirement for fighting but also a condition to perform well and successfully carry out risky tasks.

Second, in robust PKOs, contrary to war, the military units operate to maintain security and preserve law and order instead of fighting and defeating enemies. Indeed, neither the UNSC nor the Secretariat characterises "enemies" in peacekeeping. Parties to the conflict or armed groups that refuse to abdicate violence are not enemies to be destroyed but factions that must submit to the rule of law and legal sanctions[76]. Also, technically speaking, PKOs do not have battles as military doctrine defines them. Blue helmets fight, as a last resort, to accomplish tasks like protecting civilians, maintaining the host country's stability and preserving the rule of law. Ultimately, political settlements and not military victories determine the success of peacekeeping missions.

Third, the defence of one's national territory, country sovereignty or society, which are relevant causes to fight in wars, are not reasons for soldiers to take risks in peacekeeping.

Therefore, motivators such as the love of glory, hope of victory and hatred of the enemy do not pertain to peacekeeping. However, several other combat motivation factors, listed in section 3.1., apply to PKOs. That is the case of the typically military motivators, such as sense of duty, leadership, unit cohesion, discipline and institutional recognition, as well as motivators linked to the notion of legitimacy.

In 2005, a survey of soldiers from the Brazilian Battalion 3 (BRABAT 3), shortly after the unit’s redeployment from MINUSTAH, revealed important motivating factors in robust PKOs. The blue helmets were offered five motivation factors with short statements summarising them and asked to indicate, in order of importance, the factors that motivated

[76] As a matter of fact, in most UN robust PKOs, military components have a constabulary character.

them to engage with armed gangs in Haiti. The responses that received more mentions were: (1) legitimacy of the cause ("It was important for peace and to help the people of Haiti."); (2) sense of duty ("It was my duty, and I had to stick to it."); (3) unit cohesion ("I had to help my platoon fulfil its mission."); (4) efficiency of one's force ("I relied on my armament, equipment and our armoured personnel carriers - APCs, which were far superior to the weapons used by the gangs."); (5) leadership ("I followed my platoon leader."). Some other factors were spontaneously cited, such as the fact that one was representing Brazil, the importance of acquiring professional experience, and the wish to return home having accomplished the mission (GOULART, 2012). This survey is an interesting introduction to combat motivation in peacekeeping. Still, concerning legitimacy, it has the limitation of working with a simple rather than a comprehensive and thorough definition of the concept. Moreover, it did not scrutinise perceptions of MINUSTAH legitimacy to use force.

We shall briefly analyse patriotism. This feeling is a significant motivating factor in wars to defend the home country, occasions in which soldiers are expected to make sacrifices for the nation unconditionally. However, in peacekeeping, the blue helmets' engagement focuses on promoting peace, protection and better living conditions for foreigners, not fellow citizens. Consequently, the notion of *Patria* works differently. It impacts the blue helmets' behaviour through their wish to honour their country in an international environment. A Brazilian non-commissioned officer (NCO), formerly a blue helmet in MINUSTAH, referred to this point:

> The desire to represent Brazil well is an important motivator. We know that, in missions abroad, we are no longer just ourselves. In Haiti, I was no longer Sergeant R. Franco. I was "Brazil". I had the Brazilian flag on my shoulder, I was a soldier from Brazil, and my name no longer mattered (NASCIMENTO, 2020, translation is ours).

In return, the nation should support the blue helmets in their endeavours. As maintained by Franke and Heinecken, "only when soldiers […] feel supported in their decision to serve their country in both traditional combat and emerging noncombat operations can their commitment to and performance during these missions be developed and enhanced" (2001, p. 591).

Table 7 presents the main combat motivation factors in wars and relates them to corresponding motivators in robust PKO engagements.

Motivation to fight in wars (main factors)	Motivation to fight in robust PKOs (main factors)
Sense of duty	Sense of duty
Patriotism and spirit of sacrifice	Willingness to represent one's country well
Legitimacy of the cause	**Legitimacy to use force for the sake of peace**
Leadership	Leadership
Unit cohesion	Unit cohesion
Efficiency of one's force	Efficiency of one's force
Recognition and rewards	Recognition and rewards
Discipline	Discipline
Self-preservation	Self-preservation
Hatred of the enemy	
Hope for victory	
Love of glory	

Table 7: Combat motivation factors in wars and in robust PKOs

3.3.2. The role of cosmopolitanism

In the Kantian sense, cosmopolitanism envisages a universal community linked by political, economic and cultural bonds, in which ethical obligations to humanity overrule obligations to compatriots (KANT, 1903). Despite being criticised as utopian or, at least, very hard to achieve, this proposal paved the way for more realistic approaches. For instance, Emmanuel Levinas (1988) privileges a moral understanding of cosmopolitanism, according to which ethical principles lead to the obligation of responding to people —the "others"— in a state of need or vulnerability. In the same vein, Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis (2009) define cosmopolitanism as an ethical stance in which the individual goes beyond the pressures to privilege those nearest to him, sees the value of the other and works towards the connection and dialogue with the other. In turn, Kaldor (2012) proposes a cosmopolitanism that implies the commitment to the equality of all human beings, the respect for human dignity and a sense of solidarity towards foreign nationals.

Some scholars understand that exercises of power and the way international politics is conducted limit, in most countries, the capacity of military personnel to fight for international causes (ELLIOT, LORRAINE; CHEESEMAN, 2002; EREZ, 2017; WOODHOUSE, TOM; RAMSBOTHAM, 2005). However, a significant international consensus already exists around

issues such as the immorality of harming innocent civilians and the need to take a stand in the face of severe violations of human rights. In the same vein, relevant legal norms, such as the Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect, reflect cosmopolitan views. As Kendall, Woodward and Skrbis put it, albeit it cannot be said that the world has a "cosmopolitan culture", it has a culture that is "cosmopolitanising" (KENDALL; WOODWARD; SKRBIS, 2009, p. 157).

The ideas of a common humanity and moral responsibilities towards foreign people are embedded in the UN Charter. Although state-centric in most of its provisions, the Charter is people-centric and open to the world in its aims. For instance, it emphasises the member states' responsibility for ensuring solidarity towards vulnerable people and promoting social progress and better standards of life for humanity. Furthermore, calling all nations to practice tolerance and reaffirming respect for human rights and the obligations arising from international law, the Charter sets the ground for modern UN PKOs and grants them a cosmopolitan character.

Emotions significantly influence world politics, and, in several situations, they connect national interests with cosmopolitan philosophy and the UN Charter's ideals. Elaborating on the role of emotions in international relations, Hutchison (2018) signals a twofold dimension. On the one hand, emotions are imbued within the discourses and structures that underpin societies and politics and, as such, interwoven at specific contexts and times with national interests. On the other hand, the very social systems and structures through which political decisions occur are established under the influence of individual and collective emotions. The scholar explains the impact of emotions on the perceptions and intentions of political actors, like legislators and decision-makers, and their significance "as forms of agency capable of prompting political change" (Hutchison, 2018, p. 4). However, Hutchison's approach fails to delve deeper into the ability of state interests with a moral background to stir emotions in the nation and its military. That is the case of interests such as the defence of peace, peaceful settlement of disputes, and prevalence of human rights, human dignity and social justice, expressed in several countries' constitutions or basic normative frameworks.

The protection of civilians is a key UN cosmopolitan feature. It derives from and further consolidates the trend suggesting that the international community's most legitimate use of force is to protect civilians whose lives are under threat or who are victims of violence and abuses (GRAY, 2018; WILLMOT; SHEERAN, 2014). While the UN doctrine emerges as a valuable mechanism to prevent harm and protect vulnerable people, member states' adherence —which implies their nation's adherence— to the peacekeeping enterprise should function as

an international, cosmopolitan commitment to peace and protection. However, despite the moral appeal of the protection of civilians doctrine, the UN faces problems with the double standards of some member states. For instance, some TCCs criticise the use of force in peacekeeping, while others impose caveats on the use of their troops as a condition of offering them to the UN.

At this stage, returning to the question of military loyalties is opportune. There is no incompatibility between soldiers' commitment to their nation and the need to fight for populations at risk in foreign countries. For instance, soldiers are prone to accept the risks in fighting to protect foreign civilians when they come from countries with a culture of international solidarity, whose societies and institutions treat such endeavours as relevant and support them (BLOCQ, 2010). In reality, such a circumstance gives room to reinforcing motivations regarding cosmopolitanism and legitimacy. If a blue helmet accepts facing dangers because the task is relevant for his family, friends and fellow citizens back home, his convictions will be even stronger if they include the belief that it is the right thing to do. Attitudes about which the individual feels correct, particularly those with a moral sense or implying emotional commitments, tend to produce powerful motivations (FISKE; TAYLOR, 2017).

All in all, a nation's willingness to support foreign people in need should be the reason for the state's decision to participate in UN PKOs. Such context reinforces the blue helmets' disposition to take risks in the mission area. Conversely, if particularistic interests, dissociated from the nation's world view or unreconcilable with the UN intentions, determine the country's participation in the PKO, the soldiers will hardly identify a legitimate reason to put their lives on the line. As a result, their motivation will suffer[77].

3.4. Legitimacy and motivation in PKOs

The UN presence in the Korean peninsula from 1950 to 1953 provides a good example of how important legitimacy can be as a combat motivation factor. Upon taking over the command of the UN troops assembled around the 8th US Army for that peace-enforcement campaign, General Matthew Ridgway's greatest challenge was to restore the combatants'

[77] A survey in the literature indicates that besides the willingness to contribute to international peace and security and the wish to reach out to populations in need, particular motives, such as aspiration to regional hegemony, advancement of economic interests, supplementation of defence budgets through UN reimbursements, and military gains in professionalism and experience also figure among the reasons why countries contribute troops to PKOs.

fighting spirit. The Chinese had entered the conflict to aid the North Koreans, pushing the UN troops back to the south, inflicting on them their first serious setbacks. Then, in his visits to the subordinate units, Ridgway noticed great apathy and lack of confidence among the troops. After talking to the men, he concluded that the overall discouragement was due to doubts about why they were fighting. He found out that if the men did not grasp what was at stake in that war, they would be defeated.

For the first time since the UN's creation, a coalition under its aegis was fighting for peace. The context still confused many combatants since their countries were at peace and not attacked or threatened by any of those enemies. Ridgway then issued a *communiqué* for dissemination to all units, dealing with the following questions: Why are we here? What are we fighting for? In his message, the UN Force Commander warned that the second question was much more significant than the first, explaining that the purpose of the war was not to protect cities or territories nor exclusively guarantee the freedom of South Koreans. Ultimately, the question was whether individual freedom should prevail and the oppression of South Koreans should cease, or the free world should accept the violations of those high values (RIDGWAY, 1986).

General Ridgway's preoccupation with providing his troops with a sense of legitimacy in the Korean war can carry, *mutatis mutandis,* into modern peacekeeping. Robust PKOs lead the blue helmets to risk their lives and, in consequence, must provide an appropriate answer to the question of the purpose of fighting.

3.4.1. The sense of working for a legitimate enterprise

Countries give suggestive names to their armed forces' operations, not by chance. The USA, a power that regularly intervenes on the world stage, strives to designate its military operations with titles evoking justice and good intentions, such as operations named Just Cause (Panama, 1989); Provide Relief and Restore Hope (Somalia, 1992-93); Iraqi Freedom (Iraq, 2003); Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001-14) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994-95). Several other powers adopt similar criteria in their armed engagements. As a more recent example, when Russia invaded separatist regions in eastern Ukraine in February 2022 to prepare for the major assault on that country, President Vladimir Putin labelled the action as a "peacekeeping operation". Such designations seek to ensure an “aura” of legitimacy in the eyes

of such stakeholders as the domestic public, allied countries, the population in the target country and, no less important, the soldiers of the intervening force[78].

Identifying with an organisation's legitimate initiative, worthy of broad national and international recognition, encourages dedication and efforts. The mechanism of such identification is twofold. First, identification occurs when the individual's self-concept contains the same attributes as those perceived in the organisation (DUTTON; DUKERICH; HARQUAIL, 1994)[79]. Self-concept is relevant in this regard because, besides fostering behaviours related to clear expectations or immediate goals, it can also induce behaviours associated with values and moral obligation. As posited by Shamir, self-concept-based behaviour "is often guided by imagined possibilities and faith" (1991, p. 413–414)[80]. Second, the identification is strengthened when the person respects and admires what is central and distinctive about the organisation. Ultimately, the process leads to motivation because people derive meaning from being linked to a social collective through their identities, which "are expressed in activities that are congruent with the identity" (SHAMIR, 1991, p. 413).

In the case of the UN, its principles and ideals, as well as its transparency and prestige, underpin legitimacy and give a distinguished reputation to peace initiatives. Such characteristics open the way for member states, international organisations, civilians and military personnel to identify with the undertakings of the world organisation. Particularly the features that legitimise the UN *modus operandi*, once perceived and assimilated by the blue helmets, produce identification with the organisation and motivate them. Relatedly, Coicaud (2006) reports the outcome of a 2005 survey among UN staff members to gauge their motivations in working for the global public good. The research compares the answers given by respondents in 2005 with the responses to the same questions applied to a different sample ten years earlier. Asked why they joined the UN, 32,92% of the respondents replied it was for idealistic reasons and belief in the organisation, which was the most mentioned reason in 2005. The figures decreased a little when the question was "why do you still work for the UN" but

[78] The US interventions in Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Russian intervention in Ukraine were illegitimate because they were launched without the UNSC authorisation. In the case of operation Enduring Freedom, although the Council passed Resolution 1368 (2001) condemning the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and calling on all states to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators, it did not authorise the invasion of any country (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2001). Thus, some designations reflect legitimation efforts lacking the necessary foundations.

[79] Self-concept is defined as "one's self-identity, a schema consisting of an organized collection of beliefs and feelings about one-self" (BARON; BYRNE, 1997, p. 152).

[80] Self-concept internalises self-esteem in two dimensions: Esteem based on a sense of competence and achievement, and esteem as a sense of possessing attributes that have been culturally invested with positive values, such as virtue and moral worth (SHAMIR, 1991).

remained very significant: 21,86% of the participants mentioning idealistic motives, against 34,76% saying it was because of the interesting work. When the question focused on the work in the field, 32,60% of the respondents answered that they volunteered to field missions to contribute to the UN ideals, the most mentioned reason. The overall result indicated that, in 2005, "idealistic reasons" were "primary for joining the UN and for staying with it". Also, "idealistic reasons and interesting work represented 62 percent of the answers to [the question] why they joined the UN in 2005, against 54 percent in 1995" (COICAUD, 2006, p. 17).

Heinecken and Ferreira verify similar notions of legitimacy among South African blue helmets who faced dangerous situations in MONUSCO and UNAMID. The authors conducted a survey in which most respondents described fighting for peace in Africa as a noble cause. Further, many believed that belonging to a prominent nation in the continent created an obligation for them to work for peace in countries like the DRC and Sudan. Specifically, participants in MONUSCO demonstrated a sense of achievement with such actions as arresting rebels, preventing them from attacking civilians and stopping killings (HEINECKEN; FERREIRA, 2012). Likewise, Biehl and Keller verified among German soldiers deployed in SFOR that identification with the goals of NATO and the mission was very relevant for motivation. According to the result of the survey on which the authors based their conclusion, most respondents expressed the need to be convinced of the mission's legitimate goals (BIEHL; KELLER, 2009). In MINUSTAH, a peacekeeping mission that received consistent support from Latin American countries, the blue helmets in the region had a generally positive view of the legitimacy of their presence. In the words of an Argentinian officer:

> MINUSTAH was a legitimate mission, not only because the Government of Haiti gave consent to its presence, but also because the Haitian population broadly approved the mission and its actions. We went on patrols, kept in contact with the population along the route and noticed positive people's feedback. They used to thank us for being there because they felt we provided tranquillity and security (FRAGNI, 2020, translation is ours).

On the other hand, negative perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy tend to compromise individual performances. According to Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail,

> if members interpret the external organizational image as unfavourable, they may experience negative personal outcomes, such as depression and stress. In turn, these personal outcomes could lead to undesirable organizational outcomes, such as […] reduced efforts on long-term tasks (DUTTON; DUKERICH; HARQUAIL, 1994, p. 240).

The UN's image may influence its personnel's motivation very positively. However, for that to happen in PKOs, the UN mission staff and members of uniformed components must adequately comprehend the context, particularly the conditions related to legitimacy. That may be complicated because of the multifaceted and subjective character of legitimacy. Moreover, in PKOs, the complex international scenarios and the frequently chaotic political realities on the ground tend to blur perceptions of the legitimate use of force, particularly by laypeople on international political issues, like the military rank and file. In modern security crises, the diversity of opinions and the sometimes-contradictory media coverage tend to render the situation too complex for the young soldiers, who lack a comprehensive view of the problem and the ability to interpret the surrounding context. Consequently, soldiers tend to look for cognitive or affective "shortcuts" to infer the legitimacy of their role. The most common are the ROE and the position of the leaders.

During the type II interviews and questionnaire application, many of the participants raised the value of the ROE for understanding their job as right and fair[81]. Observing such rules represented for them the ethic of using violence with self-control. Captain Curbelo, a company commander in Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, explained that he considered the use of force legitimate "as long as it is applied within our fundamental mission, which is the protection of civilians, and it must be carried out in accordance with the rules of engagement established for the fulfilment of our duty" (LAVEGLIA, 2021, translation is ours). To Major André Luis, who served in BRABAT 6 as deputy commander of the special forces detachment, the ROE are "the materialisation of the [legitimacy] concept" (SILVA, 2021, translation is ours). According to Lieutenant Colonel Porto, who led a mechanised platoon in BRABAT 6 as a lieutenant,

> at the platoon level, the legitimacy of using force is perceived based on well-defined rules of engagement and the upper echelon's guidance on what attitude to take in each situation. In my perception, the sense of legitimacy based on the "contract" between the UN and the host country, although we were aware of it, was not so relevant in tactical actions and reaction to threats. But we knew that our attitudes, if they were wrong, could have negative impacts at higher levels (operational, strategic or even political) (PORTO, 2021, translation is ours).

[81] There were twelve mentions to the ROE as an indication of the correctness of the use of force in BRABAT 6 and four in Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21. Among the Uruguayan respondents, two NCOs, besides indicating the value of the ROE, complained that they are sometimes too restrictive, as when they prohibit, in MONUSCO, the use of non-lethal ammunition (rubber bullets) against civilians stoning the patrols.

Private João Oliveira (BRABAT 6), presented his understanding of the legitimacy of using force in an even more summarised expression: “The force in the mission was used in accordance with the ROE established by the UN and guidelines received from commanders” (OLIVEIRA, J., 2021, translation is ours).

Similarly, the leaders’ stance has a role in reassuring young blue helmets. When unsure whether their “side” is correct and they do the right thing, soldiers look at their commander’s positions and attitudes. That is a natural behaviour in most armed forces since military leaders are responsible for enlightening their subordinates on relevant aspects of the mission to be accomplished.

In PKOs, the position of leaders assumes great significance. For instance, if the meaning of a local operation is not clear, the military leadership on-site should create the conditions that enable the soldiers to answer the question of meaning positively for themselves (FRÖHLICH; RAUSCH, 1996). During the interviews and questionnaire application, we asked fifteen officers and NCOs, former participants in PKOs as troop commanders, if it is fair to affirm that, in building their notions of legitimacy, blue helmets consider their commanders' understanding of the issue. All respondents replied affirmatively. Colonel De Armas, from Uruguay, explained that

> for the rank and file, issues of legitimacy remain, in many cases, restricted to the knowledge obtained during the pre-deployment training. Thus, the legitimacy and its motivating value work through the leaders at different levels. If the soldier trusts his commander, he will absorb from him the notions about the rightfulness and fairness of the mission, which will be a reason for him to dedicate himself to the task (ARMAS, 2020, translation is ours).

Due to their superior hierarchical position and more advanced military education, commanders generally exert influence over the viewpoints of their subordinates. In PKOs, they are privileged in influencing the soldiers to dedicate themselves to the mission by evoking the legal basis and the high values that justify its fulfilment. I had the opportunity to experience the significance of military commanders in enhancing the motivation by legitimacy as UN Force Commander in MINUSTAH, in 2012/13. In Haiti, I led more than 7.000 soldiers from 19 countries, following the UNSC mandate and the UNHQ’s and head of mission’s guidance to the military component. On that occasion, every time I addressed my troops to speak about the moral and legal relevance of our mission, I could notice from the men’s and women’s attitudes that they were seriously reflecting on the words they heard.

3.4.2. Influence of cognitive and affective elements

Combat is a crucial psychological moment at which soldiers face two critical circumstances: the need to kill and the need to meet the risk of being killed. In the combatant's mind, the act of fighting pits the necessity of fulfilling his duty against the instinct to survive. They also raise questions of conscience associated with the act of killing. To persevere in this grave context, soldiers should comprehend the grounds that require them to fight and sense that they do the right thing. Typically, both cognitive and affective systems contribute in this regard.

Cognition and affect constitute two independent but mutually influencing systems when it comes to human motivation. As Zajonc poses, "people do not get married or divorced, commit murder or suicide, or lay down their lives for freedom upon a detailed cognitive analysis of the pros and cons of their actions" (1980, p. 172). In most circumstances, particularly the most severe, affect acts simultaneously with cognition. Furthermore, most psychologists maintain that it is not possible to completely separate cognition and affect in a person's attitude or imagine that some behaviours are exclusively based on cognition while others are solely influenced by affect (FISKE; TAYLOR, 2017). Affective reactions are inescapable because

> unlike judgments of objective stimulus properties, affective reactions that often accompany these judgments cannot always be voluntarily controlled. Most often, these experiences occur whether one wants them to or not. One might be able to control the expression of emotion but not the experience of it itself (ZAJONC, 1980, p. 156).

Applying these ideas to the UN legitimacy to use force as a motivating factor is thought-provoking since the concept comprises both "cognitive-based" and "affective-based" arguments. Hence, although careful reflection allows the comprehension of the concept, its influence on behaviour exceeds the cognitive domain. Indeed, some aspects of the legitimacy concept impact behaviour primarily through aroused emotions.

Blue helmets evaluate the aspects associated with the UN legitimacy to use force in robust PKOs through a combination of thoughts and feelings. For instance, while values and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, such as the defence of peace, human rights and human dignity, have a cognitive basis and can be learned, peace as a "cause" is predominantly a matter of emotions and belief, being assimilated through the feelings it arouses. Coming into contact with war or armed violence or indirectly experiencing the brutality and cruelty of such situations lead to embodying peace as a cause worthy of sacrifice. In this sense, this work uses

the term “cognitive-based” to refer to the legitimacy components that require cognition as a precondition to be apprehended and influence behaviour, whereas “affective-based” applies to aspects that influence mainly through feelings.

Table 8 proposes a schematic structuration of the cognitive-based and affective-based components of the legitimacy concept.

Cognitive-based components	Affective-based components
- Values and principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations (defence of peace, human rights, human dignity etc) - PKO legal basis (international law) - Consent of the host country and the main parties to the conflict - Impartiality - Multinational composition - Efficiency	- The cause of peace - Support to and protection of vulnerable and threatened populations

Table 8 – Cognitive-based and affective-based components of the legitimacy concept

Regarding the intensity of the motivation, the emotional field is the most relevant in some cases. Fisk and Taylor maintain that emotion may commit individuals to action more than the calculation of intellective cognition (FISKE; TAYLOR, 2017). This argument is in line with combat motivation theories that consider affective motivators more effective than rational motivators during combat (GOULART, 2012; OETTING, 1990). While the cognitive-based components of legitimacy suffice to motivate at the beginning of the operation and during routine tasks, the affective-based components tend to preponderate in dangerous actions or fighting situations. Furthermore, when the blue helmets intimately identify with their assignments and “develop pride in their activities”, they become much more dedicated to the job (BIEHL; HAGEN; MACKEWITSCH, 2000, p. 15).

Another point that associates feelings and motivation is the people-centric character of peacekeeping. Manstead (2010) asserts that many emotions are inherently social, i.e. they are only experienced with the presence or in connection with other human beings. Moreover, the presence of other people tends to potentialise certain emotions and feelings. In this context, the blue helmet's realisation of the sufferings and hardships of the host country's population broadens the effects of the affective-based components of the legitimacy concept and deepens the comprehension of the UN values and principles. The sympathy for the locals and the

sharing of perceptions between soldiers during the patrols and in the military camp contribute to developing feelings that include altruism and solidarity, and to strengthening their motivational value.

The literature has several examples of positive motivations arising from the peacekeepers' impressions of the situation they witness in the mission area. For instance, Jenne describes how a Chilean marine engaged in MINUSTAH came to see the civilian population, after his initial months in the mission, not “at the end of a chain of actions” to be performed but as the “primary focus”. According to the blue helmet, upon beholding the locals and the misery around them one starts to wonder —“Who is this actor?”— and then gets “interested in the people and their concerns” (JENNE, 2020, p. 38). Also in MINUSTAH, the Brazilian blue helmets showed a solid ethnic-social identification with the people in the shanty towns where they operated. This relationship encouraged them to face risks to support the poor communities of Port-au-Prince (AGUILAR, 2012; MENDONÇA, 2017). In a similar line, Heinecken and Ferreira observe that South African blue helmets deployed in Burundi, the DRC and Darfur felt frustrated that the peacekeeping missions were not doing enough to assist local populations. For most of those peacekeepers, witnessing people, particularly children and women, dying and suffering from hunger and living in poor and unhygienic circumstances was “heart-rending” and a “shocking experience” (HEINECKEN; FERREIRA, 2012, p. 53-54).

3.4.3. The legitimacy to use force as a critical motivator

Shalit (1988) proposes that, to get ready to engage in conflict, soldiers formulate and seek answers to the following questions about the engagement: "What is it all about? Does this situation concern me? Can I do something about it?". According to the scholar, “the individual must appraise the situation; make his judgement on the basis of all his past experiences, knowledge and expectations; and come to some conclusion" (SHALIT, 1988, p. 6). Similar self-questioning and considerations apply to robust PKOs, but in this case, the circumstance of using force is decisive for the answers. For blue helmets, the relevant questions are: "What is it all about? Does the situation concern me? Is the use of military force justifiable in this context?" Peacekeeping missions may have legitimacy problems concerning the way they pursue goals in political, electoral, or humanitarian fields, for instance. However, such questions do not concern the military and do not significantly affect their commitment to action. On the other hand, legitimacy issues around the use of force directly link to the blue

helmets' role and contribute enormously to justifying their presence and actions in a foreign country. Thus, those issues link directly to the soldiers' individual motivations.

Yet, some UN member states keep providing troops to robust PKOs despite their criticism of the use of force beyond self-defence and disagreements about the missions' mandates. Referring to the phenomenon, Santos Cruz alludes to a "Chapter VI syndrome", which affects member-states and leads their peacekeeping contingents to take defensive and reactive postures in PKOs (SANTOS CRUZ; PHILIPS; CUSIMANO, 2017)[82]. Some cases in MONUSCO illustrate this problem. India's contingents, deployed in the DRC since the first years of MONUC, kept doing business as usual despite the robustness that the Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) conferred on the mission (McGREAL, 2015; PAUL CRUZ, 2021)[83]. A more recent dysfunction arose after the creation of the FIB in March 2013. In a mission frequently criticised for the lack of engagement in the protection of civilians, some MONUSCO TCCs assumed that, once the intervention brigade had started its operations, the task of curbing armed groups was no longer their responsibility (TULL, 2016). The advent of the FIB served as a pretext, and the willingness to face armed groups decreased among the UN troops[84]. Consequently, the mission's capacity to protect civilians under the threat of violent spoilers was paradoxically reduced.

Similar incoherence occurred in Brazil's initial months in MINUSTAH. During the troops' final preparation for deployment, several politicians, diplomats and military officers still maintained that the country should participate only in "Chapter VI missions", espousing the false idea that the reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the mission's mandate remitted to peace enforcement operations (UZIEL, 2015). In the end, the government's rationale, focused on the importance of supporting the UN and Haiti, prevailed, and Brazil dispatched its blue helmets to the Caribbean country. However, the misconceptions kept having

[82] "Chapter VI syndrome" is an expression to translate the false understanding espoused by some peacekeeping stakeholders that military units in PKOs should use force only in self-defence.

[83] The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, as per the French acronym) preceded MONUSCO. UNSC Resolution 1925 (2010), adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, regulated the transition. The resolution determined the concentration of troops primarily in the east of the DRC with the objectives of completing military operations to minimise the threat of armed groups, consolidating state authority throughout the territory and protecting civilians (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2010).

[84] In 2014, after evaluating the protection of civilians mandates in robust PKOs, the OIOS reported that, according to some UN officials in MONUSCO, the UNSC resolution that established the FIB (UNSC Resolution 2098/2013) created a lack of parity in the use of force expected of different contingents. Identifying such perception as erroneous and seriously damaging to the military component's efficiency, the mission leadership addressed the problem by adopting the unifying slogan: "One Mandate, one Mission, one Force" (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 14).

effects and prevented the initial contingents from performing more forcefully (NOVAES, 2017; PEREIRA, 2019). Brazil's restrained attitude only changed when it became clear that the urban violence in Port-au-Prince was too serious to be controlled without fighting the armed gangs, and the UNSC, the Secretariat, and Haitian parliamentarians and society required the UN troops to change the critical situation on the ground (BRAGA, 2010; PEREIRA, 2007; PINGEOT, 2018; STOCHERO, 2010).

Another situation related to MINUSTAH legitimacy to use force happened in 2012, with the so-called "paramilitary crisis". In the previous year, during the presidential election campaign, candidate Michel Martelly vowed to re-establish the Armed Forces of Haiti (*Forces Armées d'Haïti - FAdH*), dissolved in 1995 by former President Aristide. Once elected, Martelly kept the promise, but he had to delay the measure because the country had no budget to pay the military. This situation led to a "white" uprising. Former *FAdH* members returned to their old barracks, some of them now government buildings, and began recruiting young Haitians to establish *ad hoc* the promised new army. Unlike the problem they had caused in 2005, motivated by claims of due payments and pensions, this time, the ex-servicemen felt supported by the president's promise, which had become very popular. Faced with paramilitary formations parading in Port-au-Prince and other cities, Martelly took a dubious stance, not openly condemning the rebels for its illegal initiative. By their side, the congresspersons hesitated to take a firm position on the issue. Meanwhile, the paramilitary claimed publicly to be the legitimate "army" of the nation, obtained significant public support and started adopting a hostile attitude towards MINUSTAH forces. In view of the situation, the leadership and members of the Haitian National Police (HNP), many of them former military, gave clear signs that they would not take any action (GOULART, 2017).

The unusual context raised for the mission a legitimacy issue. The episode could stand as a case of law and public order because a few paramilitary members carried weapons, and the group had illegally occupied public buildings. However, the president, the parliament and the HNP leaders tolerated the situation due to the public support for the rebels' nationalistic discourse. This entire context indicated that MINUSTAH's intervention to disband the group without the participation of the HNP could worsen the situation rather than mitigate it. Consequently, Ambassador Mariano Fernández, the SRSG, issued to the military and police components orders to avoid confrontation while trying to convince the president and prime minister to solve the problem. I experienced such a situation as Force Commander and ordered my troops to conduct their actions as planned, maintain law and order, and not respond to provocation. Furthermore, the crisis proved to be challenging in another sense. During the

elaboration of plans to intervene when orders from the UNHQ or the SRSG arrived, a high-ranking Argentinian officer indicated to me that Buenos Aires would not allow the participation of Argentinian troops in repressive actions in this case, particularly without the co-participation of the HNP[85].

The episodes mentioned above are quite different, but they all refer to the use of force to fulfil the mission's mandate and the ensuing dubiousness and misinterpretations that negatively impacted its legitimacy. Another type of occurrence in this regard, extensively discussed in chapter 1, is the criticism of political authorities and host countries' societies due to the UN military components' lack of effectiveness in carrying out their tasks, particularly the protection of civilians. The chronicle of peacekeeping has several accounts of blue helmet's camps and patrols being stoned or angry mobs demonstrating against the UN mission's presence because of troops' failures. In addition to putting pressure on the UN officials who run the peacekeeping mission, such hostile acts constitute a severe blow to the blue helmets' motivation.

[85] The situation on the ground completely changed on 17 April 2012, when several paramilitary members, some armed with pistols, invaded the parliament to demand recognition of the group as the new army of Haiti. The media severely criticised the rebels, who lost legitimacy for their actions. Days later, the SRSG obtained the concurrence of Haiti's president for the action in force and gave the "green light" to the Force headquarters. On 6 May, the military component launched, jointly with the UN police and HNP, a series of actions that successfully disbanded the paramilitary.

Interlude

THEORETICAL VERIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

As mentioned earlier, this study aims to theorise about the blue helmets' perceptions of the UN mission legitimacy to use force to achieve peace, the impact of such perceptions on peacekeeping units' performance and, by extension, on the missions' chances of success. At this stage, we will undertake the first step to reach this objective. We will test the study's central hypothesis in light of the conceptual and academic evidence gathered during the research.

The verification of the hypothesis implies establishing the relationship between the independent variable —blue helmets' perceptions of legitimacy— and the dependent variable —performance of peacekeeping units— through the phenomenon of motivation (intervening variable). The influence of extraneous variables, represented by additional motivation factors, should also be ascertained to allow an accurate evaluation of legitimacy's motivational value.

In general, blue helmets care about the legitimacy of their actions. We make this statement based on two primary considerations. Firstly, because that is a natural human attitude. People spontaneously search for identification with jobs or activities in which they get engaged. The process begins before the person starts the new activity, guided by the individual's self-concept, and continues during the engagement. Secondly, the need for identification is reinforced by principles of military ethics and the soldier's professional sense, which induce the blue helmets to consider the correction and righteousness of their tasks.

On the other hand, specific events may impact the blue helmets' perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force. For instance, the creation of the FIB in MONUSCO and the terms of its tasks in UNSC Resolution 2019 (2013) led some contingents in the mission to understand that using force to protect civilians was not their responsibility anymore. In MINUSTAH, the initial hesitation of Brazil in using force to advance the UNSC

mandate predisposed its troops to be reactive to the threat of armed gangs and less effective in protecting civilians against their criminal actions.

When blue helmets perceive the peacekeeping mission as legitimate to use force, they feel encouraged to dedicate themselves to their tasks. Psychologists explain such an association through the notion of self-concept, also called self-identity. In PKOs, if soldiers recognise the legitimacy of the tasks requiring the use of force, bonds between their identities and their role in the mission are established. As a result, they get motivated to perform despite the risks and hardships.

As shown in chapter 1, the concept of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate" comprises aspects with varying motivational appeals. Coicaud (2006) reported on the strong motivation evoked by one of the most relevant — the UN's ideals, represented by the values and principles of the world organisation. Besides, recent research involving Latin American and African blue helmets in robust PKOs has demonstrated the motivational value of another essential aspect of the legitimacy concept: the cause of peace and support to people in need. The literature has several accounts of how the grim social situation in Haiti and some African countries evoked emotions and made the blue helmets want to make sacrifices for the local population.

The military's loyalty to the home country may also encourage blue helmets to use force and incur risks. If the society favours international solidarity and support to foreign people in despair, the soldiers will perceive legitimacy in their role in robust PKOs. In this sense, the TCCs' adherence to the goals and strategies of peacekeeping missions leads the blue helmets to commit themselves to their tasks more openly.

It would not be possible to conclude about the impact of legitimacy perceptions on peacekeeping units' performances without having a grasp on its relevance in the universe of combat motivation factors which influence the blue helmets' behaviours. Several studies demonstrate the relevance of the legitimacy factor to motivate in wars. Some scholars also refer to the importance of legitimacy to motivate in robust PKOs. Concerning the comparison with other factors, the survey with former blue helmets of BRABAT 3 in 2005 (subsection 3.3.1.) showed that they highly valued the legitimacy of fighting for peace in Haiti compared to traditional combat motivators.

As argued in chapter 2 (section 2.3.), individual motivations lead to better organisational performances, a relationship that is especially noteworthy in the military realm. Indeed, the concept of combat power demonstrates that each soldier's motivation contributes

to the military unit's performance in combat. In this sense, if blue helmets perceive the peacekeeping mission as legitimate to use force, they incorporate a motive to dedicate to their tasks and thereby contribute to improving their unit's performance in risky tasks.

The phenomenon of caveats imposed by member states constitutes evidence in favour of the converse hypothesis. In several cases, TCCs establish such restrictions to the UN Secretariat or directly to peacekeeping missions to prevent their troops from fighting and incurring risks. In such situations, their countries' interferences make the blue helmets mistrust Force headquarters' guidance to confront opponents in the mission area and lead them to question the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force. Hence, the motivation by legitimacy is lost or weakened, and the unit's performance is negatively affected.

Before closing this verification instance, we should recall the social and organisational psychologists' conviction that the perceived legitimacy of the goals affects the group's efforts to achieve them (GAL, 1986). As we have demonstrated, this is also true concerning the legitimacy of the methods. In robust PKOs, when using force —the ultimate method to fulfil the tasks determined by the UNSC— is perceived as necessary, right and just, the blue helmets are encouraged to minimise hardships and accept risks. As a result, the performances of peacekeeping units improve.

In this brief methodological pause, we summarised theoretical evidence that points to the consistency of the study's central hypothesis. Relevant knowledge in the fields of social and organisational psychology, combat motivation theories and previous research on peacekeeping allow us to state that there is a direct relationship between the hypothesis's independent and dependent variables.

In the next part of the dissertation, we will use a multiple case study to endorse the theoretical proof of the hypothesis and reach additional findings and conclusions.

PART II

EMPIRICAL APPROACH

Chapter 4

CASE STUDY: PRESENTATION AND RESULTS

After the theoretical demonstration, it is recommended to use empirical methods to investigate some aspects of the central hypothesis in more detail. In this sense, the case study will provide better insight into how the blue helmets perceive the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force, the motivational value of legitimacy compared with other combat motivation factors, and how different nuances of the legitimacy concept influence individual behaviours. It will deepen the analysis through empirical lenses in order to corroborate the theoretical examination and provide additional data and information.

The present chapter describes the methodology used in the case study, presents the five cases, highlights facts and data, and shows the investigation results.

4.1. Methodological approach

The present case study is correlational, also called non-experimental. These terms refer to studies whose independent variables cannot be manipulated or controlled by the researcher (DAVIDOFF, 2001; KUMAR, 2014). We adopted a correlational approach when we sampled peacekeeping units as per their performance (dependent variable) to infer later the influence of the blue helmets' perception of the mission legitimacy to use force (independent variable) on those performances. Such a decision was based on four aspects. First, it would be extremely complex to create a circumstance in which we could manipulate the independent variable since it comprises a personal condition acquired through long-term socialisation and enduring military education. Second, blue helmets are able to form a definite notion of peacekeeping mission legitimacy only after experiencing the operations in the mission area. Third, an experimental study would exclude the participation of countries whose engagement

in specific peacekeeping missions had already ended, as in the case of Brazil concerning MINUSTAH. Lastly, the correlational study fits our needs. Experimental studies are tailored to investigate causal relationships between variables. However, as explained in the introduction of this dissertation, this is not our intention. We focus on the degree of influence that legitimacy perceptions have on the performance of peacekeeping units.

4.1.1. Selection of cases

To establish the indices of the independent variable and analyse its impact on the military units' performance, it is necessary to investigate the blue helmets' perceptions of the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force and the personal motivations they generate. For that purpose, we utilised peacekeeping units or contingents as cases. Eight countries in four continents, relevant troop contributors to UN robust PKOs, were invited to participate in the study[86]. We directed the invitation letters to the ministries of defence through the Brazilian embassies in each country. Regarding Brazil, we extended the invitation through the Army General Staff. We requested the invited countries to designate two units, participants or former participants in robust PKOs, ideally with different performance levels, and to provide the contacts of 15 to 30 members of each unit to be interviewed or respond to a questionnaire. We advised that the units should be infantry battalions or other military outfits subject to risky situations in the mission area.

Brazil, Uruguay, and Indonesia agreed to participate in the study by appointing units to be surveyed. Those countries provided one unit with effective performance each. Germany disagreed with the unit survey but consented to provide official information on its participation in peacekeeping. These four countries have different societal characteristics and diverse profiles regarding national security and as UN troop contributors, which was very beneficial to the study. They present diverse cultural and political backgrounds, different levels of development, and armed forces with varying degrees of modernisation. Furthermore, they differ in how and regularly participate in UN PKOs. Brazil has been contributing troops since 1957, when it sent a contingent to UNEF I. However, the country's participation in PKOs is based on a case-by-case analysis and, therefore, intermittent. In turn, Uruguay became, in the last decades, a very regular troop contributor. For over twenty years, the country has had at least one battalion deployed in a UN mission. Indonesia has a long history of involvement in

[86] Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Netherlands, Nigeria, South Africa and Uruguay were invited to appoint units for the survey.

PKOs and was the seventh-largest troop contributor to UN missions at the time of writing. Germany, like many other western states, is more peculiar. It prioritises security missions in the framework of NATO and the EU. Consequently, the country's troop contribution to the UN has been consistent, though sporadic.

In Germany, our primary option was to survey blue helmets from MINUSMA, probably the most challenging robust PKO. However, the Ministry of Defence turned down our proposal under the argument that the country's participation in the mission does not involve tasks requiring the use of force[87]. In consequence, due to the high-value contribution that Germany could bring to the research, we explored a case of a contingent deployed in SFOR, a UNSC-authorised, NATO-led PKO. The case rests on a comprehensive study on soldiers' view of their international engagements, published by the sociologist Heiko Biehl and the educator Jorg Keller (BIEHL; KELLER, 2009). To develop their research, the scholars relied on in-depth, quantitative research developed by the Institute of Social Sciences of the Federal Defence Forces of Germany (*Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr - SOWI*). According to the information received from the German military authorities, the selected SFOR contingent performed very well in the Balkans.

Obtaining cases of below-average performance proved to be challenging, probably due to national policies restricting information about failures. On the other hand, UN reports on investigations of blue helmets' failures do not reveal details of the units involved. Yet, by considering internal contradictions in Brazil and MINUSTAH regarding the mission's mandate in the initial months of the UN operation in Haiti, we built a special case with BRABAT 1. The case is special because the misperceptions of legitimacy that limited the unit's performance in Haiti did not reside at the troop level, but in the UN chain of command and Brazil. With the study of BRABAT 1 as a case of below-average performance, our research meets King, Keohane, and Verba (1994)'s recommendation to allow for the possibility of at least some variation of the dependent variable.

Table 9 presents a brief description of the five cases.

[87] On 23 August 2021, I visited the Section of Political Issues II-6 (*BMVg Politik II 6*) in the German Ministry of Defence to reiterate my proposal for the country's participation in the study with a MINUSMA contingent. However, despite my argument that UN troops do not need to have an "offensive" role to incur risk in robust PKO mission areas, the position of the Defence authorities did not change.

Case	Peacekeeping mission	Period of deployment	Type of performance
Brazilian Battalion 6 (BRABAT 6)	MINUSTAH	2006/07	Effective
Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21	MONUSCO	2020/21	
Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K	UNIFIL	2016/17	
8th German SFOR Contingent	SFOR	2004	
Brazilian Battalion 1 (BRABAT 1)	MINUSTAH	2004	Ineffective (special case)

Table 9 – Case study - description of cases

As explained in the introduction of this dissertation, we left it to the invited countries to select peacekeeping units with effective performance. However, we confirmed their evaluations through consultations with UN officials and staff appreciation. In some cases, opinions from political leaders and citizens of the host country were also factored.

4.1.2. Method used to collect data

The cases were developed with the support of semistructured surveys, considered an adequate tool to investigate thoughts, feelings and attitudes (SHAUGHNESSY; ZECHMEISTER; ZECHMEISTER, 2012). For the case study, we used type II interviews (Annexe B) or corresponding self-administered questionnaires. The relevance of each technique varied from one case to another and with the type of data we sought. The perceptions and feelings about the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force and its motivational implications were collected through interviews and questionnaires in BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K. Concerning the 8th German SFOR Contingent, we used data available in the literature, as already explained. In the case of BRABAT 1, we gathered information mostly from secondary sources.

In BRABAT 6, we surveyed 31 members but disregarded one form with responses due to incoherent information[88]. In the end, 19 officers, 4 NCOs, and 7 privates/corporals contributed to the survey outcomes, from which 11 were interviewed and 19 replied to self-administered questionnaires. The battalion and company commanders appointed the respondents randomly. They contacted their subordinates, verified their willingness to participate in the research, and confirmed telephone numbers and e-mails. The interviews and questionnaire administration took place between April and August 2021, i.e., approximately 14 years after BRABAT 6's tour of duty in Haiti. However, during the survey contextualisation and the formulation of specific questions, we informed the participants that the responses should reflect perceptions, feelings and motivations at the mission time. Also, the fact that the questions referred to important aspects of the military profession that impress soldiers for a lifetime, rather than to details and minutiae, mitigated the effects of the long time that had elapsed since completing the mission. We conducted the interviews through video calls (Skype or Whatsapp) to the military at their homes or workplaces. The questionnaires were shared with the respondents through e-mail or WhatsApp messages. All participants showed understanding of the interview/questionnaire aim and had no difficulties answering the questions. The interviewees appeared comfortable and willing to share their experiences and feelings.

In the Uruguayan battalion, 15 members (2 officers and 13 NCOs), all volunteers, answered the questionnaires. The Ministry of Defence of Uruguay provided the participants' names and contact details, and I shared the questionnaire forms with them through WhatsApp or e-mail. The participants self-applied the questionnaires. The survey took place between August and September 2021, approximately three months before the end of the participants' tour of duty in the DRC. At the survey time, they had already been in the MONUSCO mission area for about a year and had been able to experience several situations in which the unit had to resort to force. Moreover, most battalion members had previous experience in PKOs, which provided them with a solid basis to respond to questions on mission legitimacy.

In Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K, 21 members (7 officers and 14 NCOs) filled in the questionnaires. We sent the question form to the Ministry of Defence through the Brazilian military attaché in Jakarta. In our correspondence, we informed the Indonesian defence authorities that the participants should be volunteers and selected at random, and the

[88] The respondent stated that he was strongly motivated by legitimacy but did not attribute importance to this factor vis-à-vis other motivating factors.

questionnaires should be self-administered. The ministry selected the respondents, shared the questionnaires with them and returned the completed forms. The survey took place between December 2021 and January 2022, four years after the end of the battalion's deployment in UNIFIL.

Regarding the fourth case —the 8th German SFOR Contingent—, we collected data from Biehl and Keller's (2009) and other German academic studies. The *SOWI* databank, which served as the basis of Biehl and Keller's work, consists of a survey with members of the 8th SFOR Contingent and other German contingents in NATO peacekeeping missions. From the total strength of 1.289 soldiers in the 8th SFOR Contingent, 688 (53%) returned the SOWI questionnaires, from which 610 informed their ranks: 103 officers, 320 non-commissioned officers, and 187 privates/corporals. The survey took place in January 2004, during the contingent's deployment in the Balkans, which started in December 2003 and ended in May 2004 ('Stabilization Force (SFOR): *Deutsche Einsatzkontingente*', 2004). Biehl and Keller's research objective was to investigate the peacekeeper's professional self-image and personal motivations. To adjust the 8th SFOR Contingent case to the thesis, I also got information from visits paid to the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the *Bundeswehr* UN Training Centre, as well as from interviews with German high-ranking military officers and peacekeeping experts.

We focused the investigation on personal views, feelings and motivations. These sources and data allowed us to evaluate the motivational value of UN legitimacy and gauge its impact on the military units' performance. Since we evaluated motivations and assessed their impacts on each case individually, the differences in the number of respondents between the Brazilian, Uruguayan and Indonesian battalions did not impact the overall result of the study.

The interviews and questionnaires explored the participants' cognitive and affective domains. Both survey modalities provided the same information to the respondents and observed the same inquiry sequence. Starting the activity, I presented the research aims and importance, the operational definition of legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate, and the definition of "risky task". Interviewees and questionnaire respondents answered the questions in light of the concept of legitimacy the study proposes. They had the opportunity to opine about the legitimacy concept and propose amendments or modifications. None of the participants showed disagreement with or restrictions on the proposed concept nor suggested improvements to it.

Following, I asked a question to investigate the participants' perceptions of the legitimacy of the peace mission in which they participated and raise justifications for those perceptions. The next question aimed to ascertain to what extent the legitimacy perception affected the motivation to carry out risky tasks, i.e., the absolute motivational value of legitimacy. In order to facilitate the analysis, these questions offered the following categories of answers, respectively: "the mission is (was) legitimate", "the mission is (was) partially legitimate", and "the mission is (was) illegitimate"; and "it motivates (motivated) a lot", "it motivates (motivated) little", "it demotivates (demotivated) little", "it demotivates (demotivated) a lot", and "it is (was) indifferent". Then, a question was asked to address the value of the sense of legitimacy as a motivator in comparison with other motivating factors, i.e., the relative motivational value of legitimacy. Since several factors influence the blue helmets' performance in risky tasks, this question allowed us to consider the concurring influence of other motivators (KUMAR, 2014; RUDESTAM; NEWTON, 2015). To support the response, I offered a list of traditional combat motivation factors and advised the interviewees/questionnaire respondents that they could add other motivators. Then, the participants were asked to indicate the combat motivation factors that motivated them in order of importance. The final question aimed to check, among the essential aspects of the legitimacy concept, which ones motivated the blue helmets more.

In order to gain a broader sense of perceptions and motivations within the battalions, I also asked the troop commanders —officers and NCOs leading subunits (companies), platoons or sections— to opine on their subordinates' views[89]. Following the question on their own situation, the leaders were questioned about the perceptions of most of their soldiers on the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force, the level of motivation it generated and how important legitimacy was for them in comparison with other motivators. Two reasons support the use of military commanders to broaden the survey coverage. First, officers and senior NCOs are trained to watch over their subordinates' psychological preparation and motivation. Besides, given the frequent interactions and day-to-day observation of their subordinates' attitudes, leaders gain a sense of their perceptions and level of motivation.

During the interviews, in addition to the pre-planned inquiry, I used follow-up questions to encourage the participants to better elaborate on their thoughts and deepen their

[89] In a battalion, the subordinates of subunit, platoon and section commanders are, in the vast majority, young, low-ranking soldiers.

contributions (BRONÉUS, 2011). In the end, the interviewees were offered the opportunity for further comments. I recorded the responses or took them in writing.

The following data were collected from each interviewee/questionnaire respondent: name (with the option for anonymity), peacekeeping mission, military rank at mission time and position or function performed in the mission.

In a more detailed way, we conducted the data-gathering as follows:

1) The interviews were conducted through telephone or video calls (Skype or Whatsapp). Communication was established in Portuguese, Spanish and English. The questionnaires were prepared in the same languages. The translation from the original in Portuguese observed semantic equivalence to achieve culturally corresponding questionnaires.

2) The interviews and questionnaire forms were tested to ascertain whether the respondents would clearly understand the questions and be able to provide the answers. I conducted the test of the Portuguese, Spanish and English versions with representatives of each language. Fifteen officers and NCOs from six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nigeria, Peru and Uruguay), with previous experience in robust PKOs, participated in the test. Eight individuals were interviewed through video calls, and seven received questionnaires for self-administration. The interview and questionnaire tests were evaluated through the techniques of "respondent debriefings" and "response analysis" (SINGLETON JR.; STRAITS, 2012). The result of the test was plenty satisfactory.

3) In the cases of BRABAT 6 and Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, we sent the questionnaire forms directly to the respondents for self-administration. For Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K, the questionnaires were sent through a point of contact in the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia, which shared them with the respondents.

We considered ethical issues throughout the research (CRESWELL, 1994). The safeguards listed below were applied to preserve the rights, values and desires of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents.

- Participation in interviews and questionnaires was voluntary and according to the interest and availability of the participant.
- At the beginning of the interview and on the initial pages of the questionnaire forms, we informed the participants of the research objectives and how data would be recorded and used.
- We explained to the participants that the return of the questionnaire forms implied consent to this type of data collection. In video call interviews, the interviewees'

authorisation to record their responses was requested. We also requested the filling-in of an informed consent form.

- In the case of interview excerpts intended for transcription in the dissertation, we made the respective texts available to the interviewees for them to express their agreement.
- Interviewees and questionnaire respondents could opt for anonymity in their statements.

The vast majority of the interviewees and questionnaire respondents answered all the questions. The number of non-respondents is indicated next to the table with the question result whenever it applies.

4.1.3. Method used to analyse data

Initially, we processed data within each case study. Before using information from interviews and questionnaires, we checked for possible incoherence or impossible answers. Then, we separated data by subject categories, interpreted and analysed them to produce each case's final framework (MOURA; FERREIRA, 2005).

We performed the analysis of each case by interpreting and classifying data under the main topics of the study: perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy, levels of motivation generated by such perceptions, and prioritisation of legitimacy in comparison with other combat motivation factors. Particularly suggestive answers were quoted in the study, in total or in part. Where appropriate, we collated data with combat motivation theories, information from the literature and the data obtained in previous interviews with peacekeeping experts.

Then, we considered the data and information resulting from the five cases, restructured them and analysed them again to achieve the necessary contextualisation. The activity was eclectic during the entire process to allow comparisons, the contrast of different positions and the search for alternative explanations to come to the best description of the findings (CRESWELL, 1994; TESCH, 1990). We did not disaggregate the responses in subgroups because there was no interest in conducting multivariate analyses to compare survey participants. Nevertheless, some topics in the study of BRABAT 6 case recommended the separation of responses by military ranks.

Despite the qualitative nature of the study, we use tables, percentages and scatter plots to expose relevant data in a more concise fashion. Regarding the percentages, we rounded some

figures to avoid using decimals. Moreover, since "no response" is not a significant category in the present study, we calculated the percentages over the number of participants answering the questions (BABBIE, 2003).

4.1.4. Method for case study

The following sequence guides each case presentation. The case of BRABAT 1 is peculiar and, therefore, is presented with specific arguments.

1) Description of the case (military unit/contingent, country of origin, peacekeeping mission of deployment, period in the mission area, security condition and operations etc).
2) Description of the performance of the unit/contingent in risky tasks.
3) Description of unit/contingent members' perceptions of the mission legitimacy to use force:
   - Individual perceptions (general consultation), and
   - troop leaders' views on the subordinates' perceptions.
4) Description of how (to what extent) the legitimacy perception motivates/demotivates to accomplish risky tasks:
   - Individual impressions (general consultation);
   - troop leaders' appreciation of the value of the legitimacy factor to motivate their subordinates; and
   - motivational value of the essential aspects of the mission legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate.
5) Analysis of the relevance of legitimacy as a motivator to face risks vis-à-vis other combat motivation factors:
   - Individual impressions (general consultation), and
   - troop leaders' appreciation of the motivation of their subordinates.
6) Case conclusion

4.2. Cases presentation and results

4.2.1. Case 1 – BRABAT 6 (Brazil) in MINUSTAH

BRABAT 6 arrived in Haiti at the end of 2006, a crucial moment for the UN mission in the country. MINUSTAH had been established in June 2004 and, shortly after that, the peacekeeping units took responsibility for their areas of operations to establish a secure

environment in the Caribbean country. Two and half years later, the neighbourhoods of Bel Air, Cité Militaire and Carrefour, in the great Port-au-Prince, had been occupied by the blue helmets and were kept under UN and government control. However, in Cité Soleil, a huge shantytown in the capital's coastal area, the few blue helmets "strong points" (bases) were constantly harassed by fire and their mechanised patrols, frequently ambushed.

Cité Soleil was a strategic location for the UN peace process due to its size, central location and number of inhabitants, almost all living in absolute poverty. Moreover, the area was crucial for the weak Haitian economy because it is connected to Haiti's main harbour and crossed by "Route National nº 1", a major national north-south road. Notwithstanding, the UN's most pressing reason for conquering Cité Soleil was the high crime statistics. Murders —some of which, barbaric— kidnappings, robberies and extortions were frequent in the slum, where people lived in fear. Two and half years after its deployment, and despite the military and police components' efforts, Cité Soleil was still a severe hindrance to the Haitian capital pacification. Consequently, MINUSTAH faced severe criticism from Haitian society, the UNHQ and prominent UN member states. Such a context represented a deep embarrassment to the peacekeeping mission, which was under severe pressure to reduce criminality and improve public security.

On 17 December 2006, BRABAT 6 took over the area of operations of BRABAT 5, which had already been pacified and, in addition, received full responsibility of Cité Soleil. From this point in time until mid-June 2007, the unit conducted intensive operations to control the shantytown. The Battalion Commander, Colonel Cláudio Barroso Magno Filho, led his subordinates with a dynamic, very assertive posture. The unit conducted aggressive patrolling and launched a series of pre-planned operations to curb criminality and suppress the armed opposition in the new portion of its area of responsibility. The armed groups' strongholds were progressively dismantled through severe fighting, followed by police-type operations. In the end, a well-founded MINUSTAH presence replaced the gangs' control in Cité Soleil.

BRABAT 6's level of performance was impressive, considering that Cité Soleil was the most challenging area of operations in Port-au-Prince. Although the UN troops had to make efforts to conquer Bel Air, Martissant, Carrefour and Cité Militaire, none of those areas required the same level of military engagement as Cité Soleil. Until December 2006, the military component sporadic operations were insufficient to control the area, and the UN

formed police units (FPUs) and HNP formations could not enter the site[90]. As a result, the UN civilian staff could not develop their planned activities in aid of the peace process. To make the situation more difficult, as other parts of the city became pacified, the security situation in Cité Soleil worsened because it turned out to be the gangs' last stronghold in Haiti (PEREIRA, 2019). The Jordanian battalion in charge of the shantytown before the arrival of BRABAT 6 had severe setbacks and some fatal casualties. This unit had similar strength, weapons and equipment to the Brazilian unit but not the same level of motivation. According to General José Elito Siqueira, the Force Commander who transferred the area of operation to BRABAT 6, "the Jordanians were good officers, good soldiers, but they had an unfortunate situation, they lost two captains and two sergeants, killed inside the slum. That lowered their morale, and it [the operation] was not working" (SIQUEIRA, 2019, p. 55 translation is ours). Conversely, motivations in BRABAT 6 were very high.

Despite the grim scenario, in less than six months BRABAT 6 defeated the armed gangs in its area of responsibility. Some criminals were killed; others were arrested or fled the area. The Brazilian troops had some soldiers injured but no fatal casualties (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2004). For BRABAT 6 commander, the staff correctly assessed the situation and developed daring but feasible plans, which the subordinate companies and detachments operated synergistically to execute. “Consequently, the battalion accomplished the mission to perfection” (BARROSO MAGNO, 2021, translation is ours). Colonel Schmitz, a detachment commander in BRABAT 6, summarises the unit’s arduous task and success as follows:

> The battalion experienced a well-marked sequence of events. Upon arrival, the troops were shot at and returned fire in practically every patrol. All you had to do to be shot at was entering Cité Soleil. In some situations, the troops identified the targets and could react efficiently. During the planned, large operations, the clashes became very intense. After that phase, in the last two months of the unit’s deployment period, the clashes became sporadic. In the end, we moved within Cité Soleil on foot or in soft-skinned vehicles, in places where, weeks before, we only could move inside *Urutus*[91] (SCHMITZ JÚNIOR, 2021, translation is ours).

On 22 August 2007, the Secretary-General’s report on MINUSTAH to the UNSC informed that, with the operations conducted from 22 December 2006 to 28 February 2007,

[90] Generally, police components in PKOs are composed of individual police officers and FPUs. Police officers usually investigate crime and criminality, train and mentor local police services, and enforce law and order. The FPUs are employed in patrolling, riot control and law enforcement actions.

[91] *Urutu* is the designation of a Brazilian APC.

the mission "dislodged the main gang leaders and […] paved the way for the Haitian National Police, supported by MINUSTAH, to return to those areas and, in March, to begin joint patrols in Cité Soleil" (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2007). Operation "*Jauru Sudamericano*", launched at the beginning of February by the Force headquarters with BRABAT 6 troops in the lead, was the major operation that consolidated that result. After this operation, the gangs lost control of the area, and the security situation improved enormously. Cockayne describes the action and other ensuing successes of BRABAT 6 as follows:

> MINUSTAH launched Operation 'Jauru Sudamericanu' [*sic*] on 9 February 2007 in the Boston slum. This Brazilian-led assault was the largest engagement of the campaign: it involved some 700 troops, 44 APCs, 11 other vehicles and the overflight helicopter, and lasted 13 hours. MINUSTAH seized the gang's 'Jamaica Base', and cleared the area of Evens' gang. Eight further operations ensued, in other slums. […] Numerous major gang leaders were arrested: Ti Bazile (of Brooklyn, on 18 February 2007); Evens (Boston, 13 March 2007); Belony (Bois Neuf, 21 April); and Ti Will (Gonaives, 26 May). With the leadership removed, the rest of the gang structures collapsed: MINUSTAH and the PNH had arrested more than 800 gang members by the end of the summer 2007. This appeared to represent clear victory over the gangs —and a major turn-around in MINUSTAH's effectiveness (COCKAYNE, 2014, p. 753)[92].

After conquering the Jamaica Base, BRABAT 6 established and consolidated several strong points throughout the area and intensified the patrolling to prevent the gangs from returning and restructuring. Sporadic firefights with individuals or small groups still occurred, but the criminals' pattern of conduct changed —after shooting, they quickly broke contact and evaded the site.

Despite some criticism of the fierce firefights caused by the operations, in the end, the action was termed a great success by the Haitians, the national and international media, several scholars and the international community. Dziedzic and Perito (2008) attribute MINUSTAH's success to its actions against the gangs and crime in Port-au-Prince, particularly in Cité Soleil. The scholars maintain that, "if MINUSTAH had not been willing and able to confront the gang threat emanating predominantly but not exclusively from Cité Soleil, the mission would likely have been doomed to fail" (DZIEDZIC; PERITO, 2008, p. 6). The Haitian Prime Minister, Jacques-Édouard Alexis, recognised that, for the first time in many years, the country had reached a condition of stability because of MINUSTAH efforts to curb the armed gangs' activity (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2004). On 2 August 2007, the local mayor, accompanying the UN Secretary-General on a visit to Cité Soleil, declared that he took

[92] Brooklyn, Boston and Bois Neuf are localities within Cité Soleil.

advantage of Ban Ki-Moon's presence "to pay a great public tribute to the head of MINUSTAH and to the blue helmets for their efforts to restore peace to Cité Soleil" (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE FOR COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, 2007). Regarding the residents' appreciation, Dziedzic and Perito refer to a survey conducted in early 2008 by "Group Croissance" on behalf of the United States Institute of Peace. It cites that "97 percent of respondents believed that the UN crackdown on the gangs was justified". Another survey, conducted in November 2007 for the U.S. State Department's Haiti Stabilization Initiative indicated that "98 percent of Cité Soleil residents felt safer than they had six months earlier, and 85 percent reported that they could conduct their daily activities without fear of intimidation and extortion" (DZIEDZIC; PERITO, 2008, p. 5-6).

In Brazil, the conquest of Cité Soleil is considered a noteworthy milestone in the country's participation in MINUSTAH. On 21 October 2017, in a ceremony to honour the Brazilian troops participating in the mission, the Minister of Defence, Raul Jungmann, recalled in his speech the obstacles faced by the 26 contingents that were deployed over the 13 years of the mission, highlighting the "challenge of Cité Soleil", which had been "overcome, and in an absolutely recognised way" (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2017). For the Brazilian military, the 2007 operations in Cité Soleil represented a tipping point in Haiti's pacification process (PEREIRA, 2019; SANTOS CRUZ, 2019; SIQUEIRA, 2019). According to Lieutenant General Paul Cruz, MINUSTAH Force Commander from March 2010 to March 2011, the most intense period in Haiti's pacification lasted until the initial months of 2007. Then, the focus of the operations changed to keeping the environment secure, supporting the HNP and supporting humanitarian assistance as required (PAUL CRUZ, 2019).

The UN acknowledged BRABAT 6's outstanding performance. The Secretary-General's report to the UNSC dated 22 August 2007, two months after the unit's redeployment, affirmed that there had been "significant improvements in the security situation, particularly in the urban areas that had previously been under gang control. The restoration of those areas to State authority represents an important stride forward" (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2007, p. 5). In 2014, Edmond Mulet, then UN Assistant Secretary-General for PKO, stated in an official visit to Brazil that, having served twice as MINUSTAH head of mission and after witnessing the work of the Brazilian blue helmets, he could say "that their performance makes a big difference" (Mulet apud PUFF, 2014, p. 2). Mulet's first term as SRSG took place between June 2006 and August 2007 and comprised the entire BRABAT 6's presence in Haiti. Besides, several member states recognised, during UNSC meetings and in other settings, the successful operations in Port-au-Prince. In 2009, before a commission in the

US Congress, the Permanent Representative of the USA to the United Nations praised, in a succinct but clear reference, the exemplary job of the UN troops that pacified Cité Soleil:

> Many countries are more peaceful and stable today due to U.N. peacekeeping. In recent years, U.N. peacekeepers helped divert an explosion of ethnic violence in Burundi; extend the fledgling government authority in Sierra Leone; keep order in Liberia; and take back Cite Soleil from the lawless gangs in Haiti (RICE, 2009, p. 5).

BRABAT 6 had to make intensive use of force to achieve success. In the view of several analysts, peacekeeping experts and military practitioners, the resort to military force was a *sine qua non* for taking Cité Soleil from the criminal gangs and pacifying the shantytown. The Brazilian blue helmets broadly share such assessment, as we could observe during the survey. Asked whether they consider the UN mission legitimate (full legitimacy), partially legitimate (partial legitimacy) or illegitimate (no legitimacy) to use force for mandate accomplishment, they all responded that MINUSTAH was legitimate during their tour of duty.

Table 10.1: How do you consider the peace mission in which you participated regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legitimate	30	100
Partially legitimate	0	0
Illegitimate	0	0
	30	100%

The presence among the participants of young respondents, who had low military ranks at the mission time, encouraged us to introduce a question to investigate the source of convictions about legitimacy in the rank and file. We asked the participants who were corporals and privates in Haiti: "If you answered that the mission was legitimate (totally or partially), how did you form your understanding of the issue or, in other words, how did you come to know that it was right and fair to use military force to keep peace in Haiti?" We offered five

alternatives to respond to this question (see table 10.2). Further, we advised the respondents that they could select more than one option and indicate sources of information other than the ones presented to them. Seven respondents answered the question. The result is shown in table 10.2.

Table 10.2: If you answered that the mission was legitimate (in whole or part), how did you form this understanding?

Alternatives	Mentions
Guidance received from my commanders during the training phase in Brazil and the mission in Haiti.	6
Lectures (presentations) during the training phase in Brazil.	7
Conversation with my buddies.	2
Conversation with family members.	0
Reading of newspapers and similar sources of information.	3
Other forms of information (please, indicate which): - Realisation by myself, in Haiti, that MINUSTAH needed to use force to bring peace to the country.	2

Additionally, the participants in this section were asked: "If you indicated more than one source of information, which was the most important for you to form the understanding that you were doing the right thing in Haiti?" Six respondents answered this question.

Table 10.3: If you indicated more than one source of information, which was the most important for you to form your understanding that you were doing the right thing in Haiti?

Alternatives	Mentions
Guidance received from my commanders during the training phase in Brazil and the mission in Haiti.	1
Lectures (presentations) during the training phase in Brazil.	3
Realisation by myself, in Haiti, that MINUSTAH needed to use force to bring peace to the country.	2

In the mission area, several situations faced by the troops were challenging and risky, and the soldiers had to master their apprehensions and fears to persevere in the task. Therefore, an important point is to ascertain whether and how intensely the positive perception of MINUSTAH legitimacy to use military force to achieve peace translated into motivation. To achieve this goal, we asked the survey participants to what extent MINUSTAH legitimacy level to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivated them to carry out risky tasks. As possible responses, we offered the alternatives "it motivated a lot", "it motivated little", "it demotivated little", "it demotivated a lot" and "it was indifferent". The result points to a very significant contribution of legitimacy to individual motivations, with 83% of the participants answering that it motivated them a lot. Table 10.4 indicates the complete result.

Table 10.4: To what extent did the peace mission's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate you to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Motivated a lot	25	83
Motivated little	2	7
Demotivated little	0	0
Demotivated a lot	0	0
Indifferent	3	10
	30	100%

The scatter plot in figure 6 organises the responses regarding the perceptions of MINUSTAH legitimacy to use force and the level of motivation it generates in the respondents. The relationship displayed in the diagram indicates a highly positive correlation between the variables. Besides, the graph points out that most of the respondents who took the mission as fully legitimate were strongly motivated by legitimacy to take risks.



Fig. 6 - Correlation between legitimacy perception and motivation by the legitimacy factor in BRABAT 6[93]

We extended the investigation of legitimacy perceptions and the level of motivation it generated in this case with the support of officers and NCOs who performed as troop leaders during BRABAT 6's deployment in Haiti. We asked them how their subordinates, for the most part, considered the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks. As possible responses, the alternatives of "legitimate (full legitimacy)", "partially legitimate (partial legitimacy)" and "illegitimate (no legitimacy)" were offered. Eighteen participants replied to this question. They all opined that their subordinates took MINUSTAH as an entirely legitimate mission to use force.

Table 10.5: In your opinion, how did your subordinates, for the most part, consider the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legitimate	18	100
Partially legitimate	0	0
Illegitimate	0	0
	18	100%

[93] In the scatter plots shown in this work, "FL", "PL" and "I" stand for "fully legitimate", "partially legitimate" and "illegitimate", respectively.

We also asked the troop leaders to what extent the mission legitimacy motivated their subordinates, for the most part, to perform in risky situations. The response options were "motivated a lot", "motivated little", "demotivated little", "demotivated a lot", "indifferent" and "I don't know". Nineteen participants replied to this question. The result was as follows:

Table 10.6: To what extent did the peace mission's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate your subordinates, for the most part, to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Motivated a lot	17	90
Motivated little	1	5
Demotivated little	0	0
Demotivated a lot	0	0
Indifferent	1	5
I don't know	0	0
	19	100%

Considering that the concept of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate" is multifaceted and its different intrinsic notions may have specific motivational values, we asked a question to investigate the issue. We offered the participants the essential aspects of the concept and asked which most motivated them to perform under risk. Further, the participants were asked which aspect they would list second in importance to motivate them in risky tasks. The aspects offered were "the legal basis for the use of force", "the consent of the host country for the peace mission presence", "the local population's perception that the mission is beneficial to them", and "the noble cause of peace and support for people in need". The result pointed to a greater relevance of two aspects with affective appeal: "The noble cause of peace and the support for people in need" and "the local population's perception that the mission is beneficial to them", which received the same number of mentions as first priority. However, "the legal basis for the use of force" was also well regarded as a significant motivating aspect. The table indicates the distribution of the mentions.

Table 10.7: Among the essential aspects of the legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate, which one mostly served to motivate you to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legal basis	8	26
Host country's consent	0	0
Local population's positive perception	11	37
The noble cause of peace and support to needy	11	37
	30	100%

As second in importance, the most mentioned aspect was the "legal basis for the use of force". However, "the noble cause of peace and support for people in need" remained very well scored.

Table 10.8: Which aspect do you list second in importance as a motivator for carrying out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legal basis	12	41
Host country's consent	1	3
Local population's positive perception	5	17
The noble cause of peace and support to needy	11	39
	29	100%

(Without answer = 1)

Overall, adding the categories of "most important aspect" and "aspect second in importance", "the noble cause of peace and support for people in need" stood out as the most relevant. It received the largest number of mentions (22), followed by "the legal basis for the use of force" (20).

Some statements of BRABAT 6's members support the results in this section. Colonel Barroso Magno highlights the motivational value of the Haitians' positive perception of the blue helmets' task:

> In carrying out our task, we considered the acceptance of the population of Haiti extremely important. In this regard, we noticed that the battalion's high level of engagement and willingness to confront [the gangs] met the Haitian people's expectations because the gangs' defeat was beneficial to the good citizens (BARROSO MAGNO, 2021, translation is ours).

Major Quadros was a platoon leader in Haiti. Given the platoon's small size (32 individuals) and because such troops are tasked as a whole, he was in constant contact with his soldiers. Quadros explains that the legitimacy aspect that motivated them the most was the precarious situation of the people in the mission area, whose life they helped improve: "We could see that, after an assertive action of the platoon in a certain area, there was an immediate change in the local routine there because of the sense of security that we brought to the people" (2021, translation is ours).

Regarding the legal aspect of legitimacy, Colonel Heron, Commander of the Mechanised Cavalry Squadron, understands that it is very important for troop leaders. He argues that planning and determining actions that put soldiers' lives at risk or lead them to have to kill are very serious issues, something that is only acceptable with a clear legal backing (ANGELIM, 2021). In a similar vein, Major Gall Pires and Major Alexandre Medeiros, platoon leaders in Haiti, state that the certainty of having legal support reassured them (MEDEIROS, 2021; PIRES, 2021). According to Gall Pires (2021), in Haiti, the corporals and privates acquired the notion of legality mainly through the ROE. For Alexandre Medeiros (2021), among other effects, following the ROE gave the soldiers self-confidence, as they knew that they would not be punished or penalised if they used lethal force according to the rules.

At this stage, in order to ascertain the relative motivational value of legitimacy, its relevance to encouraging blue helmets to take risks should be contrasted with other combat motivation factors applicable to robust PKOs. For that purpose, we asked the participants to indicate, on a scale of 1 (one) onwards, in order of priority (importance), the intensity with which traditional combat motivation factors motivated them to carry out risky tasks in Haiti. It was explained that number one meant the "highest priority: motivated intensely", and the highest used number meant the "lowest priority: motivated very little". We provided the following factors, some described in detail for the sake of clarity: "UN legitimacy to act for peace, even resorting to force when necessary"; "high quality and efficiency of the unit's

weapons, equipment and vehicles, which guaranteed protection and facilitated the fulfilment of the mission and were superior to the opposing groups' weapons and equipment"; "sense that it was my duty"; "leadership of the immediate commander"; "unit's cohesion"; and "willingness to represent my country well". In addition, we informed the respondents that combat motivation factors that did not motivate them should be left blank (receive no number), and they could add additional factors to the list.

The result indicates a high value of the legitimacy factor vis-à-vis other motivators, with 70% of the respondents ranking it in the three highest priorities. Table 10.9 indicates the number of mentions that the factor received in each priority.

Table 10.9: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	15	50
2	4	13
3	2	7
4	1	3.5
5	4	13
6 or lower	1	3,5
Factor not indicated	3	10
	30	100%

Furthermore, we asked the troop leaders to indicate their views on the importance of the legitimacy factor for their subordinates —or the most part of them— to face risky tasks, in comparison with other combat motivation factors. The question was formulated using the same technique as the previous question: motivation factors were offered as response alternatives, possibility to include other factors and possibility to leave factors blank (no indication of priority). Seventeen participants replied to the question. The following table indicates the priority given to the legitimacy factor:

Table 10.10: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - troop leaders' opinion on their subordinates

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	3	18
2	1	6
3	4	23
4	3	18
5	0	0
6 or lower	5	29
Factor not indicated	1	6
	17	100%

The relevance of the legitimacy factor compared to other motivators became evident in the general consultation, but the result of the question posed to the commanders was not conclusive (eight mentions placing legitimacy among the highest three priorities and nine mentions putting it among the lowest priorities). This result also contrasts with the increased importance the troop leaders attributed to legitimacy in motivating their subordinates for risky tasks (table 10.6). Thus, to further examine the topic, we took advantage of the presence of soldiers with no leadership prerogative among the respondents and disaggregated the result of the question on the relative motivational value of legitimacy by rank. The corporals' and privates' responses indicate that they were motivated by the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force. As shown in table 10.11, this factor was a priority motivator to 71% of the respondents.

Table 10.11: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - corporals' and privates' responses

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	5	71
2	0	0
3	0	0
4	0	0
5	0	0
6 or lower	0	0
Factor not indicated	2	29
	7	100%

During the interview, several officers opined that the UN mission legitimacy to use force motivated BRABAT 6 soldiers, but it was significantly more relevant for commanders. For Colonel Alves, legitimacy was an important motivator for his subordinates in general, but in a lesser degree for the young soldiers in comparison with sergeants and officers, especially those assigned with troop command (ALVES PINTO, 2021). Related to this point, Colonel Hildebrando has an interesting opinion. He was an assistant in the battalion staff personnel cell and, as such, he dealt directly with the issues of morale and motivation. According to him, in Haiti,

> the soldiers didn't exactly think in terms of legitimacy, but they were aware that they were doing something legal. [...] Legality was important for them to carry out their task without the fear of being prosecuted or punished if they had to kill somebody. [...] However, in the course of the mission, the young soldiers realised that their task was not only legal but also fair, that is, the right thing to do. This happened because of their regular interaction with the population, the observation of how the Haitians accepted them and how they were satisfied with their presence, and also due to the words of acknowledgement and support they received during the patrols (ANDRADE, 2021, translation is ours).

Colonel Heron supports this point, recalling that,

> during the pre-deployment training, the soldiers of the mechanised cavalry squadron were told that they would be representing Brazil and should do that very well. Also, the legal basis of our mission received a great deal of attention in the training. Furthermore, once in Haiti, the soldiers added to these initial motivations the sense that they were doing something crucial for the local people. For example, providing security and allowing them to have a normal life (ANGELIM, 2021, translation is ours).

Some officers indicated that the awareness of legitimacy becomes latent during the fighting, when other factors stand out and take precedence as motivators (ALVES PINTO, 2021; BRAZ DA SILVA, 2021). However, these officers also consider that the legitimacy notion always influences attitudes and behaviours to a greater or lesser extent. For some, legitimacy is the basis for all other motivations. Colonel Braz explains, with a metaphor, that

> legitimacy is like the "ground" we walk on. Usually, we don't give importance to it and don't even realise that we are sustained by it. Nevertheless, without this "base", we wouldn't be able to do anything. So it is with legitimacy (BRAZ DA SILVA, 2021, translation is ours).

Private Simplício Santos also expressed in a plain and direct manner his view on the UN legitimacy in employing the blue helmets to achieve peace in Haiti: "The point was to do the right thing, what was fair and morally correct in that case" (SANTOS, 2021, translation is ours).

Investigating the relevance of combat motivation factors other than legitimacy to use force is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, one of these factors —the willingness to represent one's country well— should be examined because it may be related to legitimacy if the TCC supports the UN goals in the PKO. As shown in table 10.12, this factor was considered an important motivator by 67% of the respondents, who rated it among the first three priorities.

Table 10.12: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	10	34
2	4	13
3	6	20
4	3	10
5	3	10
6 or lower	3	10
Factor not indicated	1	3
	30	100%

The troop leaders also gave their opinion on the importance of this factor to motivate their subordinates, for the most part, in comparison with other combat motivation factors. Seventeen participants replied to the question. Table 10.13 presents the result.

Table 10.13: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - troop leaders' opinion on their subordinates

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	4	23
2	2	12
3	2	12
4	3	18
5	1	6
6 or lower	4	23
Factor not indicated	1	6
	17	100%

The importance of the willingness to represent Brazil well was evident in the overall result but diffuse in the leaders' opinion of their subordinates. Nevertheless, the disaggregation of responses by rank indicates that corporals and privates were significantly motivated by that factor.

Table 10.14: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - corporals' and privates' responses

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	3	43
2	0	0
3	2	29
4	0	0
5	0	0
6 or lower	1	14
Factor not indicated	1	14
	7	100%

All in all, the case of BRABAT 6 provides relevant findings for the hypothesis verification. The survey indicates that the unit members perceived MINUSTAH as a legitimate entity to use force, an impression that was likely homogeneous for the entire unit. The motivation by the notion of UN legitimacy to use force also proved to be very high, with few outliers. Finally, the outstanding priority of the legitimacy factor in relation to other combat motivators confirms its role as a motivator in the outfit. Overall, the survey results proved to be consistent and, therefore, highly significant for the relevance of the legitimacy factor.

4.2.2. Case 2 – Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 in MONUSCO

Uruguay deployed an infantry battalion to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC in March 2001. Since then, the successive Uruguayan battalions have made an essential contribution to MONUC and MONUSCO. In 2003, the mission tasked the unit to protect the city of Bunia and avoid ethnic confrontation between Lendu farmers and Hema herders in Ituri province. In 2004, the Force headquarters dispatched it to Bukavu to protect the Banyamulengue population in the region. In 2007, given the rapid escalation of violence in Kinshasa, including attacks on the embassies of Spain and Greece, the mission used the

battalion to evacuate diplomatic personnel. In 2009, given its rapid deployment capacity and usual efficiency, the Uruguayan unit became the reserve of the military component. As Force reserve, the battalion was tasked, in 2012, to reinforce the actions against the armed group M23, which threatened the city of Goma.

UN authorities have praised the Uruguayan contribution to the missions in the DRC on several occasions. In May 2003, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, wrote to the President of Uruguay in the following terms:

> Regarding the UN Mission in the DRC, I would like to reiterate my gratitude and admiration for the exceptional and courageous efforts made by the Uruguayan contingent serving in MONUC, currently deployed in Bunia to protect the UN personnel and humanitarians present in the area, as well as thousands of internally displaced people who have sought refuge in the UN. Without the timely deployment of Uruguay's peacekeeping forces in Bunia last April, the nascent UN-backed political process in Ituri would have been severely undermined. This could have affected the peace process at the national level in the DRC. [...] I strongly commend Uruguay's commitment to UN peacekeeping. The performance of its troops and their perseverance will serve as an example of the exceptional commitment in the search for international peace and security and as a source of inspiration for others (ANNAN, 2003, translation from Spanish is ours).

The Secretary-General's commendation was the result of Uruguayan troops' outstanding training, administration and logistics, associated with a high percentage of officers and NCOs with prior peacekeeping experience and the adoption of solid force protection measures. A picture of Annan's letter adorns the mess hall of the Uruguayan battalion's base and serves as encouragement for the blue helmets. Hence, the incoming units land in the DRC with the responsibility to honour a tradition of remarkable performances.

Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 arrived in MONUSCO mission area on 7 September 2020. It performed as Force's reserve until its redeployment to the home country on 6 December 2021[94]. As a reserve, the battalion must remain ready for short-notice deployments, particularly in support of civilian protection and stabilization tasks. At the time of the unit's arrival, the security situation in the DRC was kept under relative control by the mission. However, the threats of armed groups to the civilian population continued to be a serious concern. In the conflict-affected provinces, particularly in eastern DRC, the number of attacks on civilians and human rights abuses and violations had increased in 2020 (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2020).

[94] Although MONUSCO designates the Uruguayan battalions by the acronym URUBAT, the units are referred to by the Uruguayan Ministry of Defence as *Batallón Uruguay* IV (Battalion Uruguay IV), followed by the year(s) of deployment. In this work, the Uruguayan unit that constitutes the case study will be named "Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21".

The battalion main base was in Goma, in eastern DRC (North Kivu province). During the unit's tour of duty, detachments occupied temporary operating bases in Fataki village (Ituri province) and Beni (North-Kivu province). From those bases, companies or platoons operated in the vicinities or were deployed to other towns and villages in the region. The most frequent tasks were protecting civilians, providing security to UN compounds and associated personnel, escorting convoys, and patrolling to control routes and relevant areas and sites.

The unit operated autonomously and, sometimes, in support of MONUSCO sectors. It supported the Central Sector by patrolling the city of Goma to ensure security and preserve law and order. Also, it controlled riots and fought armed groups in the sectors' areas on three occasions, twice in Komanda and once in Fataki village. No Uruguayan casualties resulted from those engagements, and casualties among rebels were undetermined (OLIVEIRA, G., 2021).

Reportedly, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 performed very well in all tasks it received. According to military practice, reserve units need to be efficient outfits since they are intended to intervene in critical situations and as a last resource. Therefore, the simple fact that the Uruguayan battalion was tasked as a reserve unit indicates its outstanding capabilities and well-trained and motivated personnel. On top of that, there are significant mentions of UN authorities about Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21's work in MONUSCO.

Lieutenant General Costa Neves, the Force Commander that welcomed the unit in MONUSCO mission area, referred to its performance in the following terms:

> The Uruguayan battalion was my reserve, together with a special force detachment from Guatemala. Every time I gave a mission to the Uruguayans, they carried it out exceptionally. Furthermore, despite the language barrier, they had a remarkable ability to get closer to the population. They used this talent to help in the protection of civilians. Uruguay did very well in MONUSCO. Wherever I sent the battalion, it performed very efficiently (COSTA NEVES, 2021, translation is ours).

In January 2021, in a letter addressed to the Commander of Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, the Northern Sector Commander, Brigadier General Abu Sayeed Mohammad Ali, praised the unit for its contribution to the security of Fataki village. The sector headquarters considered the town a strategic location in its area of responsibility because several tribes live there in peace, representing the ideal of sectarian harmony the UN intends to implement in the whole country. Therefore, armed groups' threats to Fataki were seen by the sector commander as particularly damaging to the prospects of security in the area. In this context, the support of Uruguayan blue helmets contributed significantly to the security and stability of Fataki and its

neighbourhoods. The battalion established a temporary operating base in the village and launched assertive patrolling in its surroundings, deterring potential aggressors. In his letter, the sector commander stated that the Uruguayan blue helmets "showed outstanding bravery, professionalism, fellowship and commitment while serving with the other elements of the Northern Sector" (UNITED NATIONS. MONUSCO NORTHERN SECTOR HEADQUARTERS, 2021).

Lieutenant General Affonso da Costa, MONUSCO Force Commander when Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 experienced its last months in the DRC, stated in September 2021 that, after interacting with the local society and members of MONUSCO civilian components in the unit's area of operations, he observed a high degree of recognition for the Uruguayans' work. According to Affonso da Costa, the following characteristics singled the battalion as a well-prepared and determined outfit:

> Soldiers' proactive and dynamic posture, quick and efficient response to threats, attention to the protection of civilians' demands, and initiative in seeking contact with the population to understand the human terrain better, which is fundamental in the type of operation the Force conducts in the DRC (AFFONSO DA COSTA, 2021, translation is ours).

At the end of that month, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 was praised again by the Force Commander for the bravery and professionalism displayed in defence of vulnerable civilians. During the night, the Force headquarters tasked the battalion to intervene in a crisis caused by ADF rebels in the village of Ivo Makayanga, Ituri province. Early the following morning, a detachment left the battalion base in Goma for the area, where civilians were threatened and attacked by members of the armed group. Once in Ivo Makayanga, the Uruguayan detachment started a series of operations with local security forces to protect the community. One of its platoons was engaged by the rebels and fought outstandingly. Through controlled fire and proportional response, the platoon members repelled the armed elements and secured the village. Five rebels were killed, and eight others were apprehended (AFFONSO DA COSTA, 2021; UNITED NATIONS. MONUSCO FORCE HEADQUARTERS, 2021).

Due to Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21's condition as a Force reserve, its members had to deal with risk in two different ways: being prepared for the challenging tasks usually assigned to reserve units and actually facing hostile forces when the time came. The survey of the unit members indicates that they were prepared and identified with their role in the peacekeeping mission. Asked whether they considered the UN mission as entirely legitimate, partially legitimate or illegitimate regarding the resort to force to fulfil the mandate, the

majority of the participants in the survey (73%) responded that MONUSCO was entirely legitimate. Four respondents (27%) considered the mission only partially legitimate, and none considered it illegitimate.

Table 11.1: How do you consider the peace mission in which you participate regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legitimate	11	73
Partially legitimate	4	27
Illegitimate	0	0
	15	100%

As justification for their understanding of MONUSCO as partially legitimate, two of the respondents stated that the mission's ROE, albeit necessary to consolidate the legitimacy of using force, were too restrictive. Expressly, they referred to the ban on the use of rubber bullets (non-lethal ammunition) to deter violent demonstrations against the troops[95].

The investigation of how the positive perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force impacted individual motivations to perform in risky tasks led to interesting results. We asked the Uruguayan blue helmets to what extent MONUSCO's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivated them to carry out risky tasks. Five possible answers were offered: "it motivates a lot", "it motivates little", "it demotivates little", "it demotivates a lot" and "it is indifferent". Most of the respondents stated that they were motivated by the sense of legitimacy, although to different degrees.

Table 11.2: To what extent does the peace mission's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate you to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Motivates a lot	6	40
Motivates little	5	33
Demotivates little	1	7
Demotivates a lot	1	7
Indifferent	2	13
	15	100%

[95] One of the informants explained that, although the Uruguayan troops had a good relationship with the population and counted on their support, members of armed groups, particularly in the area of Beni, used to force the locals to provoke MONUSCO troops by stoning them.

After consulting the questionnaire forms, we extended the analysis by cross-tabulating the responses to the two initial questions. We verified that, among the eleven participants that considered MONUSCO entirely legitimate to use force, nine were motivated by such a condition to some extent —six were strongly motivated, and three were partially motivated. The remaining respondents considered that MONUSCO's complete legitimacy did not revert in motivation (it was indifferent). On the other hand, among the four participants that considered the mission partially legitimate to use force, two were little motivated by that condition, and two were demotivated.

The scatter plot in figure 7 organises the responses regarding the perceptions of legitimacy to use force and the levels of motivation it generates. The relationship displayed in the diagram indicates a positive correlation between the variables, i.e., increased levels of legitimacy perception correspond to increased levels of motivation by the legitimacy factor. The diagram points out that not all the respondents that took the mission as entirely legitimate were strongly motivated by the legitimacy factor. Conversely, some participants that view some restrictions in the mission legitimacy to use force kept motivated by this factor notwithstanding.



Fig. 7 - Correlation between legitimacy perception and motivation by the legitimacy factor in Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21

The investigation on legitimacy perceptions and the level of motivation by legitimacy was extended with the support of troop leaders. First, we asked the officers and NCOs in command of companies, platoons or sections how their subordinates, for the most part, considered the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks. As possible responses, we offered the same options as in the previous similar question posed to the participants in general. Eight participants replied to this question. Six (75%) opined that the subordinates took MONUSCO as legitimate to use force, and two (25%) opined that the subordinates considered the mission only partially legitimate.

Table 11.3: In your opinion, how do your subordinates, for the most part, consider the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legitimate	6	75
Partially legitimate	2	25
Illegitimate	0	0
	8	100%

Then, we asked the troop leaders about the level of motivation generated by the mission legitimacy on their subordinates. This question also referred to most of the subordinates. The response options were the same as the previous similar question, plus the alternative “I don’t know”. Seven participants replied to this question, and the result was as follows:

Table 11.4: To what extent does the peace mission’s level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate your subordinates, for the most part, to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Motivates a lot	2	29
Motivates little	2	29
Demotivates little	1	14
Demotivates a lot	1	14
Indifferent	1	14
I don’t know	0	0
	7	100%

We also asked a question to investigate the specific motivational value of the essential aspects of the concept of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate". The participants were offered four aspects and asked which motivated them the most to perform under risk. Further, we asked the participants which aspect of the concept they would list second in importance. The following aspects were presented: "the legal basis for the use of force", "the consent of the host country for the peace mission's presence", "the local population's perception that the mission is beneficial to them", and "the noble cause of peace and support for people in need".

The result points to the relevance of "the noble cause of peace and the support for people in need", which received seven mentions (47%). "The legal basis for the use of force", with four mentions, and "the consent of the host country for the peace mission's presence", with three mentions, were also well regarded as significant motivators, albeit at a level below the cause of peace and support for people in need.

Table 11.5: Among the essential aspects of the legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate, which one mostly motivates you to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legal basis	4	27
Host country's consent	3	20
Local population's positive perception	1	6
The noble cause of peace and support to needy	7	47
	15	100%

As second in importance, "the noble cause of peace and the support for people in need" was the most mentioned aspect (five mentions, or 36% of the responses), followed by "the legal basis for the use of force" (four mentions) and "the consent of the host country for the peace mission's presence" (three mentions). Table 11.6 indicates the result.

Table 11.6: Which aspect do you list second in importance as a motivator for carrying out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legal basis	3	21
Host country's consent	4	29
Local population's positive perception	2	14
The noble cause of peace and support to needy	5	36
	14	100%

(Without answer = 1)

Adding the categories "most important aspect" and "aspect second in importance", "the noble cause of peace and support for people in need" received the most mentions (twelve). It is an indication of the high motivational value of the cause of peace and efforts on behalf of the needy among the Uruguayan blue helmets. Such an aspect is followed by "the legal basis for the use of force" and "the consent of the host country for the peace mission's presence", tied in second place with seven mentions each. Still, on the significance of the cause of peace and the support for people in need, Sergeant Feirer stated that he felt motivated in the mission area

> by the satisfaction of being able to help people in most need due to the sad reality that many regions in Africa are subject to for decades. Personally, it also helps feel more mature and, in the hierarchy, more able to lead the subordinates and keep command and control in difficult situations. Besides, it helps value what one has at home after seeing the reality in which people live in that part of the world (FEIRER, 2021, translation is ours).

We then analysed the relevance of legitimacy as a motivator to face risks vis-à-vis other combat motivation factors applicable to robust PKOs. We asked the participants to indicate, on a scale of 1 (one) onwards, in order of priority (importance), the intensity with which traditional factors motivated them to carry out risky tasks in the DRC. We explained that number one meant the "highest priority: motivates intensely", and the highest used number meant the "lowest priority: motivates very little". The following factors were provided: "UN legitimacy to act for peace, even resorting to force when necessary"; "high quality and efficiency of the unit's weapons, equipment and vehicles, which guaranteed protection and facilitated the fulfilment of the mission and were superior to the opposing groups' weapons and equipment"; "sense that it was my duty"; "leadership of the immediate commander"; "unit's

cohesion"; and "willingness to represent my country well". In addition, the respondents were informed that combat motivation factors that did not use to motivate them should be left blank (receive no number), and they could add additional factors to the list. The result indicates a high value of the legitimacy factor vis-à-vis other motivators. As shown in table 11.7, 73% of the respondents ranked this factor among the highest three priorities.

Table 11.7: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	7	47
2	2	13
3	2	13
4	1	7
5	0	0
6 or lower	1	7
Factor not indicated	2	13
	15	100%

In addition to the previous question, we asked the troop leaders to indicate their view on the importance of the legitimacy factor for their subordinates (most of them) in comparison with other combat motivation factors. This question was formulated using the same technique as the previous question (motivation factors offered as alternatives, possibility to include other factors, possibility to leave factors blank). The result is presented in table 11.8:

Table 11.8: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - troop leaders' opinion on their subordinates

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	2	33
2	0	0
3	0	0
4	1	17
5	2	33
6 or lower	0	0
Factor not indicated	1	17
	6	100%

The relevance of the legitimacy factor became evident in the general consultation. However, the question posed to the troop leaders indicated that, in their opinion, the factor was not so important for the subordinates (only two mentions among the top three priorities against four in the lowest priorities). Such an outcome may have been influenced by the understanding, expressed by some senior officers during the interview, that legitimacy is more significant for commanders, especially the ones with high ranks, because of its legal aspect. As General Luis Mangini states,

> the notion of legitimacy is important to motivate soldiers on the ground. But other aspects are more important as motivators for the rank and file, such as the sense of duty, the unit's cohesion, the commander's leadership and the willingness to represent Uruguay well. However, legitimacy assumes great importance to motivate commanders, that is, those who have the responsibility to plan and direct actions (MANGINI, 2021, translation is ours)[96].

We also considered the "willingness to represent one's country well", which relates to legitimacy. When the participants were asked about the importance of representing Uruguay well, 67% ranked this factor among the highest three priorities compared to other combat motivation factors. The overall responses are mentioned in table 11.9.

Table 11.9: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	5	34
2	2	13
3	3	20
4	0	0
5	2	13
6 or lower	1	7
Factor not indicated	2	13
	15	100%

[96] By the time of the interview, General Luis Mangini was the Uruguayan Army's Chief of Staff. In 2016/17 he commanded a peacekeeping battalion in MONUSCO.

The question to troop leaders on the relevance of the latter factor to motivate the subordinates, for the most part, led to the following result:

Table 11.10: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - troop leaders' opinion on their subordinates

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	2	33
2	2	33
3	1	17
4	1	17
5	0	0
6 or lower	0	0
Factor not indicated	0	0
	6	100%

The willingness to represent their country well was a significant motivator to the Uruguayan blue helmets during the engagement in MONUSCO. This factor received ten mentions (out of fifteen) among the top three priorities from the respondents in general and was considered equally important by five among six respondents in command position.

Overall, the survey of Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 produced interesting findings to validate the hypothesis. The perception of MONUSCO legitimacy to use force to fulfil the mandate was generally high in the unit. Coherently, the level of motivation by the mission legitimacy to use force was also high. Nonetheless, the latter varied proportionally with the nuances of the legitimacy perception (legitimate or partially legitimate mission). Among the motivational factors that influenced the behaviours of the Uruguayan blue helmets, the sense of playing a legitimate role proved to be consistent and influential.

4.2.3. Case 3 – Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K in UNIFIL

Indonesia started its participation in peacekeeping in 1957, with a contingent sent to UNEF I. Since then, the country has joined several peacekeeping missions (INDONESIA. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 2019). Notwithstanding, Indonesia has not wholeheartedly endorsed the idea of using force to keep peace, mainly due to concerns that powerful states could use PKOs to advance their own interests. The presence of an UNSC-

authorised, Australia-led force in its territory and the events that culminated with the independence of East Timor in 2002 contributed to that restrictive view (CAPIE, 2016).

In any case, preoccupations with the use of force to achieve peace did not prevent Indonesia from participating in UN robust PKOs. Thus, echoing its pragmatic political view, the Indonesian government sent a considerable peacekeeping contingent to UNIFIL in 2006. At the time of writing, approximately 1.200 Indonesian soldiers were deployed in Lebanon, which makes the country the most significant troop contributor to the UN mission in that Middle Eastern country. The Indonesian contingent comprises a mechanised battalion, a military police unit, a force headquarters support unit, a force protection unit and a warship supporting the mission's maritime task force.

The present case consists of the battalion deployed by Indonesia in UNIFIL between December 2016 and December 2017. The Ministry of Defence refers to the unit as Peacekeeping Contingent / Mechanised Battalion XXIII-K (*Konga Yonmek XXIII-K*). In this study, it will be named Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K[97].

Since 2006, when the UNSC upgraded UNIFIL and provided it with a stronger mandate, the mission has been able to keep the situation stable in its area of operations. However, after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, convulsions and tensions took the region and put the stability in Lebanon at risk again (GUÉHENNO, 2015). In recent years, the potential for crises is very high, mainly due to the weakness of Lebanon's domestic politics, presence of armed groups, frequent terrorist attacks, tensions around the refugee camps and the possibility of war resumption.

Battalion XXIII-K's area of responsibility is in the centre of the mission area. During the unit's stay in Lebanon, the situation in the region and along the Blue Line remained relatively stable. Still, the provocative rhetoric of Hezbollah and the harsh replies of Israeli authorities presented a constant risk of violence outbreak. At the time, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the country's security forces made several arrests of Lebanese and Syrian terrorist suspects, allegedly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Nusrah Front and other violent extremist groups. More than a million Syrian refugees were in the Lebanese territory, including UNIFIL area of operations. In the Palestine refugee camps, the potential for violence was significant and clashes between extremist militants and Fatah members were frequent, often resulting in civilian casualties (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2017).

[97] UNIFIL designates the Indonesian battalion as INDOBAT.

In this grim context, together with other UNIFIL battalions, Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K was responsible for monitoring the cessation of hostilities, preventing the presence of armed groups, ensuring humanitarian access to civilian populations and protecting civilians. The unit's platoons and sections conducted daily foot and mechanised patrols, which played a significant role in protecting civilians. The activities of the battalion enhanced UNIFIL's visibility, thereby serving to deter potential spoilers and as a confidence-building tool for communities to feel secure (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, 2022).

In recent decades, Indonesian contingents have earned a reputation for fine performance in peacekeeping (HUTABARAT, 2014). The national authorities included Battalion XIII-K in this group by appointing it as a high-level performance unit in response to our request for a contribution. In the mission in Lebanon, the blue helmets came to understand that, despite periods of stability and calm in the region, severe security crises might erupt at any time. Besides, the resumption of the war involving Hezbollah, Israel and Lebanon is a concrete possibility (LAWRENCE; JERMALAVIČIUS; BULAKH, 2016). Thus, the Indonesian blue helmets must remain ready to react or proactively engage in dangerous situations if necessary.

The UN also recognised the superior performance of Battalion XXIII-K. For example, the Force Headquarters tasked the unit with training UNIFIL troops and Lebanese Armed Forces units in urban combat, proving its good reputation. On occasion, while reviewing the implementation of the training, Sector East Commander, Brigadier General Venancio Aguando, expressed the satisfaction of the Force headquarters with the exercise conducted by the Indonesian blue helmets (SUDJATMIKO, 2017). Furthermore, in October 2017, during the parade to present medals to the Indonesian contingent, UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Michael Beary, referred to the battalion as "very persistent and always guided by the mandate in carrying out the peace mission in South Lebanon" (JAKARTA GREATER, 2017, translation is ours). In interview, Beary detailed such assessment as follows:

> I found the INDOBAT UNIFIL between December 2016 and December 2017 particularly responsive to my demands and always seeking to achieve the best outcome for UNIFIL. […] Operationally they also performed to an exceptional standard but being deployed as a rear unit in the UNIFIL AO [area of operations] they were seldom engaged in more challenging situations with Hezbollah or the IDF along the 113 km Blue Line, but on the occasions as I recall when robust action was required, they were not found wanting. […] I believe they made a telling contribution to peace in South Lebanon and their professionalism always indicated a high level of motivation and determination to represent their country well and, if necessary, face

> risks and use force on behalf of the mandate's accomplishment when necessary (BEARY, 2022).

The survey of the Indonesian blue helmets indicates several positive aspects that potentially lead to inspired group performance. For instance, the members of Battalion XXIII-K had a very favourable perception of UNIFIL legitimacy to use force. Asked whether they considered the UN mission entirely legitimate, partially legitimate or illegitimate, most participants (65%) responded that UNIFIL was fully legitimate to use force in the name of the mandate. Besides, seven respondents (35%) considered the mission partially legitimate in this regard.

Table 12.1: How do you consider the peace mission in which you participated regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legitimate	13	65
Partially legitimate	7	35
Illegitimate	0	0
	20	100%

(Without answer = 1)

To ascertain whether and to what extent the positive perception of UNIFIL legitimacy to use military force impacted individual motivations, we asked the participants about their feelings regarding the issue. As possible responses, the alternatives “it motivated a lot”, “it motivated little”, “it demotivated little”, “it demotivated a lot” and “it was indifferent” were offered. As table 12.2 indicates, the vast majority of the blue helmets (86%) were strongly motivated by the sense of accomplishing a legitimate mission.

Table 12.2: To what extent did the peace mission’s level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate you to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Motivated a lot	18	86
Motivated little	3	14
Demotivated little	0	0
Demotivated a lot	0	0
Indifferent	0	0
	21	100%

The scatter plot in figure 8 indicates a positive correlation between the variables "legitimacy perception" and "motivation by the legitimacy factor" within the Indonesian unit since increased levels of legitimacy perception correspond to increased levels of motivation by the legitimacy factor. The diagram points out that all respondents who recognised the mission as fully legitimate were strongly motivated by the legitimacy factor. Besides, most of the participants who considered the mission partially legitimate were also motivated by this factor.



Note: One respondent was not plotted because he did not answer how he perceived the mission legitimacy to use force.

Fig. 8 - Correlation between legitimacy perception and motivation by the legitimacy factor in Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K

The investigation of the two topics above was expanded through the questioning of officers and NCOs in command of companies, platoons or sections. When we ask these troop leaders how their subordinates, for the most part, considered the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks, they all opined that they believed in the mission legitimacy. However, two commanders considered that their men took the mission as only partially legitimate.

Table 12.3: In your opinion, how did your subordinates, for the most part, consider the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legitimate	4	67
Partially legitimate	2	33
Illegitimate	0	0
	6	100%

In addition, the troop leaders were asked about the motivation of their subordinates, for the most part, by the mission legitimacy to use force. The response options were those of the previous similar question plus the alternative "I don't know". Seven participants replied to the question, and the result appears in the following table:

Table 12.4: To what extent did the peace mission's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate your subordinates, for the most part, to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Motivated a lot	3	43
Motivated little	4	57
Demotivated little	0	0
Demotivated a lot	0	0
Indifferent	0	0
I don't know	0	0
	7	100%

The outcome of the questioning of troop leaders confirms the result of the similar question posed to all participants regarding the motivational value of the legitimacy factor. However, four out of seven leaders understood that the sense of legitimacy in using force motivated the subordinates only a little.

We also investigated the motivational value of the essential aspects of the concept of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate". We offered the participants the aspects "the legal basis for the use of force", "the consent of the host country for the peace mission's presence", "the local population's perception that the mission is beneficial to them", and "the

noble cause of peace and support for people in need" and asked which motivated them the most to perform under risk. Further, we asked which aspect they would list second in importance.

"The people's perception that the mission is beneficial to them" and "the host country's consent" received the most mentions as the priority aspect (seven each). "The noble cause of peace and support for people in need" received four mentions and "the legal basis for the use of force", three.

Table 12.5: Among the essential aspects of the legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate, which one mostly served to motivate you to carry out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legal basis	3	15
Host country's consent	7	33
Local population's positive perception	7	33
The noble cause of peace and support to needy	4	19
	21	100%

Only 14 respondents selected a second aspect of importance. The population's perception that the mission is beneficial received the most mentions.

Table 12.6: Which aspect do you list second in importance as a motivator for carrying out risky tasks?

Mentions	Number of mentions	Percentage
Legal basis	2	14
Host country's consent	2	14
Local population's positive perception	8	58
The noble cause of peace and support to needy	2	14
	14	100%

(Without answer = 7)

Overall, “the local population’s perception that the mission is beneficial to them” is the aspect that received the most mentions (fifteen), followed by “the consent of the host country for the peace mission’s presence” (nine).

In the next step, we analysed the relevance of the legitimacy to use force as a motivator to face risks in relation to other combat motivation factors. We asked the participants to indicate, on a scale of 1 (one) onwards, in order of priority (importance), the intensity with which traditional combat motivation factors motivated them to carry out risky tasks in Lebanon. We explained that number one meant the highest priority and the highest used number meant the lowest priority. The following factors were provided: “UN legitimacy to act for peace, even resorting to force when necessary”; “high quality and efficiency of the unit's weapons, equipment and vehicles”; “sense that it was my duty”; “leadership of the immediate commander”; “unit's cohesion”; and “willingness to represent my country well”. In addition, we advised the respondents that combat motivation factors that did not motivate them should be left blank and they could add additional factors to the list.

The result indicates a very high value of the legitimacy factor, with 82% of the respondents ranking it among the three highest priorities. Table 12.7 shows the number of mentions it received in each priority when compared to other motivators.

Table 12.7: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	13	62
2	2	10
3	2	10
4	1	4
5	3	14
6 or lower	0	0
Factor not indicated	0	0
	21	100%

In addition, we asked the troop leaders to indicate their view on the importance of the legitimacy factor for their subordinates (most of them), in comparison with other combat motivation factors. The result appears in table 12.8.

Table 12.8: Priority (importance) of the legitimacy factor to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - troop leaders' opinion on their subordinates

Priority of the legitimacy factor	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	5	72
2	0	0
3	1	14
4	1	14
5	0	0
6 or lower	0	0
Factor not indicated	0	0
	7	100%

Therefore, the relevance of the legitimacy factor became evident both in the consultation for individual motivations and the questioning of troop leaders on their subordinates.

Regarding the factor "willingness to represent one's country well", the majority of the respondents (71%) ranked it among the three highest priorities compared to other combat motivation factors. The overall result is shown in table 12.9.

Table 12.9: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	14	66
2	0	0
3	1	5
4	0	0
5	1	5
6 or lower	5	24
Factor not indicated	0	0
	21	100%

The question to troop leaders on the same topic led to the following result:

Table 12.10: Priority (importance) of "willingness to represent one's country well" to motivate for risky tasks in comparison with other combat motivation factors - troop leaders' opinion on their subordinates

Priority of factor "willingness to represent one's country well"	Number of mentions	Percentage
1	5	72
2	1	14
3	0	0
4	0	0
5	1	14
6 or lower	0	0
Factor not indicated	0	0
	7	100%

Therefore, the blue helmet's willingness to represent Indonesia stands out as a significant motivator. It received fifteen mentions (out of twenty-one) among the top three priorities from the respondents and was considered equally important by six out of seven troop leaders.

Overall, the survey with Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K offers substantial subsidies to examine the hypothesis of the present study. The association between the positive perceptions of UNIFIL legitimacy to use force and the high motivation that such perception generated in the respondents is very consistent. Moreover, the high priority the legitimacy factor received in comparison with other combat motivation factors formed a coherent and convincing picture of perceptions, reasons and feelings within the Indonesian unit.

4.2.4. Case 4 - 8th German SFOR Contingent

The *Bundeswehr* has engaged in international peacekeeping since Germany's reunification. However, most participations are either with unarmed military observers or small contingents and logistic outfits, like the ones the country kept in the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) between 1993 and 1994. Germany's participation in robust international operations started in 1996 with SFOR, the NATO mission in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. It continued with the country's expressive engagement in ISAF (Afghanistan), another NATO mission, and MINUSMA.

German troops joined SFOR between 1996 and 2004. Troop strength in the Balkans varied, peaking at 3.000 soldiers. In the mission area, successive German contingents dealt with a volatile security situation and had to engage with adverse forces on several occasions, leading to 19 casualties[98]. In Afghanistan, the country's commitment was more profound, and the threats to the soldiers were more severe. The *Bundeswehr* deployed troops to ISAF and operation "Resolute Support" between 2001 and 2021, with the peak reaching 5.350 soldiers[99]. Germany had 59 casualties to regret in that mission, 35 of them caused by hostile acts (GERMANY. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2022). At the beginning of the country's participation in ISAF, German authorities intended to limit the troop's role in supporting humanitarian aid activities. However, the troops were progressively involved in combat operations when the Taliban started a series of lethal attacks in 2008 (KOOPS, 2016, p. 669).

Germany joined MINUSMA in 2013, in the context of what became known as the European return to UN peacekeeping. The country initially contributed a small logistic contingent to the mission. Then, in January 2016, the parliament approved the ceiling of 1.100 soldiers, and the troop contribution became more robust, albeit irregular over time. In November 2021, 530 German blue helmets were deployed in Mali, most of them dedicated to reconnaissance and aerial surveillance. However, the country's participation in MINUSMA has been restricted by national caveats. According to Lieutenant General Paul Cruz (2021), who visited the mission during his tenure as Director for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership in DPKO, the German contingent has unique assets, such as helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, armoured protection and night vision equipment. However, caveats prevent it from contributing more decisively to the mission. As a result, despite its assertive participation in ISAF, Germany is often criticised for having a risk-averse approach to UN peacekeeping operations (KOOPS, 2016; PATZ, 2019)[100].

Given the German Ministry of Defence's decline to participate in the present study with a MINUSMA contingent, and because of our great interest in investigating German

[98] This figure comprises different types of casualties (hostile acts, accidents and disease).

[99] After ISAF termination, NATO launched the operation "Resolute Support" to train and advise the Afghan security forces.

[100] Despite the caveats, the German contingent faces security challenges in Mali. On 25 June 2021, a suicide bomber attacked a mechanised patrol and injured 12 German blue helmets, three of them seriously (ZDF, 2021).

soldiers' motivations in PKOs, we built a case with the 8th SFOR Contingent, deployed to the Balkans in 2004.

The UNSC established SFOR in 1996 and gave it a Chapter VII mandate to support the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton agreement. The newborn mission replaced UNPROFOR, which also operated under a Chapter VII mandate, and took over some of its main tasks. The UN mission had been restructured by the UNSC in March 1995, which led to the restriction of its activities to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, 1996; UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 1993). However, notwithstanding its assertive mandate and small area of operations, UNPROFOR proved to be inefficient in protecting communities, as demonstrated by episodes such as the siege and shelling of Sarajevo and the massacre in Srebrenica. As a result, with the advent of the Dayton agreement, the USA rejected strengthening the UN mission and worked in the UNSC for its replacement by a NATO-led mission, including the participation of other UN member states, Russia among them (RAUCH, 2009). So, after a short, interim presence of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), SFOR inherited the "unique, extraordinary and complex character of the […] situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina" to prevent new hostilities and keep the situation secure and stable (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 1995, p. 6)[101].

Therefore, despite not being a UN-led peacekeeping mission, SFOR operated in a similar circumstance to UN robust PKOs: under UNSC authorisation to take the necessary measures to carry out its mission, in an environment still subject to hostilities among armed parties and civilian communities, and with the obligations of achieving the cessation of hostilities and keeping stability ('The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', 1995; UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 1996).

In the interviews I conducted during the field visits in Germany, interlocutors considered the performance of the German contingents in SFOR as ranging from very good to outstanding. These assessments were collected from government officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, high-ranking German officers, and the commander and instructors of the *Bundeswehr* UN Training Centre. The centre's mission is to prepare German soldiers for peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN, NATO and the EU.

[101] In general, the circumstances in UNPROFOR and SFOR were the same. The differences were due less to mandates and opposing forces than to combat support since the infrastructure that was brought by NATO considerably impacted the military operations on the ground (GLATZ, 2021).

According to the commander, Colonel Werner Klaffus, "German troops in the peacekeeping missions in the Balkans followed their rules of engagement at perfection and achieved very good results in all specific tasks. These facts indicate the very good performance achieved by those contingents" (KLAFFUS, 2021).

The good appreciation of German troops in the Balkans encompasses the 8th SFOR Contingent. Thus, we should investigate the contingent members' perceptions of the mission legitimacy to use of force to verify its association with individual motivations and troop performance. Such perceptions can be inferred from the soldiers' stance in relation to their international engagement and their identification with the role they played in SFOR. Biehl and Keller's (2009), with support of the survey conducted by SOWI, described and analysed these aspects in their article *Höhe Identifikation und nüchterner Blick: Die Sicht der Bundeswehrsoldaten auf ihre Einsätze* (High identification and a sober look: The view of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers on their missions).

In the survey, members of the 8th SFOR Contingent were initially asked to react to the statement: "Our engagement here [in SFOR] was politically decided. So, I don't have to worry too much about the meaning and purpose of the tasks". The result indicates that most soldiers (74%) denied that statement. According to Biehl and Keller, this outcome means that the German military need self-conviction about the legitimacy of the mission to perform appropriately, instead of simply following orders.

Table 13.1: Reactions to the statement: Our engagement here was politically decided. So, I don't have to worry too much about the meaning and purpose of the tasks.

Reactions	Percentage of reactions
Agree	9
Partially agree	26
Disagree	74
Total of respondents	680

Source: Biehl and Keller (2009). Extracted and translated by the thesis's author[102].

Questions on soldiers' identification with the peacekeeping mission's mandate and their specific tasks provide additional data for the present study. Regarding these topics, the

[102] For this and other results transcribed in the present dissertation, Biehl and Keller (2009) advise that "agree" is the percentage sum of "strongly agree" and "rather agree". Disagree is the percentage sum of "rather disagree" and "strongly disagree".

SOWI survey offered the participants the statement "the political decision of sending the *Bundeswehr* to Bosnia and Herzegovina was right", to which 85% agreed without restrictions, and 13% partially agreed. Then, the respondents were asked about their reactions in view of the statement "I stand behind the mission of the German SFOR Contingent", to which 77% agreed, and 17% partially agreed. Lastly, the soldiers were confronted with the statement "I identify with the tasks assigned to me", to which 69% agreed, and 24% partially agreed.

Table 13.2: The political decision of sending the *Bundeswehr* to Bosnia and Herzegovina was right.

Reactions	Percentage of reactions
Agree	85
Partially agree	13
Disagree	3
Total of respondents	682

Table 13.3: I stand behind the mission of the German SFOR Contingent.

Reactions	Percentage of reactions
Agree	77
Partially agree	17
Disagree	5
Total of respondents	685

Table 13.4: I identify with the tasks assigned to me.

Reactions	Percentage of reactions
Agree	69
Partially agree	24
Disagree	7
Total of respondents	680

Source of tables 13.2 to 13.4: Biehl and Keller (2009). Extracted and translated by the thesis's author.

Furthermore, in the opinion of the 8th SFOR Contingent members, there was support in the "national front" to their mission abroad. Being asked about their reaction to the statement "the German population overwhelmingly agrees with the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* in Bosnia and Herzegovina", 84% of the soldiers agreed, entirely or partially. Only 16% understood that there was no significant national support.

Table 13.5: Reactions to the statement: The German population overwhelmingly agrees with the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Reactions	Percentage of reactions
Agree	32
Partially agree	52
Disagree	16
Total of respondents	669

Source: Biehl and Keller (2009). Extracted and translated by the thesis's author.

The survey outcome points to the value of legitimacy notions to motivate the 8th SFOR Contingent soldiers to perform appropriately. However, some aspects of the mission legitimacy to use force stood out as more relevant than others in this regard. For instance, considering the *Bundeswehr* military's devotion to the rule of law, the legal aspect is highlighted when the vast majority of respondents value the political decision to send them to the mission (table 13.2). Moreover, the support for people in need was considered very important. When asked about their position concerning the statement "through the engagement of the *Bundeswehr* the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be helped", the vast majority of the soldiers (80%) entirely agreed with the topic.

Table 13.6: Reactions to the statement: Through the engagement of the *Bundeswehr* the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be helped.

Reactions	Percentage of reactions
Agree	80
Partially agree	16
Disagree	3
Total of respondents	685

Source: Biehl and Keller (2009). Extracted and translated by the thesis's author.

Regarding the aspect "consent of the host country", it was blurred by the characteristics of the conflict in the Balkans. With the Yugoslavian state's breakup as background and dealing with many existing tensions on the ground, SFOR strived to stabilise the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose existence as state was questioned by several actors. Thus, the coverage of the Dayton agreement, a formal arrangement between relevant parties to the conflict (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia) superseded the authorisation of a "host" state.

Concerning the relative value of legitimacy to motivate German soldiers to take risks, there are consistent indications that it is high. Dealing with combat motivation factors in the *Bundesweh*r, several scholars and military practitioners place notions related to legitimacy among the most relevant motivators. For example, Dinter (1986) points to personal beliefs, integration within the military group, leadership and training as the elements that allow for an assertive attitude of German soldiers towards the enemy. In his turn, Oetting (1990) highlights the legitimacy of the cause (*Legitimität der eigenen Sache*), comradeship, cohesion in the small groups, and confidence as essential factors for the German military to face and endure combat. Expressing a vision applicable to Germany's contemporary military engagements, Brigadier General Gunnar Brügner considers that comradeship (*Kameradschaft*) and factors associated with training and material preparedness are very important to motivate soldiers for risky tasks. However, he places the notion of legitimacy at the same level of importance[103]:

> I would say that, with almost every German soldier, be it in a peacekeeping operation, a classic military operation or a NATO mission, always happens the same: The soldier would like to make sure that his cause is just, the entire thing is just. It is not the attitude of "right or wrong, my country". That is not what the German soldier is made of. What he is made of is that kind of "I want to do good". Although this is only a notion, it is there, and one can feel it. The average German soldier wants to make sure that the reason why he is deployed, he is contributing to a mission, is just. […] Moreover, if the situation deteriorates, if there are losses —and I have experience in such a situation— legitimacy contributes to keeping the group carrying on together (BRÜGNER, 2021).

In the same vein, Pietsch (2012) concludes, based on research he conducted with German troops deployed in ISAF in 2010, that group cohesion and the meaningfulness of the mission (*Sinnhaftigkeit des Auftrages*) are the most critical factors in motivating German

[103] Brigadier General Gunnar Brügner was formerly Commander of the *Panzergrenadierebrigade 37*, in Frankenberg, Saxony. He was deployed in Afghanistan three times: as Commander of the Quick Reaction Force of ISAF Regional Command North (2008), desk officer in Afghanistan Assessment Group in the ISAF headquarters in Kabul (2010), and Deputy Chief of Staff at the operation Resolute Support mission headquarters in Kabul (2021).

soldiers to take risks abroad. According to the scholar, such motivations operate both in the context of low-intensity conflict and robust UN peacekeeping operations:

> This attitude is not specific to the German mission in ISAF. Other studies come to very similar results, above all the surveys conducted with German contingents deployed in the Balkans, which operated as "peacekeepers", i.e., under very specific, different circumstances (PIETSCH, 2012, p. 117).

The SOWI survey and the responses obtained during the interviews indicate that legitimacy's motivational value is indistinct among officers, NCOs and the lower ranks of the *Bundeswehr*. As a matter of fact, both Biehl and Keller's (2009) and Pietsch's (2012) studies show that the findings regarding the sense of legitimacy varied little across ages and ranks, which points to a high self-awareness and desire to build own judgements not only by the senior military but also the young soldiers. This position is supported by Brügner, who maintains that, for the German soldier, "legitimacy matters very much, and not only for officers or NCOs but also for the junior ranks. It matters across all ranks" (2021).

In general, German soldiers want to know the context of their engagements and make sense of the reasons that render their tasks right and fair. Such posture necessarily leads them to consider their role through the notion of legitimacy. Pietsch's (2012) conclusion in this regard is supported by Biehl and Keller's (2009) investigations of SFOR and ISAF contingents, as well as other sources mentioned in the present case. All these studies point to the average soldier's interest in the international organisation legitimacy, the righteousness of the engagement and the national stance on the issue.

Before concluding this case, we should underline two significant aspects which arose during the research and in our conversations with German authorities and peacekeeping experts. The first is about the stance of the German citizens regarding the employment of the *Bundeswehr* in foreign countries. According to Koops (2016), opinion polls conducted in Germany in the early 1990s indicated public scepticism towards military deployments abroad. Still, they showed particular support for UN-led PKOs, humanitarian assistance or operations to prevent mass atrocities. During my field visits to the Foreign Affairs and Defence ministries in August 2021, the interlocutors confirmed this point by explaining that the average German citizen perceives UN peacekeeping as generally fair and good. Consequently, the German parliament has always supported the government's requests to participate in UN peacekeeping initiatives.

The second note, related to German military culture, appears in several articles and was stressed by German authorities and officials during the interviews. The *Bundeswehr* was established in 1955, founded on two philosophical concepts that aimed to shape it as an integral institution of a democratic state: the soldier as "citizen in uniform" and the *Innere Führung*, or inner leadership. The military members of the *Bundeswehr* consider themselves "citizens in uniform", i.e., they are first and foremost citizens of the German state. Beyond that, they have a special obligation to uphold the values and standards of the Constitution as soldiers. Related to this concept, the soldiers serve the German society and behave under the premises of *Innere Führung*. Under this philosophy, they are socialised and educated to think critically and identify the ethical, legal and political criteria that legitimate their assignments and tasks (GERMANY, 2008). Being prepared to have social, political and global understandings based on Germany's values and national and international laws, they are expected to recognise the meaningfulness of their tasks and make decisions of conscience —including the decision to obey (FRÖHLICH; RAUSCH, 1996; VON ROSEN, 2009)[104]. In this context, Germany's adherence to the UN Charter and other international treaties; the mirroring of UN values and principles in the country's Constitution; the country's political orientation towards supporting peace and humanitarian missions; and the formal, detailed parliament mandate issued for each participation in PKOs connect the soldier's institutional role with the peacekeeping aims[105].

The crucial objective of *Innere Führung* is to provide the German servicemen and women with the foundations that will allow them to identify the sense of their military engagements through the ethical, legal, social and political lenses of legitimacy (BUCHNER, 2011). Accordingly, as indicated throughout the study of the present case, notions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy and the rightfulness of their role were relevant motivators for the 8th German SFOR Contingent members.

[104] The Centre for Inner Leadership of the *Bundeswehr* ensures the knowledge and significance of the ethics, values, and democratic principles of the state by military and civilian audiences. Besides, it emphasises the primacy of politics in any military operation. Military and civilian personnel attend courses at the centre and pass on the knowledge in their military units and organisations. With its expertise and international network, the centre's role is to continually develop ethical guidelines, training courses and educational material according to ministerial requests and the Armed Forces' learning requirements (POPP, 2021).

[105] In its preamble, the German Constitution declares the state's will to "serve world peace as an equal member in a united Europe". Article 1 states the inviolability of human dignity and the inviolability and inalienability of human rights as the basis of every community, peace and justice in the world. Lastly, Article 24 (2) states that, to maintain peace in Europe and among the world's nations, the country may enter into a system of mutual collective security (GERMANY, 2021). Furthermore, the German White Paper (2016) states that the country acts to eradicate the causes of conflict and support peaceful conflict management at the international level, including by increasing equipment and personnel contributions to the UN (GERMANY, 2016).

4.2.5. Special case – BRABAT 1 (Brazil)

Before MINUSTAH started its operations in Haiti, heavily armed gangs controlled vast areas of Port-au-Prince and other cities and posed a severe threat to the country's stability. The Haitian gangs lived out of a symbiosis between socio-political and criminal roles. Most of them dedicated themselves to thefts, drugs and arms traffic, kidnappings and, as a way to conduct such "businesses", killings. Human rights violations against the civilian population were frequent, and impunity was the norm. In consequence, upon establishing MINUSTAH, the UNSC invoked the Chapter VII of the UN Charter in its Resolution 1542 (UNITED NATIONS. SECURITY COUNCIL, 2004)[106]. The Council's gesture indicated that the mission's uniformed components should be assertive in their actions to carry out the tasks of establishing a secure and stable environment; assisting the government in the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order; and protecting civilians under threat of physical violence. In fact, at that time, the military capacity of the illegal armed groups and the violence of their actions were a clear sign that MINUSTAH would have to use force to accomplish its mandate. Accordingly, UN official documents, such as the report of the Secretary-General on Haiti to the UNSC dated April 2004, and the TCC Guidelines provided by the Secretariat for the preparation and pre-deployment training of MINUSTAH troops, indicated that the incoming contingents should be ready to deal with armed spoilers and use force (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, 2004; UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2004a).

Nonetheless, Brazil did not start in MINUSTAH with such determination. During the negotiations to elaborate the mission's mandate, in March and April 2004, Brazil, as a UNSC non-permanent member, worked for a resolution focused on socio-economic issues as root causes of the crisis in Haiti rather than putting weight on security issues (FONTOURA; UZIEL, 2017)[107]. In May, the Brazilian National Congress authorised the government to send troops to Haiti, but not without the severe criticism of some parliamentarians. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence opposed the participation in MINUSTAH. The rapporteur of the case, Deputy José Thomás Nonô, claimed, among other

[106] Resolution 1542 passed on 30 April 2004 to establish MINUSTAH and define the terms of its mandate.

[107] Fontoura and Uziel (2017) report that Brazil received support from some Latin American countries in advancing the proposal to prioritise socio-economic actions in the UNSC resolution. In the same vein, Moreno, Braga and Gomes (2012) maintain that other countries in the region shared Brazil's initial reluctance to use force in Haiti. Regarding utilising PKOs to develop countries, see chapter 2 (subsection 2.1.1. PKO indicators of success) for a footnote related to the question.

arguments for rejecting the Executive's authorisation request, that the mission was not being envisaged to operate in a conflict or post-conflict environment, but to deal with a social upheaval (PEDROSA, 2015). During the discussion in the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies, Deputy Fernando Gabeira strongly opposed Brazil's participation, arguing that the central interests in the case were from the USA and "what Brazil is going to do in Haiti is to guarantee the American peace, the French peace and the interests of Canada, the main country that receives immigrants from Haiti" (BRAZIL. CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 2004, p. 759, translation is ours).

On the other hand, the Executive's decision was marred by contradictions on the stance the troops should adopt on the ground. Such a circumstance raised questions and heightened criticism regarding the country's participation with troops in a PKO under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In fact, most Brazilian diplomats viewed with serious reservations the use of force to implement peacekeeping mandates (HARIG; JENNE, 2022). Besides, according to Pedrosa,

> the understanding that the country did not participate in peace missions under Chapter VII remained in force in the Brazilian Armed Forces, as they characterised the imposition of peace and implied disrespect for the principle of non-intervention, prescribed in the Constitution (PEDROSA, 2015, p. 156, translation is ours)[108].

As a result of this conundrum, the Ministry of Defence dispatched the first contingent of blue helmets to Haiti without considering its engagement against criminal groups (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2004)[109]. The troops arrived in Port-au-Prince in June 2004, prepared to operate in a traditional PKO, having received neither official guidance nor proper training to confront armed gangs in an urban environment (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2004; PEREIRA, 2019). In this regard, a BRABAT 1 company commander, being asked if he was aware, upon departing Brazil for Haiti, that MINUSTAH was ruled by Chapter VII and it was likely that the UN troops would face the resistance of armed groups, answered that "he was not aware, neither expected such kind of confrontation" (*apud* PEDROSA, 2015, p. 157, translation is ours).

[108] In this regard, the Brazilian contribution of military police outfits (a platoon and, later, a company) to peace operations under Chapter VII in East Timor had been considered an exceptional case. See the Introduction (Theoretical framework and research design) for the differentiation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

[109] At the beginning of Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH, the country's contingent was composed of a brigade with one infantry battalion and a marine task force, totalling 1.200 troops. This structure changed in mid-2005 to a single infantry battalion plus an engineering company.

At the same time, the MINUSTAH SRSG, Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile), and the Force Commander, Major General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil), were reluctant to use force. As indicated by statements they made in interviews after the mission in Haiti, both were unsure that military actions were the right instrument to use and were also afraid of possible collateral damages (ALDUNATE, 2010; PEREIRA, 2019; PINGEOT, 2018).

Some sources argue that the low number of troops at the beginning of the mission prevented the UN Force from conducting assertive operations (BRAGA, 2017; PEDROSA, 2015)[110]. Nevertheless, the Force Commander could have demarcated a portion of the area of operations to liberate it from gang control but did not implement this course of action. Instead of sticking to the Secretariat's guidance on using the military capabilities at his disposal to implement the rule of law and public safety, General Heleno embraced a restrictive view on the use of force, emphasising the need to foster development as the right strategy to stabilise the country (PEREIRA, 2019; HARIG; JENNE, 2022)[111].

Consequently, in the initial months of MINUSTAH, the Force headquarters did not determine offensive operations. The military component did not liberate areas controlled by armed groups, despite the mission's bold mandate and the ROE authorising the use of force to search and disarm individuals and groups, independently from the HNP (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2004; REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, 2005). The Haitians' strong expectation that the UN troops would support the fight against criminal groups, particularly in Port-au-Prince, did not materialise[112]. According to Mendonça, it was only in 2005 that "MINUSTAH decided to pacify Port-au-Prince and fight armed groups" (2017, p. 59)[113].

The discrepancy between the UNSC's resolve to achieve a secure and stable environment in Haiti and the reluctance of the mission leadership to use force as authorised by

[110] MINUSTAH started with approximately 25 per cent of its 6.700 authorised troop strength. Only in late November 2004 did the mission's troop strength surpass the MIF's (PEDROSA, 2015).

[111] In 2019, during an interview, General Heleno recounted a conversation with the DPKO military adviser, in which the latter insisted on the use of force to subjugate the armed gangs in Port-au-Prince. Heleno explained that he received intense pressure to use force against the gangs, but he resisted it because "the right time" had not come, the military component still needed intelligence, and he didn't want to cause "unnecessary casualties" (PEREIRA, 2019, p. 35-36, translation is ours).

[112] The commander of the Brazilian brigade reported a meeting requested by community leaders of Cité Soleil with the Force Commander, which both attended. According to the report, it rested "quite clear [in the meeting] that the group [the Haitians] wanted the brigade to get directly involved in the fight against organised crime in the neighbourhood [...], establishing a base of operations in its interior, reinforced by HNP commissariats" (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2004, p. 3, translation is ours).

[113] Then, in a series of operations to curb the armed gangs, MINUSTAH troops progressively conquered the areas occupied by the criminals and returned them to the Government of Haiti's control.

the Council reflected a disconnect between the political-strategic and local decision-making levels. Although the mission had been established in compliance with all international legal procedures and was broadly endorsed by the international community, its leadership's restriction on the use of force created a gap between the mandate issued by the UNSC and its implementation on the ground. Such ambiguity beclouded, before important audiences, the mission's image as a legitimate entity to use force.

MINUSTAH leadership's hesitation in using force led the peacekeeping units to limit themselves to a reactive posture, which encouraged the armed gangs to intensify their illicit actions[114]. The result was a progressive deterioration in law and order and public security, with crime indicators reaching a peak in mid-2005 (DAVISON, 2006; IVES, 2011; STARGARDTER, 2018). Regarding the escalation in criminal violence, the Secretary-General's report on MINUSTAH to the UNSC, issued in November 2004, stated that

> the security situation in Haiti has deteriorated, particularly in Port-au-Prince. […] The main threat continued to emanate from various armed groups, some of which have displayed an increasing willingness to defy and confront the Transitional Government (UNITED NATIONS. SECRETARIAT, 2004b, p. 2).

The end-of-mission report of the second Brazilian contingent corroborates the Secretariat's assessment. It points to the worsening of the security situation during the first contingent's period in Haiti, caused, among other reasons, by the re-articulation of the armed gangs. The report also confirms that the first contingent "operated with basis on Chapter VI of [the Charter of] the UN" and, consequently, "the security conditions began to deteriorate in September 2004" (BRAZIL. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2005, p. 19, translation is ours).

Given the circumstances of its engagement in Haiti, BRABAT 1 could not perform as the UNHQ expected from MINUSTAH troops. As confirmed by several sources, the battalion's training and its employment in the mission pointed to the containment of force. The troops acted according to the guidance and orders from the Force Commander, which matched Brazil's restrictive view on using force at that time. Colonel Izaias, then BRABAT 1 Commander, explains that

[114] When BRABAT 1's patrols were attacked by gang members, they returned fire and withdrew, instead of keeping their ground. Such an attitude led the gang members to think that the blue helmets were afraid of them (PEREIRA, 2019).

> Brazil's position was followed by the troops, which basically carried out patrols in order to maintain a secure and stable environment and protect civilians under the threat of physical violence. […] The orientation to limit the use of force to self-defence operations positively influenced the morale since we saw ourselves as a "peacekeeping troop" and not as a troop for the use of force in offensive actions, a fact that could violate the principle of "non-intervention", contemplated in the Federal Constitution of Brazil. Thus, we followed the traditional model of peace operations, in which force was used, basically, for the defence of troops and UN personnel, when attacked. […] [In this sense] BRABAT 1 excelled in the field, fulfilling all the missions that were imposed on us during the period we were in Port-au-Prince (IZAIAS DE MACEDO, 2022, translation is ours).

All in all, MINUSTAH leaders' and Brazil's restrictive positions on the use of force prevented BRABAT 1 from making an effective contribution to fulfilling the mission's mandated tasks. The battalion did not act proactively against armed opponents, nor were its capabilities efficiently used to restore the rule of law and public order in Port-au-Prince. The understanding in Brazil that an assertive use of force should be avoided led the blue helmets to adapt to such a view. Furthermore, the lack of Force headquarters guidance to act offensively endorsed passiveness as a proper operational attitude. BRABAT 1's disappointing performance in facing the armed gangs had its roots in a flawed understanding of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force by the troop contributor and along the mission chain of command.

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The case study provided relevant data to illustrate our thesis. In each case, we raised the perceptions of the mission legitimacy to use force to accomplish the UNSC mandate, the levels of motivation these perceptions generated and their impacts on the performance of military units, among other information. Particularly significant, we could ascertain the relative motivational value of the legitimacy factor within the universe of combat motivation factors in robust PKO.

PART III

FINAL VERIFICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS AND THESIS ADVANCEMENT

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

The present chapter will single the findings of the case study and discuss them thoroughly. It will debate the blue helmets' perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force, focus on the impacts of the legitimacy factor on individual motivations and analyse the relative motivational value of such a factor. Additionally, it will consider the motivational power of the main aspects of the legitimacy to use force. Finally, the chapter will conclude on the relevance of the UN mission legitimacy to use force as a motivator to accomplish risky tasks.

It shall be noted that, in qualitative studies, data are not quantified in the traditional sense given to this term (CRESWELL, 1994). As Babbie (2003) argues, in many studies of that type, precision is not necessary or even desirable. In the case of our study, the independent variable comprises individual perceptions, which cannot be measured objectively. Thus, in the case study, they were estimated with the degree of accuracy applicable, in line with the understanding that "variables are measurable, though […] with varying degrees of accuracy depending upon the measurement scale used", i.e., "crude/refined or subjective/objective units of measurement" (KUMAR, 2014, p. 81). For the case study, the blue helmets' perceptions and feelings were scaled in intensity and importance with the help of the categories contained in the interview and questionnaire questions.

In the following discussion, we assume that the survey results with samples of BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K reflect the

situation in each unit as a whole. Such assumptions constitute auxiliary hypotheses, and their use will allow the verification of the study's central hypothesis[115].

5.1. Specific findings

In the case study, all units with effective performance faced risky situations to accomplish their tasks. During the BRABAT 6 period in Haiti, the risk was constant and imminent, and the blue helmets fought armed opponents many times. Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 faced risk occasionally, but its mission as MONUSCO Force reserve implied that dangerous tasks could come at any time. Regarding Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K, despite UNIFIL's moment of stability at the time of its arrival, crises could erupt anytime. The 8th German SFOR Contingent was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina nine years after the Srebrenica massacre and NATO bombing but still experienced the grave tensions of ethnic rivalries and resentments. Consequently, the survey with the blue helmets of these units produced several noteworthy findings for our thesis. These findings showed overall coherence with one another and across the different cases.

5.2. Blue helmets' perceptions of mission legitimacy to use force

The vast majority of BRABAT 6 members considered MINUSTAH entirely legitimate to use force[116]. This finding results from the question posed to the survey participants and the specific question to the troop leaders, who opined on their subordinates' stance. The battalion had to use all its military capabilities to pacify the violent neighbourhood of Cité Soleil and, until that objective were reached, the Brazilian blue helmets had to fight regularly. This intense combat activity, the many risks involved, and the responsibility of using lethal means in densely populated areas led the blue helmets to reflect on their role in the mission and make sense of their tasks.

In this regard, the specific question to BRABAT 6 corporals and privates about how they formed their understanding of the mission legitimacy indicated that the lessons during the pre-deployment training were their most relevant source, followed by guidance from commanders during the unit's preparation and the operations in Haiti. This finding confirms our argument in chapter 3 (subsection 3.4.1.) about the relevance of attitudes, positions and

[115] For auxiliary hypothesis references, see Popper (2014, p. 82–83).

[116] The percentage among the surveyed was 100%.

orientation from military leaders for the young soldiers to develop the sense of legitimacy of their role. Nonetheless, in the opinion of some battalion members, other factors align with the leader's influence to consolidate the sense of legitimacy in the rank and file. Colonel Alves, formerly the commander of the special forces detachment that integrated the unit during the mission, understands that

> subordinates draw the concept of legitimacy from their superiors, but in a mission like that in Haiti, they consolidated this notion through the impressions they got on the streets, which led them to realise that they were doing something relevant and well accepted by the locals (ALVES PINTO, 2021, translation is ours).

Like in the Brazilian unit, most members of Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 (around three-quarters) considered their peacekeeping mission entirely legitimate. The remainder believed that MONUSCO was partially legitimate, mainly due to ROE limitations that some battalion members deemed unfair. The question posed to the troop commanders on the position of their subordinates achieved almost the same result. Three-quarters of the respondents said that their soldiers considered the mission totally legitimate, and one-quarter opined that the subordinates took it as partially legitimate.

Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K members viewed UNIFIL as legitimate. Most of them (around two-thirds) considered the mission entirely legitimate, whereas the remainder took it as partially legitimate. None of the latter informed the reasons for such assessment. The responses to the similar question asked to troop commanders on the positions of their subordinates corroborated the result of the general consultation.

The case of the 8th German SFOR Contingent offers an approach to legitimacy perception through the process of identification. According to the German doctrine, a prerequisite for defence readiness is the enlightenment and education of the people, especially the youth[117]. Coherently, the *Bundeswehr* prepares the young soldiers to make sense of and develop sober notions about the goals of the military operations and their role in the undertakings. As a result of their education and training, the soldiers have a high interest in the use force in peacekeeping operations and its justification. Biehl and Keller consider that the German peacekeepers think about their role with an "anti-ideological reflex", which enables

[117] Such principle is stated in the Himmerod Memorandum (*Himmeroder Denkschrifft*) (*apud* BUCHNER, 2011, p. 49). The Memorandum was drafted in 1950 by a group of senior officers invited by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and assembled in the Himmerod Abbey to discuss the rearmament of West Germany. The document, whose complete name is "Memorandum on the formation of a German contingent for the defence of Western Europe within the framework of an International Fighting Force", laid the foundation for the *Bundeswehr*.

them to commit themselves to the mission, to support its goals and, "at the same time, to distance themselves from the speech of politicians" (JABERG et al., 2009, p. 21, translation is ours). Although soldiers should recognise the political reasons for their engagement, they are supposed to do it with attention to the positions and justifications expressed by the Parliament through their own abilities and conscience. Specifically, regarding the use of force in PKOs, Popp explains that

> German blue helmets differentiate between a UN peacekeeping operation and a combat operation. While there are, in the case of Chapter VII mandates, blurred areas to a certain extent, the general lines of making use of force only in case of self-defence, on one side, and defending the mandate or the mission, on the other side, are well understood and accepted (POPP, 2021).

Educated and trained in such a context, the members of the 8th German SFOR contingent were concerned about the rationale behind their engagement in the peacekeeping mission. They wanted to be convinced of the righteousness of their task before devoting themselves to it wholeheartedly. Throughout the steps that led to their engagement in the Balkans, the soldiers identified with the government's decision to participate in the mission and the Parliament's approval of such participation. Also, most of them considered that the German people endorsed their involvement in SFOR.

For soldiers to identify with their tasks, the actions should correspond to their attitude-relevant knowledge, which implies the thoughtful processing of "attitude-relevant information" (FISKE, SUSAN; TAYLOR, 2017, p. 469-470). Therefore, the blue helmets' acknowledgement of their role in the peacekeeping mission requires that they have notions of the UN's legitimate use of force and are able to make sense of their engagement in view of such notions. Besides, the influence of the national society is very significant. Although the UN's rationale and the international endorsement of the peacekeeping mission may mitigate perceptions of a lack of support on the national front, there will be damage to the individual motivation if the soldier feels a lack of support or indifference back home.

Regarding the sense of legitimacy, the case of BRABAT 1 is thought-provoking. As the battalion commander stated during the interview, his troops viewed the operational attitude of limiting the use of force as the right thing to do. As "peacekeeping troops", they understood that the purpose of their presence in Haiti was to ensure peace rather than to fight. The soldiers were well equipped and could fight the armed gangs, but in their officer's minds, using force beyond self-defence would contradict the principle of non-intervention contemplated in Brazil's Constitution. At that time, several authorities in Brazil did not agree to use force in

PKOs. Consequently, the country started in MINUSTAH to operate as it did in the UN missions in Mozambique and Angola in the 90s, regardless of the fundamentally different mandates. In its turn, the mission leadership sought ways to deal with the violent gangs in Haiti without fully utilising the capabilities of the UN Force.

5.3. Impacts of the legitimacy factor on the motivation of military personnel

In the survey, we confirmed the theoretical argument, exposed in chapter 3, that the legitimacy notion has a significant motivational value for blue helmets. Most respondents in BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K considered that the legitimacy factor motivated them to endure risks and fight or be ready to fight. In most cases, increased levels of legitimacy perception corresponded to increased levels of motivation by legitimacy. The survey of 8th German SFOR Contingent also supported the relationship between the sense of legitimacy and motivation to perform.

BRABAT 6 members were strongly motivated by the sense of playing a legitimate role in Haiti. The vast majority of the respondents stated that this condition strongly motivated them to accomplish risky tasks. Considering that all participants in the survey recognised MINUSTAH as entirely legitimate to use force, it seems that the few members who stated that the legitimacy factor motivated little or was indifferent acknowledged and probably enjoyed working for a legitimate mission. Nevertheless, that condition did not translate into substantial motivation for them. Furthermore, the questioning of the troop leaders confirmed that the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force represented a relevant motivation for the battalion members.

In Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, the mission legitimacy to use force to fulfil the mandate motivated most blue helmets to carry out risky tasks. However, the portion of those strongly inspired by the notion of legitimacy was slightly more significant than the partially motivated group (40% against 33% of the surveyed). The question asked to the troop leaders supported the outcome of the general consultation. However, it resulted in a minor proportion of officers and NCOs opining that the legitimacy factor was significant in motivating the subordinates to take risks during the mission: Only 58% of the surveyed considered that the legitimacy factor motivated their soldiers, either consistently or moderately. Thus, even considering the more expressive result of the general consultation, the mission legitimacy to use force did not translate into motivation for approximately one-fourth of the battalion members.

The members of Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K were strongly motivated by the sense of belonging to a legitimate mission. The majority considered that the legitimacy factor strongly encouraged them to accomplish risky tasks. Interestingly, this group comprises even soldiers that assessed UNIFIL as only partially legitimate to use force. On the other hand, the results of the question posed to the troop leaders were not as expressive as the general consultation. Although all leaders recognised that the legitimacy factor motivated their subordinates, less than half of them attributed a high motivational power to the notion of legitimacy.

In the 8th German SFOR Contingent, the result of the SOWI survey points to the relevance of legitimacy notions for individual motivations. It indicates that most contingent members were interested in the meaning and purpose of their tasks. Additionally, the findings indicate the contingent members' interest in Germany's political intention in sending them to Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the vast majority supporting the state's decision. Lastly, most members stood behind the mission of the contingent and deeply identified with their individual tasks. Among them, around three-quarters unequivocally supported the mission and identified with their tasks.

BRABAT 1 case provides significant insights concerning the motivational value of UN legitimacy to use force. If analysed through the prism of resorting to military capabilities to pacify the area of operations, the unit's performance should be considered below average. However, the troops did have a fighting spirit and their morale during the mission was reportedly high. The paradox is explained by Brazil's reticent view of the use of force in peacekeeping missions and the disconnect between the MINUSTAH leadership and the UNHQ regarding this point. Such aspects led BRABAT 1 officers to stick to the guidance at hand, and, as a result, the unit operated below its capacity to confront armed opponents and secure portions of its area of responsibility. This situation evinces the necessity of a single understanding of the use of force along the command channel down to the troops. Besides, it points to the TCC's support for such understanding as a condition for the troops to perform appropriately in the mission. Indeed, when BRABAT 6 was sent to Haiti, Brazil had already acknowledged the need to use force, and that was the understanding of MINUSTAH Force headquarters, which fully utilised the military component's capabilities to advance the mandate. These conditions, which were lacking in BRABAT 1's time, unequivocally translated into motivation for the blue helmets of BRABAT 6.

5.4. Motivational value of the essential aspects of the UN mission legitimacy to use force

In chapter 4, we ascertained the motivational value of the essential aspects of the "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate" concept. Across the cases, the blue helmets considered "the noble cause of peace and support for people in need", "the legal basis for the use of force" and "the local population's perception that the mission is beneficial to them" the most motivating aspects. Regarding the 8th German SFOR Contingent, the SOWI survey indicates that legality and support for populations in need were priority aspects for the German peacekeepers.

The "host country's consent" was ranked second in importance in Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K and Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 but received very few mentions in BRABAT 6. Such a contrast deserves some consideration. The agreement of the host country is a mandatory condition for peacekeeping missions to deploy, and, as such, it is usually taken for granted by TCCs and peacekeepers. Therefore, in normal circumstances, such aspect does not have a significant motivating function. In Haiti, for instance, the population's approval of MINUSTAH was high during BRABAT 6's presence in the country and, as a result, the Brazilian blue helmets did not perceive the host country's consent as a particular motivator. Conversely, in the DRC, where MONUSCO faces severe criticism for failures in protecting civilians, the members of Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 attributed a great deal of importance to the government's consent for the UN presence. In the case of Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K, the explanation for the importance given to consent appears not to be in Lebanon, where the locals accepted UN troops well, but linked to a still recent development in Indonesia: The peace enforcement operation determined by the UNSC in East Timor, in 1999. In this regard, Capie refers to "the 'loss' of East Timor and the humiliating imposition of an UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force in Indonesia's territory in 1999" as an important, powerful and quite disturbing national experience, particularly for political and military elites (2016, p. 14–15, 18, 20)[118].

All in all, the four chief aspects of the legitimacy concept proved relevant to the blue helmets' motivation. However, since the basis of their influence transits between the cognitive and affective domains, they motivate with different intensities and are more or less effective depending on the circumstances. For instance, during the initial period of operations, the blue helmets' attitudes are influenced by the knowledge obtained in the pre-deployment training.

[118] See chapter 1 (subsection 1.2.1. The legal basis for the use of force) for more information on INTERFET, the peace operation that preceded the UN peacekeeping missions in East Timor.

As the actions become more intense and they experience the suffering of the host country's population, emotions and feelings of compassion and solidarity become active and provide the soldiers with a firm sense of purpose. In this context, while the host country's consent and the legal basis for using force —aspects that the blue helmets "learn"— motivate because they provide rational justification and assurance; the need to help local people in difficulty —something that the blue helmets "feel"— impacts the moral conscience and tends to generate a stronger motivation.

During the survey, several blue helmets expressed how they felt reassured being backed by the mission's legal foundations to use force. Twelve respondents in BRABAT 6 referred to the importance of ROE, whose existence allowed them to operate more confidently. In Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, four members referred to such rules. Generally, the soldiers in the case units felt that, by sticking to the ROE, they could dedicate themselves to their tasks without the fear of being punished or accused of crimes. However, it shall be noted that the legal aspect is more efficient in motivating to use force than to take risks.

Another relevant aspect to explore is how the stance of the TCC vis-à-vis the peacekeeping mission's aims articulates with the motivation generated by the international organisation's legitimacy to use force. Depending on the TCC's interests in participating in the PKO, the UNSC's guidance to use all necessary means, including military force, may not make sense for its soldiers. BRABAT 1 case reveals how the insistence of Brazil on developing Haiti as a peacekeeping strategy hampered the meaning of fighting violent criminal gangs in the eyes of its soldiers. The German 8th SFOR Contingent case also offers a contribution in this regard but in the opposite direction. As the study of Biehl and Keller (2009) indicates, the German soldiers valued the national interests and perceived coherence between their country's and the international organisation's aims in the PKO. This situation strengthened their motivation. The authors point out the nuances of the correlation between legitimacy on the national and international fronts when they describe their method of investigation:

> If […] it can be assumed that the German soldiers are oriented towards the meaning and purpose of the mission, then the next step is to distinguish the concurrence with the objectives of the engagement: First of all, it is necessary to check whether the respondents basically approve the deployment of the *Bundeswehr*. Connected with this point is the question of identification with the specific mandate and the tasks in the mission area. […] If the interviewee evaluates such aspects as positive, he may ultimately become proud of his own achievements or that of his contingent or the *Bundeswehr* as a whole (BIEHL; KELLER, 2009, p. 130, translation is ours).

The SOWI survey fundamentally refers to the righteousness of the mandate provided by the German Parliament (*Bundestagsmandat*) to the peacekeeping contingent rather than the NATO or UNSC mandates (JABERG et al., 2009, p. 16). In Germany, the sending of troops to missions abroad is preceded by discussions in the Parliament, culminating, if approved by the majority of the parliamentarians, in a national mandate to the contingent. As per the practice in the country, the mandates of the international organisation and the Parliament articulate with each other since the latter mirrors the former in all basic aspects. However, the mandate issued by the Parliament puts forward details of the engagement and complementary guidelines for the *Bundeswehr* troops[119]. In the view of the German politicians and military authorities, more than an authorisation to participate in the operation, the parliamentarian mandate represents a task given to the soldiers in the name of the nation. According to General Glatz, former commander of the *Bundeswehr* Land Operations Command, the parliamentarian mandate is very important because it is the basis of legitimacy on the one hand and a "psychological boost" on the other (GLATZ, 2021). Through such a mandate, issued by the nation's representatives, the soldiers become aware that the people of Germany back them in their endeavours.

If an individual has two or more motives for adopting a particular behaviour, his motivation for that behaviour becomes stronger than it would be if the motive were single. We discussed the phenomenon of reinforcing motivations in subsection 3.3.2., arguing in favour of the benefits that cosmopolitan societies bring to their blue helmets' motivation, and return to the topic to stress the relevance of member states espousing the UN rationale. The compatibility between the motives for a TCC to participate in a robust PKO and the UN's reasons to conduct it makes the soldiers' motivation more compelling, particularly for risky tasks. More importantly, the convergence of mindsets between the UN, the TCC and the blue helmets guarantees the best motivational benefits of the UN legitimacy to use force for peace. Figure 9 depicts the three different models of motivation based on UN legitimacy.

[119] For instance, the parliamentarian mandate for German participation in SFOR presented the justification for the participation in the mission, detailed the circumstances and condition of the engagement, defined the tasks of the German troops, and established the contingent's structure and strength (GERMANY, 1998). This model is adopted in Germany for all military engagements abroad.



Fig. 9 - Models of motivation based on UN legitimacy

State interests in international actions may be diverse, but there is always an order of importance ranking them. Therefore, for the sake of their troops' performance, UN member states should prioritise the organisation's interests upon deciding to provide peacekeeping troops. In the end, for the blue helmets to accept making sacrifices for peace, the engagement in the operation must be meaningful, either because they assimilate the UN rationale or because they feel involved in a context of harmony between the interests of their country and those of the international organisation.

5.5. Relevance of legitimacy as a motivator

As we defined in chapter 3 (subsection 3.3.1.), combat motivation in PKOs is the impulse that leads the blue helmet to face armed opponents in the mission area. When accomplishing the task requires exposition to life-threatening risks and accepting killing other human beings, the blue helmets should have a proper attitude, capable of leading them to fight.

According to Fiske and Taylor (2017), attitudes categorise *stimuli* along evaluative dimensions and, in doing so, dispose people to react positively or negatively. Under the influence of a *stimulus*, be it a fundamental value, self-interest, or identification with individuals or groups that one holds dear, the person evaluates its importance, and the ensuing

attitudinal process determines whether and to what extent the *stimulus* will influence behaviour.

As behavioural *stimuli*, the combat motivation factors function according to a scale of importance specific to each individual. Thus, making sense of the motivation by legitimacy within the universe of factors that influence behaviours in PKOs helps isolate sources of error (RUDESTAM; NEWTON, 2015). Such a step allows us to better understand the relevance of the motivation by legitimacy for unit performance.

Across the cases, most blue helmets considered the notion of legitimacy a significant motivation to carry out risky tasks in comparison with combat motivators such as leadership, unit cohesion, sense of duty, willingness to represent one's own country well and others.

In BRABAT 6, the vast majority of the members considered that the idea of playing a legitimate role was fundamental for them to dedicate themselves to their tasks. Moreover, the comparison of the responses to the questions investigating the absolute and the relative motivational values of legitimacy indicates that, although some battalion members did not place this factor among the top three motivators, they were significantly motivated by it[120].

In Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, the majority of the members elected UN legitimacy to use force as a very important motivator in comparison with other factors. Besides, the collation of this finding with the one arising from the question about the absolute motivational value of legitimacy reveals that, albeit one-third of the battalion members considered that the legitimacy factor motivated only a little, it represented one of the most important motivators for them to carry out risky tasks.

In Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K, the vast majority of the members ranked legitimacy to use force among the top three motivators. This finding is compatible with the high proportion of battalion members that considered legitimacy as having motivated them significantly during the mission in UNIFIL.

The SOWI survey does not provide information to check the relative value of the legitimacy concept among the members of the 8th German SFOR Contingent. However, the literature on combat motivation focused on the *Bundeswehr* and the interviews we conducted with German officers indicate that, for the average German soldier, personal beliefs and notions of legitimacy of their role are among the chief motivators to take risks in military engagements.

[120] A group of 83% of the survey participants considered that UN legitimacy to use force motivated them a lot, while 70% ranked it in the first three priorities in relation to other motivators.

In the Brazilian and Uruguayan battalions, the result of the question posed to troop leaders on the relative value of legitimacy to motivate their subordinates diverges from the patent relevance arising from the general consultation. In BRABAT 6, it also contrasts with the result of the question to leaders on the absolute value of legitimacy for their soldiers. These findings seem to indicate that, although the legitimacy notion is a consistent motivation to junior ranks and enlisted, other factors overlap. Furthermore, they suggest that officers and senior NCOs in the two countries armed forces consider legitimacy more important to themselves than to the rank and file. Some members of BRABAT 6 expressed such an opinion during the interview. Regarding Uruguay, Colonel Frachelle (2020), a former battalion commander in MONUSCO, understands that legitimacy is ensured when the government deals with the parliament and decides to send out troops, after which the battalion commander's guidance and orders comprise and represent that legitimacy for the soldiers in the PKO mission area[121].

The discrepancy between the general consultation and consultation to troop leaders regarding the motivational value of legitimacy to the rank and file in the Brazilian and Uruguayan battalions is significant. It seems to point to an evolving reality, in which the leaders' view on their subordinates' interest in legitimacy issues would be outdated. According to Wyatt and Gal (1990), in societies where youth becomes better educated and more sophisticated, soldiers no longer see themselves as compliantly executing orders. Instead, they "examine carefully the sources of military legitimation before furnishing the unconditional commitment that is the backbone of the military fighting spirit" (WYATT; GAL, 1990, p. x). Coherently, during the 8th German SFOR Contingent investigation, sources indicated that young German soldiers are so concerned with issues related to the legitimacy of their engagements as officers and NCOs[122]. Besides, in BRABAT 6, in which we could survey corporals and privates, 71% of them assessed the mission legitimacy to use force as a relevant motivator (see table 10.11).

The cases of BRABAT 1 and BRABAT 6, taken together, provide unique findings regarding the legitimacy to use force and its effects. As exposed, BRABAT 1 did not sustain combat against the armed gangs in Port-au-Prince because of the lack of guidance from Brazil and orders from the Force headquarters. Conversely, BRABAT 6 used force intensively to

[121] Colonel Carlos Frachelle commanded Battalion Uruguay IV 18/19, deployed in the DRC from June 2018 to June 2019.

[122] In the 8th German SFOR Contingent, 31% of the surveyed were enlisted.

accomplish its tasks and rid Cité Soleil of violent armed spoilers. Despite operating under the same UNSC mandate, the units adopted quite diverse attitudes regarding using force and achieved very different results. Interestingly, the members of both battalions believed that they accomplished their missions as expected.

The chief cause of the discrepancy between the Brazilian units' performances was the posture of MINUSTAH leadership, which was not assertive against the armed gangs in 2004, when BRABAT 1 operated in Haiti, but started directing the troops to act offensively from 2005 onwards. As BRABAT 6 Commander, Colonel Barroso Magno, explains,

> The use of force by our battalion in Haiti was determined by the UN. Therefore, it was entirely legitimate. However, we lacked a clear institutional orientation from Brazil, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Command of the Army, regarding the use of force in a context in which there were risks for our troops and there could be casualties among Haitian citizens. As BRABAT 6 Commander, I had to consider these dangers as part of our mission to pacify Cité Soleil and indicate to my subordinate commanders that I would take full responsibility for any casualty. On the other hand, when we arrived in the mission area, we received clear instructions from the UN chain of command to use force for the task's sake and we acted accordingly (BARROSO MAGNO, 2021, translation is ours).

The sharp and coherent attitude along the UN chain of command, from the political-strategic level to the local (tactical) level, empowered the commander and officers of BRABAT 6 and led them to encourage their soldiers for the challenging task ahead. On the other hand, in BRABAT 1, the inputs the officers received during the pre-deployment training in Brazil and from the Force headquarters in Haiti pointed to an operation in which the use of force should be restrictive. As a rule, soldiers do not question the lack of force if the right to self-defence is guaranteed and they have reasons to believe that they do the job as required.

Our survey also allowed us to verify the relevance of the willingness to represent one's country well. The results indicate that the blue helmets' desire not to disappoint as representatives of their countries was a significant motivation in BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K. In the case of the 8th German SFOR Contingent, the soldiers' attention to Germany's rationale for participating in the peacekeeping mission shows that they were willing to perform for the good of their homeland. Such findings are significant for the wish to honour the own country directly connects to the legitimacy to use force for peace if the TCC supports the peacekeeping goals and strategy. Besides, in an environment where the most relevant audiences —local society and authorities, foreign representations, UN staff members, and the peacekeeping troops in general— are interested in

the functioning and success of the peace process, the best way to represent one's country well is to perform satisfactorily, especially in risky situations. Thus, the motivation to represent the own country induces attention to the UN standards and reinforces the motivation by the legitimacy to use force in the name of peace.

The UN Secretariat has long been dealing with episodes of military underperformance in PKOs and working with member states —mainly the troop contributors— and other stakeholders to solve the problem. However, the regular occurrence of failures seems to indicate that some countries do not care much about their troops' performance. In such a context, blue helmets may carry out their tasks poorly because they do not owe a convincing performance to anyone back home. Conversely, armed forces that convey to their soldiers the national or institutional interest in fine performances obtain better results in PKOs. In this case, the blue helmets devote themselves to the job because they want to live up to the expectations placed on them.

We should also analyse the legitimacy to use force in PKO through the lenses of professionalism. Unlike other motivations to fight, legitimacy to use force is intimately related to the blue helmets' professional condition. It represents the foundation for them to use their weapons and means, as necessary, to accomplish critical tasks. In other words, the "professional" blue helmet must be legitimate and act legitimately. As the hallmark of their profession, the legitimacy to use force has for the blue helmets a function which is similar to the legal and statutory prerogatives of law enforcement personnel and constabulary forces.

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The case study results confirm the arguments used in the theoretical verification of the hypothesis. As discussed here, the blue helmets made sense of their tasks and were motivated by the legitimacy of their role. These conditions contributed to better individual performances in risky tasks and enabled a satisfactory collective performance. The next chapter will apply the findings to finalise the verification of the hypothesis.

CHAPTER 6

FINAL VERIFICATION AND THESIS ADVANCEMENT

UN troop contributors deploy tens of thousands of blue helmets in robust PKOs each year. Although few engage in combat situations during their half-year or one-year tour of duty, most of them need to incur risks to efficiently patrol armed groups' strongholds and protect communities under the threat of attack. Hence, the need to investigate how blue helmets can be adequately motivated to better support the advancement of peace processes despite the risks involved.

In the interlude following part I, we assessed the central hypothesis taking into account theoretical considerations, and ascertained its consistency. In this last chapter, we will enrich the verification process by expanding the theoretical proof with empirical evidence from the case study. Also, we will discuss the study's limitations and strengths and present the features that guarantee its validity. In the last section, we will explore the conditions for generalisation and replication.

6.1. Condition of consistency of the hypothesis

Empirically, the hypothesis is considered consistent if, in case units with effective performance, the majority of the blue helmets have a positive perception of the mission legitimacy to use force, and most of them consider such factor significant for their motivations. Limited perceptions of the mission legitimacy to use force or widespread opinion that legitimacy does not function to motivate would indicate that the hypothesis does not sustain[123].

[123] Interview and questionnaire responses stating that the mission was "legitimate" and "partially legitimate" are considered positive perceptions of legitimacy, and statements that the mission's legitimate condition "motivated a lot" and "motivated little" imply that it has/had the ability to motivate the blue helmets.

The green path in table 14 indicates the consistency condition, which we will use as the criterion to evaluate the cases.

Unit performance	Perception of mission legitimacy by most blue helmets	Mission legitimacy's capacity to motivate most blue helmets	Consistency of the hypothesis
Effective	Positive	Existent	Yes
		Inexistent	No
	Negative	Existent (anomalous result)	No
		Inexistent	No

Table 14 – Condition of consistency of the hypothesis

6.2. Relationship between the level of legitimacy perception and the performance of military units (hypothesis final verification)

In the theoretical verification of the hypothesis, we used arguments based on social psychology, organisational psychology and combat motivation theories to show how the UN legitimacy to use force functions to motivate blue helmets in robust PKOs and how this process improves the peacekeeping units' performances. At this point, we found that the case study broadly corroborates the theoretical verification. It shows that blue helmets mind the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission and get motivated to risky tasks when they perceive it as legitimate to use force.

In BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K and the 8th German SFOR Contingent —all units with effective performance in robust PKOs—, the majority of the blue helmets displayed a positive perception of the respective peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use military force to accomplish the mandate. Coherently, the soldiers were significantly motivated by such a condition. More specifically, most blue helmets in BRABAT 6 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K were strongly motivated to carry out risky tasks by the positive perception of mission legitimacy. In Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, the larger part of the members was also motivated by that perception. In the 8th German SFOR Contingent, most soldiers were motivated by the legitimacy of the context in which they operated.

As it is widely known, motivation is a multifactorial phenomenon. Hence, when blue helmets are motivated by the legitimacy of their role, this is hardly the only factor influencing

their behaviour. Coherently, the respondents in the case study mentioned several factors affecting their motivation to incur risks in robust PKOs. However, despite motivating factors other than legitimacy having influenced the units' members to a greater or lesser extent to accomplish risky tasks, most of them were significantly motivated by the legitimacy factor.

On the other hand, some TCCs show double standards or, sticking to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, openly criticise the use of force in robust PKOs, which may negatively impact their troops' motivations and performance. The case of BRABAT 1 exemplifies such a detrimental effect. The unit's disappointing performance in MINUSTAH was caused by Brazil's and the mission leaders' resistance to using force to advance the mandate at that time. So, the case reveals that structural gaps in the understanding of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force impair the motivation by such a concept and damage the peacekeeping units' performances.

When soldiers acknowledge the legitimacy of their engagement, they get motivated and, consequently, contribute better to the unit's performance. The study of BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21, Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K and the 8th German SFOR Contingent supports such deduction. The case study suggests that the collective performance benefits in proportion to the number of motivated individuals.

The consistency of the theoretical and empirical data and the soundness of the arguments used to verify the hypothesis indicate that the independent variable affects the dependent variable in a direct manner. On the other hand, the empirical verification of the converse hypothesis —"the blue helmets' negative perceptions of the mission legitimacy to use force tend to hamper their unit's performance"— was impaired by the impossibility of obtaining cases of ineffective performance linked to unit members' negative perceptions[124]. Nevertheless, the relevance of the legitimacy of using force to motivate the blue helmets was so evident in the units with effective performance that the converse hypothesis should also be considered valid: If positive perceptions of legitimacy benefit the performances of peacekeeping units, negative perceptions damage or, at least, do not contribute to them.

All in all, the verification process provided multiple, solid evidence of a consistent relationship between the independent and dependent variables and the intermediate role of the intervening variable. The blue helmets' positive perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use military force encourage them to dedicate themselves to the tasks despite the

[124] As already explained in the introduction, BRABAT 1 case is peculiar and does not mirror such a situation.

hardships and risks involved and, consequently, contribute to their military unit's good performance in tasks that require force.

Therefore, the central hypothesis of the study is valid and correct, both from the theoretical and empirical points of view.

6.3. Thesis advancement

We dealt in this work with three dimensions of knowledge: theoretical knowledge, concentrated in part I of the dissertation; empirical knowledge revealed by the case study, compiled in part II; and inferences by induction or deduction made during the research, summarised in part III. The three dimensions comprise the thesis we put forward, the last being its core.

Our thesis brings up a set of principles, circumstances and facts to explain the phenomenon of motivation by the sense of legitimacy in robust peacekeeping and its impacts on performance. It sheds light on the relationship between the blue helmets' perception of the UN legitimacy to use force in robust PKOs and the missions' prospects of success. The theoretical proposition consists of two main arguments:

1) When the blue helmets perceive the peacekeeping mission as legitimate to use military force, they are more motivated to dedicate themselves to their tasks, even under risk. Such a condition contributes to the effective performance of peacekeeping units in risky tasks.

2) The peacekeeping units' effective performance in risky tasks contributes significantly to the success of PKOs.

The two premises on which the theoretical proposition rests —the consideration that military tasks are relevant for the peace processes in robust PKOs and the fact that failures of peacekeeping units on risky tasks compromise the efficiency of military components— were thoroughly demonstrated in the dissertation (chapter 2). Because military tasks are essential for the success of robust PKOs and peacekeeping units' underperformance is a real problem to military efficiency, motivational factors that mitigate weak performances are of great value to the peacekeeping doctrine.

Departing from an analogy with combat motivation and the relevance of the legitimacy of the cause in wars, we propose that the UN legitimacy to use force for the sake of peace is an essential motivator in peacekeeping. In modern times, most warfare campaigns are low-intensity conflict operations. *Mutatis mutandis*, this is also the case of robust PKOs. Like the low-intensity operations that characterise modern conflicts, robust PKOs have a

decentralised character, with actions being carried out by small units at platoon or squad levels, i.e., groups of 35–40 or 8–10 individuals, respectively. This feature implies that soldiers operate out of the sight of senior commanders and, sometimes, immediate commanders. Such circumstances require that they are adequately motivated to take risks. On the other hand, our argument makes clear that "using force in robust PKOs" means "using the blue helmets"; the reason why the UN legitimacy to use force implies the legitimacy of their own role[125]. Hence the high value of blue helmets' positive perception of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force, which has the power to reassure and motivate them in the peculiar conditions of robust PKO.

Our thesis comprehensively explicates the sequential dynamics of "legitimacy perception - motivation by legitimacy - peacekeeping unit's performance - mission's chances of success". When the blue helmets perceive their peacekeeping mission as legitimate to use force, they become more motivated to dedicate themselves to their tasks even under risk. In a synergetic development, such positive motivations contribute to the effective performance of peacekeeping units, especially in risky tasks. Given the relevance of military tasks for robust PKOs to achieve their mandates, the peacekeeping units' effective performance positively impacts the robust mission's chances of success.

Moreover, considering that soldiers keep ties to their home country even under UN operational authority, the thesis highlights the relevance of TCCs' support to the UN peace process to maintain the blue helmets motivated by legitimacy[126]. In the same vein, it indicates how harmful ambiguities in the UN structure and TCCs regarding the use of force are to military efficiency in robust PKOs.

The thesis advanced with this dissertation adds to the field of peacekeeping operations by increasing the knowledge around military performance in robust PKOs, factoring the influence of the legitimacy concept, and contributing to solving the problem of peacekeeping units' underperformance.

[125] UN FPUs deployed in robust PKOs are seldom used against armed groups. In exceptional cases, they are employed in support of or jointly with military units.

[126] UN operational authority is the authority transferred by member states to the UN to use the operational capabilities of their military contingents or units to undertake UNSC-mandated tasks within the limits of an agreed period of time and a specific mission area (UNITED NATIONS. DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, 2019).

6.4. Study limitations and strengths

6.4.1. Limitations

In the case study, three cases, namely BRABAT 6, Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K, are based on surveys of small samples whose findings we extended to the entire units in order to verify the study's central hypothesis. These are internal generalisations made within the groups studied to "persons […] that were not directly observed or interviewed" (MAXWELL, 1992, p. 293)[127]. Internal generalisations are standard procedures in qualitative research because it works, by definition, with small samples and aims at theorising about the populations from which the samples were taken. Moreover, three aspects mitigate using small samples and support the internal generalisation we used. Firstly, the population to which the findings are generalised —the soldiers of each case unit — is homogeneous regarding the object of the study. Peacekeeping units are formed by individuals that undergo lengthy socialisation processes, receive the same preparation and training and interact intensively during the mission. Secondly, the reach of the findings being generalised was considerably widened by questions posed to troop leaders on their subordinates' attitudes and stances. As argued, military leaders are able to opine on their subordinates because they are responsible for ensuring their psychological preparation and motivation. Thirdly, the cases are mutually reinforcing since the research revealed a remarkable similarity between the results obtained in the three battalions, all units of effective performance in risky tasks.

Still, two other limitations of the case study should be considered. The first is that, save for the recommendations in the invitation letter, we relied on the discretion of defence ministries to select the survey respondents. Besides, no country among those invited to participate offered units whose ineffective performance was due to poor individual performances. However, the impact of both limitations is constrained by some circumstances or study characteristics. The selection of individuals by participating countries is attenuated because the study does not require informants with specific ranks, ages or other criteria of statistical representativeness. In addition, the questions posed to troop leaders on their subordinates led to data collection beyond the group of interviewees and questionnaire respondents. Concerning the absence of units with ineffective performance, it hampered the verification of the converse hypothesis to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the BRABAT 1 special

[127] For Maxwell, internal generalisability is possible in qualitative studies because they use "purposeful" or "theoretical" sampling rather than random sampling aimed at attaining statistical representativeness (1992, p. 293).

case mitigated such limitation, with the advantage of allowing for interesting findings regarding legitimacy gaps within the UN peacekeeping structure and chain of command.

6.4.2. Strengths

The study has several strengths. The most important is the combination of a solid theoretical basis with empirical evidence, based on real-life experiences and observations. Such an amalgam of theoretical and empirical arguments allowed the verification of the central hypothesis with information already consolidated in the scientific literature, such as the principles of UN legitimacy, the foundations of combat motivation and the organisational benefits that motivation brings to performance, and data raised during the case study. Moreover, the separate databases provided consistency in formulating the thesis and enhanced its explanatory potential.

The logical and objective research design, fulfilled with a detailed methodological approach, significantly contributed to the quality of the study. It ensured steadiness throughout the work, facilitated communication with contributors, and added reliability to the results. On top of that, it allowed a didactic exposition of the research, its findings and conclusions.

During the case study, asking questions straight to members of peacekeeping units led to "factual" findings regarding perceptions and motivations. Moreover, using objective questions, most of them proposing categories of responses, eliminated the possibility of misunderstandings and distorted answers. The significant volume of primary, first-hand data generated in the case represents information of great utility for further academic studies.

Another asset of the study is the qualitative approach, which allowed for an in-depth exploration of a variety of thoughts and opinions and raised valued insights into the problem. With extensive theoretical and empirical considerations, the work develops novel ideas and potential hypotheses for future quantitative research. Furthermore, mixing qualitative cases with one based on quantitative research (8th German SFOR Contingent) warranted greater reliability in the results.

Also, using five cases allowed a diversified approach to the theme and comprehensive analysis, leading to numerous and wide-ranging insights. The fact that the cases comprise armies from countries with different cultures and varying security views and needs ensured a broader scope and more consistency for the study.

Lastly, we surveyed respondents in diverse situations. Some were interviewed or responded to questionnaires in the mission area, others during everyday military life after the

mission, and others after having retired from the army. Battalion Uruguay IV 20/21 was surveyed in the mission area. On the other hand, BRABAT 6 and Indonesian Battalion XXIII-K members responded to the questions in their regular military service. In the case of the Brazilian battalion, few participants had already retired. Such a circumstance allowed the collection of impressions and opinions either elaborated on-site or matured by the passage of some years since the accomplishment of the peacekeeping mission.

6.5. Validation

King, Keohane and Verba (1994) maintain that, without a reasonable estimate of uncertainty, inferences about causal effects in the real world are uninterpretable. That is an indispensable warning, but we understand that it only partially applies to the present study, which makes no causal inference. Nevertheless, we should estimate the uncertainty, or better, the level of certainty of our correlational inference.

Our main conclusion aligns the empirical evidence collected from peacekeeping units with social and organisational psychology knowledge. Besides, a series of other features and qualities of the study indicates its internal validity, supports external validity and provides generalisability.

The basis of the study's internal validity is threefold. Firstly, the objectivity and reliability provided by the methodical research, well-selected cases, brief and candid interviews and questionnaires, and independently collected data. Secondly, the integration and judicious use of primary and secondary sources (THIES, 2002). Thirdly, a design that aligns conceptual development and empirical indicators. In this sense, the research and, particularly, the survey assess precisely what they are intended to assess (MINAYO; DESLANDES; GOMES, 2007).

Concerning external validity, the study establishes a solid "relationship between the account and […] the phenomena that the account is *about*", as Maxwell poses as validation criteria (1992, p. 283, the italics belong to the scholar). Such correspondence is ensured by adopting a dual approach to verify the hypothesis, proved in the theoretical realm and with empirical data from a case study. Besides that, a series of other features and conditions contribute to validating the study's main findings and conclusion, such as the intensive use of primary sources; the adoption of an operational definition of UN legitimacy to use force in order to eliminate ambiguity during the surveys; the study's reliance on the UN peacekeeping doctrine, which ensures conceptual coherence; and the use of sound analytical logic to guide the research.

Despite its qualitative nature, the study is generalisable. Two conditions ensure such a property. First, the existence of ethics principles and core values common to all state armed forces. Based on these common characteristics, soldiers from all military institutions tend to handle legitimacy issues similarly[128]. In addition, the thesis's theoretical framework, founded on combat motivation theories and knowledge of sociology and psychology, makes sense of the social circumstances shaping the empirical cases. As maintained by several experts on qualitative methods, this feature contributes to the study's generalisability (CRESWELL, 1994; MAXWELL, 1992; SMALL, 2009). Thus, as it happened in the cases we explored, it is to expect that troops intended to deploy in UN robust PKOs get motivated or add to their motivations to accomplish challenging tasks if they perceive the legitimate condition of their engagement. In such a circumstance, as demonstrated in the present study, the units will benefit from their members' motivation and perform better in tasks requiring the use of force.

Regarding the verification and replication of the research, relevant aspects of the design facilitate them, such as the detailed description of the methodology, the data collection protocol, precise bibliographic references, and the procedures to analyse and interpret information.

In sum, the results support our conclusion that positive perceptions of the UN mission legitimacy to use military force to keep peace contribute to peacekeeping units' inspired performances and improve the chances of success of robust PKOs. However, given the exploratory character of the present study, future research of quantitative nature is invited to refine the results, thus leading to more profound theoretical advances (RAGIN; AMOROSO, 2011). Having the present thesis as a point of departure, such future works should be conducted nationally and comprise as many units with above and below-average performances in robust PKOs as possible, including units that failed in their tasks. Specific aspects recommending further investigation are the social and psychological mechanisms that condition the military motivation by the legitimacy notion, including the influence of national societies' stances and

[128] The military ethics and values developed in the Western culture thanks to practices and traditions that Ancient Rome's military institutions bequeathed to modern states, such as discipline, hierarchy, a strictly professional sense, and values like honour and the spirit of sacrifice. After WWII, the founding of the UN and the development and adoption of international law applied to armed conflicts promoted and spread ethics based on the legitimate role of armed forces in defending the state, protecting the nation and observing the fundamentals of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. As an engaged observer, I experienced these common military ethics and values during four service periods with the UN, two of which were command assignments (Sector Commander in the United Nations Mission in Nepal - UNMIN, in 2007; and Force Commander in MINUSTAH, in 2012/13). On those occasions, my interactions with officers and troops from several countries and the interactions between the staff members at the headquarters were greatly facilitated by professional precepts and military values, such as discipline, respect, comradeship and sense of duty.

beliefs; the variation of the motivation by legitimacy across military ranks; and the extent to which military leaders influence the subordinates' perceptions of legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

In 2014, the OIOS report on the evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates, after considering several shortcomings in robust PKOs and making recommendations for their improvement, affirmed in conclusion that the crucial question remained the same since the first mission with such a task in 1999: "Whether the United Nations, an organisation founded for the fundamental purpose of promoting peace, will protect civilians only through peaceful means, or whether it is ready and willing to use violence, even on rare occasions and as a last resort, to come to their assistance?" (UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, 2014, p. 20). With this approach, the report makes it clear that no robust peacekeeping strategy will ever work without the UN's and member states' firm political will.

The UN deploys robust PKOs to respond to threats to international peace and security where peacemaking efforts failed in achieving satisfactory results, and there is urgency in protecting lives or rescuing states at the brink of collapse. However, in most complex environments where peacekeeping missions are deployed, it is impossible to ensure security and protect civilians without resorting to a certain level of force. In such a circumstance, the contrast between the General Assembly's and Security Council's resolve to protect vulnerable people and keep countries stable and hesitations in using force in UN missions by peacekeepers and among member states is concerning.

Such dysfunction illustrates the backdrop of the present work, which deals with the problem of peacekeeping units' underperformance through the lenses of UN legitimacy to use force to advance peacekeeping processes. Through an in-depth analysis, we developed a comprehensive body of ideas about the legitimate use of force in robust PKOs and theorised on its relevance to fostering fine unit performances and improving the peacekeeping missions' chances of success. In this sense, our study develops on hitherto uncharted terrain to advance

novel knowledge focused on the UN legitimacy to use force to achieve peace and its implications for military performance, thereby bridging a gap in the peacekeeping literature.

During the research, in-depth theoretical analysis and examination of selected cases led to relevant inferences and consistent empirical evidence. These findings culminated in the description and explanation of the dynamics involving the legitimacy to use force in robust PKOs, the blue helmets' views of the issue and the consequences for the peace process.

Main findings and conclusions

We operationalised the definition of "UN legitimacy to use force in defence of the mandate in robust PKOs". The operational definition resulted from an extensive and careful consultation of the literature and information obtained from primary sources. Although our main intention with the operationalisation process was to keep our investigation under adequate control during the interviews and questionnaire administration, the definition constitutes *per se* a significant contribution to the peacekeeping literature.

The research revealed that the blue helmets' positive perceptions of the peacekeeping mission legitimacy to use force bolster individual motivations to carry out tasks requiring readiness to fight. In a progression, such motivations generate better collective performances and, in the end, benefit the fulfilment of risky tasks by peacekeeping units. Besides, the study demonstrated that the motivational value of the mission legitimacy to use force is also significant in the universe of traditional combat motivation factors.

Our results also suggest that lessons received during the pre-deployment training are the most relevant source for the military, particularly the young, low-ranking soldiers, to form their understanding of the UN legitimacy to use force for peace. This source is closely followed by guidance and orientation received from commanders during the peacekeeping unit's preparation and operations in the mission area.

By exploring the compelling case of a particular Brazilian unit in MINUSTAH (BRABAT 1), the investigation revealed that ambiguous or contrasting interpretations of the righteousness of using force might cause serious dysfunctionalities in peacekeeping missions and profoundly affect the military components' efficiency. Consequently, a single understanding within the UN structure and along the chain of command down to the military units is crucial to preserving the motivational value of the legitimacy factor and safeguarding its benefits. In this same vein, it is essential that the TCCs support the UNSC's rationale in authorising the use of force to fulfil critical tasks and the peacekeeping missions' actions in this regard.

Our approach to the present study's theme goes beyond the taboo that the word "combat" still represents in the peacekeeping world. The possibility of fighting is implicit in the strategy of deploying strong military contingents in robust PKOs, as there would be no point in spending billions of dollars a year for innocuous deterrence[129]. Nevertheless, many TCCs remain reluctant to accept risks and, through caveats, limit the UN's ability to use their troops appropriately. In our view, among the several harms caused by such reluctance and caveats, undermining the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission in the eyes of the blue helmets is one of the worst. Armed forces exist to support the state's interests. If a UN member state does not back up the world organisation's intentions or fundamentally disagrees with a peacekeeping mission's concept of operations, it should relinquish providing troops to the undertaking. Otherwise, their performance will be unsatisfactory.

Recommendations and implications for policy

Several findings and conclusions of our research give way to recommendations for improving peacekeeping policies. Their enactment, preferably in combination, will enhance the preparation of peacekeeping troops and generate better performances on the ground.

Legitimacy issues are routinely considered when governments engage armed forces in wars or military campaigns to protect state interests. However, in many countries, political authorities in the executive and members of the parliament do not allude to principles and values or even refer to legitimacy upon debating, deciding and authorising the deployment of contingents in PKOs. In behaving so, they lose an opportunity to involve the national society in the undertaking, and the soldiers' motivation suffers because they lack a proper notion of their role's significance. Thus, considering that legitimacy is crucial for broad endorsement of state decisions and to motivate the military during challenging engagements, it is recommended that the commitment of troops to the UN is preceded by deep discussions at the appropriate state levels and announced with relevant justifications.

Given the importance of the UN legitimacy to use force for peacekeeping units' performance in risky tasks, it is also recommended that the issue be extensively explored in military education and peacekeeping training. Through the educational process, soldiers can comprehend the various aspects of the legitimacy concept and assimilate it more consistently. Thereby, they can develop attitudes and motivations to successfully accomplish challenging tasks in PKOs.

[129] The approved budget for UN Peacekeeping operations for the fiscal year 1 July 2022 - 30 June 2023 is USD 6.51 billion (UNITED NATIONS. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2022b).

Likewise, military socialisation has a crucial function in developing attitudes. In proper environments, it helps the soldier frequently express and be in regular contact with the cognitions associated with legitimacy, making their influence more intense and stable. Moreover, military socialisation is particularly efficient in developing feelings. Although soldiers absorb aspects like the legal basis to use force and the consent of the main parties to the conflict through lectures and training, the moral foundations around the support of fellow human beings and the value of peace as a relevant cause are better assimilated through the more intimate interactions of the socialisation process. If oriented by the armed institution and supported in the military organisations, the contacts of leaders with their subordinates and exchanges among peers can create a proper environment for soldiers to grasp, feel and internalise the affective meanings and values linked to legitimacy to use force for peace. However, it is necessary to emphasise that socialisation in military organisations depends on the values professed by the broader society. That is truer the more integrated the country's armed forces are into the national society, a condition usually more intense in democracies.

Activities to develop and enhance the sense of legitimacy concern the UN and the TCCs, but with specific functions. The UN guides the peacekeeping training and assesses the preparedness of contingents. Therefore, the Secretariat should produce legitimacy-oriented training materials and recommend legitimacy awareness-raising activities to maximise positive attitudes based on the legitimacy of using force for peace. On the other hand, the soldiers' psychological and affective preparation is the member states' sole responsibility. So, mindful of the cultural settings, TCCs should develop their own methods to optimise peacekeeping training focusing on the legitimacy to use force. More importantly, troop contributors should create the conditions for a socialisation process conducive to incorporating the more subtle and intimate nuances of the legitimacy concept.

The third and last recommendation is linked to the notion of cosmopolitanism. As a concept that views the interrelation between human groups as governed by universal values, cosmopolitanism connects with the legitimacy concept through the UN's ideals and the cause of peace. Thus, the legitimacy of using force to restore peace and protect civilians in robust PKOs and the cosmopolitan attitude towards vulnerable foreign nationals become reinforcing motivations. However, soldiers' motivation by cosmopolitanism is not a question of military education or training. Blue helmets can learn about the legitimacy of their role, but they need to assimilate cosmopolitan attitudes from their national societies.

On the other hand, societies can be inspired or led to incorporate cosmopolitan values and, based on them, better support efforts for peace[130]. In fact, there is already significant international consensus around themes such as the immorality of harming innocent civilians and the need to take a stand in the face of severe human rights violations. Hence, governments should foster public debate on peacekeeping issues and the reasons to participate in PKOs. Open discussions tend to favour value-based arguments rather than circumstantial, particularistic objectives as reasons to cooperate with the UN. When a member state's main interest in joining a UN PKO is based on international solidarity and is communicated to the nation following the UN rationale, a virtuous circle closes: The government's interest matches the UN's, the citizens get committed to the undertaking and endorse the country's participation, and the soldiers dedicate themselves to the job for the sake of the nation and the international community represented in the UN.

Final considerations

In the introduction to this study, we invited readers to a reflection on legitimacy by posing two fundamental questions to modern states: Should national societies commit their military to campaigns they do not regard as relevant? Should soldiers accept the burden of killing or put their lives on the line for causes they do not consider meaningful? Then we argued that, in most countries, the majority of the answers would be negative. At this point, after extensive research in the literature and interactions with experts and peacekeepers from dozens of nations, we conclude that the same answers apply if the questions concern military operations in robust PKOs. However, regarding peacekeeping, although a "no" is a definite response to the latter question, it seems to be merely the desirable answer to the former.

Throughout this work, we proposed novel theoretical knowledge, clarifying and explaining situations and generating new ideas in the field of peacekeeping. We offered consistent arguments that characterise the legitimacy of using force to keep peace as relevant for the military to work with inspiration in robust PKO mission areas. Furthermore, we showed that national citizens have a role in the motivational process. Motivations through legitimacy become exponentially more significant if the blue helmets' nation agrees with and supports their peacekeeping engagement.

[130] Constructivists maintain that important aspects of international relations are socially built. In this sense, states' identities are influenced by international society and ideas and concepts developed by specific societies can spread through their relationships. Therefore, the influence of other nations and the leadership of statespersons can develop or enhance the cosmopolitan sense in national societies.

It is often said that, in UN missions, peacekeepers must constantly "show the flag". Soldiers inside their camps, peering at the surroundings through APC visors, or sending out remotely controlled uncrewed vehicles cannot efficiently keep peace. In modern post-conflict and conflict settings, boots on the ground are crucial to reassuring threatened communities and building confidence in the peacekeeping mission, its mandate and the peace process. In this context, the blue helmets' awareness of the relevance of their role makes a huge difference when it comes to accomplishing challenging tasks.

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ANNEXES

ANNEXE A

INTERVIEW FORM TYPE I

RESEARCH ON THE UN LEGITIMACY TO USE FORCE
IN ROBUST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. INITIAL PRESENTATION

a. Purpose and importance of research

The research addresses the UN's legitimacy to use force in robust peacekeeping operations (PKO). The overall objective is to explore the relationship between the military's perception of the legitimacy of using force and the military units' performance in UN robust PKO.

Interview (questionnaire) data will be used statistically or by transcriptions of selected excerpts to support the development of scientific articles and the doctoral thesis of Lt Gen (Ret) Fernando Rodrigues Goulart at the Institute of International Relations (IREL) of the University of Brasilia.

It is envisaged that the result of the research will be of great use in preparing peacekeepers better. Therefore, the work benefits countries contributing with troops to PKO and the UN Secretariat.

b. Concepts and definitions

To avoid ambiguity and imprecision, the research adopts the following concepts:

Legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force in defence of the mandate

It is a specific condition ensured by the conformity of the UN structure, in general, and the peacekeeping mission, in particular, with a series of aspects that render the use of force right, just and appropriate. First and foremost, such condition is founded on the fact that the UN represents all the nations of the world and has, as enshrined in its Charter, high values and principles, such as the defence of peace, faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity of the human person, and promotion of better living conditions for all the peoples.

A solid legal basis legitimises the peace missions' existence and activities. The UN Charter, a fundamental element of international law, establishes that it is the United Nations

Security Council's responsibility to identify threats to peace and decide on measures to be taken. Thus, based on the Charter and in observance of its rites, the Council determines the establishment of peacekeeping missions and issues relevant mandates and instructions for them, including aspects regarding the use of force. In addition, the host country's participation in the UN as a member, the host government's consent to the PKO and the observance of the peace agreement by the peacekeeping mission complement the legal requirements. Also meaningful, the consent of the main parties to the conflict for the UN presence and the mission's peaceful, continuous efforts for armed groups to abdicate violence consolidate the UN legitimacy to use force.

Universality, impartiality, adequate attitude and efficiency are other elements adding to the legitimate use of force to fulfil the mandate. The multinational composition of the peacekeeping mission, particularly its military component, symbolises the international community's joint effort to support peace and the host nation. The peacekeepers' impartial attitude, without implying tolerance of breaches of the UN Charter terms or actions against the peace process, makes their presence and activities trustable and fair. The blue helmets' high standards of conduct and restraint in using force contribute to the acceptance of their presence. Equally relevant, the correspondence between the mission's objectives and the genuine wishes of the host country's population, along with the mission's efficiency in fulfilling the mandated tasks, ensure credibility in the eyes of the local public and legitimise the PKO's *modus operandi*.

Finally, the cause of peace shall be highlighted as the most relevant aspect in legitimising the PKO and the use of force. The UN mission and its appropriate actions are legitimate because the objectives of achieving and maintaining peace, as well as supporting and protecting vulnerable people are good, desirable and widely recognised.

Risky task in robust PKO

Tasks that subject or are likely to subject the blue helmets to hostile, violent acts, such as adverse fire and mines' hazards and improvised explosive devices.

2. ETHICS ISSUES

a. The contribution to the research is voluntary, which is implied by returning answers to the asked questions. In face-to-face or Skype (WhatsApp) interviews, responses will be

recorded in audio unless the interviewee does not authorise the recording. The interviewee will be asked to sign a consent form in face-to-face interviews.

b. In case of responses deemed adequate for transcription in the dissertation, the excerpts will be presented to the interviewee so that he/she makes adjustments in the text, if necessary, and authorises the publication.

c. Interviewees and questionnaire respondents can choose to remain anonymous.

PERFORMANCE OF PEACEKEEPING UNITS

1. INTERVIEWEE'S PERSONAL DATA

- Name (optional): _____
- Rank (if military): _____
- UN PKO in which you participated (if this is the case) and respective periods: _____
  _____
- Position(s) or function(s) in PKO (if you participated in PKO): _____
  _____

2. QUESTIONS

a. Concerning the concept of "Legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force in defence of the mandate", do you have any suggestions for repairs to be made or ideas to add?

b. How would you assess the value of military tasks for robust PKO to succeed?

c. How do you assess the impact of military units' underperformance in risky tasks on the effectiveness of military components in robust PKO?

d. Is the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use military force important for the PKO to succeed? Justify.

e. In your view, are perceptions that the peacekeeping mission lacks legitimacy to use military force detrimental for the blue helmets to carry out their operational tasks in robust PKO? Justify.

f. In your opinion, the performance of peacekeeping units in risky tasks is linked to nationality, so that different contingents from the same country tend to show similar performances?

   If you answered positively to the previous question: Please, indicate countries that, in your opinion, contribute troops with "above-average" performance to robust PKO.

g. Do you want to make additional comments on the subjects covered?

Thank you!

ANNEXE B

INTERVIEW (QUESTIONNAIRE) FORM TYPE II

RESEARCH ON THE UN LEGITIMACY TO USE FORCE
IN ROBUST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. INITIAL PRESENTATION

a. Purpose and importance of research

The research addresses the UN's legitimacy to use force in robust peacekeeping operations (PKO). The overall objective is to explore the relationship between the military's perception of the legitimacy of using force and the military units' performance in UN robust PKO.

Interview (questionnaire) data will be used statistically or by transcriptions of selected excerpts to support the development of scientific articles and the doctoral thesis of Lt Gen (Ret) Fernando Rodrigues Goulart at the Institute of International Relations (IREL) of the University of Brasilia.

It is envisaged that the result of the research will be of great use in preparing peacekeepers better. Therefore, the work benefits countries contributing with troops to PKO and the UN Secretariat.

b. Concepts and definitions

To avoid ambiguity and imprecision, the research adopts the following concepts:

Legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force in defence of the mandate

It is a specific condition ensured by the conformity of the UN structure, in general, and the peacekeeping mission, in particular, with a series of aspects that render the use of force right, just and appropriate. First and foremost, such condition is founded on the fact that the UN represents all the nations of the world and has, as enshrined in its Charter, high values and principles, such as the defence of peace, faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity of the human person, and promotion of better living conditions for all the peoples.

A solid legal basis legitimises the peace missions' existence and activities. The UN Charter, a fundamental element of international law, establishes that it is the United Nations

Security Council's responsibility to identify threats to peace and decide on measures to be taken. Thus, based on the Charter and in observance of its rites, the Council determines the establishment of peacekeeping missions and issues relevant mandates and instructions for them, including aspects regarding the use of force. In addition, the host country's participation in the UN as a member, the host government's consent to the PKO and the observance of the peace agreement by the peacekeeping mission complement the legal requirements. Also meaningful, the consent of the main parties to the conflict for the UN presence and the mission's peaceful, continuous efforts for armed groups to abdicate violence consolidate the UN legitimacy to use force.

Universality, impartiality, adequate attitude and efficiency are other elements adding to the legitimate use of force to fulfil the mandate. The multinational composition of the peacekeeping mission, particularly its military component, symbolises the international community's joint effort to support peace and the host nation. The peacekeepers' impartial attitude, without implying tolerance of breaches of the UN Charter terms or actions against the peace process, makes their presence and activities trustable and fair. The blue helmets' high standards of conduct and restraint in using force contribute to the acceptance of their presence. Equally relevant, the correspondence between the mission's objectives and the genuine wishes of the host country's population, along with the mission's efficiency in fulfilling the mandated tasks, ensure credibility in the eyes of the local public and legitimise the PKO's *modus operandi*.

Finally, the cause of peace shall be highlighted as the most relevant aspect in legitimising the PKO and the use of force. The UN mission and its appropriate actions are legitimate because the objectives of achieving and maintaining peace, as well as supporting and protecting vulnerable people are good, desirable and widely recognised.

Risky task in robust PKO

Tasks that subject or are likely to subject the blue helmets to hostile, violent acts, such as adverse fire and mines' hazards and improvised explosive devices.

2. ETHICS ISSUES

a. The contribution to the research is voluntary, which is implied by returning answers to the asked questions. In face-to-face or Skype (WhatsApp) interviews, responses will be

recorded in audio unless the interviewee does not authorise the recording. The interviewee will be asked to sign a consent form in face-to-face interviews.

b. In case of responses deemed adequate for transcription in the dissertation, the excerpts will be presented to the interviewee so that he/she makes adjustments in the text, if necessary, and authorises the publication.

c. Interviewees and questionnaire respondents can choose to remain anonymous.

LEGITIMACY TO USE OF FORCE IN ROBUST PKO AND
ITS MOTIVATIONAL POWER TO COMPLY WITH RISKY TASKS

1. INTERVIEWEE'S PERSONAL DATA

- Name (optional): _____
- Rank: _____
- Period in the mission (mm/yy – mm/yy): _____
- Military unit you integrated in the mission: _____
- Position(s) or function(s) during the mission: _____

2. QUESTIONS

a. Concerning the concept of "Legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force in defence of the mandate", do you have any suggestions for repairs to be made or ideas to add?

b. How do **you** consider the peace mission in which you participate (participated) regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

(__) It is (was) legitimate (full legitimacy),

(__) It is (was) partially legitimate (partial legitimacy), or

(__) It is (was) illegitimate (no legitimacy).

Please justify your perception.

Question to troop commanders (battalion commander, company commander, platoon leader): In your opinion, how do **your subordinates**, for the most part, consider (considered) the peace mission regarding the use of force to fulfil mandated tasks?

(__) They considered it is (was) legitimate (full legitimacy)

(__) They considered it is (was) partially legitimate (partial legitimacy)

(__) They considered it is (was) illegitimate (no legitimacy)

Please justify this general perception of your subordinates.

c. To what extent does (did) the peace mission's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate **you** to carry out risky tasks?

(__) It motivates (motivated) a lot

(__) It motivates (motivated) little

(__) It demotivates (demotivated) little

(__) It demotivates (demotivated) a lot

(__) It is (was) indifferent

Question to troop commanders (battalion commander, company commander, platoon leader): In your opinion, to what extent does (did) the peace mission's level of legitimacy to use force in fulfilling the mandate motivate **your subordinates**, for the most part, to carry out risky tasks?

(__) It motivates (motivated) a lot

(__) It motivates (motivated) little

(__) It demotivates (demotivated) little

(__) It demotivates (demotivated) a lot

(__) It is (was) indifferent

(__) I don't know

d. On a scale of 1 (one) onwards, indicate, in order of priority (importance), the intensity with which the factors listed below motivate (motivated) **you** to carry out risky tasks during the peacekeeping mission. The number 1 (one) means "highest priority: motivates (motivated) intensely", and the highest number used means "lowest priority: motivates (motivated) very little". Leave blank the factors that do (did) not motivate you.

___ UN legitimacy to act for peace, even resorting to force when necessary.

___ High quality and efficiency of the unit's weapons, equipment and vehicles, which guaranteed protection and facilitated the fulfilment of the mission, and were superior to the opposing groups' weapons and equipment.

___ Sense that it was my duty.

___ Leadership of the immediate commander.

___ Unit's cohesion.

___ Willingness to represent my country well.

___ Another factor (indicate which): _____

___ Another factor (indicate which): _____

___ Another factor (indicate which): _____

Question to troop commanders (battalion commander, company commander, platoon leader): On a scale from 1 onwards, indicate, in order of priority (importance), the intensity with which, in your opinion, the factors listed below motivate (motivated) **your subordinates**, in their most part, to carry out risky tasks during the peacekeeping

mission. The number 1 (one) means "highest priority: motivates (motivated) intensely", and the highest number used means "lowest priority: motivates (motivated) very little". Leave blank the factors that, in your opinion, do (did) not motivate your subordinates.

___ UN legitimacy to act for peace, even resorting to force when necessary.

___ High quality and efficiency of the unit's weapons, equipment and vehicles, which guaranteed protection and facilitated the fulfilment of the mission, and were superior to the opposing groups' weapons and equipment.

___ Sense of duty.

___ Leadership

___ cohesion

___ Willingness to represent our country well.

___ Another factor (indicate which): _____

___ Another factor (indicate which): _____

___ Another factor (indicate which): _____

e. The definition of "legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission to use force in defence of the mandate", presented on page 1, may be divided into some basic aspects, namely:

- Legal basis for the UN to use force;

- Consent of the host country with the presence of the peace mission;

- Perception by the local population that the mission is beneficial; and

- The noble cause of peace and support for populations in need and at risk.

Please, answer the questions below if they apply to you:

1) Among these four aspects, which one most served to motivate you to perform risky tasks?

_____

Why?

2) Which aspect do you list second in importance as a motivator for fulfilling risky tasks?

_____

Why?

f. Do you want to make additional comments on the subjects covered?

Thank you!