



University of Brasilia - UnB
Institute of International Relations
Concentration Area: International and Comparative Politics

Natália Bandeira Ramos Coelho

**NEITHER *VERTICAL* NOR *HORIZONTAL*:
THE US AND BRAZILIAN FOOD SECURITY
COOPERATION IN AFRICA**

Brasilia, 2020



University of Brasilia - UnB
Institute of International Relations

Natália Bandeira Ramos Coelho

NEITHER *VERTICAL* NOR *HORIZONTAL*:
THE US AND BRAZILIAN FOOD SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

PhD Dissertation submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of International Relations in the line of research on International and Comparative Politics from the Graduate Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasilia.

Supervisors:
Professor Dr. Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue
Professor Dr. Eduardo Viola

Natália Bandeira Ramos Coelho

NEITHER *VERTICAL* NOR *HORIZONTAL*:
THE US AND BRAZILIAN FOOD SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

PhD Dissertation submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of International Relations in the line of research on International and Comparative Politics from the Graduate Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasilia.

Supervisors:
Professor Dr. Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue
Professor Dr. Eduardo Viola

Examination Board:

Professor Dr. Cristina Yumie Aoki Inoue (supervisor)

Professor Dr. Ana Flávia Granja e Barros (internal member – IREL/UnB)

Professor Dr. Iara Costa Leite (external member – UFSC)

Professor Dr. Eitii Sato (internal member – IREL/UnB)

Professor Dr Maria Helena de Castro Santos (surrogate member – IREL/UnB)

*To my mother, whose braveness inspired me to go further;
To my father, whose example showed me true love for knowledge;
To my dear husband, who loved and supported me every step of the way.*

Acknowledgements

I want to start by thanking my husband, Eugenio Garcia, for his invaluable contribution in all areas of my life. He makes me happier beyond I believed possible. He is my ever-new breeze of fresh air. My main inspiration and the person I love and admire the most. Marriage is an understatement of what we share. He is much more than my spouse. He is my joy, best friend, my beloved companion who I wish to have by my side until my last breath. Infinite gratitude to him and his blessed children, Mila and Benjamin, who I love so dearly and make me and us so much happier and fulfilled.

I want to acknowledge and thank my parents. Both my mother, Lourdes Bandeira, and my father, Paulo Coelho, are professors at the University of Brasilia. Their examples influenced my academic life and my choice to pursue a scholarly path. My mother is a model of competence and integrity and my father is so passionate about teaching, especially on Buddhism, that they enchanted their students for generations. To the other members of my family, my dear grandmother Cecilia Bandeira, who is 93 and counting. To my brothers, Felipe, and Matheus, to my aunts, Leda, Lucia, Lorena and my uncle Cezar, thank you for your support and affection throughout my life.

My advisors, Professors Cristina Inoue and Eduardo Viola, deserve a very special thanks. The generosity with which they welcomed me and my ideas allowed me to grow so much as a person and an academic. Always considerate and truthful, they gave me space to develop my own perceptions and nurtured in me an admirer and friend. Their valuable guidance will serve me all my life.

I would like to thank also Professor Deborah Brautigam and Professor Eric Silla for accepting me as a visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Affairs (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. The year I attended the SAIS courses in Washington, DC, was crucial to deepen my understanding of US policies in general, and of US foreign aid to Africa in particular. I would also like to acknowledge the professors from the Institute of International Relations of the University of Brasilia. Their valuable teachings helped my education as a professional, as a Brazilian, and as a human being aware of the complexities of the world around me.

Abstract

This research focuses on US and Brazilian international cooperation regarding food security. The study takes into account, as a starting point, the traditional division into ‘North-South’ and ‘South-South’ to verify how international cooperation varies according to the donor and which elements remain similar. The research aims to investigate the distinctive approaches of the United States and Brazil to offer aid and assess if there are notable differences in terms of perception or effectiveness in improving food security. International assistance provided by the US and other developed countries has been claimed to differ from *horizontal* cooperation among developing nations, which is supposedly not conditional and said to bring about better results. However, the increasing complexity of international and domestic realities, as well as the efforts to bring convergence in foreign aid practices, are turning outdated these divisions between *horizontal* and *vertical* approaches.

This Dissertation uses a comparative analysis to scrutinize US and Brazilian international cooperation practices in food security through five main variables: budget, institutions, laws, discourse and impact. These variables will allow us to estimate what is the real importance of aid provided in this area, how it is done, by which institutions, under which legal framework, and how it is presented and justified by official sources. Finally, a broad survey will show how aid donors are perceived in their main African beneficiaries. Mapping the perception of the main recipients in relation to their donors will help to consider if the Brazilian *horizontal* approach is met with a more positive review than the traditional *vertical* assistance given by the US.

This Dissertation comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 builds the theoretical background for the Dissertation and present the methodological framework for the cases studied and the comparison of the North-South and South-South cooperation. Chapter 2 assesses the US participation in the global aid regime in the field of agriculture and food security. Chapter 3 analyses the Brazilian international cooperation in the same area. Chapter 4 establishes a comparison among the cases presented and provides an assessment of how the main beneficiaries view the assistance received. Finally, the conclusion draws final observations on aid practices, as well as recommendations to improve aid policy and make these initiatives more effective.

Key-words: United States, Brazil, foreign aid, international assistance, international cooperation, food security, Africa

Table of Contents

Dedication	vii
Acknowledgments.....	ix
Abstract.....	xi
List of Tables	xv
List of Figures	xvii
List of acronyms	xix
Introduction.....	1
Food Security Background.....	5
The Case Studies.....	8
Timeframe.....	12
Chapter 1. Theoretical, conceptual and methodological references.....	13
1.1. Discussion on Definitions of International Cooperation.....	20
1.2. Methodology.....	30
Chapter 2. The United States’ International Assistance.....	39
2.1. Africa in US Foreign Policy.....	42
2.2. US Foreign Aid Legislation.....	44
2.2.1. Section 416(b) Program.....	45
2.2.2. Food for Peace (FFP)	46
2.2.3. Food for Progress (FFPr)	49
2.2.4. McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program (MGD Program)	50
2.2.5. Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) Projects.....	51
2.2.6. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT).....	53
2.2.7. The Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP).....	53
2.2.8. Feed the Future (FTF).....	55
2.3. Organizational Framework.....	58
2.3.1. Department of State.....	59
2.3.2. United States Agency for International Development (USAID).....	59
2.3.3. US Department of Agriculture (USDA).....	63
2.3.4. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).....	65
2.3.5. Department of Defense (DoD).....	69
2.4. Assessing Aid Outlays.....	72
2.5. Presidential Diplomacy.....	77
2.6. The Ethiopian Example.....	86
2.6.1. Background of Ethiopian Agricultural Policies.....	88
2.6.2. The US aid in Ethiopia.....	92
2.6.3. USDA’s Presence in Ethiopia.....	94
2.6.4. USAID Programs in Ethiopia.....	97
2.7. Final Considerations.....	99
Chapter 3. Brazil’s International Cooperation.....	103
3.1. Historical Background of Brazil’s Food Security Policy.....	104
3.2. Measuring Resources.....	108
3.3. Legal Framework.....	111
3.4. Organizational Dimension.....	117
3.4.1. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)	118
3.4.2 The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa).....	121

3.4.3. The General-Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger (CGFOME).....	123
3.4.4. The International Center for Policies of Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG).....	125
3.4.5. The IBSA Fund.....	126
3.4.6. The Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI)...	126
3.5. Diplomacy and Discourse.....	127
3.6. The Mozambican Example.....	132
3.6.1. ProSavana Program.....	133
3.6.2. More Food International.....	138
3.6.3. Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa).....	140
3.7. Final Considerations.....	141
Chapter 4. Comparing Aid: the Brazilian and US Approaches.....	147
4.1. Comparing Aid Outlays.....	156
4.2. Comparing Institutions.....	160
4.3. Comparing Legislations.....	163
4.4. Comparing Presidential Diplomacy and Discourse.....	165
4.5. Comparing Results and Impacts.....	167
4.6. Comparing Perceptions.....	175
4.6.1. Brief Background on Chinese Foreign Aid.....	175
4.6.2. Survey Results.....	177
Conclusion.....	187
Final Considerations on Aid.....	190
Policy Recommendations.....	192
Bibliography.....	199
List of Annexes.....	241
Annex I. People contacted and interviewed for this Dissertation.....	241
Annex II. Decree n° 807 of April 22 nd , 1993.....	244
Annex III. Law Project 737/2007.....	246
Annex IV. Memorandum No. 32. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Republic, Brasilia, February 6, 2007.....	247
Annex V. Law N. 12.429 of June 20 th , 2011.....	248
Annex VI. Transcript of the announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma.....	250
Annex VII. Article ‘Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.’ Economist, 17 July 2010, p. 52+. The Economist Historical Archive.....	252
Annex VIII. Share of FAT resources without BNDES financing from 1995 to 2017, as percentage of total BNDES disbursements.....	254
Annex IX. Survey on Ethiopia’s Foreign Aid Perception.....	255
Annex X. Survey on Mozambique’s Foreign Aid Perception.....	265
Annex XI. Additional Charts on Mozambique’s and Ethiopia’s Perception on Food Security Aid.....	275
Annex XII. Photos from events and meetings attended.....	278

List of Tables

- Table 1.1. Federal government expenditures with international technical cooperation by federal agency (2011-2013) in BRL
- Table 1.2. ODA, IDC and US aid definitions and characteristics
- Table 1.3. Questions per beneficiary country
- Table 1.4. Quantifying perceptions
- Table 2.1. US Government outlays for programs related to international food security in million USD
- Table 3.1. ABC's Budgetary Variation during president Lula's first term
- Table 4.1. Federal government expenditures with regular contributions payments (2011-2013) in BRL
- Table 4.2. US Aid Objectives and Program Areas (planned allocations in millions of current dollars)
- Table 4.3. Brazilian government expenditures with international development cooperation (IDC) 2005-2013 (USD)
- Table 4.4. Brazilian government expenditures with international technical cooperation by region (2005-2016) in current reais
- Table 4.5. US GDP and Foreign Aid (current USD)
- Table 4.6. Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and International Development Cooperation (IDC) in current reais
- Table 4.7. Ten Major Exporters of Agricultural Products: Share of Total Export Value, 2016 and 2000
- Table 4.8. Perception Index on Food Availability by country
- Table 4.9. Perception Index on Food Stocks by country
- Table 4.10. Perception Index on Nutritional Value by country
- Table 4.11. Overall Perception Index by country

List of Figures

- Figure 2.1. US Foreign Assistance in billions (in constant 2017 US dollars)
- Figure 2.2. United States ODA in USD billion
- Figure 2.3. Breakdown of ODA in 2010-16 and distribution of multilateral and multi-bi ODA in 2016, gross disbursements, United States
- Figure 2.4. US ODA in Billion USD, 2015 constant prices, and as a share of GNI
- Figure 2.5. Food-for-Work and related project types in Ethiopia
- Figure 2.6. Disbursements to Ethiopian programs made by US government in million dollars (2013 constant)
- Figure 2.7. Preparation of school feeding ration
- Figure 2.8. Students eating ration
- Figure 2.9. Food for Progress in Ethiopia (Disbursements in million USD)
- Figure 3.1. Quantitative of Cooperation Projects and Activities per Year
- Figure 4.1. Composition of US and Brazilian foreign aid by laterality
- Figure 4.2. Composition of US and Brazilian foreign aid according to respective official government categories
- Figure 4.3. US Aid by Type, 2016 Disbursements
- Figure 4.4. US bilateral ODA and Brazil IDC by region (2014-16)
- Figure 4.5. Regional Distribution of US Aid in 1995, 2005 and 2015
- Figure 4.6. US ODA and Brazil IDC in million dollars
- Figure 4.7. Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in million reais (current values) and IDC in percentage of GDP
- Figure 4.8 Perception on Food Availability Cross-Countries
- Figure 4.9. Perception on Food Stocks Cross-Countries
- Figure 4.10. Perceptions on the Nutritional value Cross-Countries
- Figure 4.11. Overall Perception Cross-Countries
- Figure 4.12. Mozambique's Overall Perception by Donor
- Figure 4.13. Ethiopia's Overall Perception by Donor

List of acronyms

- ABC:** the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Port. *Agência Brasileira de Cooperação*)
- ABIMAQ:** the Brazilian Machinery Builders' Association (Port. *Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Máquinas e Equipamentos*)
- ACDI/VOCA:** Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance
- ADLI:** Agriculture Development Led Industrialization
- ANFAVEA:** the Brazilian National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Port. *Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores*)
- ATER:** Brazilian technical assistance and agricultural extension (Port. *Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural*)
- ATDCs:** Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers
- BAPA:** Buenos Aires Plan of Action
- BEHT:** The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust
- BNDES:** Brazilian Development Bank (Port. *Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social*)
- BRICS:** Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
- CAADP:** Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
- CCC:** USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation
- CFW:** cash-for-work
- CGFOME:** General-Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- CNAT:** the Brazilian National Technical Assistance Commission (Port. *Comissão Nacional de Assistência Técnica*)
- CONSEA:** Brazilian National Council for Food Security (Port. *Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar*)
- COBRADI:** Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (Port. *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional*)
- CPLP:** Community of Portuguese Language (Port. *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*)
- CRS:** Catholic Relief Services
- DAC:** Development Assistance Committee
- DFAPs:** Development Food Assistance Programs
- DINTE:** Directorate of Studies and Economic Relations and International Policies of IPEA
- DoD:** US Department of Defense
- DSCA:** DoD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- EFSP:** the USAID Emergency Food Security Program
- Embrapa:** Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Port. *Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária*)
- EFSP:** the USDA's Emergency Food Security Program
- ERP:** Ethiopia's Economic Reform Program
- EU:** European Union
- FAO:** Food and Agriculture Organization
- FAT:** Workers' Assistance Fund (Port. *Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador*)
- FAS:** the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service
- FDI:** Foreign direct investment
- FEED:** Feed Enhancement for Ethiopian Development project

FFP: Food for Peace
FFPr: Food for Progress
FFW: Food for Work
FH/E: Food for the Hungry Ethiopia
FNDE: National Fund for Educational Development (Port. *Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação*)
FPA: Brazilian Parliamentary Front of Agriculture (Port. *Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária*)
FtF: US Feed the Future Program
F2F: Farmer-to-Farmer Program
FY: Fiscal Year
GAFSP: Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GFSA: Global Food Security Act of 2016
GNI: Gross National Income
GTI-AHI: Brazilian Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Humanitarian Assistance
GTP: Growth and Transformation Plan
HLPE: High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
IBSA: India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
IDC: International Development Cooperation
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMF: International Monetary Fund
INAN: Brazilian National Institute of Food and Nutrition (Port. *Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição*)
IOs: International Organizations
IPEA: Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (Port. *Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada*)
JICA: the Japanese Agency for Cooperation International
KHG: Catholic Student Community
LFSI: L’Aquila Food Security Initiative
LOSAN: Law for Food and Nutritional Security
LRP: local and regional procurement
MAPA: the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (Port. *Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento*)
MCA: Millennium Challenge Account
MCC: the Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDA: Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development (Port. *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário*)
MEC: the Brazilian Ministry of Education (Port.
MESA: the Brazilian Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security and the Fight against Hunger (Port. *Ministério Extraordinário de Segurança Alimentar e Combate à Fome*)
MGD: McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
MOFCOM: the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
MoFED: Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MRE: Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Port. *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*)
MTIC: Ministry of Labor, Industry and Trade (Port. *Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio*)

MP: Provisional Measure (Port. *Medida Provisória*)
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
NIEO: New International Economic Order
NSS: US National Security Strategy
ODA: Official Development Assistance
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHDACA: DoD's Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action account
PAA: the Brazilian Food Acquisition Program (Port. *Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos*)
PALOP: Portuguese-speaking African countries (Port. *Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa*)
PASDEP: Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PMA: More Food Program (Port. *Programa Mais Alimentos*)
PNAE: the Brazilian National School Feeding Program (Port. *Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar - PNAE*)
PNPD: Brazilian National Development Program at DINTE, IPEA
PNS: Brazilian Health Nutrition Program (Port. *Programa de Nutrição e Saúde*)
PNSAN: Brazilian National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (Port. *Política Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional*)
Prodecer: the Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados' Development (Port. *Programa de Cooperação Nipo-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento dos Cerrados*)
PRONAF: National Program of Strengthening of Family Agriculture (Port. *Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar*)
ProSavana: Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique
PPD: US Presidential Policy Directive
PPP: Purchasing Power Parity
PRC: the People's Republic of China
PSNP: Productive Safety Net Program
PT: Workers' Party (Port. *Partido dos Trabalhadores*)
PVOs: Private Voluntary Organizations
REST: Relief Society of Tigray
SCI: Save the Children International
SDPRP: Ethiopia's Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program
SEPLAN/PR: Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic (Port. *Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República*)
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
SSC: South-South Cooperation
SUBIN: Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation (Port. *Sub-Secretaria para Cooperação Internacional Técnica e Econômica*)
UN: United Nations
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
USA: United States of America
USAID: US Agency for International Development
USDA: the US Department of Agriculture's
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP: World Food Program

WHO: World Health Organization

Introduction

The League of Nations is often seen as the starting point of modern-day international cooperation¹. In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference stressed the importance of accepting certain rules and obligations for fostering cooperation and understanding among states. Similarly, the United Nations (UN) Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, lists it as a key objective in Chapter I, Article 1, that one of the purposes of the UN is to foster international cooperation to resolve international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian nature, and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinctions of any kind.

Until that time, though, ‘international cooperation’ referred to the general disposition of nations to have amicable relations instead of conflictive ones. With a few humanitarian exceptions in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, the concept of ‘cooperation’ as a synonym for foreign aid was almost nonexistent.

(...) the gift of public resources from one government to another (or to an international organization or nongovernmental organization), sizable and sustained over time, an important purpose of which was to help improve the human condition in countries receiving the aid, was unheard of—even unimagined—in policy circles or by the public. (Lancaster, 2008: p. 5)

Therefore, international cooperation in this Dissertation is used to refer to the phenomenon of external aid or international development cooperation, not in the broad sense used by liberal institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane (2005, 1988) and Joseph Nye (1986). However, even when referring to international cooperation as foreign aid, there is no consensually agreed definition. China usually calls it ‘aid’, the USA uses ‘assistance’ and Brazil prefers the term ‘cooperation’. These nomenclatures are neither neutral nor empty of meaning. As the research showed, they revealed much about the donor’s or partner’s ideology and intentions, but, above all, they are indicators of the restructuring that is taking

¹ There is no universally agreed nomenclature to refer to foreign aid. While OCDE members call it Official Development Assistance (ODA), Brazil uses International Development Cooperation (IDC). These nomenclatures are neither neutral nor empty of meaning. They reveal much about the donor’s or partner’s ideology and intentions. The distinctions in what these concepts includes will be scrutinized throughout the Dissertation, but when referring to the phenomenon in general, these terms will be used interchangeably.

place in the global aid system. Although the specificness of each concept is explained later on, the terms ‘foreign aid’, ‘international assistance’ and ‘international cooperation’ are used interchangeably, as they all describe, despite particularities, the object of study of this Dissertation. Here, these terms will be used interchangeably to describe and explain the initiatives.

The concept of international development assistance started to take shape after World War II, with the Marshall Plan. From its beginning, US assistance was tied to purchasing US goods, leading to the perception that aid was always conditional and self-interested. The Cold War is considered a main factor which contributed to the emergence and development of foreign aid programs, as it motivated the United States, the largest net aid donor, to proactively engage in providing international assistance as part of its strategy of communist containment.

In 1969, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in an attempt to better track/measure resource flows to developing countries from its member-states, coined the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA). This is defined as ‘government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, excluding loans and credits for military purposes’ OECD (2020). The concept of ODA has been updated and used since then in assessments of aid given by DAC member-states.

While aid began as initiative of developed nations, by the late 20th century, it had become a generalized practice in relations among states, independently of their level of development (Lancaster, 2008: p. 5). This process of expansion of international assistance began with Afro-Asian decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. In 1955, the Bandung Conference, which brought together 23 countries from Asia and 6 from Africa, is considered a milestone in the process of awakening the so-called ‘Third World’ to partnerships without the involvement of European states or the hegemonic powers of the Cold War. The promotion of cooperation was one of the principles expressed in the Conference’s final *communiqué*, which established the basis of ‘solidarity of the people of the South’ (UNDP, 2013).

In 1978, the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries was held, resulting in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing

Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (PABA). It was in this plan that the concept of "horizontal cooperation" would be coined, which advocated "the sharing of information and technical expertise among developing countries in areas such as health, education and agriculture" (Leite, 2011: p. 71). The concept has been constantly reaffirmed in developing countries official discourse, which emphasizes that the horizontal approach should be 'without any kind of domination or hidden interest' (Goulet and Sabourin, 2012: 20).

In the 1980s, the establishment of the Global System of Preferences among Developing Countries (SGPC), proposed at the G-77 ministerial meeting in Brasilia and concluded in Belgrade in 1988 with the participation of over 40 countries, was a successful outcome of South-South cooperation at a time of unfavorable international conjuncture. The MNA, the UNCTAD, the SGPC and other alliances between developing states and international organizations were instrumental in expanding the reach of South-South cooperation and making it more effective. By holding regular discussion meetings, expanding contact channels, and offering information, they provided, especially to poorer countries, ways of overcoming social, economic, and political vulnerabilities (Ramos, 2006).

In this way, South-South cooperation emerged in opposition to the traditional framework of cooperation between North and South, which has often been seen as a method for opening up recipient countries to the economic ambitions of more developed nations. Thus, these new partnerships were based on humanitarian values, governmental rhetoric, and political justifications different from those of the previous approach. Since then, the global aid system has been going through a process of restructuration. The inclusion of rising powers and new approaches to aid changed considerably the international development cooperation scene, bringing about new concepts and South-South cooperation to the core of the international development debate.

In Africa, while traditional donors remained responsible for an integral part of aid flows, new donors emerged as an alternative to conventional *vertical* Western sources of international financing. After achieving their independence, despite being free of overt political domination, neocolonialist practices remained widespread in many African countries by means of more subtle and multilayered economic exploitation through commercial and

financial ties with the United States and former European colonial powers. Therefore, the *horizontal* and unconditional aid offered by emerging countries presented something that Africans had formerly been denied: the right to self-determination in relation to their own development paths (Cook, 2012: p. 92).

A set of favorable conditions enabled the intensification of these emerging powers' engagement in Africa and the development of joint cooperation initiatives. First, this expansion coincided with the recovering of most economies in Africa, following a long period of economic stagnation, caused by a persistent debt crisis, lack of investment, depressed commodity prices, droughts and climate hardship, and protracted conflicts. These countries went through an extended period of neoliberal economic restructuring, which made room for investment, stimulating the economy and creating business opportunities for international capital, while at the same time restricting the role of the state and often undermining local businesses. Governments and elites also played into the dynamics of development cooperation in Africa, by using investment as a tool to build up their commercial and political interests, occasionally resorting to corruption to do so (Scoones *et al.*, 2016).

Moreover, the 2008 global economic and financial crisis created a greater need to find new destinations for investments by unattached capital, increasing agricultural commodity prices and boosting demand for assets, especially land. Investments by a range of foreign companies went to Africa, often closely linked to emerging countries' governments, in what some called a 'global land rush'. Thus, the mid-2000s accentuated a tendency of concentrated interest in agricultural investments in Africa, in which Brazil, along with many other investors, was also involved. After the global crisis subsided, the heat of the land rush receded too. Many investors woke up to the difficulties involved in establishing large land concessions in remote parts of Africa. Nonetheless, part of the legacy of the period persisted, with new ventures and partnerships that permanently changed the African aid scenario (Scoones *et al.*, 2016).

In the US case, its model for economic engagement with Africa has often appeared one-sided, with US-driven neoliberal strategies being criticized for giving signs of neocolonialism or even for representing a 'neocolonial model'. US-Africa relations were (and to some extent still are) characterized by an unbalanced trade relationship, narrow investment portfolio,

profound inequalities, and numerous examples of political meddling and military intervention. However, the increased focus of the United States on humanitarian actions and its advancements in human development and infant mortality led US presence to be seen at the end of the day more positively (Cook, 2012: p. 93).

Beyond this overview of the continent's prospects, each African country had different experiences and specific realities, thus the need to choose Ethiopia and Mozambique as concrete examples of aid beneficiaries by the two donors analyzed, the United States and Brazil.

Food Security Background

Due to the large scope of foreign aid, this research focused on policies and programs in the area of food security. Initial elaborations on the concept of food security echoed the strategic-military concern of the World Wars that a country's inability to provide food to its population made it vulnerable to foreign dominance. In 1974, at the first World Food Conference of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the understanding that countries needed to increase their self-sufficiency in food supply was reinforced due to successive crop failures and climatic problems, particularly in Africa, which led to an international food supply crisis. At that time, food insecurity was understood as simply a measure of food availability.

In the following decades, there was a gradual realization that despite substantial increases in food supply fostered by the Green Revolution, relevant populations of developing countries remained unable to access food. Amartya Sen summarized this in *Poverty and Famines* by stating that starvation is not the condition of there not being enough food, but of **some people** not having enough food (Sen, 1981; Ashley, 2016:1). This led to an expanded version of food security, adopted by FAO's report *The State of Food Insecurity in the World of 2001*: 'Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life' (FAO, 2002).

This definition comprises three key aspects: food availability, economic accessibility and adequate nutrition. Thus, for cooperation initiatives to effectively reduce food insecurity, they must improve at least one of those three interrelated elements. There are several

challenges when measuring food security, with approaches ranging from household surveys to proxy indicators. This research focused on data from national level², such as gross household production and purchases, food stocks, and agricultural productivity.

Increasingly, food security is drawing the attention of scholars, politicians and practitioners alike. Abundant literature addresses its multidimensional and interdisciplinary nature, which involves issues such as climate change, national security, humanitarian assistance, trade, development, and agriculture, among others (Mergos and Papanastassiou, 2017; Ashley, 2016; Anderson, 2016). As Juma Calestous stated, the perception that agriculture is ‘just a steppingstone in linear stages of economic development no longer holds true. Future strategies for economic inclusion and sustainability demand a systems approach in which agriculture will remain important’ (Juma, 2015:x).

Despite collective progress in global food security that led the world to be closer than ever before to ending hunger, undernourishment, and extreme poverty at a planetary level, significant challenges remain. FAO estimates that about 795 million people of the 7.3 billion people in the world (in other words, one in nine) were suffering from chronic undernourishment in 2014-2016 (FAO, 2017a). The African continent witnessed a reduction in the proportion of its undernourished population, which went from 27.6 percent in the early 1990s to 20 percent in 2014-16. However, in absolute terms, the number of people undernourished increased by around 50 million (FAO, 2017b).

Throughout the last century, the global aid regime tried to address the issue of hunger and undernourishment, though with limited success (Akonor, 2008; Andrews, 2009; Lancaster, 2008; Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Over the last decades, scholarly and policy circles have identified ‘emerging donors’ as one source of important quantitative shifts in international assistance flows (Manning, 2006). The dynamism of South–South cooperation emerged as a result of structural transformations in the international system, associated with clear rebalances in the distribution of economic and political power at the international level in the last three decades (Santander and Alonso,

² For more information on the methods and difficulties to correctly assess food security gains that matter, see John Ashley (2016).

2018: p. 1925).

There has been an increase in the relative economic weight of the South in relation to the North. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007, the economies of emerging and developing countries surpassed the share of advanced economies in the global gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2018, emerging and developing countries contributed to more than 59%, while the advanced nations' contribution was 40% (IMF, 2019). These changes affected the distribution of global production, trade, investment and aid.

The rise of developing countries as non-DAC donors brought about hope that food insecurity would be tackled more effectively, since one of the features of these countries' new role is found in their attempt to establish a paradigm for international aid that is different from the established donors, by questioning some of the foundational terms and challenging the dominant aid discourse of vertical cooperation (Modi and Cheru, 2013). However, it is still unclear whether this rise means a clear departure from past practices, or if similar interests, goals and practices are being pursued, disguised as solidarity (Stolte, 2015; Stolte, 2012). In this sense, this research aimed to examine these ambiguities and uncertainties.

Although there is a burgeoning literature about international aid to Africa, emerging and traditional donors included (Dias, 2018; Brautigam, 2015; Rotberg, 2013; Amanor, 2013; Shambaugh, 2013; Chin and Quadir, 2012; Kragelund, 2011; De Haan, 2011; Brautigam, 2009; Rotberg 2009; Taylor, 2009; Riddell, 2008; Alden, 2008;), there is much yet to be done in terms of systematically and critically analyzing policies, motivations and objectives of aid providers in a comparative manner. As Perch and Bradley stated, 'South-South cooperation is, in many situations, largely unproven: the evidence base for its impact on reducing poverty still largely unwritten'(2012: p.3). This Dissertation aims to fill this gap by deepening our knowledge of the cooperation provided by two key agricultural powers (the US and Brazil), as they are three key agricultural powers and approach international cooperation distinctively.

The USA is a traditional Western donor of foreign aid: its projects have a history of financing several areas related to development with tied-end assistance. By contrast, Brazil, also a

major agriculture producer and exporter, only recently started to provide aid and its initiatives suffer from oscillations and discontinuities. This is exemplified by the gains of importance as an actor in the food security agenda during the 2000's, due to results in poverty reduction, and the following downsizing of its profile, due to political turmoil and economic stagnation.

To assess the influence of the United States and Brazil as development cooperation providers, this Dissertation aimed at delivering a deeper understanding of how these countries' foreign aid operated: their national dynamics needed to be unpacked by mapping institutions, legislation, discourse, funding and interests informing decision-making processes. These variables shaped not only their aid policies, priorities, practices and effectiveness, but also why they have taken certain shapes or paths including roads not taken (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: Summary).

The hypothesis that the differences between the foreign aid given by the United States and Brazil were more related to domestic factors and distinctive foreign policy goals was tested. The cases studied found that although *horizontal* and *vertical* intellectual constructs exerted some influence in policy decisions, especially in Brazil, neither countries strictly fall under these narrow categories, as both have acted out of parameters of what is considered South-South or North-South aid.

Historically, nonetheless, the *vertical* vs. *horizontal* divide did contribute to make different perspectives on foreign assistance explicit, which ultimately influenced and transformed the global development system as a whole. This is demonstrated by the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2012), which is considered a turning point in the international development system. The new equilibrium set in Busan attributed a greater role to non-traditional players, a welcomed approach that contributed to move forward the debate from aid to development cooperation, hence representing a synthesis of how South and North development paradigms can be able to converge (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 6).

The case studies

The US international development assistance took shape after World War II, with the plan to rebuild Europe's infrastructure and stabilize the region conceived by the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall. From its very beginning, US assistance was tied to buying US

goods and was part of a strategy to diminish Soviet influence in the region. The following key US initiative on international development was the Point Four Program launched by President Harry Truman in 1949. The program's goals clearly reflected US national interests: 'creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing production in developing countries; diminishing the threat of communism by helping countries prosper under capitalism' (USAID, 2018d).

Another factor that contributed to US initiatives being subject of criticism is its long-lasting practice of tying food aid to national producers. This approach was incorporated into legislation through Public Law 480 of 1954, which aimed to channel food surplus from the post-war period to developing nations. Later, the practice was reedited by the Food for Peace program of 1961, whose goal was to "increase the consumption of US agricultural commodities in foreign countries". Current US legislation still determines that food used for aid be produced in the US and shipped to recipient countries via US-owned modes of transportation. This food-aid policy gave rise to opposition from the international community and UN agencies, which increasingly advocated that food aid supplies should be purchased within affected countries, in order to support home-grown markets, eliminate shipping burdens, and lower the overall cost of food and environmental impact.

Despite improvements in recent years, the US aid system remains attached to these old habits, since proposals of reforming US food-aid policies usually face fierce opposition from US agricultural groups (Wraith, 2013). Ethiopia has been the largest African recipient of Official Development Assistance from the United States in the total net disbursements period of 2006-2015 (approximately 6.465 billion USD)³. Therefore, it was chosen to serve as an example and key model of US aid practices (OCDE, 2017: p. 76; OCDE, 2011: p. 66).

In relation to Brazil, the boom of commodity prices in the 2000s was met by the intensification of social programs and the integration of workers to the labor market, which boosted employment rates and strongly expanded the lower middle class (De Negri and Cavalcanti, 2014). Since 1995 the minimum wage was increasing year after year well beyond

³ Sudan was ranked as second with 6.295 billion USD and Kenya in third with 6.139 billion USD. (OCDE, 2017; OCDE, 2011) Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2017-en-fr; http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2017-en-fr (accessed October 20, 2017).

the medium wage. These conditions helped Brazil to reduce the share of its population in poverty and to leave the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)'s map of hunger in 2014. Internationally, these social achievements enhanced Brazil's status on the world scene and increased its legitimacy as a global actor in this area. Public policies in the field of food security were important not only to boost Brazilian international prestige, but they also contributed to motivate significant growth in cooperation projects undertaken by the government.

Mozambique was selected as a concrete example of a beneficiary of Brazilian international cooperation in Africa due to its relevance to both Brazil's food aid and foreign policy more broadly. The country belongs to the group of Portuguese speaking countries (PALOP), which together accounted for 74% of the resources spent on technical cooperation in Africa in 2010 (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p. 5). Mozambique receives the largest proportion of Brazil's overseas agricultural aid and investment, consistently being placed as the main recipient of government's technical cooperation from 2005 to 2013⁴ (Ipea, 2013, Ipea, 2017; Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p.5; Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013: p. 57)

Furthermore, Mozambique was also chosen due to the importance of the Brazilian presence in the country with ProSavana, which polarized public opinion in that country and fostered transnational networks of civil society organizations against the program (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016). The international assistance given to Mozambique has spurred debates on agricultural cooperation not only within the involved governments but also within the international academic community (Cabral *et al.*, 2016: p. 55).

It is worth restating that this study is focused on the donors, their policies, actors, approaches, budget and political discourse. The analysis of the receivers was used as a subsidiary source of information to assess how the assistance was welcomed in a relevant beneficiary country, what were its impacts, how it was implemented, and if it actually helped on the ground. In order to do so, it was necessary to briefly overview the main historical, socio-economic and political characteristics of the receiving countries, as these factors influenced the donors' policies and practices.

⁴ In 2010, Mozambique was placed in 4th, after Haiti, Peru, São Tomé e Príncipe (Ipea, 2013). 

The objective was to analyze and compare cooperation initiatives in Africa in the field of food security since the middle 2000's. In doing so, I sought to answer these research questions:

- Do aid initiatives from Brazil, a non-DAC member, contribute more to underscore food security than DAC donors?
- What are the differences between aid provided by a high-income and a low/middle-income country?
- To which extent can international cooperation help decrease food insecurity in the African continent?
- Is *vertical* and *horizontal* assistance perceived differently by recipient countries?
- Is it possible to assess differences in effectiveness between vertical and horizontal approaches?

The goals of the research were:

- To map and scrutinize how foreign aid became a widely spread practice: its concepts, its importance as a foreign policy tool, its mention in official discourse, and its key players in the countries studied.
- To find similarities and variations in the approaches, methods and goals of the assistance.
- To evaluate if distinctive approaches were welcomed differently by African partners.
- To estimate to what extent international cooperation was seen as reducing food insecurity in recipient countries.
- To recommend policy improvements to enhance positive results in the global aid system.

This Dissertation tested the hypothesis that the dissimilarities between aid practices put forth by the US and Brazil were more related to internal pressures and limitations, as well as to distinctive foreign policy goals, rather than being influenced and dictated by *vertical* or *horizontal* intellectual constructs. In fact, the research showed that neither international cooperation actions taken by Brazil followed the rules of conduct of South-South cooperation (SSC) nor the US always acted within the dictates and parameters of what is considered North-South aid strictly speaking.

Timeframe

This research covers the period from the mid-2000s onwards, with an emphasis on the 2005-2015 years. The choice of this timeframe is justified by the growing importance of international cooperation in the foreign policy agenda of both Brazil and the US. A series of domestic and international events contributed to the increase of these countries' share in international aid flows.

In Brazil, food policy implemented under President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's government was the starting point of this research. During the 2000s, the boom of commodity prices, fostered by a large and rapidly expanding Chinese economy, led to more investments in agribusiness and increasing commercial revenues for agricultural exporters. This helped Brazil to reduce the share of its population in extreme poverty and boosted Brazilian exports. Consequently, in 2007, when President Lula started his second term, Brazil significantly expanded the budget and scope of international cooperation projects, especially in Africa (Amorim, 2010; Amorim, 2004; Cabral *et al.*, 2016; Cabral, and Shankland, 2013; Júnior, 2008; Gonzalez and Pereira, 2012; Saraiva, 2001).

As a traditional donor, the United States has been a key participant in the global aid regime for decades. In absolute terms, the US government has been one of the main sources of development assistance throughout the globe, and in particular in Africa. However, the mid-2000s also represented a turning point, with President George W. Bush's initiatives increasing US foreign aid from \$ 11 billion in 2002 to \$ 18 billion in 2006. These initiatives were quite unexpected from a conservative Republican, president whose party has shown long-standing antagonism toward foreign aid. To some, this signaled a reluctant acceptance that poverty (and US inaction or aloofness towards it) generates hostility and resentment towards the United States in disenfranchised regions, thus jeopardizing its national security (Radelet, 2003).

Chapter 1. Theoretical, conceptual and methodological references

This Dissertation works mainly with the concept of international cooperation and its various denominations, such as international development cooperation, foreign aid and international assistance. This concept emerged as an international practice in the second half of the twentieth century, as a real innovation introduced into the practice of foreign policy. International Relations' theories perceive international cooperation differently. For scholars who embrace realist thinking, aid is mostly a diplomatic instrument guided by self-interest and its impact on the beneficiary is of secondary concern. According to this perspective, countries operate in an anarchic environment and are guided mainly by self-preservation and national security interests. As a result, foreign aid is perceived as being only minimally related to the needs of recipient countries, whose economic and humanitarian needs are downplayed (Liska, 1960; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998). According to Morgenthau, foreign aid should be:

‘considered an integral part of the political policies of the giving country – which must be devised in view of the political conditions, and for its effects upon the political situation, in the receiving country. In this respect, a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation.’
(Morgenthau, 1962: p. 309)

A series of qualitative scholarly studies conducted in the 1970s and 80s were used to underpin the realist argument that foreign aid was a tool for enhancing national power and security by showing the national-interest motivations in the aid programs of individual countries, i.e. the US was motivated by the Cold War, the French by preserving its postcolonial influence in the African continent (Lancaster, 2008).

Marxist and dependency scholars perceive international assistance as an instrument of wealthy nations to control and exploit developing ones. These intellectuals point to many instances when foreign aid was tied to the export of goods and services or to secure access to raw materials (Rodney, 1973; Escobar, 1997).

By contrast, liberal internationalists and other liberal traditions in international relations understand foreign aid as a result of the need of states to cooperate in addressing problems of interdependence and globalization. Large amounts of aid have been directed to expand

international ‘public goods’, such as reducing greenhouse gases’ emissions and halting environmental degradation, among others (Lancaster, 2008).

Foreign aid has also been viewed through the prism of constructivism. Constructivism’s approach to social analysis deals with the role of human consciousness in social life and it argues that human interaction is also shaped by ideational, not just material, factors. Ideational factors and shared ‘intersubjective’ beliefs influence interests of actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001), in turn, influencing the foreign policy of states. A main proponent of this view in the literature on foreign aid is David Lumsdaine. In *Moral Vision and International Politics*, he argues that:

‘foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of the economic and political interests of the donor countries alone; the essential causes (of foreign aid) lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of donor countries and in their implicit belief that only on the basis of a just international order in which all states had a chance to do well was peace and prosperity possible.’ (Lumsdaine, 1993: p. 30)

All in all, none of these theories of international politics explain adequately the complexities of international cooperation, which is influenced by too many domestic and international interacting variables to allow the adoption of a single theory. Moreover, this research shares the perspective of professor Amado Cervo, elucidated in his book *Inserção Internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros*, which states that the universal explanatory scope of theories is limited, since they are linked to interests and values from the countries where they are elaborated and for which they are useful (Cervo, 2008: p. 8). Thus, this Dissertation draws from the framework of *analytic eclecticism* (Katzenstein and Sil, 2010), which argues that science has no absolute basis, thus one must allow more room for plural approaches. These scholars seek to raise the field of International Relations to that of pluralist science without resorting to a single epistemological foundation for knowledge:

The utility of this research program derives from it giving a place to researchers using a plurality of theories. It shows that problem-driven pragmatism is interesting, coherent, and most importantly, possible. This legitimizes research that transgresses and transcends paradigmatic lines, allowing for eclectic analyses using theoretical frameworks from different parts of the epistemological spectrum. (Cornut, 2015: p. 53)

In line with analytical eclecticism, our dialogue among diverse theories was guided by ‘integrative pluralism’, a tendency identified as one of the most promising ways to attune different paradigms and approaches in the area of International Relations. According to its proponents, ‘integrative pluralism accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more comprehensive and multidimensional accounts of complex phenomena’ (Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen and Colin Wight, 2013: p. 416).

In a somewhat similar view, Robert Keohane claims that it is not possible to achieve a general theory of international relations: ‘no general theory of international politics may be feasible. It makes sense to seek to develop cumulative verifiable knowledge, but we must understand that we can aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations rather than to discover universal laws, and that our understanding of world politics will always be incomplete’ (Keohane, 1988: p. 379).

Therefore, this study adopts several theoretical references which can guide us to the object of the analysis, namely international cooperation, its formulation and results. The analysis of the cooperative instances developed by the United States and Brazil demonstrated the mutual influence of both domestic and international factors in the construction of foreign policy and cooperation strategies. In this sense, a theoretical perspective that helped in the understanding of a country’s foreign aid is the ‘two level game’ of *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, by Putnam, Evans and Jacobson (1993). According to this approach:

At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent yet sovereign. (Putnam, Jacobson and Evans, 1993: p. 436)

An important outcome arising out of the studies in ‘two level game’ is developed by Helen Milner in *Interests, Institutions and Information*. The author starts from the premise that states are not unitary actors, but rather are composed of several actors with distinct preferences, which share power for themselves by means of decision-making processes.

Milner suggests that domestic politics is more influential than external factors in explaining cooperations. Her central argument is that cooperation is affected less by fears of other countries' relative gains or cheating than it is by the domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors (Milner, 1997: p. 9). Drawing from the denial of the state's premise as a unitary actor and the introduction of a myriad of stakeholders in the decision-making process, one of Milner's conclusions is that the chances of cooperation become more remote the more divided a government is, lowering the chances of more international cooperation.

In addition, this research recognizes that inter-state relations correspond only to a fraction of the overall phenomenon of international relations. The latter is composed of flows of information, goods, individuals, social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others. Transnational relations are characterized as interactions that cut across national boundaries and in which at least one of the actors is not a state or an international organization (OI). This is why subjects that were previously absent from traditional analyzes now emerge as important actors in the international cooperation arena. The theoretical contributions on transnational networks, such as Thomas Risse-Kappen's (1995) *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*, make it a valuable contribution to this research.

Another theoretical reference used in this study is the literature on the diffusion of policies. Maggetti and Gilardi define policy diffusion as 'the process by which policy choices in one unit are influenced by policy options in other units' (2013, p. 3). The diffusion of policies is also understood as 'the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system' (Rogers apud Lütz 2007: p. 132). In this way, the policy diffusion framework studies the dissemination of a certain political practice between autonomous but interdependent units.

It is possible to distinguish between a narrow concept and a broad concept of policy diffusion. In its *stricto sensu* (narrow) version, the diffusion occurs in a decentralized way, since it is characterized by the absence of a central governmental setting. However, the diffusion can also occur centrally and interstate, directly or through an international organization (Bender,

⁵ Here cooperation is being used in a broad, systemic sense - for instance, complying with the rules of an international regime or lowering trade tariffs – not as a synonym for foreign aid. Even so, the argument is valid for the latter sense as well.

Keller and Willing, 2014). Since South-South cooperation in the area of food security often helps recipient countries to develop regulatory and institutional frameworks similar to those of the donor country, it can be considered as a form of international diffusion of one's social policies.

In *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998), Finnemore and Sikkink analyze the stages of policy diffusion. The process begins with the emergence of norms at the internal level, through committed internal actors - norm entrepreneurs - which act on organizational platforms for the construction of these normative frameworks. After internal consolidation, the process of adhesion to this set of rules by other states begins until a certain moment - tipping point - is reached, triggering more countries to adopt new norms more rapidly, even without domestic pressure for such change. Empirical studies suggest that, at this point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or 'contagion' occurs in which international and transnational norm influences become more important than domestic politics for effecting norm change (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p 902).

Although it is not possible to predict exactly when the process of widespread adoption of a country's standards by the international community begins, the tipping point is an important indication of the broad acceptance of the standard, and it occurs when critical states adhere to them. For instance, in Brazil's case, its food security policies of the early 2000s were adopted by the UN World Food Program (WFP), which created a Center for Excellence in Combating Hunger in the Brazilian capital to spread its policies worldwide. Although famine problems mainly affect countries with scarce economic and social resources, even developed nations have shown interest in Brazil's hunger alleviation strategies. The Catholic Student Community (KHG) has set up a support committee for the Zero Hunger Program in Germany. In Italy, there is a parliamentary front in favor of the Zero Hunger. And in New York, an income transfer program, inspired by *Bolsa Família*, started implementation in 2015 (MDS, 2007).

Finally, as this Dissertation encompasses the analysis of international cooperation's results and impacts, theoretical contributions on aid effectiveness were needed. One key concern of these theories is the effects of foreign aid over local agricultural productivity. Since the seminal work of Theodore W. Schultz (1960), innumerable analyses have discussed this topic.

They showed that food aid's key potential adverse effect would be depressing local food crop prices, thus reducing the income of farmers. The economic explanation for this seemed simple: food aid from abroad increases supply, which *ceteris paribus* would cause prices to fall. However, the correlation is not as simple and direct as it seems. Empirical studies over the last decades have found it difficult to produce robust data showing this causality. Although current literature acknowledges that food aid can have adverse effects on food markets, this is rarely the case. When negative effects do occur, they are more related to programmatic failures in the projects' design and implementation, such as poor targeting, rather than to the provision of food itself (Margolies and Hoddinott, 2012; Yamano, 2000; Lentz, Barrett and Hoddinott, 2005). In the Ethiopian case in particular, food aid was not found to have a direct correlation with local prices (Kirwan and McMillan, 2007).

Another key study addresses the widespread claim that aid would generate long-term dependency. According to Margolies and Hoddinott (2012), there is no strong evidence that suggests that aid necessarily causes dependency. One argument presented against the aid dependency claim is that food transfers usually account for a small part of total household needs. Moreover, beneficiaries are often uncertain about who will receive assistance targeting, or if payments will be made regularly. Thus, food aid flows have been shown to be so unpredictable that household dependence would be unlikely simply because of erratic delivery and timing (Margolies and Hoddinott, 2012: p. 5).

The authors also debunk the argument that food aid creates disincentives for labor. Food aid programs are designed to avoid encouraging recipients to leave the labor market, by providing only small improvements to household assets. Confirming this assumption, data from rural Ethiopia revealed no empirical evidence of negative dependency effects; rather, it showed a potential positive effect on work supply (Margolies and Hoddinott, 2012: p. 4).

Adding to this discussion, a recent quantitative study ran a simulation of the effects of removing in-kind food aid in Ethiopia. The model ran two scenarios: one where food aid was simply eliminated and another where in-kind aid was replaced by cash-transfers. The results showed that the removal would generate demand stimulus for local agriculture, expanding the food producing sector by 2.2% in the former scenario where the aid was not replaced and by 4.5% in the latter scenario. In the first scenario, the food crops sector was the only

commodity group that experienced a positive impact, while most of the other sectors faced adverse effects. However, in the second scenario, when households receive cash transfers, all sectors were positively stimulated via inter-sectoral multiplier effects.

This phenomenon occurs because while the first scenario solely stimulates local supply (by removing the food aid), it does not boost demand, since former aid beneficiaries remain with severe budget constraints. On the other hand, in the second scenario, both demand and supply are stimulated, as the removal of in-kind aid boosts local supply, while cash-transfers increase budgets, thus creating greater demand. The only significant adverse effect the model found was a 'modest' deterioration in the external current account, since imports would tend to rise and exports to fall. The author concluded by stating that the results allowed a cautious policy recommendation in favor of cash transfers (Gelan, 2006: p. 436-458).

This result was reinforced by another quantitative study analyzing the correlation between types of food aid and food production in the recipient nation. Three delivery modes were scrutinized: in-kind transfers, local purchases (cash transfers), and triangular purchases (food aid bought in a third country). The study concluded that in-kind donations generally presented a negative correlation with local food production, whereas locally procured food aid had a positive association with food production. Finally, triangular purchase presented no clear linkage with agricultural production. Consequently, locally purchased food aid was recommended as the form of food aid with better chances of enhancing food security (Wolf, 2014).

All in all, empirical studies and project evaluations reinforce the conclusion and recommendation of the main international development agencies, which is the adoption of cash vouchers in local procurement projects as the most efficient and less risky way to provide aid. However, as it will be shown in the following Chapter, the pressure of US agricultural commodity producers, transportation companies and their representatives in Congress still prevent the US government from fully adopting this recommendation, being

the only OECD donor to still provide most of its assistance as in-kind donations⁶ (Riley, 2017: p. 479).

1.1. Discussion on the Definitions of International Cooperation

Not only foreign aid is one of the most widely used policy instruments of the international development community, but a very complex one. Its complexity stems from the dramatically different forms assistance is defined and take shape: it occurs in distinctive modalities, through numerous channels, including a multitude of actors (Mussa, 2010: p. 10; Margesson, 2013). Beyond these variations, countries adopt various concepts and methods to assess their aid. Comparing approaches from Southern and Northern countries that do not share the same metrics or designations can be challenging. As mentioned in the methodology section, five variables, or aspects, of US and Brazilian aid will be employed as guidelines for our comparison.

The US aid follows the standards set by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. These parameters include restrictions on what sort of loans and grants can be counted as Official Development Assistance (ODA) defined by the OECD as ‘government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. By contrast, as most donors from the geopolitical South, Brazil does not follow OECD’s guidelines for giving or assessing its foreign aid.

Rather than the result of difficulties in assembling and validating the data required to fulfill OECD metrics, Brazil’s refusal to follow ODA parameters is first and foremost a consequence of the limitations of the ODA concept to encompass initiatives carried out by the Brazilian government. The official designation adopted by Brazil which would be equivalent to that of ODA is the concept of International Development Cooperation (IDC). This metric allows for a much broader range of possibilities to be included as foreign aid,

⁶ The shift from tied to untied assistance began with the European Union in 1995, followed by Canada, Australia, and the individual European donor governments, which led that, by 2010, tied procurement had almost vanished, being almost entirely replaced by local procurement practices (Riley, 2017: p. 479).

since much of the assistance that Brazil provides to developing countries would not fall under the DAC's category of ODA.

The Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA)⁷ has been leading efforts to collect data on Brazil's South-South development cooperation. It periodically publishes reports from Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (Port. *Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional* - COBRADI), mapping outlays from over one hundred federal government's agencies and covering a period spanning from 2005 onwards. These reports were designed to make Brazil's contribution to international development more transparent to the public, advocating the need for a conceptual adjustment to understand the Brazilian role as an aid-provider and the new dynamics of international cooperation (Lima, Campos and Junior, 2014).

Insofar as Brazil's foreign aid efforts are neither assessed by the IMF, the IDB nor the OECD, thus COBRADI reports are the best available survey of Brazilian governmental cooperation practices and institutions. Its modalities and definitions will help guide the comparative analysis in this Chapter, even though its metrics do not necessarily reflect the governmental official position (Campos, Lima and Gonzalez, 2012; Leite, 2011). Other governmental institutions apply different frameworks to describe aid-related activities. Secondly, this Dissertation makes use of ABC's quantitative data, but that refers only to technical cooperation under the agency's management.

According to João Brígido Bezerra Lima, Planning and Research Technician at the Directorate of Studies and Economic Relations and International Policies (DINTE) at IPEA⁸, the creation of the IDC concept addressed the need to assess governmental disbursements of international assistance that are not characterized as transfers of financial resources under the conditions historically adopted by OECD donors. Bezerra Lima explained that the metric needed to be adapted to the Brazilian reality, a developing nation with scarce resources to finance international development, but willing to cooperate with Southern partners.

⁷ IPEA is a public autarchy of the Brazilian Federal government, linked to the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of the Presidency.

⁸ Phone interview granted on February 15, 2019.

To understand more precisely the dissimilarities between the aid provided by DAC donors and the Brazilian one, each part of the definition of ODA is analyzed, so that the respective distinctions regarding IDC come to the fore. As seen above, ODA is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. 'The OECD maintains a list of developing countries and territories; only aid to these countries counts as ODA.' This is not valid for Brazilian IDC activities, which are not restricted to any group of countries (IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 33). Brazil's cooperation portfolio even includes projects with developed countries, such as France, Germany, Italy and the United States, among others.

Resuming the definition of ODA: 'Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channeled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank.' Brazil has these categories of aid, bilateral and multilateral, but it also engages in trilateral cooperation, which are triangular partnerships with foreign governments and international organizations to assist a third nation. Usually, in triangular cooperation, Brazil acts in partnership with a developed country which is the one financing the aid, while Brazil provides mostly technical assistance.

It is easy to understand why Brazil welcomes triangular cooperation in its portfolio. As a country with little funding for foreign aid projects, partnering with a developed nation willing to bear most of the costs, Brazilian aid can go to countries otherwise out of reach. Brazil's leading partners in trilateral cooperation are as follows: Japan, the United States, Germany, France, Canada, Argentina and Spain. More recently, Australia and Belgium have indicated interest in working in partnership with the Brazilian government in the field of technical cooperation (IPEA and ABC, 2010). Brazil has made increasing commitments in this area because triangular cooperation allows the scale and impact of its aid to increase, since the efforts of two external partners are combined, optimizing the results (IPEA and ABC, 2010: p. 33).

Another dissimilarity between ODA and IDC, as far as the multilateral dimension of cooperation is concerned, highlights the differences in which contributions to international organizations are eligible for their official records. The OECD keeps a list of ODA-eligible international organizations and only contributions to those may be reported (in full or in part)

as multilateral ODA. According to Bezerra Lima from IPEA, this list is too limited, as it contains international organizations considered ‘exclusively from the North’ (IPEA and ABC, 2010: p.17). Brazil’s IDC, however, includes contributions to a broader range of international organizations, as it can be seen in the table below.

Table 1.1. Federal government expenditures with regular contributions payments (2011-2013) in BRL

Expenditures	2011	2012	2013	Total
Regular budget of the United Nations (UN)	63,362,513	74,428,005	82,251,512	220,042,031
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/Ministry of Health (MS)	12,412,463	12,626,366	24,242,901	49,281,730
World Health Organization (WHO)/MS	12,529,809	-	31,457,202	43,987,011
Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO)/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE)	698,074	740,771	39,801,703	41,240,548
Organization of American States (OAS)/MRE	10,653,559	15,583,115	9,757,010	35,993,685
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/MRE	3,158,374	7,765,637	7,621,025	18,545,037
Capital Master Plan UN – headquarters renovation	5,036,626	12,626,366	-	17,662,991
The United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)/MRE	3,787,548	4,421,747	8,769,124	16,978,419
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)/ Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (Mapa)	3,693,064	3,796,149	6,323,017	13,812,229
World Trade Organization (WTO)/MRE	3,942,241	3,969,088	5,836,360	13,747,689
Pan American Centre for Foot and Mouth Disease (Mapa)	4,243,949	4,383,773	4,893,295	13,521,016
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)/Mapa	1,969,701	2,096,521	2,194,169	6,260,391
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)/Ministry of Defense (MD)	1,106,581	1,419,189	2,210,976	4,736,746
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)/Ministry	-	2,062,447	2,053,637	4,116,084

of Communications (MC)				
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OEI)/Ministry of Education (MEC)		1,955,577	2,082,908	4,038,485
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL-France)/ Ministry of Justice (MJ)			1,657,674	1,651,674
Other contributions	81,291,335	61,546,333	248,966,095	391,803,762

Source: IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 159.

The last part of the definition of ODA acknowledges that aid should include grants, ‘soft’ loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and the provision of technical assistance. This also does not correspond to the IDC metric, which does not encompass the provision of loans. Brazilian resources offered as aid are totally non-refundable, that is, they have no expected return. This does not mean that Brazil does not provide loans to support international development, because in fact it does. But these are not taken into account and reported as IDC.

Brazil’s biggest financier for international development is the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), but surprisingly its loans are not included as IDC. IPEA was contacted to explain the reasons why international funding from BNDES to development programs were not taken into consideration for IDC metrics. The answer provided by Jose Romero Pereira Júnior, researcher of the National Development Program (PNPD) at DINTE / IPEA was the following:

With respect to the BNDES, IPEA, with the support of the IPC-IG and the French Development Agency (AFD), and in partnership with the Bank, carried out a recent study (still pending publication) on Bank practices in the area of financing infrastructure and services in foreign countries. Analyzing data referring to the last ten years, it was verified that the BNDES does not make international cooperation for development and does not practice ‘concessionality’ (either in the form of ODA or in others), since these are resources from the Workers’ Assistance Fund (Port. *Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador* - FAT), the Bank has a obligation to guarantee the profitability of the fund under its responsibility. Thus, the available data

do not include international development cooperation when analyzing the Bank's practice⁹.

Another explanation lies in the fact that BNDES international loans do not have a predetermined standardized interest rate, repayment schedule, or grace period. They are negotiated on a case-by-case basis, thus making it impossible to calculate the grant element of its loans (Baker, 2010). Another issue is that although directed to finance international development, these loans were granted to projects carried out mostly by Brazilian companies, such as Vale, Petrobras and Odebrecht.

Furthermore, Brazilian law does not have a regulatory framework authorizing the government to give public money to other governments or even establishing clear conditions to use public money in aid projects in foreign countries (The Economist, 2010: p. 52)¹⁰, which creates room for legal inadequacy, loopholes and opacity. In this sense, by restricting the scope of IDC and leaving out BNDES loans, the government reduces what it needs to be accountable for the general public regarding its foreign investments (Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 22).

Estimates on BNDES's development aid amount to 4 billion dollars per year from 2004 to 2010. This level of financing would be roughly similar to countries like Canada and Sweden (The Economist, 2010: p. 52). Even if these loans do not follow the specific metrics of ODA, they reach the same levels of other developing nations state-backed loans, such as China's. Moreover, in the same manner as other forms of foreign aid, they follow a logic of promoting the donor's national interests abroad, acting in practice as a soft power¹¹ tool. As a result, even if BNDES loans cannot be precisely assessed because of difficulties to gauge the specifics of loans and how they relate to international parameters, they need at least to be acknowledged as having a relevant participation in Brazil's role in the global aid system.

⁹ Translated by the author. Conversation by emails exchanged on March 2019.

¹⁰ Available at Annex VII: 'Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.' Economist, 17 July 2010, p. 52+. The Economist Historical Archive, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9AFda3>. Accessed 20 June 2019.

¹¹ Soft power is a concept put forth by Joseph Nye in the book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (1990)*. It refers to a country's ability to influence and co-opt others through appeal and attraction rather than by coercion and the use of hard power.

During the period studied, BNDES loans were instrumental to the internationalization of large Brazilian companies, helping to leverage the country in the international market, mainly in the areas of goods, services and engineering. According to former Minister Celso Amorim, lending money to African and Latin American countries was part of a larger strategy to gain increasing presence in these countries (Castro, 2017). The main problem with this strategy occurred in 2009, when Brazil was facing the consequences of the international economic crisis and the BNDES found a way to keep lending even without its traditional sources of supplies. Before 2009, funds for BNDES loans originated almost exclusively from taxes, especially the Workers' Assistance Fund (FAT), but after changes in the bank's regulations, they started to be financed through Treasury debts, leading to monetary inflation¹². This allowed BNDES loans to increase exponentially at a time when public debt was increasing. It is worth recalling that BNDES's total amount of credit operations in the financial system in 2008 was around 140 million reais, but, in 2013, it jumped to 550 million (Hermes, 2014).

Although international loans from national development banks are a common practice, some aspects of the Brazilian case raised concerns in the domestic and international public opinion. First, the choice of beneficiaries of the loans was criticized for being politically and ideologically motivated. Secondly, the loans were granted without enough studies on their viability and without proper assessment of risks of default. Thirdly, there was no effective guarantee method in case of default, and the Brazilian government would take the burden when default happened, such as in the cases of Mozambique and Venezuela (Rebello, 2018).

Moreover, international loans from the Brazilian development bank were usually destined to Brazilian companies to implement projects in receiving nations. These companies were found to be involved in large corruption schemes, such as those revealed by the Lava-Jato (Car Wash) Operation led by the Brazilian Federal Police. Finally, in addition to lack of transparency, critics argued that the financial contribution to international development made by BNDES was draining resources still very much necessary in Brazil, which had many economic weakness and bottlenecks, including poor infrastructure.

¹² This shift in BNDES funding sources can be visualized on Annex VIII.

In relation to loans provided by the US government, although accounted as ODA, they represent a very small part of US aid. Although loans represented 32% of total assistance between 1962 and 1988, this figure declined substantially from the mid-1980s onwards. By 2001, they began to represent less than 1% of total aid. This decrease in loan programs was a reaction to the debt crisis faced by developing countries, which led the United States to adopt measures to ensure that foreign aid would not add to the already existing debt burden of these nations. Currently almost all US financial assistance is provided as a grant rather than a loan (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: 28). All in all, the comparison between ODA and IDC show that, on the one hand, IDC may give the impression of Brazil's aid being greater than it actually is, since it includes contributions to more international organizations than ODA; on the other hand, it downplays the role of Brazil, as it does not comprise concessional loans, such as the ones from its national development bank.

In a recent report, the OECD assessed Brazil's development cooperation to find out that the official figures published by the Brazilian government accounted for significantly higher aid than ODA metrics would indicate. Based on IPEA's data, the OECD estimated what Brazil's ODA for 2012 and 2013 would be. To achieve a closer approximation of the actual value of ODA, the OECD took into consideration only expenses with activities in low and middle-income countries and contributions to multilateral agencies focused on promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries. In the case of a multilateral agency that does not work exclusively on developmental activities in developing countries, the respective percentage of these contributions was not considered. The OECD excluded bilateral peacekeeping activities (OECD, 2018: p. 450).

The values found were of 411 million dollars in 2012 and 316 million in 2013. Regarding the discrepancy between the two metrics, the IDC values for the same period were 513 million and 396 million respectively¹³ (as Table 1.1 shows), which means there was a difference of 102 million in 2012 and 80 million in 2013. While the OECD excluded items from IDC statistics, it also did not include the ones that were already missing, such as loans given out by BNDES. The OECD's report justifies this by arguing that DAC statistics are

¹³ Just to have an idea, ODA by the US was of 32 billion dollars for each year (OECD, 2020).

based on Brazil's official data. If that data excludes some activities that would be included as ODA, they will also be absent from OECD's estimates (OECD, 2018: p. 450).

Although the US government follows ODA's criteria, its reports and other official documents present their own concepts and definitions. For instance, the US has an official definition of foreign aid under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) that establishes aid as any tangible or intangible item provided by the US government to other countries or international organizations, including but not limited to trainings, services, technical advice, agricultural commodities, or money (§634(b)) (USA, 1961). The table below shows the particularities of each metric and definition.

Table 1.2. ODA, IDC and US aid definitions and characteristics

Aspect/criteria	ODA/OCDE	IDC/Brazil	Foreign aid/USA
Geographic distribution	Developing countries according to list kept by OECD	No restriction	No restriction
Aims/goals	Foster development and welfare	Contribute to international development, understood as the strengthening of groups or populations from other countries to improve their socio-economic conditions.	Promote five strategic objectives: Peace and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance.
Scope / modalities	grants, loans and technical assistance to aid programs	Technical assistance, food donations, financial resources invested in other countries,	Any tangible or intangible item, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real,

		foreign nationals and international organizations ¹⁴ . Excludes local procurement, and loans. total resources invested by the Brazilian federal government, in the government of other countries, nationals of other countries in Brazilian territory, or in international organizations with the purpose of contributing to international development	personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, US dollars, and any foreign currencies owned by the US government
Categories	Bilateral, multilateral, multi-bilateral	Bilateral, trilateral, plurilateral ¹⁵ and multilateral	Bilateral and multilateral (trilateral also – with Brazil)
Military aid	Excluded	Excluded	Included
Financial aid (debt relief, public loans)	Included	Excluded	Included

¹⁴ In none of the above cases, the Brazilian government has transferred resources from the Treasury to other countries. The sum represents the amounts recorded for the promotion of cooperation, such as daily expenses, tickets, technical staff hours, scholarships, research funding, food and medicine donations, and administrative and management expenses associated with logistics and the coordination of initiatives and projects. (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 270)

¹⁵ Plurilateral cooperation in COBRADI reports is referred as cooperation with ‘groups of countries’ (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 270).

Source: made by the author (OECD, 2018; IPEA and ABC, 2018; Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018)

Efforts have been made to unify and standardize concepts, as well as to integrate Brazil's and other emerging donors to the OECD data base. In December 2014, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) scheduled a meeting of Ministers in Paris to discuss a new definition for ODA. In August, in an article entitled 'The Future of the ODA Concept: The Political Dimensions of Seemingly Technical Discussion,' the possibility of a definition of ODA was proposed, which included cooperation actions beyond the scope of ODA, thus integrating the expansion of the international performance of countries such as Brazil and China (Lima, Campos and Junior, 2014).

The discussion on a new concept of ODA is timely, as changes in the international system point to a more active role for emerging countries, which are not all OECD members. To deny their weight in the dynamics of international cooperation for development is to disregard a wide range of actions that have taken place around the world, possibly hampering a more precise and comprehensive overview on the current dimensions of the field (Lima, Campos and Junior, 2014).

1.2. Methodology

This Dissertation made use of several methodological tools according to each step of the research. This work begins by outlining two study cases: the United States and Brazil. As noted above, these were chosen due to both countries being key agricultural powers, main food producers and exporters, while representing distinct approaches to international cooperation and foreign policy. The detailed theoretical-interpretative analysis of the actors and processes involved in foreign aid, provided by the cases studied, aimed to demonstrate how the aid policies of a flagship North-South donor and a key South-South partner were historically formulated and implemented.

The cases provided deep knowledge and evidence to international behavior in the area chosen. More precisely, it allowed to assess the role that a set of socio-political factors played in accounting for the different international cooperation models adopted in these two countries. To this end, intensive fieldwork was carried out, including the review of policies, laws, institutions and speeches, as well as conducting surveys and interviews with experts

and professionals associated with development cooperation policy management and decision-making for each country.

Therefore, this study relied heavily on the empirical side of the research undertaken. Despite having counted with the support of several theoretical frameworks, the cases and their comparison represent the core of this Dissertation. A common critic of the case approach is that it has a weaker foundation for generalization, since it delivers information about specific examples but not about general mechanisms, making it difficult to confirm or reject theories from case studies. However, this does not represent a hurdle to this work, as its goal was not to infer directly from case to theory. Rather, the resemblances and dissimilarities between the cases represented the research puzzle itself (Litta, 2011: p. 77).

The methodology for the first part of the Dissertation falls into the category of ‘interpretative case studies’, which ‘are selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in the formulation of general theory.’ Arend Lijphart argued that although these studies make explicit use of established theoretical propositions, generalization and theorization is applied with the aim of throwing light on the case, rather than improving generalizations or confirming theories (Lijphart, 1971: p. 692).

After laying down the foundation of the cases studied, this Dissertation proceeds to the comparative analysis between the two donors. The comparative method is considered one of the best suited to deal with *low number of cases* (the ‘small-N problem’). In its classic version, the comparative method can be defined as ‘a set of logically based procedures for systematically testing against empirical evidence alternative (or competing) hypotheses about causal connections between phenomena, and thereby either corroborate or reject them.’ (Caramani, 2009: p. 3) In this sense, it aims at identifying causal regularities (Sartori, 1991; Collier, 1993; Lijphart, 1971).

The theme, scope and goal of this Dissertation prevents it from strictly attributing causality to the plethora of political, social, economic, international, domestic and regional influences that contribute to the determination of foreign aid practices. Even if causal attribution was feasible, the method would still lack one of its essential components, which is the capacity

to test against empirical evidence alternative hypotheses on cause-effect relationships. That is, there is no way to control variations.

This does not hinder the application of the comparative method. Instead of looking for ‘laws’ between variables and creating (or refuting) theories, the comparison here was used to test certain hypothesis about the foreign aid provided by the countries concerned. Therefore, this study aimed to establish relations among the variables, comparing their behaviors and influences in the international cooperation approach of each donor. Although the comparative analysis’ goal was to establish correlations and not *stricto sensu* causation (Keohane *et al.*, 1994: 75), in this sense, it mainly addressing who, what, when, where and how questions, and leading to descriptive inferences, the assessment also estimated why the countries studied adopted the approaches to foreign aid (or international cooperation) that they did. In order to do so, a broader comparative method was developed.

This methodological step consisted in using five key variables to assess the international aid provided by the United States and Brazil in the area of food security. These were: budget, institutions, legislation, discourse, impact/results and perceptions. As foreign aid (whether stated or implicitly) is a soft-power tool, the analyses of the aid approaches of the United States and Brazil would not be complete without an assessment of how aid is received by beneficiaries. A survey estimated how cooperation was welcomed in selected African countries - in this case Ethiopia and Mozambique - by mapping the perception of decision makers and civil society representatives from the recipient countries. Mapping the perception of the main recipients in relation to their donors helped to assess, for instance, if the approach used by Brazil is met with a more positive review than the assistance given by the United States. The survey used a specific analytical model in which arithmetic codes are attributed to negative and positive assumptions that African governments have regarding the role cooperation has played in addressing food security. The specific methodological steps followed in the design, implementation and analysis of the survey are presented as follow.

Although a complete analysis of Chinese aid is not the focus of this Dissertation, the survey includes questions mapping the perception of this donor, as a merely illustrative counterpoint to enrich the comparison among different aid partners. China is also a key player in the international aid system and a global agricultural power with increasing presence in Africa.

The survey uses an analytical model based on several steps. At the first stage, preliminary questions determined the profile of the respondents – their titles and institutions – and their knowledge and experience in the area of agriculture and food security. Their general understanding of the field was assessed by the question: *How would you rate your knowledge and experience in the area of agriculture and food security?* More than 80% of the respondents answered that they had some knowledge and experience in the area – that they had previously worked and researched in the area. Then, three questions assessed the respondent's acquaintance with each donor:

- *How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security received by Ethiopia from the US government?*
- *How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security received by Ethiopia from the Brazilian government?*
- *How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security received by Ethiopia from the Chinese government?*

The possible answers were:

- *I have extensive knowledge and experience. I have worked, researched and/or known the area for more than 10 years.*
- *I have reasonable knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 5 years.*
- *I have limited knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 3 years.*
- *I have no knowledge and experience. I have never researched or worked in this area.*

The vast majority of respondents in Ethiopia and Mozambique have some level of knowledge and experience with the aid given by the United States: 73,3% of Ethiopians, 83,3% of Mozambicans, and 78,3% in average for both countries. This result contrasts with the knowledge of the Brazilian cooperation, which was high in its main aid beneficiary, Mozambique, with 90% of respondents having some degree of knowledge and experience,

while 80% of Ethiopians have no knowledge of Brazilian aid, which is unsurprising, since Brazilian aid is scarcely present in that country¹⁶.

Secondly, key-issues related to foreign aid's capacity to address food security's three pillars were selected:

1. Food stocks
2. Food availability
3. Nutritional value

The questions inquired on a selected donor country in one of the three issues identified.

Table 1.3. Questions per beneficiary country

FOOD STOCKS	<p><i>How would you rate American external agricultural aid in relation to the formation of food stocks?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate Brazil's external agricultural aid in relation to the formation of food stocks?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate China's external agricultural aid in relation to the formation of food stocks?</i></p>
FOOD AVAILABILITY	<p><i>How would you rate American agricultural aid in relation to food availability?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate Brazilian agricultural aid in relation to food availability?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate Chinese agricultural aid in relation to food availability?</i></p>
NUTRITIONAL VALUE	<p><i>How would you rate American agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional value of food?</i></p>

¹⁶ 73% of Ethiopian and 12% of Mozambican respondents have no previous knowledge about Chinese aid in their respective countries.

	<p><i>How would you rate Brazilian agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional value of food?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate Chinese agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional value of food?</i></p>
GENERAL ASSESSMENT	<p><i>How would you rate your general perception of the US foreign aid in agriculture?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate your general perception of Brazil's foreign aid in agriculture?</i></p> <p><i>How would you rate your general perception of China's foreign aid in agriculture?</i></p>

Respondents were asked to pick up one of five alternatives, which covered a spectrum from strongly positive to strongly negative perception. For instance, in the of Food Stocks, the options were:

- a. Projects help to greatly increase food supplies.*
- b. Some projects help to increase food supplies.*
- c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.*
- d. Some projects hamper the formation of food stocks.*
- e. Projects make it very difficult to increase food supplies.*

On Food Availability, the options were:

- a. Projects greatly increase the availability of food.*
- b. Some projects increase the availability of food.*
- c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.*
- d. Some projects hamper the availability of food.*
- e. Projects make it very difficult to access food.*

On the Nutritional value:

- a. Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do very well for health.*
- b. Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very healthy.*
- c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.*
- d. Food from external aid has reduced nutritional value.*
- e. Food from foreign aid has no significant nutritional value and is therefore harmful to health.*

Finally, for the overall perception, the options were:

- a. It is very positive.*
- b. It is predominantly positive, but it has flaws.*
- c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.*
- d. It is predominantly negative, but it has qualities.*
- e. It is very negative.*

At the third step, already evaluating the answers, arithmetical figures were attributed to the individual perceptions, in order to give them a further arithmetical treatment and translate the results into quantitative measures. The different variations of ‘a’ answers portraying very positive perceptions were valued as 2. The ‘b’ ones showing moderately positive perceptions value 1; the neutral views of ‘c’ answers value 0, ‘d’ moderately negative answers are valued -1, and ‘e’ strongly negative perceptions are -2.

Table 1.4. Quantifying perceptions

Answer	Correspondent Arithmetical Value
a. strongly positive	2
b. moderately positive	1
c. neutral/ no opinion	0

d. moderately negative	-1
e. strongly negative	-2

At the fourth step, the results of all respondents for each topic are gathered, leading to the Collective Perception Index. Finally, at the fifth step, all the perceptions of all issues are added, arriving at the Final Perception Index of the donor country. For this, the following formulas will be used.

The Perception Index (*PI*) by Pillar is measured by:

$$PI = \frac{\Sigma[Qa. 2 + Qb. 1 + Qc. 0 + Qd. (-1) + Qe. (-2)]}{NR}$$

In which:

Qa = number of 'a' answers

Qb = number of 'b' answers

Qc = number of 'c' answers

Qd = number of 'd' answers

Qe = number of 'e' answers

NR = total number of respondents

The result of each donor country is compared to estimate whether there is a difference in the way aid is welcomed by African partners.

The survey was either answered in person or sent electronically. It was applied in person during my stay in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in August 2018, and by distance in Mozambique, from January to June 2019. I also counted with the support of two colleagues, Arthur Catraio and Rodolpho Vasconcellos, in gathering respondents to the survey and revising the results¹⁷. Around 300 people were contacted, ranging from high representatives of main segments of

¹⁷ Catraio is a PhD candidate from Fundação Getúlio Vargas at Rio de Janeiro, who visited Ethiopia in March 2019. Vasconcellos is a PhD from the Department of Administration of the University of Brasilia. As they have a sounder background on Statistics and Quantitative Methodologies, they provided guidance in the methodology and the design of the charts.

the government, academia, civil society, and NGOs. Of those, 266 people visualized the survey, 84 people responded, but 18 responses were incomplete and only 66 qualified as valid (34 from Mozambicans and 33 from Ethiopians). The combined participation rate¹⁸ was of 32,9% and the completion rate¹⁹ was of 78,95%. The survey took an average of 15 minutes to be completed.

Amid the respondents are counted high representatives of civil society, academia and NGOs, such as the American Relief Agency for the Horn of Africa and the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. Answers were also received from the first top layer of national government agencies, such as the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, H.E Dr. Eyasu Abraha Alle. The result of each donor country was compared to estimate whether there is a difference in the way US and Brazilian aids are welcomed by African partners. Complementing the survey, a series of interviews further assessed the perception of foreign aid.

¹⁸ From the people who have seen the survey, how many participated.

¹⁹ From those who participated, the percentage of those who completed.

Chapter 2. The United States' International Assistance

The first record of US foreign aid in American history is found on the Congressional Record of May 8, 1812. It authorized the humanitarian delivery of wheat flour to Venezuela, which had suffered an earthquake, severely damaging Caracas, and causing many deaths. In the following decades, the US Congress approved the provision of food aid to many foreign populations suffering from disasters (Riley, 2017: p. 5).

Only with the end of World War II and the rise of the US as a global superpower would the United States become a main aid donor (OECD, 2015). Its role in the modern global aid regime started with the Agriculture Act of 1949 to stabilize prices of agricultural commodities, especially its Section 416 (b), which provided a permanent legal basis by which surplus food could be donated to friendly overseas countries as development aid. President Truman presented yet another initiative on international development, the Point Four Program (1949), which aimed at opening markets to US companies and reducing the 'communist threat'²⁰.

In that period, the US government established a pattern for America's international food assistance that prevails until today based on providing aid through the donation of US agricultural commodities. President Dwight D. Eisenhower reinforced the linkage between foreign aid and national production with the signing of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly known as PL-480, which channeled agricultural surplus commodities to 'friendly' nations. This law fostered a permanent program of foreign aid distribution, since prior to that the United States mostly offered aid (mainly humanitarian) to countries while experiencing natural disasters or war (Department of State, n.d).²¹ As such, it represented the first permanent, large-scale US international food aid program (Schnepf, 2016: p. 2, 8).

²⁰ In the original Point Four Program: 'creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing production in developing countries; diminishing the threat of communism by helping countries prosper under capitalism'. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values> (accessed September 17, 2017).

²¹ Department of State (n.d). Office of the Historian. **USAID and PL-480, 1961-1969**. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480> (accessed October 24, 2018).

The administration of John F. Kennedy reinvigorated Eisenhower's PL-480, renamed Food for Peace (1961), and sought to redirect its focus from surplus liquidation to humanitarian needs (Kennedy, 1961). In September 1961, President Kennedy signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195), which established the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to centralize aid initiatives, coordinate capital disbursement and technical assistance²². Kennedy also expanded US foreign assistance by establishing the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. All these initiatives ultimately aimed at serving the US foreign policy goal of halting the spread of communism (Radelet, 2003: p. 106).

President Lyndon B. Johnson underscored the Food for Peace program as a cornerstone of US foreign assistance. He revised it with the Food for Peace Act of 1966²³, which required agreements established under it to ensure receiving nations would tackle production limitations. To strengthen food aid's strategic role as a diplomatic tool, President Johnson transferred the functions of director for the Food for Peace program from the White House to the State Department, where he would serve as a special assistant to the Secretary of State. Johnson's administration used PL-480 agreements to leverage support for US foreign policy goals, or at least to reduce criticism of the US's international stances, especially in the ongoing Vietnam War. However, the program would soon face limitations, given Congressional reductions in foreign aid expenditures by the end of the decade²⁴.

Despite the efforts to link foreign aid to US national interests abroad, foreign assistance continued to face congressional reluctance to approve its outlays. To make things worse, by the end of the Cold War, aid had lost its main *raison d'etre* as a tool to halt communist influence and, therefore, it also lost much of its remaining support (Radelet, 2003: p. 106-107). The dim scenario for aid was accompanied by the decrease of government commodity surpluses and the boom in agricultural exports, which made large-scale food aid programs used to distribute food and help sales no longer necessary (Riley, 2017).

²² Department of State. Office of the Historian. **USAID and PL-480, 1961-1969**. (N/A) Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480> (accessed October 24, 2018).

²³ PL 89-808.

²⁴ Department of State. Office of the Historian. **USAID and PL-480, 1961-1969**. (N/A). Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480> (accessed October 24, 2018).

After September 11th, 2001, however, international assistance came to the fore once again. President George W. Bush presented a series of programs which, combined, led to an increase of US foreign aid from approximately 11 billion dollars in 2002 to 18 billion in 2006 – the largest increase in decades. Thus, the 2000s witnessed a turning point in US foreign aid regime:

One of the most remarkable foreign policy initiatives under President George W. Bush was the strong increase in development assistance, as the administration increased US development aid to sub-Saharan Africa dramatically from 2001 onwards. In 2012 prices and exchange rates, the annual net bilateral disbursements increased from 3.585 million dollars during 1990–1999 to 5.377 million during 2000–2009, reaching 8.924 million dollars during 2010–2013 (Olsen, 2017: p. 2107).

President Barack Obama aimed to continue his predecessor's engagement in international development, despite the severe deterioration of both domestic affairs and global context. When he stepped into the presidency in January 2009, the United States was facing its biggest economic crisis since the 1930s. More Americans had lost jobs in 2008 than in any year since World War II, and 800 thousand more would lose theirs in Obama's first month in office (Norris, 2016).

Adding to this, in 2010, Congress became dominated by Republicans, who were determined to fiercely oppose Obama's policies, and the Middle East's unrest persisted, with the unending war in Afghanistan (Norris, 2016: p. 5). All in all, the political environment was far from favorable for new commitments regarding global development, and Obama's campaign pledge to double US assistance to Africa seemed unfeasible²⁵ (Norris, 2016: p. 5). However, despite the intensely confrontational period in Washington, the Republican-led Congress approved high appropriations for foreign assistance, leading it to reach its peak since the years of the Marshall Plan²⁶. These disbursements were not able to make up for the

²⁵ 'It is hard to overstate how bad relations with Congress were on both policy and appropriations. Witness the fact that significant numbers of House Republicans openly flirted for a period of time with the idea during 2011 of crashing the US debt ceiling with potentially cataclysmic results for global markets and stability.' (Norris, 2016: p. 5).

²⁶ 'Adjusted for inflation, annual foreign assistance funding over the past decade was the highest it has been since the Marshall Plan in the years immediately following World War II.' (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: *Summary*).

escalating commodity prices and, in the end, the total volume of food aid decreased (Riley, 2017: p. 463)²⁷.

In his 2010 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD), Obama sought to elevate global development as a pillar of US foreign policy²⁸. Three main aid areas shaped Obama's development vision: global health, food security, and climate change. The Global Food Security Initiative was materialized with the Feed the Future (FTF) program, launched by Secretary Hilary Clinton in May 2010. The initiative boosted agriculture aid funding and included training for farmers, research, and the introduction of new technologies to improve productivity and develop markets. Agriculture gained ground as a major component in the US aid program, and funding obligations in the sector doubled between 2008 and 2012 (Tarnoff, 2015: p. 8, 16).

In order to achieve this amidst budgetary constrictions and low legislative support, the Obama administration sought to reform existing programs, rather than creating new ones. Obama's legacy to global development efforts were more on development's 'how' than its 'what' (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: *Summary*), that is, much of aid's priority-sectors remained the same but the ways by which they were implemented were revised (CRS Report, 2017: p.18).

2.1. Africa in US Foreign Policy

There is no consensus about the relevance of Africa to US foreign policy. Various authors see the continent as a less strategic ally and of limited importance to the interests of the United States (Okumu *et al.*, 2018: p. 430-436). This perception is somewhat contradicted by the US position as the largest single contributor of aid to Africa (Harris, 2017: p. 21). What is less debatable is that the US government has given limited political attention to the region after

²⁷ The dropping sizes of traditional food aid shipments persists due to a combination of American budgetary restrictions, the adoption of local procurement methods and continually increasing prices for food globally (Riley, 2017: p. 478).

²⁸ 'The directive recognizes that development is vital to US national security and is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States. It calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power and charts a course for development, diplomacy and defense to mutually reinforce and complement one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security.' Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy> (accessed on: November 12, 2018)

the end of the Cold War, which represented a period of significant decline in US assistance to Africa (Olsen, 2017: p. 2100). Thus, at the end of the 20th century, for all intents and purposes, Africa remained geopolitically insignificant (Clough *apud*. Metelis, 2016: p.2).

One factor that contributed to this lower standing is the bipartisan character of African matters. The US main political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, generally agree upon the overall direction of the policy towards that continent, which leads to less politicized foreign policy initiatives, and, in turn, in a less prominent place in Congress's debates (Olsen, 2017: p. 2100). This 'almost benign neglect of African issues through its [Congress] subcommittee activities' can also be explained by 'the prevalent assumption held in Washington that Europe had a special responsibility for Africa due to its colonial past relations' (Okumu *et al.*, 2018: p. 430-436).

All these factors contributed to reduce the level of personal engagement of the US President and the White House in the making of US African foreign policy. This opened space to greater involvement of government bureaucracies in policymaking. The State Department, its Bureau of African Affairs and the Department of Defense, through its Office for African Affairs, are considered the most influential ones (Okumu *et al.*, 2018: p. 430-436).

One consequence of less engagement by the President and Congressmen is the prevalence of continuity in US policies towards Africa, since state bureaucracies tend to be more stable and less prone to radical reorientations (Okumu *et al.*, 2018: p. 430-436). This somehow elucidates in part why African programs implemented under George W. Bush's Republican administration were kept by Barack Obama's presidency.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, African affairs gained momentum in Washington, leading to a series of new initiatives. In 2002, the formation of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) marked the resurgence of US efforts to bring peace and security to Africa, as well as to promote development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth (Pham, 2014: p. 246).

The arrival of the first African-American president to the White House increased expectations of Africa becoming a focus of more political and presidential attention. Barack Obama was greeted with wild enthusiasm by millions of ordinary Africans who saw in him

the chance of a new relationship between Africans and Americans. Notwithstanding, the continent's strategic relevance did not suffer major revisions and Africa maintained its relative low-profile position in US foreign policy. Obama's priorities for the continent focused on strengthening democratic institutions and spurring economic growth, trade, and development. The novelty of Obama's relationship with his African counterparts was his notion that US engagement with Africa should move beyond the simple provision of assistance and foreign aid to a new model of partnership 'between equals' (Pham, 2014: p. 246).

2.2. US foreign aid legislation

Two initial laws provided the legal basis for US food aid programs: Section 416(b) of the Agriculture Act of 1949; and PL-480 (1954), renamed as the Food for Peace Act (FFP). Both laws founded programs to provide in-kind donations of food accumulated under the US Department of Agriculture's (USDA) commodity price support programs, while responding to humanitarian, economic development, and geopolitical goals in foreign countries. Since then, the main food aid programs signed into law were the Food for Progress, the McGovern-Dole Food for Education, the Local and Regional Procurement, and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust programs. They include both emergency and non-emergency food delivery, and also certain agricultural development activities (Schnepf, 2016: p. 3).

US legislation has a series of requirements for American in-kind food donations. These conditions limit the flexibility and the timeliness of the US response to emergency food crises, since they demand that:

- all agricultural commodities be sourced from the United States²⁹;
- at least 50% of the US food aid must be shipped on US-flag vessels;
- at least 20%, but not more than 30%, with a minimum of \$350 million, of funding must be available for non-emergency food aid;
- at least 75% of in-kind food transfers dedicated to non-emergency assistance must be in a processed, fortified, or bagged form;
- at least 50% of any bagging must consist of whole-grain commodities bagged in the United States; and
- at least 15% of non-emergency food aid funding must be made available to qualifying nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for monetization—that

²⁹ This is an example of 'tied aid', which consists of conditioning aid to the procurement of goods and services from the donor-country.

is, the process of selling donated US commodities in recipient-country markets to generate cash for development programs. (Schnepf, 2016: p. 3)

Many attempts were made to update and relax these rules. In the years covered by this Dissertation, both the Bush and the Obama administration tried to improve US food aid procedures by removing legislative impediments added over the years that increased the costs and slowed the delivery of food aid shipped from the US (Riley, 2017: p. 479). For instance, Bush requested, without success, to add, in the 2008 Farm Bill, the usage of 25% of Title II's budget (the main funding of aid) to purchase food in or near recipient countries rather than sending it from the US. Similarly, Obama's 2014 Farm Bill proposal for Congress also included a reform in the food aid system to increase the use of other methods of delivery, but the Members of the agriculture committees rejected the demand. Again in 2016, Obama attempted to increase the budget for aid given through local and regional procurement (LRP), however, the House Appropriations Committee declined and reprimanded his 'continued efforts' to change the traditional way the United States gives food aid, that is, through in-kind donations (Riley, 2012: p. 484).

2.2.1. Section 416(b) Program

The Section 416(b) Program is managed by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and it regulates the donation of agricultural surpluses to countries in need (Margesson, 2013: p.6). Depending on the agreement with the receiving country and the cooperating sponsor, the commodities donated under Section 416(b) can be directly distributed to a target population, or they can be sold (i.e., monetized) in the recipient country with the proceeds then used to support emergency and non-emergency activities, such as agricultural, economic, or infrastructure development programs (Schnepf, 2016: p. 8).

The Section 416(b) program has been an unstable component of food aid, since it is entirely dependent on the availability of surplus commodities in the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) inventories. Consequently, the program's helpfulness has oscillated along with the price paid by the federal government agricultural commodity support programs. In the mid-1980s, Congress changed the rules for the government's stock accumulation, leading to the

depletion of government-owned grain stocks by 2006 and the suspension of the Section 416(b) program (CRS RL 34081, 2016)³⁰.

2.2.2. Food for Peace (FFP)

Originally authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act of 1954 (PL-480), Food for Peace (FFP) became the main legislative vehicle for US international food assistance. It disciplines the delivery of US commodities to recipient countries either for direct use, in food distribution programs, or for sale in the local market, monetization. The program has five statutory objectives: combat world hunger, malnutrition and their causes, promote sustainable agricultural development, expand international trade, foster private sector and market development, and, finally, prevent conflicts (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10).

The FFP includes six sections, referred to as titles. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) manages Title I, whereas USAID manages Titles II, III and V. Finally, Title VI is administered by the Department of the Treasury.

Title I, called Economic Assistance and Food Security, regulates the concessional sales³¹ of US agricultural commodities to selected developing countries so as to spur economic growth, supporting non-emergency food security projects. The 1996 Farm Bill allowed private entities to benefit from Title I loan agreements. Since a main goal of the program was to promote trade of US agricultural goods, it prioritized subsidizing credit to nations with the greatest commercial potential for US agricultural commodities (Riley, 2017: p. 463).

Title I food aid programs have been inactive since FY2006. The main reason for Title I's downward trend is found in its meager market or economic development results after 1990, which, in turn, is related to changes in beneficiary countries. In the beginning, most Title I sales had been done in nations with rather strong economies, such as Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Brazil, and India. So, when these markets expanded and became important customers

³⁰ Once the program has been inactive since the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY2007) and the focus of this dissertation begins on the mid-2000s, Section 416(b) program will not be under further scrutiny.

³¹ Which are long-term, low-interest loans.

for US agricultural products, many perceived this as a direct consequence of their participation in the Title I sales program (p.464).

The 1990 Farm Bill brought about a new direction to the program, shifting the focus of sales agreements to poorer and more food-insecure countries. These nations did not enjoy the economic strength of the initial beneficiaries and were less likely to emerge eventually become important markets for US agricultural products. As Title I stumbled to create new paying consumers of US agricultural products, the program started to be perceived as inefficient, and its outlays steadily diminished until it was discontinued.

Title II, named Emergency and Development Food Assistance Programs, disciplines in-kind donations of agricultural commodities to governments and eligible organizations. Public and private agencies, such as private voluntary organizations (PVOs), NGOs and cooperatives are qualified to receive Title II funds. The program offers food aid as a grant (not needing to be repaid).

Title II can be employed to address both emergency humanitarian needs and nonemergency assistance with development-oriented goals. However, most of its outlays have been progressively diverted from development projects to emergency relief. In 1985, there were more than 35 million people benefiting from Title II development projects, but in 2013 this number dropped to 6.2 million (Riley, 2017: p. 475).

Title II has been gaining importance since the 1980s, becoming the largest funding source for US food aid. Since 2000, Title II outlays have accounted for 73% of the US's total annual international food aid spending. A partial motive behind the funding shift from Title I to Title II was the international pressure from major trading partners who argued that US use of concessional sales terms for exporting surplus commodities was displacing normal commercial activity. These concerns influenced the development of an international framework to monitor and discipline international food aid (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10; Riley, 2017: p. 470).

The 1990 farm bill contained some of the most significant food aid legislation since the foundation of PL-480 in 1954. The bill made enhancing global food security a formal objective of US food aid. Moreover, part of Title I's competencies was allocated into a new

segment, Title III. Called Food for Development, Title III consisted of grants of US agricultural commodities to ‘countries willing to commit their own resources to agricultural growth and development’ (Riley, 2017: p. 456). Analogously to what occurs in Title I, the food aid was sold, though grants could be forgiven insofar as the proceeds were used in development endeavors addressing food insecurity³².

Title V was created by the Food Security Act of 1985 and it funds the Farmer-to-Farmer Program (F2F), which provides technical assistance to farmers, farm organizations, and agribusinesses in developing countries. The program relies on American volunteers from farms, universities, cooperatives, private agribusinesses and nonprofit organizations to transfer their knowledge and expertise host-country farmers and organizations. It finances non-emergency initiatives to foster long-lasting broad-based growth in the agricultural sector, encompassing food processing, production and marketing. A secondary goal is to foster understanding of international development issues in the American population and, reciprocally, increase international understanding of the US development programs (FY 2016 US International Food Assistance Report: p. 26).

In the 2008 Food for Peace Act, Congress named the program the John Ogonowski and Doug Bereuter Farmer-to-Farmer Program, to pay tribute to a pilot killed in the 9/11 attacks, John Alexander Ogonowski, and to one of its first advocates, former Congressman Douglas Kent Bereuter. In 2016, the program provided 884 volunteers, who carried out missions in 45 countries.

Evaluations measure the impact of the F2F program through the changes of local practices. Besides training, the volunteer assistance makes recommendations, which, if accepted, lead to behavior change and improvements in productivity. Around nine thousand recommendations have been made and around four thousand of those (46%) were reportedly adopted. The F2F program is estimated to have boosted more than 7.8 million dollars to the beneficiaries of the technical cooperation (FY 2016 US International Food Assistance Report: p. 26).

³² Title IV is dedicated to Food for Peace Act’s general authorities and requirements.

Title VI, named Enterprise for the America's Initiative of the Food for Peace Act, authorizes official debt relief. It links aid programs to debt owed to the United States to structural adjustments and open investment policies.

In the last decades, several of these categories of food aid were discontinued. Title I declined to zero in 2006. Title III was defunded in the late 1990s. Section 416(b) ceased in 2006 (Riley, 2017: p. 456).

2.2.3. Food for Progress (FFPr)

Authorized by the 1985 Farm Bill (P.L. 99-198; §1110), the Food for Progress program aimed to improve agricultural productivity and to expand trade of agricultural products in foreign countries. It established the conditions for countries to receive donations of US agricultural commodities which ought to be sold in the local market, sometimes with the help of a third party (i.e. PVOs, cooperatives, NGOs, and IOs, among others). The proceeds are used to support agricultural, economic or infrastructure development programs (USDA, 2019a).

The 1985 Farm Bill also contained provisions that significantly increased the cost of US food aid. Firstly, it increased the percentage of aid that must be sent abroad on US flag ships from 50% to 75%. Secondly, the percentage of food aid with value added in the US also grew to 75%, and, finally, it imposed a quota of aid leaving from ports of the Great Lakes region. All measures would significantly increase the cost of US aid, thus reducing the number of agricultural commodities actually sent to food insecure populations (Riley, 2017: p.453)

The FFPr program focuses on promoting agricultural policy reforms that incorporates free enterprise elements through changes in commodity pricing, marketing, input availability, distribution, and private sector involvement. This approach reflected President Ronald Reagan's belief that the private sector was the most suitable to deal with economic problems, and that, thus, US aid should use free markets to deal with developing countries. The program is administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA, which negotiates multi-year contracts with cooperating sponsors (organizations or governments), requiring the monetization of donated commodities in support of eligible developing countries, especially incipient democracies. Its activities focus on fostering the private sector of agricultural

infrastructure, such as improved production practices, marketing systems, farmer training, agri processing, and agribusiness development.

In response to requests for commodities, USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) purchases produces from the US market and ships them to the recipient country, using either appropriate Title I funds or CCC financing. Upon arrival, USDA transfers them to the implementing organizations for monetization.

Since 2006, Food for Progress program has relied entirely on CCC financing, inasmuch as Congress has not appropriated any funds for it since then. Despite requiring that the program should provide at least 400,000 metric tons (mt) of commodities each fiscal year, purchases have been around 212,600 mt. In addition, once the commodity requirement is based on weight, the program's actual cost fluctuates along with commodity prices (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10). In 2014, the program was active in 35 countries with around one hundred projects. However, projects have modest budgets and the program's total size is relatively small (Riley, 2017: 469).

2.2.4. McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program (MGD Program)

Named after its two main advocators, US Senators George McGovern and Bob Dole, the MGD program was authorized by the 2002 Farm Bill³³. The initiative began in 2000 through a pilot program called the Global Food for Education Initiative, which aimed at providing meals for children in 38 countries. The program's initial budget was \$300 million. Program is classified by the US government as an initiative in education, not in agriculture, since it helps support education and child development in food insecure countries (USDA, 2019b).

In May of 2002, President George W. Bush officially signed into law the McGovern-Dole Program, committing to in-kind donations of US agricultural commodities, as well as financial and technical assistance, to support school feeding, maternal, infant, and child nutrition programs in countries experiencing critical food needs.

³³ The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171, §3107).

The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA administers the program, but, as it occurs with many US aid projects, the government outsources the implementation to qualifying charitable private voluntary organizations (PVOs), cooperatives, and IOs, or it is executed directly by the receiver foreign country. The implementing partners use the commodities for direct feeding or, in limited situations, for local sale, with the proceeds supporting school feeding and nutrition projects (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10).

From the pilot project in 2000 until the end of 2014, the MGD Program provided approximately two billion dollars³⁴ to children of more than 40 countries (Schnepf, 2016: p. 6), including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malawi, Moldova, Nicaragua, Niger, Ethiopia and Pakistan. In 2008, the program's creators, Senators McGovern and Dole were made World Food Prize laureates for their efforts to curb hunger in the world and in particular for this program³⁵, which, at that time, boosted school attendance by 14 percent and girls' attendance by 17%³⁶.

2.2.5. Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) Projects

LRP programs are based on awarding cash grants to the acquisition of agricultural commodities from markets close to populations going through food crises and disasters. Two main advantages stem from purchasing locally rather than trans-shipping commodities: first, it expedites the provision of aid, since acquisitions are not delayed by international shipping operations. Second, it spares transportation costs, which allows more food to be bought with the same amount of funding (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10). On the other hand, LRP projects face limitations, which include the unavailability of enough field staff, inadequate regional market supplies, insufficient infrastructure, as well as adverse market effects on local producers or consumers (Hanrahan, 2010: *Summary*).

³⁴ Between 2000 to 2002, the funds were given to the Global Food for Education program, which was a precursor to the McGovern-Dole program. For FY 2000-2001 it was \$300 million; for 2002, \$112 million; for 2003, \$100; for 2004, \$50; for 2005, \$90; for 2006, \$96; for 2007, \$99, for 2008, \$99; for 2009 \$100. From 2010 to 2014, the yearly average was \$184 million, all in nominal prices (current-year prices), not adjusted for inflation. (Ho and Hanrahan, 2010: p. 10; Schnepf, 2016: p. 6).

³⁵ Available at: https://www.worldfoodprize.org/en/events/laureate_award_ceremony/2008_ceremony/ (accessed on: November 3, 2018).

³⁶ *Id.*

US legislation institutes limitations to LRP activities. They must provide food aid to affected populations without significantly increasing commodity costs for low-income consumers from the region. In addition, US law prohibits the resale or trans-shipment of the commodities procured to any country other than the recipient country, and the use of the eligible commodity for any purpose other than food aid (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10).

This type of food aid was not invented by LRP programs. Purchasing aid food in local markets has been a popular practice for decades. The World Food Program (WFP) began locally procuring food in Asia in the 1970s and in Africa in the 1980s (Lentz, Barrett, and Gomez, 2012: p. 1). The United States was one of the last donors to join LRP, inasmuch as initial attempts to instate local procurement programs were rejected by Congress, which defended the interest of national commodity producers and agribusiness stakeholders (Hanrahan, 2010: p. 6).

In 2008, two policy-changes started to shift US aid programs in the direction of cash-based food aid. First, the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (i.e. the 2008 Farm Bill) authorized funding of 60 million dollars for the USDA to undertake a five-year Local and Regional Procurement Pilot Project between 2009 and 2012. Second, the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-252) authorized USAID to use LRP in support of emergency food security projects (Hanrahan, 2010, Summary). Thus, in 2008, both US agencies responsible for foreign aid were granted funds to implement LRP projects.

Currently, USAID funds cash-based assistance through the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) through the Office of Food for Peace, which provided more than 2.2 billion dollars for projects distributing cash and vouchers between 2010 and 2014. The 2014 Farm Bill also authorized up to 80 million dollars for LRP, rendering the 2008 pilot program permanent (CRS, 2019).

These changes made US policy more similar to other OECD donors, such as the European Union (EU), Canada, and Australia, which provide almost all their food aid in the form of cash and have substantially accelerated the diffusion of LRP as the delivery mode of choice in international food assistance (Hanrahan, 2010: *Summary*). In the wake of these changes, LRP's share of global food aid flows jumped from just 11 percent of global food aid flows

in 1999 to 67 percent in 2010 (WFP Interfais 2011 *apud*. Lentz, Barrett, and Gómez, 2012: p. 1-3).

2.2.6. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT)

The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust is not a food aid program *per se*, but rather a reserve of US commodities and cash to meet unanticipated humanitarian food aid needs in developing countries (Hanrahan, 2013: p.9). Originally authorized by the Agricultural Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-494) as the Food Security Wheat Reserve, and by the Africa Seeds of Hope Act of 1989 (P.L. 105-385), the BEHT has been reauthorized by subsequent farm bills (Schnepf, 2016: p.5).

The fund is under the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture, but the USAID Administrator oversees the use of the resources (USAID, 2018a). USAID is also responsible for initiating requests and sending them to the USDA for approval (Hanrahan, 2013: p1). This allows the Office of Food for Peace to meet urgent needs when other Title II resources are not available (USAID, 2018a).

When it was signed into law in 1980, the Trust was designed to hold up to four million metric tons of wheat. Subsequent reauthorizations allowed it to include other commodities, but wheat has been the only commodity held in reserve ever since (Hanrahan, 2013: p. 9). In 2008, as global food prices spiked, the USDA sold the remaining stocks of wheat, converting the trust into an all cash reserve. The Trust was last used in 2014 (Schnepf, 2016: p. 18; USAID, 2018a).

2.2.7. The Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP)

The EFS is a cash-based food-assistance program administered by USAID that provides grants to eligible organizations for rapid response to the highest priority emergency food security needs. Initially sanctioned by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its subsequent alterations (FAA; P.L. 87-195), EFSP was initiated by USAID in FY2010 and it was

permanently authorized as part of the FAA (22 USC. 2292(c)) by the Global Food Security Act (GFSA)³⁷ of July 2016 (Schnepf, 2016: p. 18).

EFSP's stated purposes are 'to mitigate the effects of manmade and natural disasters by utilizing innovative new approaches to delivering aid that supports affected persons and the communities hosting them, build resilience and early recovery, and reduce opportunities for waste, fraud, and abuse.' (USAID FY 2017 EFSP Report: p. 1)

USAID uses cash-based assistance, such as the EFSP, primarily when US-purchased, in-kind food aid cannot arrive fast enough to respond to an emergency or when local market conditions demonstrate it is the most appropriate approach. This evaluation is based on four criteria: market appropriateness, feasibility, project objectives and cost (USAID, 2018b).

EFSP funds have relied on three principal forms of emergency food security assistance: local and regional procurement (40% of outlays), food vouchers (26%), and cash transfers (14%). From FY2010 through FY2015, USAID awarded EFSP grants totaling 3.3 million dollars for cash-based food assistance, with the majority of this aid going to Syria. Implementing partners include US and foreign NGOs, cooperatives, and IOs. (Schnepf, 2016: p. 18).

USAID implements the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) through its Office of Food for Peace (FFP), with funding from the International Disaster Assistance account. The FFP Office manages the majority of US international food assistance authorized by Title II of the Food for Peace Act, which in FY2015 totaled about 1.47 billion dollars³⁸.

Even though Congress ended up approving programs for the local purchase food, the main emergency food assistance strategies in the United States are still built upon the provision of in-kind commodities produced in the United States. Whether stemming from the EFSP or from local and regional procurement (LRP) projects, cash transfers to address food insecurity internationally are subject to regulations and restrictions to limit their scope and usage. In this sense, they are only allowed 'on a case-by-case basis when in-kind food aid is unavailable or impractical, and only when compelling evidence exists of an urgent need

³⁷ P.L. 114-195; §7.

³⁸ House Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Hearing. Publication info: Congressional Documents and Publications; Washington, July 9, 2015.

where LRP, cash transfers for food or food vouchers in place of other options will save lives, reduce suffering or serve substantially more people in need" (USAID, 2014a: p. 2)

2.2.8. Feed the Future (FtF)

Established in 2010, Feed the Future (FtF) is a major Obama Administration foreign assistance initiative that combats hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity³⁹. FtF backs US pledges made at the G8 Summit of 2009 and the following L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (LFSI). It also supports the implementation of President Obama's 2010 Policy Directive on Global Development, by acting as a coordination mechanism for all US international agricultural and food security development programs (CRS Report 44216, 2016).

It is considered a new paradigm for international development, going beyond the traditional US practice of donating or selling US-sourced food aid commodities in local markets, an approach which has been criticized for being supply-driven, poorly oriented to respond to local needs, and inept to enhance local production (CRS Report R44216, 2016). Instead, FtF's cross-sectoral approach focuses on bridging the gap between agricultural research outputs and global food security. The initiative helped develop and deploy over 900 innovations in agricultural practices in partnering countries from 2011 to 2016. These innovations include improved crop residue management for livestock feeding and transgenic rice lines that are tolerant to drought, for example (USAID, Feed the Future, n.d).

The initiative has assisted 19 low-income countries, 12 of them in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Tumusiime and Cohen, 2016; CRS Report R44216, 2016). The initiative coordinates all actions by the government regarding foreign donations and food security, once FtF guidelines are extended to all US international agricultural development programs, including 'the Food for Peace Title II non-emergency food aid, the Food for Progress program, and McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program' (CRS Report 44216, 2016). FtF cuts across existing programs to facilitate coordination and potentially prevent

³⁹ The program was maintained by President Donald J. Trump. USAID (2018c). Office of Press Relations. Statement by Administrator Mark Green on the Reauthorization of The Global Food Security Act. Friday, October 12, 2018. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/oct-12-2018-administrator-green-reauthorization-global-food-security-act> (accessed on: October 31, 2019).

duplication and gaps. Thus, FtF is influencing the overall US international agricultural assistance, moving it away from in-kind donations to technical cooperation.

The initiative targets the poorest countries while prioritizing those that demonstrate to have the greatest potential to improve their food-related indexes: ‘the ones identified as having the greatest needs, strongest host-country commitment and resources, potential for agriculture-led growth, and opportunities for regional synergies’ (CRS Report, 2017: p.9).

FtF is assessed through a set of publicly released metrics that justify the countries and projects chosen to receive investments. The program also relies on various indicators to monitor and evaluate progress, which are compiled in an annual report to Congress, thus fostering the program’s transparency and accountability (CRS Report R44216, 2016).

From 2010 to 2014, USAID invested 4.7 billion dollars in the FtF program and other federal agencies have invested 6.6 billion dollars more in development activities under the initiative (CRS Report R44216, 2016). USAID leads the initiative, coordinating ten other agencies and departments. Their actions include (USAID, 2018: p. 10):

- Investing in cutting-edge scientific and technological agricultural research often provided by US universities and firms to develop stronger seeds and greener fertilizers so farmers can grow more;
- Developing agricultural markets, expanding trade and using mobile phones to provide real-time prices, so farmers can sell what they grow at a profit;
- Providing access to capital and extension services, so farmers can expand farms, buy equipment and learn the best techniques for growing and storing crops; and,
- Helping countries design and implement phytosanitary standards to ensure the safety of their domestic food supply and exports.

Feed the Future is the only original Obama foreign aid initiative specifically signed into law (the Global Food Security Act of 2016, P.L. 114-195 - GFSA). The initiative and the legislative support provided by the GFSA have given food security and agricultural development a more prominent role in the US development policy and budget (CRS Report, 2017).

FtF’s whole-of-government approach faces criticism in relation to its capacity to implement and monitor activities across different government agencies. Another issue raised is that authorities and appropriations underpinning FtF may be incongruent with those governing

long standing separate programs, such as Food for Peace, since FtF brings forward a new paradigm of aid-provision. Moreover, FtF's country-led planning met resistance from civil society actors who were afraid that privileging government-led planning would marginalize civil society's efforts to promote development (CRS Report 44216, 2016).

Table 2.1. US Government outlays for programs related to international food security in million USD

Outlays											
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
USDA	366	239	541	430	385	432	448	344	481	341	375
Food for Peace	60	10	10	13	13	13	10	10	15	na	na
Title I	50	ne	ne	ne	ne	ne	ne	ne	ne	ne	ne
Title V (Farmer-to-farmer)	10	10	10	13	13	13	10	10	15	na	na
Food for Progress	220	130	166	238	166	190	246	150	127	149	153
McGovern-Dole IFECN ¹	86	99	99	168	174	206	192	184	165	192	202
Local and Regional Procurement (LRP)	ne	ne	0	5	24	23	0	0	0	0	0
Section 416 (b)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
BEHT ²	0	0	266	6	8	0	0	0	174	0	20
USAID	1,839	1,870	2,351	2,552	3,803	3,829	3,929	3,847	4,146	4,436	3,697
Food for Peace	1,839	1,870	2,351	2,552	2,746	2,628	2,583	2,312	2,302	2,446	2,697
Title II	1,839	1,870	2,351	2,552	1,933	1,660	1,610	1,355	1,324	1,466	1,696
Title III	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feed the Future ³	ne	ne	ne	ne	813	968	973	957	978	980	1,001
Emergency Food Security Program	ne	ne	ne	ne	244	232	374	578	866	1,009	na
World Food Program (WFP)											
US contribution	1,123	1,184	2,070	1,767	1,553	1,243	1,460	1,494	2,227	2,006	1,778
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)											
US contribution	na	na	na	na	90	29	30	28	30	30	32
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)											
US contribution	61	60	58	79	86	34	123	52	132	164	na
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP)											
US contribution	ne	ne	ne	ne	67	100	135	143	0	123	0
Total	3,389	3,353	5,020	4,827	5,984	5,666	6,126	5,908	7,016	7,099	5,882

na = not available.

ne = not available because the program was nonexistent.

¹IFECN = International Food for Education and Child Nutrition.

²Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust.

³Omits Feed the Future funding provided through the Millenium Challenge Corporation, US African Development Fund, Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, and Peace Corps.

Source: Tandon *et al.*, 2017: p. 2.

2.3. Organizational Framework

According to the US Constitution, the Executive Branch and Congress are the main powers responsible for US foreign policy (Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, 2011). Beyond that, there is only a broad outline of who should take part in foreign policy making, without specific laws or regulations directing how decisions should be made. Much depends upon personalities and management-styles of the President and high-level officials, a situation that paves the way for personal relations to override formal lines of authority (Whittaker, Smith, and McKune, 2008: p. 5).

There is a plethora of state agencies directly or indirectly involved in the provision of foreign aid. Due to limitations of scope, this Dissertation focused on the ones that are most relevant and directly related to food security and agriculture. They are analyzed in detail below. However, prior to that, it is important to briefly mention the steady growth in the participation of private sector entities, both nonprofit and commercial ones, in US foreign assistance.

Currently, most development and humanitarian activities are not directly implemented by US government personnel, who are in charge of selecting implementers, monitoring projects and ensuring their effectiveness and financial accountability. They work as intermediaries between Congress (which sets requirements and budget) and those implementing projects in the private sector, guaranteeing that projects meet aid objectives. Private sector aid actors currently carry out the vast majority of aid projects. They are constituted by firms, nonprofit NGOs, universities, charitable PVOs, and individual contractors (Margesson, 2013).

The rise of the private sector in foreign aid, especially since the 1990s, has also been followed by the increasing involvement of the military in foreign assistance, as it was seen in more

detail below. Both processes have brought about changes in the organizational structure of US aid and how it is perceived domestically and globally⁴⁰.

2.3.1. Department of State

The Department of State is the main governmental agency in foreign affairs and the leader of interagency coordination in developing and implementing US foreign policy. It provides support to the international activities of other governmental entities, including the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense (DoD) and USAID (Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, 2011).

Heading the State Department is the Secretary of State, who should serve as the President's principal foreign policy advisor. Beneath the Secretary in the senior hierarchy are the Deputy Secretaries - one for Policy, one for Management and Resources - and the Counselor of the Department. Further beneath them are a series of Under Secretaries who are responsible for policy and management areas. Assistant Secretaries for regional and functional bureaus then follow in terms of authority and responsibilities (Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, 2011).

Despite the State Department's prominent role in US foreign affairs, its direct involvement with aid donation has been of secondary importance. From the foundation of USAID in 1961 until recently, the agency was in charge of that part of US foreign policy. This is the reason why this work did not deeply extend in the analysis of the State Department's functions, organogram and activities, focusing instead on USAID, the USDA, and the DoD.

2.3.2. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The United States Agency for International Development was created by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, during President John F. Kennedy's administration. It brought together in a single agency several existing foreign assistance organizations and programs.

⁴⁰ Comments made off-record by Dr. Michael Tetelman, Deputy Director of the Global Education, Employment and Engagement (G3E) business unit at FHI 360, a global non-profit human development organization. He has close to twenty years' experience designing and developing programs worldwide that promote economic growth, strengthen government service delivery, and that build human and institutional capacity. He has designed and management programs in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

This transformation created opportunities for US international development assistance to grow intensely, leading the 1960s to be known as the ‘decade of development’ (Lancaster, 2008: p. 69).

USAID’s stated purposes have not significantly changed since they were first outlined 50 years ago: ‘furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while also extending a helping hand to people struggling to make a better life, recovering from a disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country’ (USAID, n.d.-b). Possibly to justify the cost of aid to the domestic audience (USAID, n.d.-b), official websites and statements leave no doubt that the primary objective of the US government in providing foreign assistance is to promote its own international security and prosperity. The instrumentalization of US aid as a tool to foster foreign policy goals is evident from the 1960s up until now:

USAID promotes American prosperity through investments that expand markets for US exports; create a level playing field for US businesses; and support more stable, resilient, and democratic societies. (USAID, n.d(b).

There is no doubt that investing in global development progress is vital to US national security. However, US foreign assistance through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) also benefits the US economy and US workers. As one of the most internationally competitive economies in the world, the US is a major exporter of goods and services, and our exports are in demand the world over. As countries get richer, they want to buy more US products and services. By supporting economic growth and self-reliance in developing countries, USAID helps create better, stronger and more resilient markets for US exports. When countries commit to moving forward, USAID programs can provide the needed capital, technology, ideas, and know-how to assist them. USAID is both from and for the American people (USAID, 2019).

USAID is headed by an administrator and deputy administrator, both appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate (USAID, 2017a). USAID is divided into organization units called bureaus, which are divided into subdivisions. USAID has both geographic and functional bureaus, which are respectively responsible for supervising activities in each country and the programs across geographic boundaries (USAID, 2014b).

USAID operates programs in nearly a hundred countries divided into five geographic regions: Europe and Eurasia, Latin American and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia,

and the Near East⁴¹. USAID's field presence amounts to an important source of strength for the US. One reason for that is its provision of first-hand information and direct access to local populations. Secondly, it promotes US national and security interests (i.e. boosting US exports, stabilizing conflict-prone areas, etc.). Thirdly, it also acts as a soft-power mechanism, promoting a caring (or at least non-threatening) image of the US government.

For much of its existence, USAID enjoyed considerable autonomy and relative prestige. In recent decades, however, these have continuously been stripped away. Despite the greater need for international assistance in the 1990s, especially in Africa, leading that decade to be called the 'lost decade', the end of the bipolar order of the Cold War caused the African continent to lose its strategic importance and aid its main *raison d'être*. In a response to this new international setting, the government reshaped its foreign priorities and USAID's role. This led the agency to endure budget cuts, which reached its staff, training and offices worldwide. For instance, in 1980, USAID had 4,058 permanent employees, but, by 2008, this number dropped to 2,200.

In most cases, the decrease in presence was followed by a rise of military presence in the regions concerned. As it will be seen, the Department of Defense has increasingly taken part in US foreign assistance. Even if this shift from civilian to military presence remains to be fully understood, there is little doubt that there were cost in terms of soft-power and long-term projects sustainability. USAID's decentralized structure allows its programs to be more receptive to local conditions and needs (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 123-131). In contrast, the Armed Forces in the field are bound to a much stricter hierarchy and are less committed to promote local development, which is not their expertise nor main focus⁴².

Another key feature of USAID's loss of prominence and autonomy is found in the growing involvement of the State Department in US foreign assistance programs, with USAID being placed in a subordinate position. In 2001, the State Department took over USAID's account and its direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget. In 2004, the Secretary of State - rather than the USAID Administrator - was named to chair the Millennium

⁴¹ Available at: <http://www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/usaaid.php> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

⁴² Informal conversation with Yonatan Holz, former Reconstruction Team Member of the US Air Force. Granted on December 6th, 2018, at Washington, DC.

Challenge Corporation (MCC), one of the main initiatives of the George W. Bush administration. The pinnacle of this process happened in 2006, when USAID was effectively integrated into the State Department, which became responsible for the administration of the Agency's budget, while the head of USAID began acting as the State Department's Director of Foreign Assistance.

According to USAID's former Administrators Brian Atwood (from 1993 to 1999) and Peter McPherson (1981 to 1986), USAID's partial-fusion with the State Department has not worked properly. The missions and personnel requirements of the two organizations are different and incompatible. USAID is an operational and program-management agency, with a staff comprised of professionals with the technical and managerial skills. By contrast, the State Department deals with more urgent matters and a more politically influenced agenda, one that is prone to sudden changes due to domestic pressure and international instability. Moreover, diplomats and other State Department personnel are trained to operate with a different rationale. With the semi-merger of the two agencies, the urgency of the State Department's mission and the collective mindset of its personnel stood out, to the detriment of the development agenda (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 128).

All these changes led USAID to lose power and influence within the government and abroad. Thus, policymakers began to look for other vehicles to implement their development initiatives, leading other players to increase their participation in the foreign-aid arena. For instance, the DoD created independent organizational structures to carry out aid-programs, under the umbrella of the Africa Command, founded in 2007.

USAID's reduced role in aid policy-making allowed presidential initiatives and congressional earmarks for foreign aid programs that were politically motivated, and not necessarily in tune with local needs and realities. More often than not, these projects concentrated on providing emergency support, at the expense of fostering long-term development. Unsurprisingly, short-term and easily achievable goals are politically appealing, since they show direct and quick results, which, in turn, can be instrumentalized to boost one's popularity. On the other hand, USAID, as a long-standing governmental agency, tends to design projects focusing more on attaining sustainable results.

The proliferation of players in US international assistance has also brought about other domestic and international complications. Internally, it has led to incoherence and poor integration across programs and to a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. Abroad, it has caused confusion among recipients and other donors as to which agency represents the America government in development issues.

Brian Atwood and Peter McPherson add that ‘there is no evidence that this broad array of new development agencies has done any better than the old, more unified USAID, and much evidence that this organizational structure has done worse’. They argue that this ‘organizational chaos’ has significantly increased the costs of implementing foreign aid programs, delayed their implementation, and reduced their impact (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 123-131).

2.3.3. US Department of Agriculture (USDA)

Originally created in May 1862 by President Abraham Lincoln, the Agriculture Department has responsibility for developing and implementing federal laws related to farming, forestry, and food. ‘The People's Department’ (USDA, 2012), as Lincoln called it, aims to ‘provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and related issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management’ (USDA, 2015: p. 1). Besides helping American farmers, USDA’s mission statement also mentions helping feed other nations throughout the world. This is further detailed in one of the main USDA’s strategic goals:

- (1) enhance America’s ability to develop and trade agricultural products derived from new technologies while supporting grower choice among all segments of agriculture;
- (2) ensure that US agricultural resources contribute to enhanced global food security; and
- (3) promote productive agricultural systems that enable food- insecure countries to feed themselves. (USDA, 2015: p. 8)

According to the USDA, the US government has a strong interest in promoting effective agricultural systems in the developing world, because failing agricultural systems and food shortages fuel political instability and diminish the economic vitality of developing nations

(USDA, 2015: p. 8). This reiterates the main US justification for giving aid: protect its national security and interests.

The agriculture sector and farm exports have been one of the brightest points for the US economy. US agricultural exports continue to out-pace US agricultural imports since 1960, generating a surplus in US agricultural trade. The period 2009-2013 stands as the strongest five-year period for agricultural exports in our nation's history with a total export value of more than \$657 billion. 2013 was a record for US agriculture exports, which reached 144 billion dollars. The value of bulk commodities exported has trended upwards at a 10 percent growth rate per year from 2005 to 2015. USDA estimates that every 1-billion-dollar worth of agricultural exports supports 6,600 jobs and generates an additional \$1.3 billion in economic activity (USDA, 2015: p. 14).

The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) links US agriculture to the world by fostering US exports and promoting global food security. Thus, it is the agency part of the USDA which administers US food assistance programs by helping foreign countries to improve their agricultural systems and build their trade capacity. In addition to USDA's foreign aid programs, FAS also administers programs designed to open international markets to US agricultural products. 'FAS also carries out activities that promote productive agricultural systems in developing countries and contribute to increased trade and enhanced global food security. Working bilaterally and with international organizations, FAS encourages the development of transparent and science-based regulatory systems that allow for the safe development and use of agricultural goods derived from new technologies' (USDA, 2015: p. 29).

The FAS has a global network of 93 offices covering 171 countries. These offices are staffed by agricultural attachés and locally hired agricultural experts who are the eyes, ears, and voice for US agriculture around the world. FAS staff identify problems, provide practical solutions, and work to advance opportunities for US agriculture and support US foreign policy around the globe (USDA, n.d).

Several USDA programs, such as the Scientific Cooperation Exchange Program, Cochran and Borlaug Fellowship Programs, provide expertise, mentoring and training to researchers

and policymakers to promote food security and economic growth (USDA, n.d.-b). These are similar to technical cooperation projects implemented by Brazil and other developing countries under the prism of South-South cooperation.

The USDA is frequently criticized for not having enough independence and for serving the agricultural sector interests in detriment to those of the general population, a phenomenon called ‘regulatory capture’. This means that the USDA is overly influenced by the industry it regulates and its inspectors are vulnerable to pressure, since they are responsible for enforcing the law at facilities that also pay for their services (Perkowski, 2014).

A number of leading nutrition experts warned the 2015 Dietary Guidelines for Americans is giving advice that does not match the latest medical research. This is considered the result of influence from food manufacturers, producers, and special interest groups. The absence of a top-line message about limiting raw and processed meat has many experts, including spokespeople from the American Cancer Society, criticizing the guidelines. David Heber, founding director of the University of California, Los Angeles, Center for Human Nutrition stated that ‘the public has been confused and will remain confused by these guidelines’ (Heid, 2016). Moreover, in 2016, the Food & Water Watch claimed that, according to at least 10 government scientists, the USDA censored research outcomes that run against the interests of corporate agribusinesses (Schwab, 2016).

2.3.4. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

The Millennium Challenge Corporation was one of President George W. Bush’s major transformations in the US governmental structure regarding international assistance. Announced on March 14, 2002, MCC was formally established by Congress in January 2004 with bipartisan support as an independent, sub cabinet-level agency with a chief executive officer and a board of directors that included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, and the USAID Administrator, among other high government officials. The new aid agency aimed to finance low-income countries under the threshold of the World Bank’s classification for upper-middle income nations, which are countries with a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of less than roughly four thousand dollars (in the amount used for FY2017)

(Tarnoff, 2018: p 3-4). MCC would provide selected countries with grants to promote sustainable economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen institutions.

According to MCC's website, grants are of three kinds. Compacts, which are large, five-year projects of large-scale investment. Concurrent Compacts for Regional Investments—grants that promote cross-border economic integration and increase regional trade and collaboration. And Threshold Programs — short-term, narrowly-defined efforts focused on policy and institutional reform in countries that come close to passing MCC's eligibility criteria⁴³(MCC, n.d; Tarnoff, 2018: p.9).

Upon the approval of a receiving country, by the time of the signing of the compact, a local entity is formed, known as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which is responsible for being the focal point for managing and overseeing the program. Its board is usually comprised of government officials and representatives of civil society. Ministers who are associated with the projects' sectors usually represent the government (Tarnoff, 2018).

To access grants, countries need to be categorized as 'good performers', that is, they go through a competitive selection in which MCC's Board examines their performance on 17 policy indicators. Applying countries need to show that they meet standards of honesty, competency, and business-friendliness, and that they tackled their populations' basic needs (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 2; Lancaster, 2008a: p. vii). By establishing these criteria, the new agency sought to address the criticism that foreign assistance did little to change the reality of those who receive it.

Besides competitive selection based on objective performance indicators, MCC projects follow two other guiding principles which differed from US traditional aid practices: country-led solutions and country-led implementation. Under such framework, program proposals are developed solely by qualifying countries and they are fully responsible for the implementation of their compacts. MCC only oversees the project through independent fiscal agents. In addition, MCC demands partnering governments to submit their proposals with broad-based civil society involvement, which in turn would allegedly render results more

⁴³ Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), n.d. About MCC. Available at: <https://www.mcc.gov/about> (accessed on: November 15, 2018).

sustainable and legitimate: ‘projects that are driven by partner countries and incorporate local perspectives lead to sustainable know-how and self-sufficiency that continue long after MCC’s investment ends’⁴⁴. Finally, recipient countries are requested to abide to public transparency regulations in all phases of the project (Tarnoff, 2018: *Summary*). All these requirements end up by building the capacity and know-how of local governments in partner countries and increase their accountability.

As the criteria to grant assistance is based on objective performance indicators and it is not directly linked to US foreign policy goals, some argue that MCC provides an opportunity to countries that were normally overlooked by US aid⁴⁵. However, it cannot be said that the MCC does not serve US interests. In fact, as the MCC’s website clarifies, investments should not only ‘support stability and prosperity in partner countries but also enhance American interests’⁴⁶.

Despite being considered innovative, some MCC principles resemble those part of the rhetoric of the *horizontal* approach to international assistance, i.e. South-South cooperation. Instead of tiding the aid to the implementation of predetermined solutions decided by the donor, MCC’s ‘country-led solutions’ request the receiving country to identify its priorities (local ownership) for achieving sustainable economic growth and develop its own proposals for solutions with the involvement of its civil society. This is quite similar to those made by horizontal approach advocates:

The South-South cooperation agenda and South-South cooperation initiatives must be determined by the countries of the South, guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit.

The basic objectives of South-South collaboration, according to the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries endorsed by the General Assembly in 1978 (resolution 33/134), are to foster the self-reliance of

⁴⁴ Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d. About MCC. Available at: <https://www.mcc.gov/about> (accessed on: November 15, 2018).

⁴⁵ 153 Cong Rec E 1458. June 29, 2007. Congress-Session: 110- 1. Reference Volume: Vol. 153 No. 107 Pg. E1458. Available at: <https://congressional-proquest-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congressional/docview/t17.d18.c1dfdd555e001efc?accountid=11752>

⁴⁶ Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d. About MCC. Available at: <https://www.mcc.gov/about> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

developing countries by enhancing their creative capacity to find solutions to their development problems in keeping with their own aspirations, values and specific needs. (UNOSSC, 2018)

There was speculation over why to create a new agency and not use USAID or the State Department's structure. The Bush administration maintained that the initiative represented a new concept in aid delivery, and for this reason it should have a new organizational framework, unfettered by existing authorities and regulations (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 2). USAID did not have a good reputation in Washington, especially among the Republicans (Lancaster, 2008a: p. 19-22). It was argued that directing the funds of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to USAID would put the MCC's innovative approach at risk. Regarding the reason why the MCC was not allocated to the State Department, there was speculation in some quarters that the State Department had limited experience running development programs.

Fearing that close collaboration between the two agencies would lead to the absorption of the MCC by USAID, the new agency sought to distance itself from the old one. So much so that initially the USAID Administrator was not among the members of the MCC's Board. Although the MCC's proposal was altered to add USAID to its board, the agency continued to avoid contact with USAID, leading the MCC to lose many opportunities to learn from USAID's extensive experience (Tarnoff, 2018).

All this accounted for the agency's rough start. It took the MCC a considerable amount of time to acquire its reduced staff of less than 300 employees and to start operating. More than a year after its founding, in June 2015, the MCC had approved only two compacts and had disbursed barely any. Even with advancements in the following years, MCC never achieved anywhere near the level of the funding initially proposed by President Bush in 2002 of 5 billion dollars annually. In most years since the MCC was established, its enacted appropriation has been below the President's request, and the total amount of funding, from 2004 until 2018, was slightly over its intended biennial budget of 11 billion dollars (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 10; Lancaster, 2008a: p. 19-22).

Many attempts to assess the MCC's impact were made. For grants already finished, 61 evaluations had been completed and 58 were planned or ongoing as of December 22, 2017. The first evaluations were published in October 2012 and examined farmer training programs

conducted in five compact countries. They showed the MCC met their targets in those cases. Aside from standard impact measurements, the MCC process of admittance motivated countries to implement reforms to improve their performance indicators and qualify for the grants. As stated in *NEXT: A Strategy for MCC's Future* of February 2016, the program aimed to 'push for partner government reforms that will have greater systemic impact, including prioritizing those that support sustainability and address corruption' (MCC, 2016). As an example, Yemen is a case in point. Following its suspension from the program in 2005, its government approved a number of reforms to improve its indicators and the country was reinstated (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 23-28).

Another positive externality results from the MCC's principle of country-led implementation. Receiving countries end up building government capacity in order to run the development projects, while maintaining accountability and oversight of the use of the funds. For instance, Cabo Verde and Honduras have adopted, for general practice, the MCC's transparent procurement methodology (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 24; Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016.).

Until 2018, the MCC approved 33 compacts in 27 countries, totaling more than 11 billion dollars. Projects have emphasized infrastructure, especially transportation, a sector which accumulated 26% of MCC funds until September 2017. The second main sector funded was agriculture, with 17% of outlays. Most investments were directed to sub-Saharan Africa, which has received most of MCC spending. On February 24, 2016, the MCC released a document entitled 'Next: A Strategy for MCC's Future'. The strategy reviews and reaffirms the MCC model and the principles on which that model is based, and it also establishes several priority goals for the following years (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 19).

2.3.5. Department of Defense (DoD)

The Department of Defense has long played a role in US foreign aid initiatives. Since at least the 19th century, US military forces have provided support to stabilize emergency situations in times of crises, such as earthquakes and floods. More recently, US military forces have also provided aid to man-made disasters such as famines and forced population movements. The aid the DoD provides ranges from logistical support to the provision of low-cost humanitarian daily rations. These actions are funded through the Overseas Humanitarian,

Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account and implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is the central DoD body for global security cooperation programs (Serafino, 2008: *Summary*; Margesson, 2013).

Opinions about the appropriate non-combat role for the US military have evolved over time. After 9/11, the US government became inclined to use military staff in preventive, deterrent, and preemptive activities. This strategy expanded the DoD's role in foreign assistance activities stemming from the perception that the DoD was in a privileged position to respond to international emergencies. Its massive staff by far exceeded (and it still does it today) the ones of the State Department and USAID, allowing it to gather more manpower to carry out aid activities.

In 2018, the military had more than 200,000 personnel deployed to more than 700 overseas posts. By contrast, the State Department had around 70,000 people working in 250 embassies and consulates overseas, with roughly 65 percent of this being supporting positions occupied by non-Americans (Adams, 2018). Moreover, not only do commands have considerably more personnel than embassies, but their personnel are also oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering US policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact (Serafino, 2008: p. 23). Roughly, there are seven military employees for every civilian diplomat working on US policy toward Africa. But even when there are career diplomats specialized in Africa available for deployment, they are often overlooked in favor of military commanders (Rickman and Booker, 2018).

The DoD also has substantially larger budgetary resources. For instance, its annual budget is around 700 billion dollars (FY 2018), while the State Department's is approximately 50 billion (FY2018). Some argue, however, that although the DoD enjoys greater human and financial resources, these do not necessarily provide it with the needed competence and expertise to carry out foreign assistance activities. For many years, defense analysts have

stated that US military civilian affairs experts do not have the adequate skills-set to carry out the wide variety of tasks needed to foster international development (Serafino, 2008: p. 23)⁴⁷.

According to Yonatan Holz, former Reconstruction Team Member of the US Air Force⁴⁸, one advantage of using military officers in providing aid is that they already have personal relationships with local leaders. An essential part of the job of the military personnel deployed in the field consists of gathering local support to their presence and operations. They have routine visits and patrols to engage in a strategy called ‘key leader engagement’, in which they gather support for US military presence and information on what local needs are. According to Mr. Holz and his experience in Afghanistan, even UN agencies with large field presence, such as the WFP, ask the US military to help them taking donations to conflict and remote areas.

This is not to say that military officers are not aware of the implications of the Armed Forces providing aid. Mr. Holz acknowledges it is not good for ‘the hand giving aid to be the one pulling the trigger’. This can lead to the militarization of the United States’ image abroad and compromise the supposed neutrality of aid agencies, ultimately jeopardizing the safety of their personnel. Indeed, a key DoD document recognizes that state-building tasks may be ‘best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals.’ (DoD, 2005).

Therefore, even DoD officials have made it clear that Congress should provide the State Department and USAID with the resources to build their capacity to carry out foreign assistance. In a speech in 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advocated the strengthening of civilian agencies: ‘It has become clear that America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long — relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.’ He also stated that the

⁴⁷ Military officers were by criticized US civilian agencies’ personnel for being ‘poorly trained in information gathering’ and seldomly having in-depth regional or linguistic expertise (CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007 *apud*. Serafino, 2008: p. 23), both essential skills and requirements for promoting in successful sustainable development projects.

⁴⁸ Informal conversation granted on December 6th, 2018, at Washington, DC.

percentage of the federal budget destined to these vital activities was small compared to the rest of the government (DoD, 2008; Serafino, 2008: p. 23).

Another criticism regarding the potentially detrimental role of the DoD in foreign aid is related to its lack of coordination with the State Department and other aid agencies. The DoD's increasing engagement in foreign assistance adds yet another actor to a cluttered cast of aid organizations in the US government (Lancaster 2008a: p. 9). There is also criticism regarding the DoD's failure to ensure its programs' sustainability. In view of the priorities and goals that guide the Armed Forces, the policy rationale for US military aid is to ensure US national security. Thus, promoting sustainable international development is not – as it should not be – the focus of their initiatives.

Not only may the use of DoD in aid be ineffective in promoting foreign policy goals, it may also impede their advancement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of December 2006 stated that the usage of DoD personnel for counter-terrorism programs was being considered suspicious in Latin America, 'making it difficult to pursue meaningful cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda.'⁴⁹ In 2007, another analyst claimed that 'African publics and governments have already begun to complain that US engagement is increasingly military' (Loftus *apud*. Serafino, 2008: p.23). It should be obvious that the military cannot be the foundation of US relations with the African continent. The DoD may provide weapons, training and vehicles to African militaries, but it cannot offer trade deals, and it can poorly offer infrastructure or agriculture projects (Booker and Rickman, 2018). There has been a growing unease in Africa with US militarism, which is tangible in the refusal of African countries to host the US Africa Command, causing it to be headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany (Booker and Rickman, 2018).

2.4. Assessing Aid Outlays

In absolute terms, the United States accounts for the largest ODA donor in the world, giving about 24% of all official development assistance in 2017⁵⁰ (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018:

⁴⁹ Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign a Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States. Senate Richard G. Lugar, Chairman One Hundred Ninth Congress Second Session December 15, 2006. P. 12 Available at: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT31324/pdf/CPRT-109SPRT31324.pdf> (accessed on: January 14, 2019)

⁵⁰ This data takes into account only donations registered by OECD.


Summary). The current US foreign aid system was created by the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which attempted to streamline the government's efforts to provide assistance around the world. Its statute defines aid as "unilateral transfers of US resources by the US Government to or for the benefit of foreign entities" (USA, 1961). These resources include not just cash transfers and commodities, but also technical assistance, educational programming, health care, and others.

Implementing mechanisms also vary and they can include direct hires, contracts, loans, grants and others. However, in recent decades, assistance has been provided almost exclusively on a grant basis. Recipients include foreign governments, foreign militaries and security forces, as well as local businesses and charitable groups, international organizations such as the United Nations, and other nongovernmental organizations (McBride, 2018).

The 1990s represent the lowest point for US aid flows. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fading of the communist threat, aid levels were cut substantially. In 1997 they were less than 20 billion dollars, which corresponded to 0.8 percent of the total federal budget. However, in 2016, US foreign assistance was estimated at 49 billion dollars, or 1.2% of the overall budget. About 48% of this assistance was for bilateral economic development programs, including political/strategic economic assistance; 33% for military aid and non-military security assistance; 14% for humanitarian activities; and 5% to support the work of multilateral institutions (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: *Summary*). Thus, aid funding levels have been at their highest since the period immediately following World War II, when the United States invested heavily in rebuilding Western European economies (*Id.*).

According to US official nomenclature, foreign aid encompasses economic assistance and military assistance. Economic assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs with a development or humanitarian objective. Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. The majority of US aid is comprised of economic assistance.

Figure 2.1. US Foreign Assistance in billions (in constant 2017 US dollars)



Source: Made by the author (USAID, 2017b)⁵¹

Development aid programs foster sustainable, broad-based economic progress and sociopolitical stability in developing countries, while humanitarian aid programs focus on the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies, both natural and man-made disasters, as well as problems resulting from conflict associated with failed or failing states. Economic assistance captures US voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations, non-military security assistance, as well as humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the Department of Defense (USAID, 2017c).


The evaluation of US aid focused on US economic assistance, especially Official development assistance (ODA), which is defined by the OCDE as ‘government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries’ and excludes loans and credits for military purposes.

As aforementioned, the US foreign aid rose from the 2000s onwards. In current dollars, US aid was higher in 2005 than at any time in US history, even deducting the outlays for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This increase has lifted the US out of bottom place on OECD donor’s list as a percentage of Gross National Income - GNI (Lancaster, 2008a). Figure 2.2 shows the increase of Official Development Assistance in 2005, reaching a peak of 33.8 billion. With the exception of 2006 and 2007 when ODA decreased, in all other years, aid outlays remained close to (or over) 30s billions, which is double what it was until 2001.

⁵¹ The data from USAID that the table was based on is on US aid obligations, which are binding agreements resulting in outlays (disbursements), immediately or in the future.

Figure 2.2 also corroborates that although the Obama administration did not manage to surpass the 2005 peak, it kept donations high even in a much more adverse financial scenario domestically and internationally.


Figure 2.2. United States ODA in USD billion



Source: Made by the author (OECD, 2019).

Aid may be provided multilaterally, when given to a multilateral organization, such as the United Nations or the World Bank, or it can be given bilaterally, directly from donor to recipient, or it can be given bilaterally to projects implemented by a multilateral development agency, which OECD calls ‘multi-bi/non-core contributions’. Traditionally, the US allocates most of its aid in bilateral programs. From 2010 to 2016, approximately 80% of US ODA was provided bilaterally, from which 20% was bilateral but implemented by multilateral organizations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).


Figure 2.3. Breakdown of ODA in 2010-16 and distribution of multilateral and multi-bi ODA in 2016, gross disbursements, United States



Source: Made by the author (OECD, 2018)

The UN Millennium Development Goals of 2000 and the Monterrey Consensus (2002) established a level of 0.7% GNI as a target for developed countries to donor to foster international development through Official Development Assistance (ODA) (OECD, 2020). As shown by Figure 2.4, the aid given by the US throughout the decade 2006 to 2016 remained between 0.15% to 0.20% of its GNI. This demonstrates that despite the US being the single largest donor, proportionately to the size of its economy and its national income, the aid it gives it is relatively small, since it is far below the UN goal. If one considers the aid in percentage of GNI, the US leading position as donor falls down several spots, losing to Sweden, Luxemburg, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Belgium, Austria, France, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Japan, Portugal, and Italy. The US aid is smaller even than the medium of DAC countries' aid, which is between 0.27% to 0.32% of GNI (OECD, 2018).

Figure 2.4. US ODA in Billion USD, 2015 constant prices, and as a share of GNI



Source: OECD (2018)

In the longer view, agricultural development aid disbursements over recent decades suggest that agricultural development became a higher priority within the foreign assistance budget, increasing from 2.2% of total economic aid in 2005 to 4.5% in 2015, and notably higher in real dollar terms than a decade prior. This trend began in the later years of the George W. Bush Administration and was maintained by the Obama Administration, even in the face of some early resistance in Congress (CRS Report, 2017: p.9).

Most of US global aid goes to Africa, more specifically to Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia has been the largest African recipient of Official Development Assistance from the United States

in the total net disbursements period of 2006-2015 (approximately 6.465 billion USD)⁵². Therefore, it was chosen to be a case study in this Dissertation (OCDE, 2017: p. 76; OCDE, 2011: p. 66).

2.5. Presidential Diplomacy

After the Cold War ended, US foreign aid started a long period of inactivity, when aid's value as a diplomatic and national security instrument was disregarded. President George W. Bush halted this trend and brought US foreign aid to the limelight. Some consider that his administration represented 'a combination of transformation and chaos' in the US foreign aid system (Lancaster, 2008a). Regardless of whether the changes were positive or negative, one thing is certain: it was the most ambitious renovation of US aid since President Kennedy.

In 2002, Bush announced the new National Security Strategy (NSS), which declared international development was a foreign policy priority, along with defense and diplomacy. This was the first time, for many decades, that a US president promoted international development as a key priority for both foreign policy and foreign aid (Lancaster, 2008a). Similar priorities were showcased in the NSS during his second term, in 2006 (The White House, 2006).

Internationally, the United Nations had a major Conference on Financing Development, which was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002. There, President Bush pledged to increase US aid by 5 billion dollars per year until 2006 and announced the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a new aid agency. These were Bush's deliverables in a Conference marked by European leaders' declarations of aid budget-increases and Bono Vox's participation stressing the importance of aid to combat poverty (Lancaster, 2008a: p.16).

Bush profited from favorable external and domestic situations to propose his foreign aid makeover. Development gained international momentum with the Monterrey Conference, while, internally, both houses of the US Congress were controlled by the Republican Party.

⁵² Sudan was ranked as second with 6.295 billion USD and Kenya in third with 6.139 billion USD. (OCDE, 2017; OCDE, 2011).

Besides, the fresh memory of the 9/11 attacks served as a reminder to a customarily aid-skeptical and aid-averse public opinion that problems abroad could produce terrible consequences at home. This sentiment remained present in Bush's second term and inspired his new diplomatic approach.

In his inaugural speech, in January 2005, President Bush declared that 'the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. (...) So, it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.' (The White House, 2005). This speech was translated into a new policy, presented in 2006 by his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a speech at Georgetown University: 'To achieve this bold mission, America needs equally bold diplomacy, a diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself.' This was the basis of Bush's 'transformational diplomacy', of which foreign assistance was to be an essential component (Lancaster, 2008a: p.29).

Part of the 'transformational diplomacy' reform included the 'dual hatting' of the USAID administrator, who also became the director of US foreign assistance, a new role that gave the administrator authority over not only the USAID budget, but of foreign assistance budgets located in the Department of State as well. Also, part of this reform was the integration of USAID into the State Department structure. Thus, the USAID administrator was to report to the Secretary of State.

Regarding Bush's discourse, foreign aid and promoting development was a reoccurring theme. On January 23, 2007, at the State of the Union Address, he called Congress 'to take on the challenges of hunger and poverty and disease' (Bush, 2007: p. 474). He constantly stressed the importance and innovation of the MCC: 'We've also changed the way we deliver aid by launching the Millennium Challenge Account. This program strengthens democracy, transparency, and the rule of law in developing nations, and I ask you to fully fund this important initiative' (Bush, 2008).

The fight against hunger was also present in his statements, such as the 2008 State of the Union Address: 'America is leading the fight against global hunger. Today, more than half

the world's food aid comes from the United States'. And in his address to the White House Summit on International Development, on October 21, 2008: 'I believe our nation is better when we help people fight hunger and disease and illiteracy' (Bush, 2008: p. 525-540).

The increased commitment to promote development in Africa was mentioned in February 2008, when Bush was leaving for his fourth trip to the African continent. In the Smithsonian National Museum of African Art, he reinforced that his new approach to foreign aid was pioneering a new era in development, treating 'African leaders as equal partners, asking them to set clear goals, and expecting them to produce measurable results. For their part, more African leaders are willing to be held to high standards.' (Bush, 2008: p.544).

Bush also renovated the terms traditionally used to describe US donor-receiver relations with African countries: 'America is serving as an investor, not a donor.' (*Id.*, p. 545). His renewed model of aid would 'foster sustainable economic growth, and promote good governance, and advance a model of true partnership that gives poor nations a real stake in their own development' (Bush, 2008: p. 592).

At the beginning of President Bush's second term, he promised to double US international assistance again by 2010. In his address to the White House Summit on International Development, on October 21, 2008, he stressed that his administration made international development one of their biggest priorities: 'For the past eight years, the United States has provided more foreign assistance than at any time in the past half century.' (*Id.*, p. 592).

It is worth noting Bush mentioning local procurement as the most suitable way to combat hunger: 'And tonight, I ask Congress to support an innovative proposal to provide food assistance by purchasing crops directly from farmers in the developing world, so we can build up local agriculture and help break the cycle of famine' (Bush, 2008: p. 539). Again in the White House Summit on International Development, on October 21, 2008: 'I believe that as the United States moves forward, we ought to purchase up to a quarter of our food from local farmers. In other words, of all the food aid we get we ought to take a quarter of that, and purchase the food directly from local farmers. If it's in our interest to help build a local agricultural industry, then instead of just giving food, we ought to purchase food from the farmers themselves, to help build a vibrant agricultural sector in parts of the world where

food is desperately needed. And I support the World Bank's strategy to increase investment in agriculture.' (*Id.*, p. 594).

All in all, Bush's presidential diplomacy devoted unexpected attention to international and African development. Hunger, which has not traditionally been a priority theme in US foreign policy, continued to have secondary importance. For instance, in a White House compilation of 71 speeches given by Bush, totaling around 600 pages, hunger was mentioned only 9 times. On the other hand, Africa appeared 51 times.

When Barack Obama took charge of the US presidency on January 20, 2009, the international community was leaving a major food price crisis (2007–08), which led international agricultural commodity-prices to spike. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that from June 2007 to June 2008, its food price index increased by 44%, with wheat and rice prices increasing by 90% and maize prices by 35% (CRS Report, 2017: p.9), which led the number of people facing hunger worldwide to reach historical levels.

Despite all international attention drawn to food security issues, Obama's Inaugural Address focused on other affairs and the theme was barely mentioned:

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders, nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it (Macon, 2009).

In 2009, at the G8 Summit in Italy, G8 donors launched the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (LFSI), pledging to give 22 billion dollars to enhance smallholder agriculture in developing countries in the three following years. This was the opportunity for Obama to unveil what would be the main foreign aid initiative of his administration: Feed the Future (FtF). Obama pledged to provide a minimum of 3.5 billion dollars to FtF (from FY2010 to FY2012), which would integrate the Global Partnership to promote agricultural gains and food security in developing countries.

In May 2010, the Department of State rendered FtF official. According to the Obama Administration, the initiative's goal was to sustainably reduce hunger and poverty by

‘addressing the root causes of hunger that limit the potential of millions of people,’ and by ‘establishing a lasting foundation for aligning our resources with country-owned processes and sustained, multi-stakeholder partnerships’ (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011: p. 1). In November 2010, the Bureau for Food Security within USAID was established to lead FtF’s implementation (Tumusiime and Cohen, 2016: p. 5; CRS Report, 2017: p. 9).

At the London G20 Summit in 2009, President Obama announced his desire to take part in a new global food security initiative, which would take form in the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). Obama stated that the United States was ready to lead in this endeavor: ‘In the coming days, I intend to work with Congress to provide 448 million dollars in immediate assistance to vulnerable populations - from Africa to Latin America - and to double support for food security to over 1 billion dollar so that we are giving people the tools they need to lift themselves out of poverty. We will also support the United Nations and World Bank as they coordinate the rapid assistance necessary to prevent humanitarian catastrophe.’ He concluded adding that those efforts were not ‘just charity’ but attempts to strengthen ‘future markets for all countries, and future drivers of world economic growth’ (Obama, 2009).

In November 2009, the World Food Security Summit took place, which included a keynote speech from Pope Benedict XVI and speeches from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf. Sixty Heads of State and Government and 192 ministers, from 182 countries and the European Community attended the Summit at FAO’s headquarters in Rome. However, President Obama, as well as all the leaders of the G8, with the exception of the Italian Prime Minister, failed to attend (A. Yngve *et al.*, 2010: p. 151). The Summit adopted five key principles that constitute the foundation for collective and global action on agricultural development and food security. Known as the Rome Principles, they were followed by the Obama Administration’s FtF: ‘supporting comprehensive strategies; investing through country-owned plans; improving stronger coordination among donors; leveraging effective multilateral institutions; and delivering on sustained and accountable commitments’ (CRS Report, 2017: p.9).

Responding to the demand made by the leaders of the G20 at the London meeting of 2009, in January of the following year, the World Bank Board approved the creation of the Global

Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Trust Fund. The Program was launched on April 22, 2010, with commitments from the United States, Canada, South Korea, Spain, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among others. The fund mobilized public and private resources to scale up agricultural assistance to low-income countries, fostering more effective public and private sector investment in the agricultural and rural sectors. Financial commitments to the GAFSP Trust Fund on January 31, 2011, totaled 925.2 million dollars and by the end of 2017, its portfolio had grown to 1.4 billion dollars, with the US being its main contributor, giving an estimate of 653 million dollars to the fund⁵³ (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011: p. 3).

In September 2010, at the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit, President Obama urged donor countries to maintain development assistance to poor nations out of self-interest:

I suspect that some in wealthier countries may ask, 'With our economies struggling, so many people out of work, and so many families barely getting by, why a summit on development?' The answer is simple. In our global economy, progress in even the poorest countries can advance the prosperity and security of people far beyond their borders, including my fellow Americans.

Let's put to rest the old myth that development is mere charity that does not serve our interests,' he said. 'And let's reject the cynicism that says certain countries are condemned to perpetual poverty. (Wilson, 2010)

Obama also argued in favor of shifting the focus of US aid from the short to the long term: 'Our focus on assistance has saved lives in the short term, but it hasn't always improved those societies over the long term,' the president said. 'Consider the millions of people who have relied on food assistance for decades. That's not development, that's dependence, and it's a cycle we need to break' (*Ibid*).

At that occasion, Obama joined UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Government of Ireland, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and several non-profit organizations and world leaders to launch the 1,000 Days Initiative, a partnership to scale up action and investment

⁵³ The project was active in 41 countries, with approximately 63 percent of its funds in Africa (GAFSP, 2017).

towards improving women's and children's nutrition throughout the world⁵⁴ (FAO, 2011; Thousand days, n.d).

On May 18, 2012, the Remarks by the President at the Symposium on Global Agriculture and Food Security in Washington, exhibited elements of continuity of the US rationale for addressing food insecurity and giving aid. Obama called food security a moral and economic imperative:

History teaches us that one of the most effective ways to pull people and entire nations out of poverty is to invest in their agriculture. And as we've seen from Latin America to Africa to Asia, a growing middle class also means growing markets, including more customers for US exports that support American jobs. So, we have a self-interest in this. (White House, 2012)

This reinforces the United States' long-lasting justification for aid, one that was present even before the foundation of USAID in 1961: as boosting America's exports and economy. The President also reiterated the argument of his predecessor, George W. Bush, linking food insecurity and poverty to international instability and the national security of the United States. During the event, the US President launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which was set out to

reaffirm continued donor commitment to reducing poverty and hunger; accelerate implementation of key components of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP); leverage the potential of responsible private investment to support development goals; help lift 50 million people out of poverty in Africa by 2022; achieve sustained inclusive, agriculture-led growth in Africa. (New Alliance, n.d.)

For Obama, the initiative reinforced his administration's commitment to continue making substantial investments in development, even in tough fiscal times, and called the private sector to join governmental efforts.

When taking office for his second mandate, Obama's Inaugural Address of January 20, 2013, did not mention hunger, development or food security, and only mentioned Africa once:

We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on

⁵⁴ Thousand days Org, n.d. About Our Story: *Since day one, we've been fighting to give mothers and children a healthy first 1,000 days.* Available at: <https://thousanddays.org/about-our-story/>.

behalf of those who long for freedom. And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice — not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity, human dignity and justice.

This should not come as a surprise, since the inauguration address is mainly directed at the domestic audience, one that is known for caring little about foreign policy and even less about foreign aid.

On June 26, 2013, Obama left for a trip to Africa, visiting three countries: Senegal, South Africa, and Tanzania. Among other issues, the visit focused on African economic development and US-African trade and investment. The president was accompanied by the US Trade Representative Michael Froman and several American CEOs. However, the trip was criticized for being ‘too little too late’, as many argued that Africa had been overlooked by the White House, whose top concern with bringing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end overshadowed African affairs (Campbell, 2013).

In the following year, the Obama administration displayed more willingness to prioritize Africa and make up for the apparent negligence during the first term. In August 2014, Washington hosted the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, the largest event a US president ever organized for African Heads of State. The Summit reaffirmed the administration’s focus on trade and investment (Kimenyi, 2013). Discussions centered on how to encourage progress in key areas for the continent’s future: engaging youth, fostering inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, expanding cooperation in peace and security, and how to secure a better future for Africa’s next generation (The White House, 2014a, 2014b).

On July 20, 2016, President Obama organized the White House Summit on Global Development, in which entrepreneurs, diplomats, civil society members, public and private sector financing partners, and development leaders, gathered to find ways to catalyze further development in six key areas: ‘energy, food security, global health, governance, partnership, and youth’ (The White House, 2016). On the occasion, Obama signed the Global Food Security Act of 2016 into law, institutionalizing the Feed the Future program (Public Law No: 114-195). Among the goals of the bill enshrined in Section 3, it specifies that ‘it is in the US national interest to promote global food security, resilience, and nutrition, consistent with

national food security investment plans through programs and activities that: demonstrably meet, align with, and leverage U.S strategies and investments in trade, economic growth, national security, science and technology, agriculture research and extension, maternal and child health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene'⁵⁵.

Over the eight years of his administration, Obama helped reshape the US approach to development by enhancing inter-agency coordination and partnerships with corporations, foundations, universities, NGOs, and faith-based communities (White House, 2016). In a nutshell, Obama's presidential diplomacy pushed for a foreign aid agenda focused on redefining development aid as a national security tool, further engaging the private sector in aid ('the government cannot do it alone'). Therefore, by focusing on the long-term, it sought to make aid more efficient and coordinated as a whole.

Many were the continuities between the two leaders. Both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations aimed at improving aid's efficiency by increasing flexibility in the use of aid funding, directing it towards cash-based assistance. In this sense, greater expediency, lower costs and attention to local food preferences when responding to international emergencies became integrated priorities. However, this initiative faced the opposition of US commodity producers and naval transportation companies that persistently advocated for keeping in-kind transfers as the US main aid approach (Schnepf, 2016: p. 3).

Some changes of focus are noticeable between the two administrations. Most of Obama's African programs were geared towards trade and development, while President Bush policies seemed to be directed more towards humanitarian assistance for the Sub-Saharan region. Nonetheless, their presence on the African continent was of similar intensity. While Bush made 48 international trips to 73 different countries - 11 of which were African, Obama made 52 international trips to 58 different countries, visiting 9 African nations (Department of State, n.d.-b; n.d.-c). Bush met 25 African Heads of State in his first two years in office, which represented an unprecedented level of engagement with the continent by an American

⁵⁵ For more on the Global Food Security Act of 2016 see: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1252> (accessed on: January 12, 2018).

president (Okumu *et al.*, 2018: p. 430-436), while Obama hosted the US-Africa Leaders' Summit, which welcomed 50 African leaders (White House, 2014a, 2014b; All Africa, 2014).

2.6. The Ethiopian example

Ethiopia is the second most populous African nation, only behind Nigeria. As of January 2019, its population was comprised of approximately 109 million people (US Congress, 2016). The average age is 18 years old, with 43 percent of the population younger than 15 years old (CIA, n.d.) and 65% younger than 25 (WorldoMeter, 2020⁵⁶; African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 8), comprising the largest share of young people in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of the fastest growing populations in the world, with an annual growth rate of around 2.5%, which means the population doubles every 27 years. Its diversity is evidenced by the more than 80 groups that make up the Ethiopian people, with the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray constituting the majority (Mussa, 2010: p.2). One key fact of Ethiopia's demographics is that only 21 percent of the population is urban, with 78.9 percent still living in rural areas, as in January 2019 (*Ibid*).

This gives an assessment of the centrality of agriculture to the livelihood of more than two-thirds of the population. The agricultural sector employed 72% of the labor force and accounted for 34.8 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017⁵⁷. Despite significant progress during the last two decades in restoring its degraded lands and improving productivity (Reij, 2015), Ethiopian agriculture is still based on subsistence, relying on rain-fed farming and archaic techniques in small and fragmented landholdings. There are discussions on whether archaic techniques are inappropriate, or if previous interventions interfered in local ecosystems and communitarian land structure making rural populations more vulnerable. The argument is that, although archaic, traditional knowledge and technology could be more efficient in preventing rural exodus and food insecurity (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2; Mussa, 2010: p. 10).

Discussions aside, as finding out the roots and causes of Ethiopia's agricultural reality is beyond the scope of this Dissertation, the fact is that Ethiopian farmers are particularly

⁵⁶ Based on the latest United Nations estimates.

⁵⁷ Recently, services have surpassed agriculture as the principal source of GDP, accounting for 43.6%. (CIA, n.d.).

vulnerable to environmental phenomena, such as droughts and soil infertility. These factors, combined with a growing and poor population with limited employment opportunities, resulted in Ethiopia being one of the most chronically food-insecure countries in the world (Awokuse, 2014: p. 54), with about 23 million people living below the poverty line (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 7).

In recent decades alone, Ethiopia faced five major droughts: in 1984-85, 1990-92, 1999-2000, 2002-03, and 2009-11. The famine of 1984-85 captured great international attention due to its huge toll on human lives (Awokuse, 2014: p. 54). At those critical moments, the flow of food aid rose to address the extent of the emergencies the country was going through. But the engagement of the international community remained active for a long time after the crisis. Instead of serving as a temporary mechanism to provide relief to emergency needs, food aid became a chronic necessity to sustain segments of the population (Mussa, 2010: p. 2; Humphrey, 1998: p. 1). It is estimated that 10-15% of the population is dependent upon humanitarian aid to survive. From 2001 to 2010, food donations to Ethiopia accounted for around 450 million dollars per year, which represented 91% of the humanitarian aid given to the country⁵⁸ and 10 percent of total domestic cereal production⁵⁹ (Awokuse, 2014: p. 54). In 2014, aid to Ethiopia reached 3.2 billion dollars (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 13).

Notwithstanding, all the aid did not prevent Ethiopia from being among the poorest countries in the world, ranking 173th out of 188 countries in the UN Human Development Index (UNDP, 2020). One reason that contributes to the exacerbation of poverty in Ethiopia is its poor infrastructure. Despite increases in foreign investment over the past few years, Ethiopia's infrastructure remains one of the least developed in Africa (Mussa, 2010: p. 3-5). On the other hand, the Ethiopian economy has one of the highest growth rates of the continent, with a GDP that multiplied ten-fold in 17 years, going from 8.2 billion dollars in 2000 to 80.5 billion in 2017⁶⁰. All sectors of the economy took part in the economic expansion. From 2004 onwards, agriculture grew by 8% a year, while industry grew by 12.9%, and services by 12.9% on average (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2).

⁵⁸ In 2009.

⁵⁹ From 1993 to 2003.

⁶⁰ GDP in current US dollars at purchaser's prices (World Bank, 2019b).

Exports also rose significantly, from 0.6 billion dollars in 2004 to 3.25 billion in 2011. However, simultaneously, imports increased four-fold, largely driven by capital goods, resulting in increasing trade deficits ⁶¹ (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2).

Unfortunately, Ethiopian economic progress has not been followed by structural transformation. The manufacturing sector continued to account for a minor share of GDP, and the private sector remained restricted by bureaucratic limitations. The high level of public investment crowded out the private sector and widened the investment-saving gap. All these limitations contributed to the economic growth having limited capacity to significantly reduce the parcel of the population below the poverty line, which in 2015 accounted for 23.5%⁶². Moreover, the African Development Bank predicts that future sustainable growth will be hindered by low indexes of human capital, institutional capacity and agricultural productivity (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2).

2.6.1. Background of Ethiopian Agricultural Policies

The period of Emperor Haile Selassie's autocracy was marked by human rights abuses and wide-spread famines, with the regime being accused of denying food to people living in dissident regions. The main instrument to deal with food insecurity was food hand-outs, which neither addressed the roots of hunger nor alleviated dependence on aid. With the fall of the military regime in 1991, and the creation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995, a process of decentralization and community empowerment was initiated (WFP, 2011).

In 1992, Ethiopia launched the Economic Reform Program (ERP), which implemented market orientated policies (e.g. devaluation of the birr, trade liberalization, prudent fiscal policy) to spur economic growth. The Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) was the key development strategy of the ERP, bringing agriculture to the limelight of the Ethiopian development agenda (Mussa, 2010: p.5). While ADLI saw some success

⁶¹ The overall balance of payments was not significantly affected. Its deficit was mitigated by surpluses in services and capital account. Private transfers, including remittances, also offset import rise (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2).

⁶² As defined by the World Bank: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines in % of population (World Bank, 2019b).

and fostered agricultural growth, the increase in productivity was below the population growth rate, which led to declining per capita rates of productivity and increasing criticism of the program (Mussa, 2010: p.5).


In October 1993, the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy established a new approach to address food insecurity aimed at changing the practice of distributing food hand-outs to the population. The new framework was called Food for Work (FFW) and it stated that no able-bodied person should receive gratuitous relief. Instead, FFW required participants to labor in exchange for food wages. The strategy was complemented by the provision of free food aid for those who could not work. The official goal was to expand work-based food aid to the point where it accounted for 80% of all distributions (WFP, 1995), but this level was never achieved⁶³.

The FFW aimed at being a transition between emergency relief and long-term development. The work was channeled to labor-intensive activities, such as road construction and afforestation, or income generating activities, like vegetable gardens. Therefore, besides addressing emergency food needs, FFW projects had a double goal: to create self-sustaining livelihoods tackling food supply shortenings and to improve local infrastructure, both of which would strengthen the community's capacity to endure droughts and other shocks (Humphrey, 1998: p. 1).

The Ethiopian government also developed an extension of the FFW approach consubstantiated in the concept of cash-for-work (CFW). In this variation, the project's participants were paid in money rather than food (Humphrey, 1998: p. 1). Figure 2.5 presents a scheme of FFW and its variants.

⁶³ In 1995/96, only 35% of aid involved work in exchange for food (Clay, Molla, and Habtewold, 1999).

Figure 2.5. Food-for-Work and related project types in Ethiopia



Source: Humphrey, 1998: p. 5

This approach has been integrated into Ethiopian programs against poverty. In the last decades, the government brought about several plans and strategies related to food security. The main initiatives in this area were the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP), spanning from 2002 to 2005, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), from 2005 to 2010, the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), from 2010 to 2015, and, finally, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), which was launched in January 2005 and has been renewed since then (Haile, 2015: p. 13; Cochrane and Tamiru, 2016).

The PSNP draws a conceptual distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity. Although responses to famine have been dominated by emergency food aid, in reality, a high proportion of families that receive food aid every year are not at risk of famine, but are chronically food insecure, that is, they are permanently unable to meet their food needs due to poverty rather than food scarcity. Thus, there are two groups of food insecure Ethiopians: the unpredictably and the predictably food insecure. The goal of the PSNP was to support

people facing chronic food deficits, transferring their needs from emergency programs and alleviating the burden over humanitarian relief programs. The PSNP represented a clear improvement in the way the government dealt with food insecurity, as it focused on a long-term and sustainable solution (Rahmato, Pankhurst and van Uffelen, 2013; Devereux *et al.*, 2006).

Therefore, PSNP operated by providing ‘predictable transfers to meet predictable needs’. Instead of receiving food aid only during crises, predictably food insecure families received transfers on a regular basis for a period of up to five years. The aid was given until these families were better able to cope with shocks and were considered food sufficient, thus being able to graduate from the program (Devereux *et al.*, 2008). The two main principles of the program were predictability and avoiding dependence. The first sought to honor the commitment to reliably delivering aid to the qualified households until they graduated. The second relates to the aforementioned FFW framework, which requires households with adult labor capacity to participate in public projects in return for transfers.

Ethiopia’s PSNP is the second largest in Africa, losing only to the one implemented by South Africa. When it was launched in 2005, it supported approximately five million people living in 262 chronically food insecure *woredas*⁶⁴; by 2015, the program reached seven million people and expanded its operations to 319 districts (Rahmato, Pankhurst, and van Uffelen, 2013; Cochrane and Tamiru, 2016: p. 650).

Assessments of PSNP’s impact have yielded positive results (Cochrane and Tamiru, 2016: p. 650). The program was found to have maintained or increased the assets of participating households and to have lifted 1.4 million people out of extreme poverty⁶⁵. It was also credited with having enabled Ethiopia to avoid a mass famine episode during the severe 2010/11 drought, an accomplishment reiterated by the US government, PSNP’s main international funder. President Obama mentioned that he took pride that no emergency relief was needed during the 2010-11 drought in the 2012 Symposium on Global Agriculture and Food

⁶⁴ *Woreda* is an administrative unit of the Ethiopian government which is equivalent to what would be called a district.

⁶⁵ USAID-Ethiopia. Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2011 – 2015: Accelerating the Transformation Toward Prosperity. Public version March 2012

Security⁶⁶. The Ethiopian government plans to expand the program to reach 10 million beneficiaries by 2020 and to sustainably lift half of them out of extreme poverty (OECD, 2018: p. 62).

PSNP integrated Ethiopia's efforts to boost the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Besides funding from the Ethiopian government, the programs counted on the financial support of the international community and development partners (Haile, 2015: p. 14; Mussa, 2010: p.5-6; Report MoFED, 2005: p.1). Unlike aid programs from the past, whose funding and implementation remained under the responsibility of international donors, the program's approach was developed within a broader shift in Africa, with greater engagement by local governments.

Despite having gone through rounds of consultations with civil society, non-government actors, and partners, especially PASDEP, the plans still faced criticism of being top-down and not allowing civil society organizations and the private sector to play an essential role in providing substantial comments to improve the documents (Haile, 2015: p. 14). Moreover, Cochrane and Tamiru (2016), found in their study that PSNP's execution diverged from its formal guidelines in what concerned participatory activities, consistently excluding civil society. This demonstrates that, in spite of social improvements in many areas, the making and the implementation of social policies in Ethiopia is still a closed process dominated by government officials. The government remained largely coercive and intimidating in the way it conducted its affairs⁶⁷.

2.6.2. The US aid in Ethiopia

Decades ago, few people would have predicted that Ethiopia, which had been for decades a key ally to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), would become the US's largest African recipient of development assistance (OCDE, 2017: p. 76; OCDE, 2011: p. 66)⁶⁸.

⁶⁶ 'So we take pride in the fact that, because of smart investments in nutrition and agriculture and safety nets, millions of people in Kenya and Ethiopia did not need emergency aid in the recent drought.' (White House, 2012).

⁶⁷ Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 5-057 0. House of Representatives Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, October 16, 1985.

⁶⁸ In from 2006 to 2015, it received approximately 6.465 billion USD. Sudan was ranked as second with 6.295 billion USD and Kenya in third with 6.139 billion USD. (OCDE, 2017; OCDE, 2011) Available at:

During the historical period when Ethiopia was governed by a military Marxist government, US engagement was reluctant at best, even when the African nation's population showed signs of going through widespread food deprivation. The flow of food aid to Ethiopia between 1981 and 1984 was extremely low in comparison with the one sent by the US to other drought-affected African nations. President Ronald Reagan went so far as to saying that his administration was going to terminate US food aid to Ethiopia by September 30, 1983. Washington justified its lack of engagement by blaming the Ethiopian government (and indirectly its Soviet sponsors) for its incapacity to respond to the needs of its own population (Riley, 2017: p.432-433).


As Jack Shepherd argued (1989), the Reagan administration deliberately delayed and withheld food aid from the Ethiopian government for almost 24 months, while providing aid to anti-government guerrillas, in an effort to undermine the Marxist regime (p. 6). But, as the catastrophe unfolded, the famine gained increasing international attention. The documentary *Seeds of Despair* and several BBC broadcasts (Gill, 2010: p. 38) ignited popular pressure for the US government to 'do something'. In January 1985, a public opinion survey from the Los Angeles Times found that more Americans were following the news on the Ethiopian famine than on the upcoming Super Bowl (Knecht, 2010: p. 180).

As a result, the White House gave in to domestic pressure and, in January 1985, the US government was spending significant amounts on relief for Ethiopia, causing it to become 'the largest official donor to the most doctrinaire Marxist country on the African continent' (Riley, 2017: p. 442). From 8.4 million dollars and 12,390 metric tons of food in FY1983, US aid went to 400 million and 787,000 tons in FY1985-86 (Riley, 2017: p. 442). Therefore, Ethiopia served as an example not only of the use of food aid as a foreign policy instrument, but also of the influence of public opinion on US aid.

In January 1989, George W. Bush reinstated the White House's policy of not providing development aid to a still-Marxist Ethiopia. Such a state of affairs would remain the same until May 1991, when the defeat of the Mengistu government by combined Eritrean and

Tigrayan forces ended the 17-year-old rule of the military (Riley, 2017: p.449). That was a turning point for US-Ethiopia bilateral relations.

Figure 2.6. Disbursements to Ethiopian programs made by US government in million dollars (2013 constant)



Source: made by the author (USAID, 2019b)⁶⁹.

As the goal of this Dissertation is to compare *horizontal* and *vertical* cooperation approaches, the analysis below will focus on the initiatives under the supervision of US government agencies. As shown by Figure 2.6, USAID accounts for most of the aid provided to Ethiopia. Since its foundation and signature into law, Feed the Future (FtF) has been USAID's flagship program. However, FtF is not a project *per se*, but a whole-of-government approach to coordinate and integrate all US projects regarding food security and agricultural development. Thus, the programs that are the main components of FtF will be considered, rather than the FtF program as a whole.

2.6.3. USDA's presence in Ethiopia

USDA has a small presence in Ethiopia, with the agency having no budget to operate in the country during some of the years studied (FY2004, FY2006, FY2011, FY2014 and FY2015). Its activities in Ethiopia are concentrated in the McGovern-Dole International Food for

⁶⁹ Available at: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/ETH?fiscal_year=2005&measure=Disbursements (accessed on: February 6, 2019)

Education and Child Nutrition (MGD) Program, implemented by a partnership with the Agriculture Cooperative Development International and the WFP (USAID, 2019b) 70.

In FY2015, the MGD Program fed 263,000 students at 590 primary schools from Afar and Somali regions, two of the most food-insecure areas in the country, supporting nearly 20 percent of the primary school student population in these regions. The school feeding ration was comprised of a fortified porridge made of a blend of corn and soy, in addition to a monthly take-home ration of vegetable oil for female students.

Besides the feeding component, the program included technical assistance, by training teachers and school administrators to build their capacity to increase the literacy of school-age children. It also distributed educational materials and improved facilities, by improving schools' infrastructure and increasing access to clean water and sanitation services.

According to the WFP, the program contributed to higher enrollment rates in both regions. From 2011 to 2014, student enrollment in Somali climbed from 64 to nearly 100 percent and in Afar it went from 35 to 60 percent. Targeted schools during this timeframe demonstrated a high, stable attendance rate of 97 percent (GAIN Report ET1605, 2016).

Figure 2.7. Preparation of school feeding ration



Source: GAIN Report N. ET1605 from February 5, 2016.


Figure 2.8. Students eating ration



Source: GAIN Report N. ET1605 from February 5, 2016.

Another USDA program in Ethiopia is Food for Progress (FFPr), which uses the proceeds of monetized food aid to support agricultural, economic or infrastructure development programs, thus improving agricultural productivity and expanding agricultural trade. As it can be seen in Figure 2.9, the program's funding for activities in Ethiopia has been limited and hectic, with nearly inexistent outlays in the years of 2006, 2011 and 2012.

Figure 2.9. Food for Progress in Ethiopia (Disbursements in million USD)



Source: made by the author (USAID, 2019b)

During the FFPr years in Ethiopia, it provided support mainly to the livestock and dairy sectors. The proceeds from the monetization of US food donations, mainly of wheat, were used to support the Feed Enhancement for Ethiopian Development (FEED) project. The

FEED program (ACDI-VOCA, 2020; ACDI-VOCA, 2020b; ACDI-VOCA/USAID, 2017) was implemented by ACDI/VOCA⁷¹, a non-profit organization based in Washington and founded by the US cooperative community. The FEED program is currently in its second phase. Both FEED I and II aimed to increase the incomes of smallholder farmers by improving the animal feeding sector (GAIN Report Number ET1517).

As to the positive impacts of the FFPr project, in 2015, the sale of 35 thousand metric tons of monetized wheat provided about 9.2 million dollars of proceeds that were given to FEED, which accounted for 70 percent of the 13 million dollars of FEED II 2015's budget. According to the Ethiopian businessman Nuredin Abdultife Abdu, who bought wheat through FFPr, the monetization is very much a 'win-win' for all involved, since it provides wheat to local markets which constantly face shortages and because it finances social programs (GAIN Report Number ET1517).

2.6.4. USAID programs in Ethiopia

From 1951 to 2013, USAID and predecessor agencies provided approximately 11.7 billion dollars in economic assistance to Ethiopia (USAID, 2020)⁷², making it the largest US governmental entity in the country with a diverse portfolio of projects. According to the OECD classification, the main area where USAID acts in Ethiopia is in emergency response, followed by Development Food Aid. Agriculture usually ranks 5th place among such expenditures. The top sector varies according to the challenges the country faces. During periods of drought, such as the 2015-2016 one caused by El Niño, USAID's assistance is almost entirely channeled towards emergency response. For instance, in FY2015, 84 percent of the aid budget for Ethiopia was directed to that sector (USAID, 2019b)⁷³.

The main program carried by USAID in Ethiopia is Food for Peace (FFP), especially its Title II. Usually, around 20% of Title II resources are destined to non-emergency food assistance activities, such as Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). As mentioned above, PSNP focuses on households that regularly face seasonal food shortages and it addresses

⁷¹ The acronym stands for Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI-VOCA, 2020b).

⁷² In 2013 constant dollars.

⁷³ 452 million dollars of a total of 538 million (USAID, 2019b).

food insecurity by strengthening household resilience to social, economic, and climate shocks, while simultaneously increasing access to economic opportunities. FFP non-emergency activities supporting the PSNP are estimated to have reached around 1.6 million people, injecting approximately 100 million dollars in the Ethiopian economy per year (US International Food Assistance Report FY 2016: p. 23).

The FFP supports the PSNP through Development Food Assistance Programs (DFAPs). There are four DFAPs, each one is implemented by a different NGO and is responsible for supporting a specific Ethiopian region: the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) acts in Dire Dawa and Oromia. The Food for the Hungry Ethiopia (FH/E) is in Amhara. The Relief Society of Tigray (REST) is in Tigray and Save the Children International (SCI) in Oromia and the Somali Region (Anderson, and Farmer, 2016; USAID, 2017). The DFAPs closely follow PSNP program implementation procedures, including the adherence to the pattern of up to five years of transfers of food or cash to targeted households. The transfers will be of food or cash depending on local conditions, such as productivity and market accessibility, but also on the donors, with the US donating mainly food and other international supporters, such as the World Bank, giving cash (USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy - Ethiopia 2012).

According to the Performance Evaluation report of Title II Funded Development Food Assistance Programs in Ethiopia of 2017, the goal of increasing short-term food security was reached, in the sense that households receiving transfers were more food secure than before. However, few of them became inherently capable of maintaining food self-sufficiency in the long run. Another contributing factor to the limited results of the DFAPs was the forced graduation from the program. Instead of being a consequence of households' self-sufficiency, the large graduating rate from the DFAPs was due to externally imposed quotas (USAID, p.54). These factors show the limitation of assistance programs in tackling the underlying causes of food insufficiency and in increasing long-term household productive capacity or purchasing power.

Traditionally, USAID emergency food assistance programs in Ethiopia have provided in-kind donations, mostly with rations of wheat and split peas. The first pilot program using

electronic cash transfers funded by USAID's FFP started in January 2017 in Ethiopia's northwest region (USAID FY2017 EFSP Report: p. 4).

The two main implementing partners of USAID's emergency food assistance in Ethiopia were the WFP and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS). In the Ethiopian highlands, the CRS led an Emergency Operation Program Consortium, composed of seven national and international partners. By 2016, the consortium had provided general food distributions for more than 2.9 million beneficiaries, reaching almost a third of those in need of emergency relief in the country. Simultaneously, in the lowlands of the Somali region, WFP concentrated emergency relief actions, reaching 1.5 million people. WFP was also in charge of the overall logistics of emergency operations. It managed supplies and it gave technical assistance to the local government, as they were responsible for directly delivering aid to around seven million people (FY 2016 US International Food Assistance Report).

2.7. Final Considerations

Ethiopia's position as one of the main receivers of food aid for decades has spurred debate on whether the vast amounts of international assistance sent to the country actually contributed to reducing the level of poverty, hunger, stunting and malnutrition (Awokuse, 2014: p. 54). It is clear that there has been steady improvement in the country's social indicators. For instance, the percentage of the Ethiopian population living below the national poverty line is declining, going from 38.7% in 2004 to 23.5% in 2015 (World Bank, 2019b), while the proportion of undernourished people fell from 75% in the early 1990s to 32% in 2015 (WFP USA, 2020). It is difficult to attribute these improvements to the Ethiopian government alone, especially since almost the totality of its public policies has counted on the support of international donors in general and of the United States in particular.

Evaluation reports of the programs supported by the US government in Ethiopia have generally yielded positive results. Since the Feed the Future initiative encompasses all governmental efforts in this area, an assessment of its results can serve as a basis for estimating the effect of US aid in Ethiopia. According to USAID's report for FY2016⁷⁴, more

⁷⁴ Although US official reports could represent partial results, the US government has developed in the last few decades robust methodologies and a system of constant evaluation and transparency of its foreign aid initiatives,

than 500 thousand local producers are using new technology and practices learned from US programs, which helped them to earn 35 million dollars in agricultural sales and leverage 19 million dollars in private investments. Furthermore, the report states that FtF provided nutritional assistance to 6 million Ethiopian children (FtF, n.d.).

The available data demonstrates that the US presence has contributed to alleviate circumstantial occurrences of hunger and poverty. However, the long-lasting effects of its aid are less evident. As explained before, due to the resistance of Congress to offer cash, the majority of the aid provided by the US government is still given as food donations. These large amounts of US agricultural commodities have raised concerns that they could generate adverse effects on Ethiopia's own grain production. One key negative consequence attributed to food aid is that, despite helping people in the short run, it may create food aid dependency in the long run (Yamano, 2000: p.1-2).

Another negative aspect of US aid is its exaggerated focus on humanitarian aid, rather than in development projects, which are designed to address the root causes of food insecurity. As mentioned above, only around 20% of the US main foreign aid funding, Food for Peace (FFP), is destined to non-emergency projects. Of this percentage, even less is directed to agriculture. For instance, in 2007, around 38% of all US assistance to Ethiopia went to emergency food relief, and 50% to HIV/AIDS related programs, but only 1.5% went to agriculture (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 128-131).

Such distorted profiles of development aid are the result of many factors. The decisions regarding fund allocations are determined by earmarks, presidential initiatives, diplomatic pressure, economic interests, and congressional lobby, among others. However, this failure is not only caused by US domestic politics, but it is also due to mounting international needs. Much of FFP aid, originally meant for use in food-security-focused development programs, has continuously been diverted from development projects to emergency relief, due to the increasing number of refugees, conflict-displaced and climate-affected people. Despite improvements, the absolute number of food insecure and undernourished people is rising. According to FAO, people facing chronic food deprivation have gone from 783 million in

agencies and programs. In addition, independent sources of evaluations from outside the government are scarce, thus USAID's assessments are used as a valid source of input.

2014, to around 820 million in 2017, receding to the levels of a decade ago (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2019). Even with high foreign aid outlays, assistance cannot keep up with the demand, especially considering the higher commodity prices. For instance, in FY2002-2004, the Title 2 program's emergency budget of 1 billion dollars bought 1.7 million metric tons of food and reached 75 million beneficiaries. A decade later, the same amount of funding purchased about half the amount of food and aided only 26 million (Riley, 2017: p. 472).

Despite these shortcomings and limitations, the United States is still the main gross provider of international assistance and its role has been positively noted by its African counterparts. The multiplication of donors with emerging countries taking a more active participation on aid flows, as well as new directives emanated from OECD's DAC, persuaded the US government to take action to reform its own system, adding yet another sense of urgency to much-needed changes in US foreign aid practices.

Chapter 3. Brazil's International Cooperation

Although the recognition of Brazil as a new player in global aid flows is a recent phenomenon, the country's engagement in this area is not new. The historical origins and basic principles of Brazilian International Development Cooperation (IDC) go back to different political, social and economic circumstances from the 1960s and 1970s. At international level, they were largely ignited by the independence of former colonies in Africa and Asia, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the creation of the G-77 at the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, among others (ABC, n.d). Internally, in this period more awareness emerged in realizing that Brazil could take advantage of the learning it had received as a beneficiary of foreign aid to provide expertise to other nations with similar challenges and socioeconomic conditions (Puente, 2010: p. 103).

This incipient process started with projects focusing on Latin American and African countries, in particular Portuguese-speaking ones. Looking South was seen as a pragmatic route to universalize and diversify partnerships, thus promoting a more 'autonomous' position for Brazil in an international system dominated by a rigid Cold War's bipolarity. The 'Independent Foreign Policy' of Joao Goulart's civilian government (1961–1964), and the 'Ecumenical and Responsible Pragmatism' of General Ernesto Geisel's military rule (1974–1979), were two well-defined historical periods marked by the expansion of Brazilian South-South relations (Leite, 2011).

The 1978 United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries in Buenos Aires boosted Brazil's South-South engagement and by the 1980s, demands for technical cooperation were already numerically more significant than projects involving received technical cooperation. However, macroeconomic complications and political instability affecting its democratic transition led Brazilian foreign aid to suffer setbacks, slowing its path towards a more prominent role (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2009). Only by the end of the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, Brazilian South–South cooperation would clearly regain momentum (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 19).

In the transition to the twenty-first century, several transformations in the Brazilian political-institutional situation received increasing international recognition. These changes included constitutional reform, democracy consolidation, strengthening of civil society and social movements, social programs expansion, and overall greater economic and financial stability. In turn, this led the Brazilian government to receive increasing requests to share its experience and best practices with partner countries, especially in the area of hunger alleviation and poverty eradication.

The improvements achieved in the social area were widely publicized by the diplomacy of former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, being cited in numerous Brazilian pronouncements (as it will be seen in the section on Presidential Diplomacy), contributing to the creation of a unique period in the prestige enjoyed by the country abroad in this specific area. This was demonstrated by the statement of then Executive Director of the WFP, Josette Sheeran, at the inauguration of the Center of Excellence against Hunger in Brasilia, in November, 2011:

As a world champion in the fight against hunger, Brazil has a wealth of experience that can be shared with governments eager to learn how they achieved that success and adapt it to their own countries.

Brazil has taken the fight against hunger and malnutrition seriously and is now among those defeating hunger faster than any nation on earth. We will partner to leverage this success to other nations seeking to end hunger and malnutrition. (UN News, 2011)

3.1. Historical Background of Brazil's Food Security Policy

Since Brazil's technical cooperation programs are based on its domestic policies, a brief historical overview of its social public policy in the field of food security will be presented. An initial framework in this regard was the Supply Committee of the Ministry of Labor, Industry and Trade (MTIC) of 1939. Similar to the case of other incipient public policies of the mid-twentieth century, the initiative sought to fight food shortages by expanding supply for the domestic market. The National School Feeding Program of the Ministry of Education (MEC), whose objective was to provide 15% to 30% of the nutritional needs of students enrolled in public elementary school system, was the most relevant strategy of this initial phase (Andrade, 2006).

Josué de Castro exerted a major influence in contemporary mechanisms to fight hunger in Brazil. Among his numerous studies, the two volumes of 'Geography of Hunger' stand out. Originally published in 1946, they examine the phenomenon of collective hunger, one that reaches endemic or epidemically large human populations, in all its gradations, from total hunger, starvation, to partial and hidden hunger, which is characterized by the persistent lack of certain key nutrients. Castro convincingly demonstrated the primacy of socioeconomic factors over physical-natural factors in the causality of the phenomenon of hunger and how undernourishment would negatively affect the overall condition of people:

Hunger is no more than an expression - the darkest and most tragic expression of economic underdevelopment. An expression that will only disappear when economic underdevelopment is swept away from the country, with the generalized pauperism that it provokes. What is necessary on the part of the public powers is to create conditions for development and direct it towards well-defined ends, of which none overlaps with that of the food emancipation of the people. It is to direct our economy towards the social well-being of the community. Only then we will enjoy a true economic development that emancipates us from all forms of servitude. From servitude to the external economic forces that for years have been trying to hinder our social progress and perpetuate our internal bondage to hunger and misery, preventing the growth of our wealth. (Castro, 1965: 304)

In 1951, Castro published the 'Geopolitics of Hunger', a book in which he applied the methodology used in the analysis of Brazil to study the problem of hunger in the world, in its biological, economic and social significance. His work was acclaimed internationally, being translated into nineteen languages and bestowed with several awards, such as the Roosevelt Prize of the Academy of Political Sciences of the United States, in 1952, and the International Peace Prize in 1954, a recognition that gave him leverage to become the Director-General of FAO between 1952 and 1956.

From the 1970s to the 1990s, the establishment of social policies on food security was characterized by some advances and a few retreats. Programs to reduce hunger and poverty were loosely institutionalized, causing them to lack stability and be held hostage of political volatility (Peliano apud Andrade, 2011: 78). The creation of the National Institute of Food and Nutrition (Port. *Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição* - INAN), in 1972, and the Health Nutrition Program (Port. *Programa de Nutrição e Saúde* - PNS), in 1975, are among the milestones in this period.

In the 1990s, the prevalence of neoliberalism in governmental decision-making bodies and reports of irregularities in some programs led to the interruption or reduction of most of the social policies then in place. A significant factor, however, was the growing mobilization of civil society, which had been hitherto excluded from the elaboration and planning of hunger alleviation initiatives. This new engagement culminated in the campaign 'Action of Citizenship Against Hunger, Misery and For Life,' led by the sociologist Herbert of Souza, also known as Betinho. The campaign, launched in April 1993, managed to mobilize large sectors of Brazilian society and was a development of the 'Movement for Ethics in Politics', which was pushing for the impeachment of then-President Fernando Collor. The campaign articulated the preparation of a national map of hunger, which revealed the shocking reality that 32 million Brazilian nationals were below the poverty line.

In view of the tragic situation described by the hunger map, President Itamar Franco created the National Council for Food Security (Port. *Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar - CONSEA*), an advisory body attached to the Presidency of the Republic. The main innovative aspect of the Council, which was signed into law by Decree 807 of April 1993 (Annex II), was in its composition. Only around one-third (8 of 29) of its members were government officials (Ministers of State), while two-thirds (21) were comprised of civil society representatives designated by the President. This gave a groundbreaking and institutionalized channel to the participation of civil society in the formulation of public policies for food security. Although the body would not survive the turbulence of the following years, closing in 1995, it was revived in 2003, in the wake of the new impetus attributed to combating hunger by the Workers' Party administration.

The 2000s brought about a more favorable context to broaden government-led social policies. The boom of commodity prices fostered by the rapidly expanding Chinese economy increased commercial revenues in agricultural exporting nations. In Brazil, this positive reinforcement coming from external conditions contributed to the integration of workers to the labor market, which in turn further improved employment rates and strongly expanded the lower middle class (De Negri and Cavalcanti, 2014). This combination of factors helped Brazil to reduce the share of its population in poverty, to overtake Italy as the seventh largest world economy in 2011, and to leave FAO's map of hunger in 2014.

Internationally, these achievements enhanced Brazil's relative status in the world scene and increased its perceived legitimacy as a global actor. Public policies in the field of food security were important not only to boost its international prestige, but also to motivate significant growth in the cooperation projects undertaken by the government. SSC was seen as benefiting Brazil in various ways: boosting its soft power (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 18); projecting power in the Southern Atlantic (Morais de Sá e Silva 2005); strengthening ties with developing countries, especially in regions of prime importance (Puente, 2010: p. 32); strengthening economic interests abroad (Dauvergne and Farias 2012: p. 909); gathering additional international support for Brazil's international ambitions, such as candidatures to international organizations (Barbosa, 2012: p. 123) and its bid at the United Nations for a permanent seat in an enlarged Security Council (Cervo 1994; Valler Filho 2007).

However, the less known part of the commodity-boom is that it represented a lost opportunity for inducing real changes in Brazil's economic infrastructure, by increasing, for instance, its competitiveness and productivity, which have been declining since at least the last quarter of the 20th century (Coelho and Inoue, 2018; De Negri and Cavalcanti, 2014). Instead of focusing on a status-seeking policy, President Lula could have used its high popularity and commercial revenue to spearhead wide-ranging structural reforms. Consequently, after his two terms, Brazil was very low in its capacity to overcome the aftermath of the 2008 global financial and economic crisis.

In the 1950s, as previously noted, Josué de Castro's seminal work 'The Geography of Hunger' (1946) gained international recognition⁷⁵. Over the following decades, however, the subject lost importance and remained secondary on Brazil's foreign policy agenda. The reemergence of food security was a noteworthy change in a foreign policy traditionally known for its continuity and its aversion to sudden variations. This rise occurred through multiple channels: budgetary, legislative, organizational, participatory and in official discourse, each of them working as a transmission link through which the new domestic orientations were projected onto Brazil's international action.

⁷⁵ Castro demonstrated the primacy of socioeconomic above physical-natural factors in the causality of the phenomenon of hunger and the condition of sub-nutrition of the people around the world. His work will indirectly support the adoption of the first public policies to fight hunger in Brazil.

In addition, the reemergence of the theme ‘hunger’ is intertwined with the rapprochement with Africa. Although Brazil had developed very secondary African policies in the early 1960s and since 1975 times, the rise of President Lula resulted in a new approach to bilateral relations between Brazil and African nations, since it brought about an active stance to help tackle African challenges. This contrasts with President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s posture, evident in his statement that the responsibility for removing Africa from the sidelines of international relations fell exclusively upon rich countries (Júnior and Faria, 2015: p.10). Brazilian rapprochement with Africa was characterized by an increase in financial aid, political initiatives and cooperation projects (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014). The government also fostered horizontal partnerships, without explicit pre-conditions, but expected in return support to the candidature of Brazil to the Security Council, to the World Trade Organization and other bids, as well as a favorable attitude towards major Brazilian companies trying to expand their business abroad.

Another sign of Brazil’s renewed interest in Africa is the opening of 13 diplomatic representations in that continent⁷⁶. Brazil went from 18 to 30 embassies (and from 1 to 2 general consulates). The number of African ambassadors in Brasília also rose, increasing from 16 to 25 between January 2003 and December 2006. Finally, the intensification of Brazilian presence in Africa is attested by trade. Between 2003 and 2006, exports to Africa increased by 315% and imports from that continent increased 307%, which represented a growth of 9 billion dollars – from 6 billion to 15 billion dollars (Ribeiro, 2007: p. 172).

3.2. Measuring resources

Analyzing Brazilian cooperation initiatives in food security is not a simple task, not only because of their relative opacity, but also because of the difficulty in defining a perspective that is intersectoral and multidimensional (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p. 30). In this sense, it is challenging to estimate the exact proportion of Brazilian international cooperation that strictly relates to food security, since data on foreign aid usually refers to agriculture in general. Distinguishing initiatives related to hunger alleviation from those directed to large-

⁷⁶ The Embassies opened were in Addis Abeba (Ethiopia), Khartoum (Sudan), Cotonou (Benin), Dar Es-Salaam (Tanzania), Yaounde (Cameroon), Lomé (Togo), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), San Tomé and Príncipe), Conacri (Guinea). Gaborone (Botswana), Lusaka (Zambia), and a General Consulate in Lagos (Nigeria). In Brasília, embassies of Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe were installed (Leite, 2011: p. 180).

scale agribusiness is important if one aims to assess the effects of international assistance on reducing food insecurity.

One of the best ways to understand Brazilian cooperation initiatives in food security is by analyzing how their resources are allocated. When president Lula's administration started, the theme of food security was almost absent in Brazil's foreign policy. By the end of his second term, it had a significant presence. This was reflected in the increase in the budget for technical cooperation projects: it went from 1.9 million reais in 2003 to 5.3 million by the end of Lula's first term (2006), and to 37.8 million in 2010⁷⁷. Likewise, the organ responsible for providing technical cooperation, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Port. *Agência Brasileira de Cooperação* – ABC), was engaged in a total of only 37 projects in 2003, while in 2006 they had increased to 179, and in 2010 to 737 projects, a historical record (ABC, n.d.-b).

Table 3.1. ABC's Budgetary Variation during President Lula's First Term

Year	Nominal Budget	Absolute Variation in Brazilian currency (Reais)	Relative Variation in Percentage	Participation in MREs Total Budget in Percentage
2003	4,500,000	- 151,200	- 3.25%	0.43
2004	7,999,914	+ 3,499,914	77.78%	0.62
2005	37,729,900	+29,729,985	371.63%	2.40
2006	28,022,187	- 9,707,713	- 25.73%	1.77

Source: Puente, 2010: p. 293. Translated by the author.

The expansion of Brazil's cooperation was not a straightforward accomplishment. As Table 3.1 shows, there was some oscillation in the increase of ABC's budget during Lula's first government. The annual resources allocated to international assistance initiatives decreased between 2003 and 2004, but then rose by nearly 30% in 2005, and quintupled from 2005 to 2006 (ABC, n.d.-c). It may be argued that budget fluctuations during the initial years of the administration of the Workers' Party (PT) were primarily due to a period of adjustment of

⁷⁷ The annual amounts are the financial sums of the execution of the ABC budget, transfers to International Organizations and transfers of resources from Brazilian governmental bodies and institutions to be executed in actions of technical cooperation by ABC. Available at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/EvolucaoFinanceira> (accessed April 5, 2016)

governmental policies and structures, thus leading Lula's cooperation initiatives to only reach their peak during his second term.

This also helps to understand why data from this initial period is rather scarce. As an illustration, one can mention the case of the General-Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger (CGFOME), which, despite being established in 2003, functioned without proper funding until 2007, when a budgetary heading for humanitarian operations was approved in the Annual Budget Law (LOA).⁷⁸


Therefore, Lula's second term brought about new momentum to international aid, with further allocation of financial and human resources. Brazil spent around 3.5 billion reais (in current values)⁷⁹ between 2007 and 2010 with international development cooperation (IDC) (Port. *Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento Internacional*), which includes humanitarian assistance, scholarships to foreign nationals to study in Brazil, technical cooperation and voluntary contributions to international organizations (Ipea, 2012: p. 7). During that period, ABC conducted projects with transfer of technology for agricultural activities in 30 countries, with a special focus on Portuguese-speaking nations (Goulet and Sabourin, 2012). Food security was made a central tenet within the Brazilian portfolio, especially in activities in Africa, where agriculture accounts for 20% of all technical cooperation (Ipea, 2012).

In 2013, Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) mapped initiatives of South-South cooperation that followed the guidelines of Brazil's National Food and Nutrition Security Plan (PANSAN), providing an overview of its foreign aid initiatives. The mapping revealed that 85% of Brazilian cooperation actions related to food security were carried out in Africa. Around 30 African countries were involved in cooperation projects, among which Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia stood out as the main receivers in that region. Regarding modalities, there is a predominance of technical cooperation initiatives, accounting for 87 projects, compared to 12 humanitarian actions. The vast majority (72) of Brazilian projects were bilateral, while 28 were multilateral and only three of a trilateral nature (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p. 31).

⁷⁸ Interview with Bianca Fadel, ex-employee at the CGFOME, conceded to the author on the November 31, 2016.

⁷⁹ The information was gathered from Ipea 2013 and 2010 reports listed on this bibliography.

Figure 3.1. Quantitative of Cooperation Projects and Activities per Year



Source: Made by the author.⁸⁰

3.3. Legal Framework

The first initiative to implement an International Technical Cooperation System in Brazil took place in 1950, when the Brazilian government created the National Technical Assistance Commission (Port. *Comissão Nacional de Assistência Técnica* - CNAT), comprised of governmental representatives from the Secretariat of Planning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies. Its main attribution was to set priorities in the requests from Brazilian institutions to receive technical assistance from abroad. Aid was provided by developed countries with which Brazil had specific agreements for the transfer of technology in the form of cooperation (ABC, n.d.-a).

In these first decades of exchange, the focus of cooperation was to support the structuring of federal public institutions and national entities specialized in areas then considered strategic for the national economy (Abreu, 2013: p. 4). Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) was one of the main beneficiaries of these initiatives and, in the 1970s, it

⁸⁰ The annual amounts are the financial sums of the execution of the ABC budget, transfers to International Organizations and transfers of resources from Brazilian governmental bodies and institutions to be executed in actions of technical cooperation by ABC. (ABC, n.d.-b; n.d.-c) For the year of 2003, the information was gathered from Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013: p. 55.

received financial support from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for the development of soybean in the Cerrado (Brazilian savanna). This Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Program for Cerrados’ Development (Port. *Programa de Cooperação Nipo-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento dos Cerrados - Prodecer*) would be decades later the cornerstone of Embrapa’s flagship development program with African countries, the Triangular Co-operation Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique (ProSavana) being a case in point (Abreu, 2013: p. 13; Barrios Diaz, 2017: p. 240).

In 1969, the Brazilian cooperation system went through a broad institutional reform. A decree centralized the foreign assistance procedures in the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic (Port. *Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República - SEPLAN/PR*⁸¹) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Port. *Ministério das Relações Exteriores - MRE*), both chosen as the bodies responsible for aid management. What mostly motivated the reform was the need to strengthen the system, enabling it to direct the high volume of external resources available to the guidelines and priorities defined in the National Development Plans. In 1984, another reform followed to provide the system with greater managerial effectiveness by terminating the Sub-Secretariat for International Economic and Technical Cooperation (SUBIN) and transferring its responsibilities to the Technical Cooperation Division (*Id.*).

In 1987, Decree 94,973 created the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), formally linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). Although this new structural milestone represented a step forward in providing the country with a specialized organ in international technical cooperation, the need to find a definitive structuring persisted, as it will be further explained in the following sections.

⁸¹ SEPLAN/PR was extinguished by the Law No. 8,028 of 12.04.1990, but it reemerged in 1995 as the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPO). On July 30, 1999, under Provisional Measure No. 1,911-8, MOG was renamed the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG), which was amended on May 12, 2016 to the Ministry of Planning, Development and Management with Provisional Measure No. 726. Available at: <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/aceso-a-informacao/institucional/o-ministerio/historia>; <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/base-legal-de-governo/orgaos-extintos/secretaria-de-planejamento-da-presidencia-da-republica> (accessed on: June 27, 2019).

As a developing country whose foreign assistance only recently became more prominent, Brazil's legal framework for providing international assistance is in its infancy. For instance, up until today the government does not have a comprehensive legislative model to guide its aid provision and implementation. In 2007, the bill PL 737/2007⁸² attempted to regulate humanitarian actions undertaken by the Executive Branch, but the draft is still waiting for deliberation in Congress, more precisely in the Chamber of Representatives. This law, if or when passed, would authorize the government to employ 'the necessary and sufficient means to implement international humanitarian actions', thus granting permission to use and donate movable property, including food from public stocks, as well as financial resources (Annex III).

This draft bill was a proposition from the Inter-ministerial Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance, created in 2006, under the coordination of Itamaraty. According to the justification sent by the then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (Annex IV), the bill would enable Brazil to act with alacrity in cases of emergency, since the current system delays or even renders aid virtually unfeasible.

Whenever a humanitarian assistance operation is going to be carried out abroad, it is necessary to previously approve a temporary bill, called Provisional Measure (Port. *Medida Provisória*; abbreviated as MP), authorizing shipments on a case by case basis. In 2011, the MP 519/2010 authorizing the provision of food assistance to 14 countries and those from the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Port. *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* - CPLP), was signed into law.

In the following year, Law 12.429/2011 authorized the MRE to allocate the remaining stocks to other countries affected by adverse socioeconomic events or acute food insecurity (Annex V). In the face of the legislative gap and considering the absence of a more comprehensive framework, this law has been providing the criteria and procedures for the donation of public stocks of food for international humanitarian assistance. According to this law, it is under the MRE's responsibility to define the quantitative and respective recipients of the agricultural

⁸² Annex VII. Also available at: <https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=348306> (accessed on: February 26, 2019).

products sent, which are restricted to those mentioned in the law's annexed table, periodically updated. The last update was in 2014 and since then rice, beans, corn, powder and vegetable seed were also included. Although this law made it possible to send humanitarian assistance more quickly, it did not solve the problem entirely, since it reinstated reliance on the World Food Program (WFP) to cover freight and other transportation expenses. Moreover, the law only addresses in-kind donations, thus not authorizing the Executive Branch to fund local procurement projects.

As the main focus of Brazilian international assistance is technical cooperation and, in turn, technical cooperation programs are virtually a replica of Brazil's most successful social programs, the legal framework supporting the public policies exported by Brazil's aid programs shall be analyzed.

The first legal landmark for social policy under the PT presidency was Law 10.683 of May 28, 2003⁸³, which founded the Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security and the Fight against Hunger (MESA)⁸⁴. The Ministry would be made the central organ for the Zero Hunger Program and Professor José Graziano da Silva was chosen to lead it. Graziano was one of those responsible for the elaboration of the Workers' Party food security strategy and eventually became Director-General of FAO in 2012.

The Law also reestablished the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (Port. *Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional* - CONSEA) as an advisory body of the Presidency of the Republic. The Council is composed by two-thirds of civil society representatives and one-third of governmental delegates. The presidency of the organ is held by a member of civil society (Machado, 2017). Originally created in 1993, the Council was the first governmental agency exclusively designed to address domestic food security issues. It derived from civil society's mobilization known as the 'Betinho Campaign', in reference to sociologist Herbert de Souza, who championed the initiative (Takagi, 2006).

⁸³ Originally, the Law was approved as the Temporary Measure N.103, of January 1st, 2003.

⁸⁴ The MESA would be terminated the following year, by law 10.869 of March 13th, 2004, and replaced by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), which had a broader scope, comprising all social policy of the Lula government.

The re-creation of CONSEA represents a milestone in the participation of civil society in the making of public policies. Numerous legal and institutional mechanisms that casted Brazil in the world's avant-garde regarding hunger alleviation were propositions that arose from the Council. For instance, the Food Acquisition Program (Port. *Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos* – PAA), the National School Feeding Program (Port. *Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar* - PNAE), and Article 14 of Law 11.947 (2009) – which states that 30% of the resources of the PNAE must come from smallholder agriculture – were all directly influenced by the Council. Moreover, CONSEA had an important role in the formation of transnational networks of social movements in the agricultural field. This is exemplified by CONSEA's involvement in the mobilization of farmers and NGOs against the ProSavana program in Mozambique, as it will be seen in the case study.

Launched on October 16, 2001 (World Food Day), by the Citizenship Institute, the Zero Hunger Program consisted of three types of policies: i) structural, aimed to tackle the fundamental causes of hunger and poverty; ii) target-specific, directed to social groups in food scarcity situations; and iii) local, implemented directly by municipalities. Profiting from the experience of many previous social programs, Zero Hunger brought the issue of food security to the limelight. One of the program's key structural policies that earned Brazil broad international recognition was the PAA. It constituted one of the 17 engagements of the National Program for Strengthening Family Agriculture (Port. *Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar* - PRONAF), in which the government purchases food from family farming,⁸⁵ a model that was going to be diffused to many nations.

In July 2008, PRONAF launched another mechanism that would increase international interest and be disseminated through Brazil's international cooperation projects. The More Food Program (Port. *Programa Mais Alimentos*) aimed to establish a credit line for investment in productive infrastructure for family agriculture, such as the purchase of machinery and equipment, soil repair, irrigation, agroforestry systems and genetic improvement. An agreement with the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers (Port. *Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores* - ANFAVEA) and the

⁸⁵ PAA was instituted by Law 10,696 of July 2, 2003. Available at: http://www.conab.gov.br/OlalaCMS/uploads/arquivos/12_07_23_11_43_47_sumario_paa_2003.pdf (accessed: October 3rd, 2017).

Brazilian Machinery Builders' Association (Port. *Associação Brasileira da Indústria de Máquinas e Equipamentos* - ABIMAQ) ensured a reduction of up to 17.5% in the prices of agricultural capital. In addition, the MFP extended the services of technical assistance and agricultural extension (Port. *Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural* – ATER), increasing its budget from 168 million to 397 million reais and its staff on the ground from 20 thousand to 30 thousand technicians (BRASIL, 2017; CUT, 2008).

Law 11.346 of September 15, 2006 is also another important legal landmark. Known as the Law for Food and Nutritional Security (LOSAN), it included Brazil's definition of food security: 'the right of everyone to regular and permanent access to quality food in sufficient quantity, without compromising access to other essential needs, based on eating habits that promote health, respect cultural diversity, and are environmentally, culturally, economically and socially sustainable'. It also stipulated policies, plans, programs, and actions with the objective of guaranteeing the human right to adequate nutrition. Furthermore, the law contributed to the international diffusion of social policies to combat hunger by stating that Brazil 'should engage the promotion of technical cooperation with foreign countries, thereby contributing to the promotion of human rights and adequate nutrition at the international level' (BRASIL, 2006).

Law 11.947 of June 16, 2009, established new guidelines for the National School Feeding Program (PNAE), expanding it for all kindergarten, elementary education, high school and youth and adult education (MDS, 2014b). The law also determined that the National Fund for Educational Development (Port. *Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação* - FNDE) would coordinate financial resources allocated for PNAE. Yet, the major innovation of this law (and one of the key factors for the success of Brazilian social policies) was defined in Article 14, which states that 30% of the resources of the National Program for School Feeding must come from smallholder agriculture. This is the legislative innovation that most awakened interest of foreign governments and the key aspect that the UN Center of Excellence against Hunger in Brazil of the World Food Program (WFP) diffuses internationally.

Launched in 2011, the Center of Excellence is a joint initiative of Brazil and the WFP, as a powerhouse of solutions to combat hunger and malnutrition. The Center draws on Brazilian

experience to share knowledge and policy innovations primarily focused on linking school meal systems to local agriculture. In partnership with ABC, it provides technical assistance to national governments to design, improve, expand, and eventually run their own school feeding programs (WFP, n.d)⁸⁶. Finally, Decree 7.272, of August 25, 2010, established the National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (Port. *Política Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional* - PNSAN), with the parameters for the elaboration of the National Plan of Food and Nutritional Security.

3.4. Organizational Dimension

Until recently, Brazil's agricultural cooperation was characterized by sporadic technical assistance involving short training courses and peer-to-peer sharing of tropical agriculture science and technology — activities that were conducted mainly by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Port. *Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária* – Embrapa). Brazilian cooperation took on greater diversity when an additional set of actors outside the agricultural research domain joined the programs, bringing a focus on the diffusion of public policies, rather than just technical exchange based on agronomic expertise (Cabral, et al., 2016: p. 49).

Both within the domestic and external environments, institutional structures were created with the goal of exporting Brazil's social policies. This section focuses on the mechanisms responsible for the inclusion of food security in Brazilian foreign policy. Six main structures can be listed as being key for policy diffusion: The General-Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger (Port. *Coordenação-Geral de Cooperação Humanitária e Combate à Fome* - CGFOME), the International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), the IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Hunger and Poverty, the Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC).⁸⁷

⁸⁶ WFP, n.d. Centre of Excellence Against Hunger. Available at: <http://www1.wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-against-hunger> (accessed August 10, 2017).

⁸⁷ The Center of Excellence in the Fight Against Hunger of the WFP and the FAO-Embrapa Fund were created in 2011 and 2013, respectively.

3.4.1. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)

The creation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency occurred at a time of great changes in the flow of international cooperation for development, when national governments were increasingly taking responsibility for the management of cooperation programs implemented by international organizations. The foundation of ABC allowed Brazil to expand the cooperation it received and gave, especially the incipient modality of South-South technical cooperation.

While ABC's operational structure, human resources and management systems were in the process of consolidation, Brazil's overseas cooperation engagements also grew larger, expanding geometrically in terms of partner countries and projects implemented. As established in MRE's regulations (2012), the Agency functions are:

to plan, coordinate, negotiate, approve, execute, monitor and evaluate, at the national level, development cooperation programs, projects and activities in all the areas of knowledge received from other countries and international organizations and that between Brazil and developing countries, including related actions in the field of training for the management of technical cooperation and dissemination of information. (ABC, n.d)

As seen above, ABC was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and while it was granted technical and executive powers, the political formulation of cooperation remained in the hands of Itamaraty. Since its early beginnings, the Agency has acted in close cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which provides human resources, techno-managerial qualifications, and expertise in the way international cooperation projects are carried out (*Id.*)

Until the present moment, ABC continues to rely upon technicians hired by UNDP and diplomatic staff from Itamaraty to perform cooperation initiatives. Although ABC argues that this lack of enough civil servants allows it to save with personnel, thus enabling it to spend more on its projects, to many this unending reliance on temporary arrangements shows the suboptimal conditions in which ABC operates (Puente, 2010), further weakening Brazil's capacity to fully exert its soft power through cooperation. ABC's structural deficiencies spurred a lot of debate on a different format for the agency or even the hypothesis of creating

a new one. Some proposed that ABC should no longer be part of the MRE and instead be linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) (Paraguassu, 2013). Others argued in favor of ABC remaining attached to the MRE, but with its status elevated to an autarchy and, as a result, with its own staff and financial autonomy (Barbosa, 2013). Finally, there were propositions for the agency to be subordinated directly to the Presidency's Chief of Staff Ministry (Casa Civil) (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 46).

In May 2013, during the celebration of the African Union's fiftieth anniversary in Ethiopia, President Dilma Rousseff announced her plan to create a new agency of cooperation, trade and investments:

We have an agency, called ABC, but this agency is a department of the Foreign Ministry, in fact. All major countries have international trade agencies. We will create an international trading agency for Africa and Latin America. It is a funding agency, but also a commercial agency, it is also an agency to enable investments. In short, it is an agency that has a very large scope. This agency aims to create a mechanism through which the initiatives that Brazil takes do not have to go through other multilateral bodies. You can even do in partnership with the UN, but often our actions in Africa are performed by one of these international agencies, and not by us directly, even though they are our resources. Hence the reason for this agency cooperation, trade and investment with African countries⁸⁸.

A subsequent note from Casa Civil stated that the establishment of the new agency was part of 'measures aimed at intensifying Brazil's relations with the African continent relying on reciprocal cooperation and mutual development' (Rossi, 2013). In July 2013, during the National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Patriota mentioned ABC's reform, saying it would have more financial resources and it would be renamed the Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation (ABCD) (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 46).

However, these propositions lost momentum with the political turmoil Brazil went through during the impeachment and downfall of Rousseff's administration in August 2016. There have not been further discussions regarding ABC's remodeling since then. But there is an

⁸⁸ Announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma at Addis Ababa, 25 May 2013 (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 88). The full transcript is found on Annex VI of this thesis. The video with the presidential statement is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=d7tPg39k2XE (accessed on: February 26, 2019)

overall consensus that either ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency should be created, as a fundamental step to underpin and expand Brazil's international development cooperation initiatives (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 62).

The changes that ABC did go through were minimal. In August 2016, the Agency incorporated most of the responsibilities of CGFOME, which comprised the coordination of the emergency humanitarian response actions, through donations of food, medicines and other essential items to serve countries in situations of socio-environmental disaster, public calamity, armed conflict, food and nutritional insecurity, or other situations posing serious threat to the life, health and humanitarian rights of its population. In the following year, ABC's General Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation (CGCH) was officialized by Decree 9,110 of July 27, 2017.

Ambassador Lauro Moreira, ABC's Director from 2003 to 2006, described Brazil's Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries (TCDC) as being without any economic, commercial or lucrative goals, and with 'no strings attached'. His statement reflected the administration's critical posture regarding traditional approaches to cooperation, which tie assistance to donors' economic and political aims. In spite of this typically South-South solidarity rhetoric, Brazil's TCDC promoted, directly and indirectly, an increase of Brazilian economic presence in receiving states, opening many African countries to state-owned companies like the energy giant Petrobras and private companies, such as Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez, Odebrecht, Braskem and others.⁸⁹ Evidence that in practice cooperation and business usually go hand in hand is supported by the presence in Mozambique of Brazil's mining company Vale, the main recipient of Brazilian technical cooperation in the African continent (Rodrigues, 2015; Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013).

As it was later disclosed, the operations of Brazilian company giants in Africa were tarnished by huge corruption scandals on both sides: the African governments and the Brazilian corporations and politicians. According to investigations led by the US Department of Justice (DoJ), from 2001 to 2015, Odebrecht and Braskem paid around 788 million dollars in bribes to officials and political parties in Brazil and in 11 other countries. In Africa, Angola and

⁸⁹ For more information on the participation of Brazilian companies in foreign policy, see the report available at: https://i3gov.planejamento.gov.br/textos/livro6/6.1_Politica_Externa.pdf (accessed September 8, 2016).

Mozambique were the two main receivers, with 262 million and 900 thousand dollars, respectively⁹⁰.

3.4.2 The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa)

Embrapa was founded in 1973 as part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), with the stated mission of finding technical solutions to sustainable agricultural development. Throughout its existence, it became a *locus* for excellence in problems related to agriculture in tropical climates. This was mainly due to its participation in the process of agricultural modernization, which helped Brazil to overcome natural limitations to farming in its territory (Embrapa, n.d.).

Embrapa gained international recognition due to its role in the transformation of the infertile lands of the Cerrado into one of the world's biggest soy producers. The lands incorporated into the national production system account for more than half of all Brazilian grain production. This achievement, called by *The Economist* 'the Cerrado miracle' (Economist, 2010), attracted many countries' interest in agricultural technical assistance from Brazil. The likeness between Cerrado's soil and climate with the African savannas rendered the Brazilian experience a development model for many countries in Africa, a proposition endorsed by the World Bank (Cabral and Shankland, 2013).

Embrapa's institutional arrangement changed several times since its foundation. A snapshot of the organ's technical cooperation in 2014 shows it took place on four fronts: i) structuring projects which involve longer-term commitments and resources above 1 million dollars; ii) smaller size and short duration projects; iii) training in tropical agriculture; iv) agrilivestock innovation platforms, more specifically the Agricultural Innovation Market Place project. Regarding its structuring projects, Embrapa has three technical cooperation initiatives in its portfolio. The first of them is Cotton-4, a project with technology transfer to increase cotton productivity in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Togo. The second is ProSavana, a

⁹⁰ 'The payoffs brought Odebrecht and Braskem contracts for around 100 projects, many of them to build public infrastructure. Often, governments paid more for the work than they needed to. The DoJ alleges that Odebrecht set up a 'Division of Structured Operations', which 'effectively functioned as a stand-alone bribe department'. The American investigators say that the companies' top brass, including Marcelo Odebrecht, the conglomerate's former boss and grandson of its founder, not only knew all about the scheme but authorized it. He is now serving a 19-year jail sentence in Brazil for his role in the Petrobras scandal.' (The Economist, 2016).

trilateral cooperation initiative with the Mozambican government and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The third and most recent project is a partnership with FAO to strengthen agricultural research institutions in Angola (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p. 34).

President Lula was an advocate of the internationalization of Embrapa and the transfer of technology to African countries. The agency opened its first Regional Office in Ghana in July, 2006, and its presence *in loco* allowed to deepen cooperation initiatives, especially in Portuguese-speaking countries (Lopes *apud*. Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 124). In addition, the establishment of Embrapa's virtual laboratories abroad (LABEX) further facilitated the intensification of the exchange of experiences and information on agricultural research⁹¹ (Brasil, 2013: p. 97).

Launched in May 2010, during the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development, in Brasilia, the Agriculture Innovation Marketplace for Africa represents one of Embrapa's most significant initiatives in the African continent. It is a partnership aiming at linking Brazilian, African and Latin American and Caribbean experts and institutions, from the public and private sectors, to develop research projects to benefit smallholder farming by increasing productivity, improving natural resource management, and strengthening institutional infrastructure. Through Innovation Marketplace, Embrapa established a continent-wide agricultural research network in Africa, including regional, sub-regional and national agricultural research organizations, with more than 30 projects being implemented (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 126).⁹²

Due to Embrapa's focus and specialization, the company was able to participate in 95% of all agricultural cooperation projects (Magalhães, 2008 *apud*. Fingermann, 2014: p. 57). Nevertheless, despite its positive results as a platform for the dissemination of Brazilian policies in food security, the Workers' Party (PT) brought new actors to join the efforts in

⁹¹ The first LABEX was implemented in the US in 1998. In 2002 the second LABEX was opened, with its seat in Montpellier, in France, anteceding the Lula government. The third was created in South Korea in 2009. In 2012, two additional representations were opened in China and Japan.

⁹² For more on Embrapa's role in Brazil's foreign policy for food security see: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2651:seminario-cooperacao-tecnica-brasileira-agricultura-seguranca-alimentar-e-politicas-sociais&catid=42&lang=pt-BR&Itemid=280 (accessed August 16, 2015).

agricultural cooperation, ending Embrapa's long-lasting quasi-monopoly on the matter. This meant that its focus on market-oriented agribusinesses began to suffer competition from smallholder agriculture supported by other agencies with pro-social agendas. In this process, increasingly antagonistic interests emerged in Brazil's food security international cooperation initiatives (Cabral and Shankland, 2013).

However, it is important to stress that this dualistic approach in relation to agriculture (agribusiness vs. smallholder) precedes Lula's administration, and for decades it has been the cause of intense domestic debate. The novelty which arose with PT's administration was the inclusion of the smallholder interests in the international cooperation agenda, in opposition to the uncontested hegemony of agribusiness until then. The dichotomist domestic agrarian dynamic thereby was reproduced in the technical cooperation in which Brazil engaged. Even if this fragmentation may have had negative effects, it also amplified the scope of Brazilian cooperation by launching projects that were better tuned to all the pillars of food security, not only gains in productivity.

2.4.3. The General-Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger (CGFOME)

Upon taking charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lula's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim launched an institutional reform which founded the CGFOME.⁹³ Milton Rondó Filho, a career diplomat and former advisor of CONSEA and the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), was designated its General-Coordinator on September 10, 2004.⁹⁴ According to Rondó, CGFOME served as the international interface of the Zero Hunger strategy, and it 'institutionalized the political will of establishing the fight against hunger as a new line of international action' (Brazil, 2013: p.89). The creation of an institutional structure dedicated exclusively to food security symbolized adjustments of Itamaraty to the new priority pioneered by Lula (Castro and Castro, 2009)⁹⁵ and represented a new course of

⁹³ Decree 4.759, on the 21st of June, 2003.

⁹⁴ Source: Service Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 175, 2004.

⁹⁵ According to Article 40 of the Foreign Service Internal Regime, CGFOME was in charge of issues, such as the human right to nutrition, agrarian development, agrarian reform, smallholder agriculture, dialogue with civil society and humanitarian assistance. Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/RISE.pdf> (accessed November 18, 2016).

action within Brazilian diplomacy, diminishing the Ministry's traditional autonomy in establishing and conducting the diplomatic agenda.

Rondó revised the concepts used by Itamaraty to refer to its partnerships. The term 'assistance' was replaced by 'cooperation'; 'natural' disasters became 'socio-environmental' (since they were no longer seen only as the result of isolated factors, but also as a byproduct of a series of elements combined); 'South-South' cooperation became 'horizontal' (referring to the manner in which cooperation occurs, not its geographical-hemispheric location); and last but not least Brazil would no longer be called a 'donor', but a 'partner'. Although Rondó claimed⁹⁶ that these changes of nomenclature have been officially adopted during his time ahead of CGFOME, internationally these terms had commonly been used since 1978, when the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries replaced the concept of 'assistance' for 'cooperation' and coined the term 'horizontal cooperation'⁹⁷.

According to Rondó, CGFOME acted on two different tracks. The first one dealt with socio-environmental emergencies and the second addressed structural deficiencies. It was within the field of long-term structural actions that Brazil went on to export its expertise in methods for eradication of hunger and extreme poverty. However, there is some level of controversy on the actual role of CGFOME.⁹⁸ The director of the UN Center of Excellence Against Hunger in Brazil, Daniel Balaban, stated that Rondó refused to be the focal point of the Center, as he did not believe in the effectiveness of structural actions and preferred instead to focus exclusively on emergency humanitarian aid. It is emblematic in this regard that the task of providing support for the cooperation given jointly by Brazil and the WFP was given to ABC, although CGFOME was, institutionally, the organ designated to provide this kind

⁹⁶Interview given to the author on the 19th October, 2016.

⁹⁷Although Milton Rondó stated, in an interview given to the author (on the 19th October, 2016), that these changes of nomenclature have been officially adopted during his time ahead CGFOME, internationally these terms were commonly used since 1978, when the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries replaced the concept of 'assistance' for 'cooperation' and coined the term 'horizontal cooperation'. Available at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/CooperacaoTecnica/Historico> (accessed November 18, 2016).

⁹⁸Opinion given by colleagues, governmental counterparts and former employees in interviews and informal talks to the author.

of assistance.⁹⁹ Later, on June 21st, 2016, CGFOME was abolished by Decree 8.817, and its responsibilities were absorbed by ABC.

2.4.4. The International Center for Policies of Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG).

Another important mechanism in the international promotion of food-security-related policies was the International Center for Policies of Inclusive Growth. Founded in 2004, the Center was the result of a partnership between the Brazilian government and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to collect data, promote research and disseminate studies about public policies and foster exchange of best practices through international cooperation (ONU Brasil, n.d.). The IPC-IG is essentially theoretical in nature, since it does not focus on cooperation implementation. It is a partner of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a governmental think-tank often engaged in economic surveys and research about poverty and social inequality (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 110).

At the outset, the government did not use the Center as a tool to bolster official discourse. Indeed, it only did so when IPC-IG became sought out by several African and Latin-American countries. By virtue of its function as a platform for knowledge-sharing of robust academic research on social protection schemes and cash-transfer programs, the Center was able to reach out to people who otherwise would not be easily persuaded by the official line (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 113).

Therefore, IPC-IG's broad array of publications contributed to increase Brazil's international visibility in this area. For instance, the work of its researchers on empirical evidence of the success of *Bolsa Família* (a household cash-transfer program) in reducing hunger drew attention from various international organizations, including the World Bank, which modified its initial critical position in relation to the Brazilian social program and geared towards a more positive evaluation (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 110). Over time, the Center became an important element in Brazil's strategy to broaden demand from other countries for Brazilian technical assistance.

⁹⁹ Source: Interview with the Director of the Center of Excellence WFP-UN, Daniel Balaban, conceded to the author on November 9, 2016).

3.4.5. The IBSA Fund

Created in March 2004, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Fund was another mechanism which reinforced President Lula's call to establish new sources of international financing for the fight against hunger and poverty. It was agreed that it would receive annual donations of a million dollars from each of its members, and resources would be managed by the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation of the UNDP (Brazil, 2013). The project selection prioritized financing activities in the least developed countries, and although the Fund acted in many different areas, such as infrastructure and health care, its main focus was to tackle hunger and extreme poverty.

While government officials hailed the Fund as a centerpiece of the IBSA grouping, its modest budget severely limited its scope of action. The amounts available for projects are extremely insignificant when compared to other development institutions in which IBSA members themselves participate (Stuenkel, 2014). Yet, despite its small size, the Fund gained considerable international recognition when it won the UN South-South Partnership Award in 2006, and the 'Millennium Development Goals Award' in 2010.¹⁰⁰ Even if its capacity of implementing projects remained limited, and its true importance was inflated by governmental propaganda, the Fund was another channel for Brazil to share its knowledge and further advance its soft power capabilities in faraway regions.

3.4.6. The Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI)

On June 21, 2006, a presidential decree established the GTI-AHI, coordinated by Itamaraty and with the participation of fifteen ministries. The group sought to render the processing of the petitions for humanitarian assistance received by the Brazilian government more efficient. It thereby became an important instrument to organize the governmental agencies involved in Brazilian cooperation initiatives. In this respect, the GTI guided the elaboration of a legal framework (which is yet to become law) to regulate Brazil's foreign aid. Currently, governmental donations require the approval of the Brazilian equivalent to Executive Orders (Port. *Medidas Provisórias*) authorizing its concession. These bureaucratic hurdles still

¹⁰⁰ IBAS homepage. Available at: <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/ibsa-fund> (accessed November 11, 2016).

prevent the government from responding quickly to emergency humanitarian aid requests.¹⁰¹

102

3.5. Diplomacy and Discourse

This section aims to scrutinize food security diplomatic rhetoric of Brazilian authorities, as well as to map out Brazil's participation in international fora in the same area. Although there were too many events and discussions to be mentioned one-by-one, the most important initiatives are presented here¹⁰³. Our intention is to trace the evolution of this theme on the foreign policy agenda, from an almost inexistent issue to one overwhelmingly present and then, again, a disappearing feature in statements by Brazilian officials¹⁰⁴.

Although Brazilian society had a long historical engagement in fighting hunger, the mobilization of social actors was not always reflected at the level of Brazilian international relations. The process of re-democratization paved the way for the reincorporation of social issues within the Brazilian political agenda. The Workers' Party spearheaded efforts to combat hunger at the political level. Hence, extreme poverty and hunger were issues present in the electoral campaigns undertaken by Lula as presidential candidate in 1989, 1994, 1998 and 2002, even though concerns about hunger were not explicitly present in the PT's party

¹⁰¹ Amorim, Celso. Memorandum No. 32. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Republic, Brasilia, February 6, 2007.

¹⁰² According to Minister Milton Rondó, the law-draft is presently 'forgotten' at the Presidency of the Republic, with no timeline to be submitted for voting in the Brazilian National Congress. Its dispositions authorize the Executive to 'proceed towards international humanitarian action with the goal of preventing, protecting, preparing, avoiding, reducing, and mitigating suffering and assisting other countries or regions which find themselves, momentarily or not, in situations of emergency' and to, 'employ the necessary and sufficient means in order to implement international humanitarian action' amongst other measures. A minute of the law draft about International Cooperation was made available to the author by Milton Rondó. Interview in-person conducted in October 2016.

¹⁰³ The most important of these forums were: the Committee on World Food Security (CFA) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the Meeting of Ministers and Authorities for Social Development of the Mercosur (RMADS); the Specialized Meeting about Family Agriculture of Mercosur (REAF); the Meeting of High Functionaries regarding Smallholder Agriculture of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC); the South American Council for Social Development of the UNASUL; the Council for Food and Nutritional Security of the Community of Lusophone Countries (CONSAN-CPLP), and the Working Group for Social and Productive Integration of the Latin American Association for Integration (ALADI). Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/cooperacao/11937-cooperacao-humanitaria-brasileira> (accessed on: October 10, 2016).

¹⁰⁴ It should be underlined that the discourse level merely serves as a subsidiary mean in relation to other instances through which a foreign policy is evaluated. It is necessary to keep in mind the inherent limitations of analysis at the purely rhetoric level, which in itself is insufficient in order to outline a precise evaluation of the foreign policy in that period.

program (1979), nor in its founding manifesto (PT, 1980). During his candidature to the presidency in 2002, Lula repeatedly referred to the fight against hunger as a priority of his government. His inaugural speeches in Congress and at the Planalto Palace, made on the 1st and the 2nd of January 2003, respectively, confirmed the high degree of importance attributed to this goal, which was referred to as a ‘national cause’ (Tomazini and Leite, 2016: p.19). It is interesting to observe that, while this objective was elevated to the status of a ‘mission’ (Lula da Silva, 2003: p. 2; Lula da Silva, 2003a), the issue was practically absent from the speech given by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in his address upon taking office, on January 2nd, 2003. The Minister limited himself to vaguely declaring that foreign policy would contribute to ‘eliminating poverty’ (Amorim, 2003).

In a nutshell, hunger was not one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ initial concerns. Rather, Lula’s election was perhaps the most relevant motivation for the incorporation of this issue into the diplomatic agenda. Milton Rondó, the former head of CGFOME, also corroborated this hypothesis by declaring that besides Minister Amorim, Marco Aurélio Garcia, the International Advisor of the Presidency of the Republic, also did not display any particular interest on the matter.¹⁰⁵

Four months after the Foreign Minister’s inauguration speech, in which the social dimension was practically absent, his fine-tuning to the priority determined by the President was noticeable. In the magna class for the Rio Branco Institute (Brazil’s diplomatic academy), Amorim stated that the priority conferred to the fight against hunger demanded a corresponding action in foreign policy, to spread Lula’s message globally (Amorim, 2003). From this moment on, food security would be a relatively frequent topic in the Foreign Minister’s diplomatic discourse and on his international agenda.

A key event of this diplomatic agenda was the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Extreme Poverty, founded on January 30, 2004. Championed by the Brazilian Head of State, the Geneva Declaration resulting from that meeting established a Technical Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms to create a Fund for the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty. As the

¹⁰⁵ Rondó also affirmed that Amorim complained about Brazil adopting the concept of food security, which would be considered as an ‘European invention’ in order to create barriers for Brazilian exports. Interview to the author on October 19, 2016, Brasilia.

French President Jacques Chirac stated in a press conference, Lula was considered the person responsible for the increased attention towards these issues globally (UN *apud.* Fraundorfer, 2015: p.95).

On September 20 that year, once again Brazil, along with the ‘quintet against hunger’¹⁰⁶, coordinated a summit with more than 50 states, which resulted in the New York Declaration on Action against Hunger and Poverty. Among the measures it proposed were the taxation of arms trade, the collection of funds for social projects through credit cards, and the reduction of taxes on foreign remittances, among others.¹⁰⁷ In spite of the positive international repercussions, the New York Summit ended without major concrete outcomes.

The Initiative for Latin America and the Caribbean without Hunger is also noteworthy. It was jointly launched by the Brazilian and Guatemalan governments, in 2005, in association with the Regional Office of FAO. The region had been the only one to reach the Millennium Development Goals on food security. The Global Summit on Nutrition became the first to uphold the commitment of eradicating hunger and extreme poverty (FAO, n.d). The campaign was endorsed by 29 countries and gave rise to an intense interchange of public policies between participant states. Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico became receivers of bilateral technical cooperation from Brazil and adopted social policies inspired by Zero Hunger (FAO *apud.* Brazil, 2013: p. 114). Much of the regional progress in food security can be traced back to Brazil (FAO, n.d) and it served as a platform for the diffusion of Brazilian social strategies and the provision of technical cooperation (Maluf, Santareli and Prado, 2014: p. 20).

The Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development (2010), in Brasilia, played an important part in promoting Brazil’s expertise on tropical agriculture for Africa. The initiative of President Lula was well received abroad and

¹⁰⁶ Consisting of Jaques Chirac (President of France), José Luiz Rodriguez Zapatero (Prime Minister of Spain), Ricardo Lagos (President of Chile), and Kofi Annan (UN General-Secretary).

¹⁰⁷ New York Declaration on action against hunger and poverty New York, September 20, 2004. Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Declaration_de_New_York_sur_l_action_contre_la_faim_et_la_pauvrete_20_septembre_2004.pdf; <http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/lula040920.doc.htm>; <https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/488922/noticia.htm?sequence=1> (accessed November 8, 2016).

representatives of 45 African countries, FAO and WFP, as well as civil society entities from Brazil and Africa, attended the meeting (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 10).

Lula's opening speech singled out the More Food Program (Programa Mais Alimentos – PMA) and the Food Acquisition Program (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos – PAA) as two public policies in agriculture which had helped Brazil to reduce food insecurity and could do the same to impoverished countries in Africa. The event was followed by a surge in demand for Brazilian technical cooperation projects. At the time of the event, 26 African countries hosted Brazilian technical cooperation projects, in either a design or implementation stage, and, in the following year, the number of partner-countries had increased to 38 (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 10-11). In this regard, the Brazil-Africa Dialogue fostered new triangular cooperation initiatives among UN agencies, Brazil and Africa.

According to professor Antônio Carlos Lessa, presidential travels are another indication of the value attributed to foreign policy by a country's leader (Schreiber, 2015). Throughout Lula's first mandate, he spent 216 days outside the country - an increase of 30% in relation to the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and 50% more than Dilma Rousseff. Between 2003 and 2006, Lula made four tours in Africa, during which he visited 17 African countries.¹⁰⁸ ¹⁰⁹ His predecessor, Cardoso, only visited three African countries - Angola, South Africa, and Mozambique - during his eight years as President. Furthermore, during this period Brazil received more than 20 visits from African Heads of State (Leite, 2011).

In regard to FAO activities, Brazil was an energetic player in the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), considered by the former UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, the 'most inclusive international and intergovernmental platform' on food security and nutrition. This active role of the Brazilian diplomacy as well as the expansion of its technical cooperation resulted in the support of the great majority of African countries to the Brazilian candidacy for the FAO leadership in 2011 (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p.27;

¹⁰⁸ 'In 2003 on his first visit, he was in San Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa. In 2004, he visited San Tomé and Príncipe, Gabon, and Cap Verde. in 2005, he visited Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Senegal. In 2006, he visited Algiers, Benin, Botswana, and South Africa.' (Leite, 2011: p. 180).

¹⁰⁹ The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lula government accompanied the president's activism, having visited 31 African countries during 67 trips to the continent during his administration (Brazil *apud*. Oliveira, 2015).

Brazil, 2013: p. 103; Fraundorfer, 2015: p.104-107; FAO, 2017c) and the subsequent re-election of José Graziano da Silva.

Another sign of the successful instrumentalization of international assistance in favor of foreign policy goals is found in the backing African nations also gave to the bid of the Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Azevedo to become the Director of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In May 2013, President Rousseff declared her gratitude to African countries for having supported Ambassador Azevedo to become the WTO Director (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 88).

Regarding the statements made to a foreign audience, in a sample of 59 speeches, 9 articles, and 17¹¹⁰ interviews given by President Lula during his first term, hunger was present in approximately half of all his statements: 62%, 44% and 47%, respectively. The rhetoric employed by Lula can be summarized in three main elements: the creation of a global fund for the fight against hunger, the adoption of integrated actions on two levels, including emergency measures as well as structural efforts, in line with those followed internally by the Zero Hunger Program; and the increase of financing sources (MRE, 2007a).

As for the speeches of Foreign Minister Amorim, data from the Secretariat of Diplomatic Planning (MRE, 2007b), which contains 35 speeches, 6 lectures, 22 articles, and 14 interviews, indicated that the fight against hunger was mentioned in 13 speeches (37% of the total), 4 lectures (66%), 7 articles (31%), and 1 interview (7%). Although the data does not allow us to infer how much the issue was really considered a diplomatic priority, its mere presence testifies to its incorporation into the foreign policy narrative, considering that, during his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cardoso's government, Celso Lafer rarely mentioned this issue.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ The analysis comprised of all of the pronouncements in the publication of the SPD-MRE (2007) which 'constitute a small and representative sample of the Presidents interventions about issues of foreign policy through his first mandate' (MRE, 2007a: p. 12).

¹¹¹ According to Vilela and Neiva (2011), the references to social inequality were substantially more characteristic of Lula compared to his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which constituted one of the major differences between the two governments.

Regarding Lula's successor, President Dilma Rousseff, 56 statements were studied¹¹². The analysis revealed that only once the issue of hunger was mentioned, and even so in vague terms: "my government will remain engaged in the fight against hunger and misery in the world" (Rousseff, 2011), in the Constitutional Commitment to the National Congress on January 1st, 2011. Over the years, there was a steady decline in Brazil's commitment to hunger alleviation, reflecting the presidential lack of enthusiasm and the deterioration of its international cooperation initiatives.

It is important to underline that Lula reaffirmed the conclusions which Josué de Castro had drawn half a century earlier, according to which the persistency of hunger should be viewed as a question of lack of political will (Fraundorfer, 2015). However, there was a huge gap between discourse and reality. Lula's many promises to African leaders waned as soon as he left office and even during his terms many agreements were never implemented. As it will be demonstrated in Mozambique's case study, even Brazil's flagship project ProSavana has had little real impact locally, leading it to be considered another Brazilian broken promise from a bygone era of great expectations and unfulfilled commitments (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016: p 36).

3.6. The Mozambican example

Mozambique was selected to showcase a concrete example of Brazilian international cooperation towards Africa. The country belongs to the group of African Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP), which together accounted for 74% of the resources spent on technical cooperation in Africa in 2010 (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p. 5). Mozambique receives the largest proportion of Brazil's overseas agricultural aid and investment, consistently being placed as the main recipient of Federal Government's technical cooperation from 2005 to 2013¹¹³ (Ipea, 2013, Ipea, 2017; Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p.5; Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013: p. 57)

Secondly, Mozambique was chosen due to the importance of the Brazilian presence in the country with the ProSavana, which polarized public opinion and ended up uniting

¹¹² The speeches are in the compilation 'Discursos Seleccionados da Presidente Dilma Rousseff' by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹¹³ In 2010, Mozambique was placed in 4th, after Haiti, Peru, São Tomé e Príncipe (Ipea, 2013).

transnational networks of civil society organizations against the program (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016). The international assistance given to Mozambique spurred debates on agricultural cooperation not only within the governments concerned but also among the community of experts in various countries (Cabral *et al.*, 2016: p. 55). Although cooperation initiatives between Brazil and Mozambique will be analyzed here, it is not our purpose to exhaustively describe all the projects and their characteristics; instead, the focus shall be on an overview of Brazil's approach to foreign aid in food security, its main features, and concrete results (whenever available).

Regarding Mozambique's background, the country is one of the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) in the world – ranking 181 out of 188 countries in 2016 (UNDP, 2016). Since its independence, and more than a decade of civil war, it has increasingly become dependent on food aid, especially of rice and wheat, with its predominantly rural population facing high levels of malnutrition and food insecurity (Amanor and Chichava, 2016). In 1975, influx of international aid accounted only for 9% of food consumption, whereas in the early 2000s it amounted for 86% (de Brito *et al.*, 2015). In 2007, Western donors contributed with more than two-thirds of the Ministry of Agriculture's (MINAG) budget (De Renzio and Hanlon, 2007, p. 15). This precarious and unbalanced situation led Mozambique to create policies aiming to support family farming, such as the Strategic Plan for Agrarian Development (PEDSA) for 2008–2019.

3.6.1. ProSavana program

During the G-8 summit in Aquila (Italy) in 2009, Brazil and Japan decided to work together for agricultural development in Mozambique. The initial proposal was to adapt the experience acquired with the Japan-Brazil Cooperation Program for Development of the Cerrado Region (Prodecer) to the African savannas. This was seen as something viable by virtue of the similarities between the biomes that share the same latitude. Consequently, in September 2009, the Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique marked the official launch of the ProSavana program. According to its executive summary, published in June 2011, ProSavana was intended to improve the competitiveness of the rural sector in northern Mozambique along the Nacala Corridor by 'increasing food security through measures to organize and increase the

productivity of family farming and by generating exportable surpluses through the provision of technical support for agribusiness-oriented agriculture' (UNDP, 2011).

Similarly to Prodecer, ProSavana laid out a 20-year program based on three components. The first was ProSavana-PI (or ProSavana-TEC, as originally called). It consisted of strengthening research capabilities and identifying the most appropriate agricultural technologies for promoting sustainable agricultural development in the region of the Nacala Corridor through a partnership between Embrapa and the Agricultural Research Institute of Mozambique (IIAM). The total budget for ProSavana-PI was set at US\$14.68 million, of which 42.1% was financed by ABC, 43.8% by Embrapa, and the remaining 14.1% by the Mozambican government. The second component was ProSavana-PD, which focuses on creating an overall strategy (a Master Plan) for the development of local agriculture. The bulk of the funding for it came from Japan (US\$6,254,000), followed by Brazil (US\$800,000) and Mozambique (US\$300,000). The third component was ProSavana-PE. Its goal was to improve access to agricultural extension services for farmers by boosting the number of studies for planning and implementing community-level productive projects. Since the implementation of this third element required inputs from the other two components, little information on its scope and funding has become available so far (Ekman and Macamo, 2014: p.8-9).

As agreed trilaterally, ProSavana should provide the groundwork for efforts in reducing poverty and revitalize the local economy. Thus, its Master Plan should be coherent with pre-existing farming plans. In this sense, ProSavana sponsored the cultivation of the same crops recommended by the Mozambican government's PEDSA plan as the best way to tackle food insecurity. These included soy, maize, potato, cassava, and other vegetables, as well as cash crops (such as tobacco, cashew and cotton), and the poultry industry.

The plantation of soybeans led to suspicions that it would supply Japanese demand (as it happened before with Prodecer), since the domestic demand for soybean is relatively new in Mozambique. However, according to field research of the Center for International Forestry Research, the domestic production is largely insufficient to respond to the growing local demand. Moreover, the Mozambican market for soybean is believed to hold great potential due to the expansion of the poultry industry (Ekman and Macamo, 2014: p.22).

Since its foundation, ProSavana has received countless negative reviews from public opinion. One key risk often associated with the program is the destruction of the Miombo woodlands, which cover two thirds of Mozambique and supports the livelihood of local communities (Salomão and Matose, 2007). The forest is mainly located in the northern region, specifically in the provinces of Nampula and Niassa. Nonetheless, this region accounts for around 45% of the land along the Nacala Corridor explored by ProSavana (ProSavana-PD interim report *apud*. Ekman and Macamo, 2014: p.28).

On the one hand, it is claimed that the development of ProSavana is not incompatible with forest conservation, since the program focuses on areas already used in agriculture and that its guidelines forbid the clearance of forest land for agricultural expansion. In addition, ProSavana endorses projects designed to mitigate logging by creating alternative sources of wood and fuel for local populations, and to strengthen monitoring and enforcing environmental regulations. On the other hand, some forest clearance seems inevitable, because some woodland areas are located on the way of required infrastructure. As details of projects and exact locations are yet to be determined, it is not possible to quantify the impact at this stage, making any overall evaluation rather imprecise. But experts estimate that the program will have both positive and negative impacts on the forests surrounding the project areas (Ekman and Macamo, 2014: p. 32).

Brazilian and Mozambican social movements had already established initial contacts before they engaged in mobilization efforts directed against ProSavana. For instance, the International Network of People Affected by Vale, the World March of Women and Via Campesina have been carrying out joint social actions for years and the foundation they laid was politically crucial for structuring the local resistance that was later carried out (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.14).

In May 2012, the People's Summit at Rio+20 represented a turning point to the transnational network of social movements opposing ProSavana. On that occasion, one of the main organizations of family agriculture in Mozambique, the National Union of Peasants (UNAC), had meetings with the Brazilian Via Campesina. Other organizations joined and strengthened this relationship over time and this collective engagement ended up resulting in a visit of the UNAC and the Rural Mutual Aid Association (ORAM) to Brazil. The trip was organized by

the NGOs FASE and Oxfam International. Mozambican representatives visited the Cerrado region and Brasilia, where they held meetings with government officials and with the president of CONSEA. The gathering with the leader of CONSEA would bear fruit, such as the invitation for a representative of the UNAC to feature as a speaker in the plenary session of the Council, in the following year (2013). This growth in contacts between Brazilian and Mozambican civil society's representatives contributed to consolidate a transnational network among social movements of both sides of the Atlantic.

In May 2013, local Mozambican entities published an Open Letter to Urgently Stop and Reflect on the ProSavana Program, which was also endorsed by civil society organizations in Brazil and Japan. Although there has never been an official public answer to it, the letter had a significant impact within the Brazilian government, causing ProSavana's initial plans to be delayed. In August, social organizations from Mozambique, Brazil and Japan gave yet another demonstration of their network's influence by calling the First People's Triangular Conference (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.24). The meeting further obstructed the program's political agenda.

A reiterated point of frustration with ProSavana related to a lack of information and transparency, since the program has never gone through any popular consultation process. In an attempt to address this criticism, the Mozambican government started *consultations* in the provinces during 2013. In these meetings, government representatives conveyed only superficial information about the program's benefits (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.22). Thus, the *consultations* were accused of being merely *pro forma*, because government officials did not listen to the needs of farmers, but only followed a pre-set protocol of sharing basic information to give the program a 'democratic appearance'.

Another key complaint resulted from the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers, which carried the risk of polluting water resources. Moreover, entities of Brazil's civil society accused the government of encouraging rural exodus and land concentration in Mozambique, as Prodecer had done in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, increasing the risk of impoverishment in rural Mozambican communities (Milani, 2017: p. 124-125). Finally, the well-known links of the project to the economic interests of private companies, such as the Brazilian Vale, have also spurred reproach.

Some argue that the strong criticism led ProSavana to undergo reformulation. In October 2013, Mozambique launched the Concept Note for Formulation of the Agricultural Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor. The note focused on the need to increase the productivity of Mozambique's farming, based on public lands made available to small farmers under a concession contract. This system produces almost no surplus and generates low income. The note proposed to expand contract farming in order to enhance productivity in select areas.

Also, the note deliberately omitted any explicit mention to exports of commodities and references to the Brazilian program Prodecet. Instead, the Mozambican Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA) for 2008–19 was adopted as the new base-line for ProSavana. All in all, it remained rather ambiguous whether the note represented an actual shift in the direction of the program, but some saw it as a vindication for the transnational network of peasants and NGOs. In any case, shortly after, the note was removed from the official ProSavana website following criticism by Japanese partners and financial donors (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.26) ¹¹⁴.

In June 2014, the 'No to ProSavana' campaign was launched by local farmers, who claimed the program disproportionately benefited Brazilian and Japanese private and public sectors, damaging Mozambican peasantry. One month later, the Second People's Triangular Conference was held, a meeting with social organizations and movements from Brazil and Mozambique. Opposition against ProSavana became a reference for social movements in Africa and all over the world. Pressure both inside and outside Mozambique for higher transparency, accountability and participation was relatively effective, since it managed to halt ProSavana's agenda, change its narrative, and delay the schedule of its Master Plan.

Acclaimed by some as a transformative initiative and vilified by others as an eviction of farmers from their lands, ProSavana is now being seen as having caused much ado about (almost) nothing. Even among its erstwhile backers, the project is deemed to have failed. In addition to the huge controversy it sparked with local civil society organizations (Gonçalves

¹¹⁴ The text is available at <http://www.farmland-grab.org/post/view/22964-japanese-experts-analysis-the-concept-note-for-formulation-of-agricultural-development-master-plan-in-the-nacala-corridor>

and Shankland, 2016), ProSavana has been affected by the recent Brazilian economic crisis, which has led to lower investments in developing projects¹¹⁵.

Its Master Plan has been limited to half-a-dozen small-scale ‘quick impact projects’ financed by JICA, with only tenuous Brazilian involvement (Mosca and Bruna, 2015). Consequently, the program has yet to establish a visible presence in northern Mozambique, beyond an agricultural research component (mainly focused on soybeans), whose results have reached very few farmers. The future of ProSavana remains uncertain and its implementation deserves to be further examined with close attention (Milani, 2017: p.125).

3.6.2. More Food International

This new feature in Brazil’s portfolio of agricultural cooperation came into existence when President Lula’s popularity was at its highest and the nation’s economy had not yet shown signs of the forthcoming crisis under Dilma Rousseff. In this sense, partnering with this South American emerging power and farming giant appealed to many African countries as a suitable alternative to traditional donors. Launched at the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development (2010), More Food International (MFI) drew from Brazil’s domestic experience with the More Food Program of subsidized credit for the acquisition of agricultural machinery to support the modernization of smallholder farming¹¹⁶ (Cabral *et al.*, 2016: p. 49; Pinto, Belmonte, and Padua, 2015; Patriota and Pierri, 2013).

MFI’s offer of concessional loans tied to the purchase of agricultural machinery manufactured in Brazil aimed to operationalize a countercyclical industrial policy (Patriota and Pierri, 2013: p. 140). The loans provided a 15 to 17-year repayment period, a 3 to 5-year grace period and an interest rate of 2 per cent (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 12). In addition to hardware financing, MFI included specific activities designed to strengthen technical assistance and rural extension (ATER) in partner countries (Vaz, 2015). Just as it occurred

¹¹⁵ Available at: <http://app.folha.uol.com.br/site/noticia/533494> (accessed 20 August, 2016).

¹¹⁶ For more information: MDA, 2015. Mais Alimentos Internacional Estimula Exportação de Empresas Brasileiras de Pequeno Porte. Available at: <http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/noticias/mais-alimentos-internacional-estimula-exporta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-empresas-brasileiras-de-pequeno-porte>; <http://www.organicnet.com.br/2015/07/plano-nacional-de-exportacoes-ajuda-o-agricultor-a-agir-no-mercado-externo/> (accessed October 10, 2017).

in Brazil's original program, lending facilities were complemented by post-sales support, such as insurance against harvest losses and provision of technical assistance. This was supposed to give Brazilian exports a comparative edge vis-à-vis its traditional competitors (Cabral *et al.*, 2016: p. 49).

In a joint endeavor with FAO, the MFI placed a particular focus on the Sahel, the poorest region of the African continent (Vaz, 2015). The initiative was well-received by the African delegations in early 2011 and, in the same year, credits amounting to US\$ 470 million were made available to five participating countries: Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and Zimbabwe (Cabral *et al.*, 2016: p. 49). The first export of 340 tractors happened in August 2014, having Zimbabwe as its destination (Vaz, 2015: p.183). A total of \$640 million was approved by the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX) for implementation of the program in the 2011-12 biennium (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 12). In 2015, the program finished its first stage: in total, 513 machines were delivered, amounting for 32 million dollars (about 120 million reais, in current values) (MDA, 2015).

The MFI was created within the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA). The initiative exemplifies the diversification of domestic actors providing technical cooperation. Whereas ProSavana was the flagship project of MAPA's and Embrapa's duet, the MFI and the PAA Africa were innovations brought about by the MDA and Pronaf ¹¹⁷. In addition to the MDA as the leading institution, other actors were involved in the program's design and implementation, including CAMEX, as the export credit oversight agency, and the Bank of Brazil (BB), as the lending institution, as well as industry associations.

The technical cooperation agreement 'Training and Technology Transfer for the More Food Program between Brazil and Mozambique' was signed by the Brazilian Minister of Agrarian Development, Afonso Florence, and his Mozambican counterpart, Daniel Miguel Ângelo Clemente. It established that the project would last two years and would have an initial cost of US\$ 400,000, in addition to a line of credit of 97.6 million dollars to purchase equipment. The agreement was part of the Mozambican PEDSA, which aims to stimulate the growth of

¹¹⁷ The MDA was extinguished by the government of Michel Temer on May 13, 2016. It was unified with the Ministry of Social Development (MDS). Some secretariats dealing with agrarian reform and family agriculture were moved to the Civil House (RBA, 2016).

the agricultural sector by at least 7% per year and increase in 25% of the cultivated areas. Actions carried out would also be added to the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP), which aimed to reduce the country's malnutrition rate from the current 54.7% to 45% by 2014 (UFRGS, n.d.). The first delivery of machines in Mozambique took place in January 2015. In this first phase, 513 tractors and 2,500 agricultural implements were delivered among planters, such as plows and tools to prepare soil work and fertilization (MDA, 2015).

The MFI was criticized for a biased selection of beneficiaries of loans and equipment, considered too sophisticated (thus with questionable applicability) for the farmers of its target group (Amanor, 2013). Yet, criticism was not restricted to the issue of suitable targeting. The MFI has also been accused of prioritizing the interests of the industry over those of family farmers (Sá, 2012). Moreover, the program contradicted, at least partially, Brazil's South-South cooperation rhetoric, since it provided tied-aid by sponsoring commercial gains.

3.6.3. Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa)

As a result of the Brazil-Africa Dialogue (2010), ten countries were chosen to partake in the pilot Purchase from Africans for Africa Program (PAA Africa). The initiative aimed to address food insecurity and strengthen local markets through food purchases to supply for public programs, such as school feeding, in-kind donations to food-insecure populations, and food stocks. Both Brazil's PAA program and WFP's program Purchase for Progress (P4P) were direct references for the PPA Africa, which was to be carried out jointly by FAO, WFP, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Brazil.

FAO was to be responsible for the provision of seeds and fertilizer and for boosting the capacity of small-scale farmers to grow, process and sell their products. On the Brazilian side, the MDS would provide technical and coordination support, and CGFOME would act as its coordinating focal point. The Brazilian government committed 2.4 million dollars to support the program's implementation and the United Kingdom another 2 million (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p.12). Until 2014, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal had begun implementation of phase I, and presented a total of 5,187 participating farmers, with 434 primary schools recipients of food and 124,468 students (Ipea: ABC, 2017: p. 128; Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p.27; Vaz, 2015: p.181-182).

3.7. Final Considerations

This chapter analyzed how Brazil became a provider of SSC, starting from the broadening of its public policies related to food security. Even though the Lula administration benefited from pre-existing organizations and social programs, his government expanded and unified them under the aegis of Zero Hunger. As such, food security entered into the foreign policy agenda bolstered by domestic transformations in the perception of national interests and foreign policy priorities. This fact corroborates the viewpoint of the two-level-game theoretical framework, which states that domestic dynamics are a permanent relevant feature in the making of diplomacy. This Dissertation also mentioned international factors which boosted Brazil's aid scope abroad. These findings further confirmed Putnam's perspective which emphasize the complementarity between domestic and international factors in explaining international relations.

Brazilian international engagement in hunger alleviation brought new domestic actors to the technical cooperation landscape, whose practices did not always converge. Besides traditional players such as Embrapa and ABC, new agents joined in, such as the MDA and Itamaraty's CGFOME. This multiplication of agents and decision-making levels occasionally resulted in uncoordinated efforts (Maluf, Santareli and Prado, 2014; Cabral and Shankland, 2012), but, at the same time, it led Brazil to amplify the outreach of its foreign engagements.

Another challenge regarding Brazil's model of development cooperation in Africa resides in its legal framework, which is ill-equipped to deal with costs related to international aid, since it forbids financing activities abroad. What was supposed to be a provisory solution for hiring personnel through the UNDP is still in place for ABC today. On top of that, the lack of long-term consensual goals guiding foreign assistance can also be pointed out as having weakened such cooperation initiatives (Burges, 2016). Consequently, Brazil still confronts considerable institutional fragmentation and lack of central planning and coordination in implementing its international development cooperation.

Brazil's agricultural-cooperation initiatives in Mozambique (and probably in the whole African continent, since the same initiatives were replicated in several nations) were

motivated by multiple factors, some of them (benefiting Brazilian agribusiness and large corporations) arguably more important than the altruistic solidarity promoted by governmental propaganda. Many initiatives did focus on assisting the receiving country to achieve food security and to strengthen its smallholder agriculture. Simultaneously, though, most projects also promoted, directly or indirectly, Brazilian economic interests. For instance, the MFI aimed of course to address food insecurity constraints, but it also served very specific industrial interests by providing steady demand for machinery ‘made in Brazil’. Likewise, ProSavana had a technical cooperation component, but it also provided a platform for private investment in the Nacala Corridor (Patriota and Pierri 2013: p.28).

Therefore, while official rhetoric justified expansion of the programs on the basis of ‘South-South solidarity’, Brazil surely benefited economically. Looking beyond Mozambique, this is illustrated by the fact that Odebrecht became the biggest private employer in Angola, with commercial activities in biofuels, diamonds, supermarkets, and many other areas (Stolte, 2015; Fellet 2012a; Fellet, 2012b; Vilas-Bôas, 2011: p.5–6). Later, huge amounts of bribery were revealed in a multidimensional corruption network, which had among its most important beneficiaries the PT and Lula’s government. In addition to Odebrecht and other firms, Brazil’s Development Bank (BNDES) was also involved in corruption scandals in Africa.

If economic interests played an important role in guiding decisions on the allocation of cooperation projects, they do not explain all the government’s decisions though. Brazil’s development aid in Africa also served political purposes. They allowed Brazil to present itself globally as being capable of technology-sharing and fostering development beyond its neighborhood region; thereby, it has also underlined Brazil’s ability to become a global player and to pursue more influence in key international institutions (Maluf, Santareli and Prado, 2014: p. 22). In this sense, strengthening partnerships with Africa was instrumental to acquire broader support to Brazil’s diplomatic goals (Stolte, 2015).

However, Brazil’s foreign policy ambitions were not grounded on sustainable and structural pillars and they would suffer major setbacks after Lula’s era. The end of the commodity-boom represented a lost opportunity for inducing necessary socioeconomic and infrastructure changes. The significant amount of foreign investment and commercial revenue Brazil

received during the first decade of the 2000s could have been employed to implement long-overdue labor, pension and political reforms. On the contrary, Brazil has had low capacity to overcome the global financial and economic crises, whose deleterious effects persist up until today.

Moreover, Lula's successor, President Dilma Rousseff, did not share his enthusiasm for international affairs, and significantly reduced the scope of Brazil's presidential diplomacy. Thus, not only did Brazil's domestic situation deteriorate, but also its new leader did not care enough to maintain previous foreign policy engagements. Rather, Rousseff focused on internal issues, particularly the sluggish economy, the growing political crisis, corruption scandals, and her decreasing popularity (Scooner *et al.*, 2016: p.6). Brazil's political turmoil led to Rousseff's impeachment, which further damaged Brazil's status-seeking policy and reduced the scope of cooperation it provided to other countries.

In 2013, Embrapa announced a reduction of its presence in Africa, significantly decreasing the number of partner countries in that continent (Fellet, 2013). In 2017, ABC marked its 30-year anniversary, but with little to celebrate, since it has been operating under severe budgetary restrictions, and with only a minimum of its operations being carried out on the ground. In reality, many of the much-hyped Brazilian investments in Africa have not materialized and remained on paper.

In addition to Brazil's domestic problems, Africa has shown to be difficult in terms of partnerships. According to a project analyst of the ABC's General Coordination of South-South Cooperation, even when technical cooperation projects achieve the approval of high-ranked government officials, such as Ministers, they end up not being fully implemented. More often than not, the initial political support fades away, plagued by lack of enthusiasm and proper follow-up. In addition, African countries in general, and Mozambique in particular, are so used to receiving foreign aid that their own capacity to deliver is limited. They rely on international organizations and NGOs to execute a significant part of their public policies. And since there is a plethora of NGOs and IOs acting simultaneously in the same country, sometimes without coordinating their efforts, it can be quite tricky for the government to make its guidelines be respected. For example, even the WFP, a major IO involved in food security, does not have a cohesive approach. While its Center of Excellence

in Brazil prioritizes programs which buy food locally (P4P), its headquarters still mostly assist nations with agricultural surpluses of donating countries, such as corn and soy coming from the United States, its main patron¹¹⁸.

Furthermore, rhetoric in favor of cooperation initiatives used to exaggerate the similarities between Brazil and African countries. Despite historical bonds and agroecological resemblances, the economic, political and sociological realities of these nations are very diverse (Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013). First of all, Brazil has a long history of social mobilization in the field of agricultural policy, which led civil society to be a part in all the phases of public-policy formulation. This was an essential factor to the sustainability and success of its family farming programs.

Early stages of this engagement were noticeable in Mozambican society's response to ProSavana. Perhaps, the program's main achievement has been to boost social mobilization, by bringing together a transnational network of farmers, civil society representatives, and NGOs presenting an opposition to ProSavana. In this sense, much of the success of the Brazilian development cooperation model to Africa may rely on the continent's ability to replicate of Brazil's domestic best-practices (Souza, 2014).

Even if cooperation initiatives did not lead to the expected outcomes, they certainly contributed to diffuse Brazil's public policies abroad. This process of internationalization also brought unintended results. Together with its policies, Brazil's contradictions in the agricultural field – with two conflicting sectors: agribusiness versus family farming –also crossed the Atlantic.

As it was suggested, although South-South (horizontal) cooperation promises to be intrinsically distinctive from the archetypical North-South (vertical) model, most technology transfers, financial influx and other foreign interventions promote some kind of market penetration and usually lead to the integration of smallholder farmers into existing forms of market accumulation. Therefore, this Dissertation reinforces the argument of other authors (Amanor and Chichava, 2016: p.21) that despite framing its diplomatic initiatives as being horizontal and giving room to family farming, the underlying processes of Brazilian

¹¹⁸ Information obtained during interviews and informal talks with WFP employees and ABC officials.

engagements in Africa followed dominant frameworks of global agribusiness, similarly to the ones originating in the geopolitical North.

Finally, this study argued that social gains on food security were used to boost Brazil's soft power. It is worth mentioning, however, that using a nation's assets to increase its relative power in the global arena does not imply any wrong-doing and is a widespread practice. The spillover effect of foreign aid into the economic field is also a common byproduct of such policies, and it should not invalidate eventual gains obtained by cooperation. The Brazilian discourse of solidarity may have in a way played a role in bringing countries of the global South closer together. But believing in purely altruistic action is not only naïve but also ill-conceived, since it takes rhetoric as a sign of deceit, when in fact it is a misconception of the obvious: rhetoric is necessarily distinct from practice.

Chapter 4. Comparing Aid: the Brazilian and US Approaches

The database from USAID is the most comprehensive source available on US foreign aid. It includes reporting from 30 agencies, stretching back to 1946 and with information on individual sectors and programs from 2001 onwards. This USAID database adopts a broad definition of foreign aid, which, contrary to the ODA concept, includes military aid. The table below shows the five strategic objectives of US aid and their respective sectors and budgets, as presented in a framework developed by the State Department.

Table 4.1. US Aid Objectives and Program Areas (planned allocations in millions of current dollars)

Aid Objectives and Program Areas	FY2015	Aid Objectives and Program Areas	FY2015
Peace and Security	9,070.00	Investing in People	9,870.00
Counter-Terrorism	1,260.00	Health	8,700.00
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction	288.95	Education	783.88
Stabilization/Security Sector Reform	6,560.00	Social Services/Protection of Vulnerable	386.12
Counter-narcotics	555.33		
Transnational Crime	91.24	Governing Justly & Democratically	2,430.80
Conflict Mitigation	311.60	Rule of Law & Human Rights	644.28
		Good Governance	1,050.00
Promoting Economic Growth	3,795.65	Political Competition	233.43
Macroeconomic Growth	284.80	Civil Society	501.72
Trade & Investment	170.25		
Financial Sector	104.72	Humanitarian Assistance	4,680.00
Infrastructure	550.85	Protection, Assistance & Solutions	4,500.00
Agriculture	1,180.00	Disaster Readiness	149.78
Private Sector Competitiveness	522.32	Migration Management	30.50
Economic Opportunity	271.30		
Environment	711.41		

Source: Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p. 5.

US foreign aid is also classified according to the types of activities they are expected to support, using broad categories such as military, bilateral development, multilateral development, non-military security, humanitarian, and political/strategic activities (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p.6). In the Brazilian case, aid focuses on eight modalities: technical,

educational, scientific/technological and humanitarian cooperation, as well as refugee support, peacekeeping operations, and expenditures with international organizations.

Table 4.2. Brazilian government expenditures with international development cooperation (IDC) 2005-2013 (USD)

Modality	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Technical cooperation	11,422,103	15,046,399	18,256,037	32,097,330	48,872,380	57,770,553	45,617,071	33,970,749	31,846,055	294,898,677
Educational cooperation	23,088,150	25,896,724	28,911,102	38,615,610	22,236,954	35,544,099	20,689,408	22,251,006	23,809,864	241,042,917
Scientific and technological cooperation						24,009,084	73,106,869	72,085,370	53,174,326	222,375,648
Humanitarian cooperation	487,994	2,534,110	16310158	16,253,978	43,521,166	161,469,749	72,418,476	109,828,325	21,667,913	444,491,870
Refugee support and protection						590,469	4,710,229	4,122,857	1,819,718	11,243,273
Peacekeeping operations	60,820,165	37,022,477	67,575,897	69,901,093	62,704,500	332,422,426	40,167,190	20,654,923	10,330,872	701,599,543
Expenditures with International Organizations	123,105,205	233,731,176	228,421,353	249,862,951	247,579,564	311,569,290	331,642,424	250,857,370	254,157,155	2,230,926,490
Total³	218,923,618	314,230,885	359,474,548	406,730,962	424,914,563	923,375,670	588,351,667	513,770,600	396,805,904	4,146,578,417

Note: From 2005 to 2009, the data on scientific and technological cooperation were inserted into the technical cooperation modality.


Source: IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 15.

Even though the foreign aid budgets of Brazil and the US are classified in distinctive ways, it is possible to establish parallels between them. The charts below demonstrate the greater importance of bilateral aid for the US when compared with Brazil, which spent around 9% of its aid outlays in this modality. Brazilian initiatives in this case are concentrated on only five countries, which represent 52% of bilateral expenditures in the 2014-2016 period. These were Mozambique, United States, Haiti, Cuba and Guatemala (IPEA and ABC, 2018).

As shown in Figure 4.1 below, Brazil spent 5% of its aid budget with trilateral assistance. This modality of triangular cooperation is carried out in association with another country or an international organization. Partnerships with third countries mobilize fewer resources than those with international organizations (6 million reais in comparison to 178 million reais) but are considered particularly relevant for the practical operationalization of Brazilian cooperation. The low budget of this type of triangular cooperation is mainly related to the costs of aid being paid by the developed nation partnering with Brazil. In the period of 2014-2016, Japan was the largest triangular cooperation partner, accounting for 54% of expenses with trilateral cooperation towards third countries (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 275).

Concerning Brazilian triangular cooperation with international organizations, 80% of the resources were concentrated on initiatives with five international agencies: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). FAO was the main partner, totaling 60 million reais, equivalent to 34% of these resources (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 275).

Figure 4.1. Composition of US and Brazilian foreign aid by laterality



Note 1: the US data is according to OECD's ODA metric, thus excluding military expenses.

Note 2: As seen in the chapter on the US foreign aid, the multi-bi terminology refers to outlays given bilaterally but implemented with the support of a multilateral agency.

Note 3: Plurilateral cooperation in COBRADI reports is referred as cooperation with 'groups of countries'.


Source: made by the author (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 270; OECD, 2018: p. 403).

Figure 4.1 also shows that more than 80% of Brazilian aid was in multilateral form. For someone familiar with Brazil's foreign policy, the focus on multilateralism in the distribution of aid should not come as a surprise, since the country has a history of supporting/highlighting multilateralism as a flagship guideline of its diplomacy. Of the resources used by the multilateral modality, 780 million reais were allocated to contributions to the United Nations, representing 24% in the period 2014-2016. The 15 largest financial contributions to regional and international organizations accounted for 87% of resources, underscoring the importance given to some agencies by the Brazilian government (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 271).

In the case of the US, most aid was given bilaterally (67%). But this does not mean the American government did not prioritize multilateralism. The US has historically been the largest donor to the UN system, covering roughly one fifth of the UN budget (Hillard and Shendruk, 2019). The discrepancy between the weight of multilateral aid in the US and Brazil is more related to the scarcity of funds Brazil has to engage in SSC, in contrast to the more abundant flow of US outlays. Thus, the financial contribution Brazil does to IOs accounts for significantly more than its remaining SSC resources.

Since most national contributions to international organizations are not used separately according to the donor but are rather used indistinctively to promote development, the assessment of the differences between the *horizontal* and *vertical* cooperation approaches cannot be ascertained by studying multilateral aid and shall focus on aid given bilaterally.

Figure 4.2. Composition of US and Brazilian foreign aid according to respective official government categories




Source: made by the author (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p. 6; IPEA and ABC, 2017: 17).

The majority of US development aid is project-based assistance (75% in FY2016), in which aid is channeled through an implementing partner to complete a project. Aid is also provided in the form of core contributions to international organizations such as the United Nations,

technical assistance, and direct budget support (cash transfer) to governments. A portion of aid money is also spent on administrative costs.

Figure 4.3. US Aid by Type, 2016 Disbursements



Source: Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p.26

As far as technical cooperation is concerned, although both countries declare it as a significant part of their aid portfolio, in relation to the total aid budget, it has never reached 10% of this total. The number of Brazilian programs in this aid modality is greater than the US's. As seen on Chapter 2, there are only two US programs regarding food security which have technical cooperation in their scope. These are the Farmer-to-Farmer program and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. The former has limited scope and depends on expertise and knowledge provided on a voluntary basis. The latter is not a technical assistance program *per se*, but it has a provision for technical assistance in its many components.

In the Brazilian case, even if not reflected in budgetary terms, technical assistance is by all accounts its flagship modality. Between 2011 and 2013, 88 federal government agencies operated technical cooperation activities in 128 countries, with Mozambique being the main beneficiary (IPEA, 2017: 23, 28). ABC is the primary agency in charge of this modality and, from 2005 to 2014, its portfolio expanded from 87 to 385 projects. The peak of the agency's international engagement occurred in 2010, when 472 new projects were initiated, thus leading to a total of 737 projects under its direct administration (ABC, n.d.-b). From this universe, 19% were in agriculture.

Even though ABC's performance is a key element in any attempt to assess Brazilian technical cooperation, such initiatives are not circumscribed solely to actions that are financed or

coordinated by ABC. Indeed, technical cooperation managed by other federal government institutions accounted for 28.4 percent of aid expenditures (IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 25). At the same time, initiatives are increasingly combining different modalities of assistance. For instance, the Food Acquisition Program includes both humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation, while the More Food Africa program combines technical and financial cooperation (Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 23).

Brazil's focus on technical assistance has several motivations. In its plainest form, this modality of cooperation consists in the exchange of people who, in turn, share knowledge and expertise. In the Brazilian case, most participants are civil servants from governmental agencies, including ABC. They travel and support local governments in the planning and execution of development-oriented activities. The extra cost for the federal budget comes chiefly from travel arrangements and daily rates paid to the staff. It makes it, therefore, considerably less costly than other types of foreign aid.

Another reason is the increased popularity and international recognition that Brazil's social policies on hunger alleviation enjoyed during the 2000s. This renewed interest led to requests from innumerable countries to receive technical guidance from Brazil. Furthermore, a perception of shared identity among developing countries has been brought forward as another propelling reason for this kind of assistance, on the grounds that similar geographical contexts, historical experiences (e.g. colonialism) and analogous socioeconomic realities would render the provision of technical expertise among them more effective (Milani *et al.*, 2013: p. 5).

Technical assistance also advances Brazil's identity as a 'middle-power' and as an advocate for developing nations, reaffirming its 'diplomacy for development'. As discussed in Chapter II, it helped Brazil to pursue its soft power and its implicit aspiration to be a 'system-affecting state' (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 8).

Although, like the United States, Brazil is also a major agricultural exporter, it does not provide significant amounts of in-kind food donations. The donation of food has been a practice of the US government for decades to dispose of production surpluses. But a similar mechanism was never successfully implemented in Brazil. Among the reasons found for this

is that Brazil does not have a strong maritime transportation sector to lobby and put pressure on the government. As mentioned before, there are legislative impediments for public resources to be used to provide aid, even if it is to pay for transportation fees. In situations when Brazil does provide humanitarian aid in the form of in-kind donations, a UN agency (usually the UNDP or the WFP) will assist with delivery.

A secondary argument can be made on the kind of agricultural products of which Brazil has a surplus and could use for in-kind donations. Brazil's coffee production, for instance, experienced many episodes of overproduction during the first part of the 20th century. However, even if coffee could provide any hunger relief, the government decided to burn the excess production and never donated it internationally. However, this may change. If the Law Project 737 (Annex III) is approved, the Brazilian government will be allowed to provide in-kind donations to assist countries facing humanitarian emergencies.

If technical cooperation is Brazil's modality of choice, in-kind donations are the US's most important aid category. This is the result of a historical process in which the US Congress and the federal government sought to enhance the domestic benefits of foreign aid by requiring that most of it should be used to procure US goods and services. This practice has increasingly been discarded by the international community due to its reduced effectiveness in comparison to other modalities of foreign assistance¹¹⁹. In March 2005, the US signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, joining other donors in committing to reduce tied aid. Since then, the portion of tied aid from all donor countries fell from 70% in 1985 to 16% of bilateral development assistance in 2013. However, despite reiterated efforts of both presidents Bush and Obama, the United States still provided 37% of its 2013 bilateral development assistance in the form of tied aid (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p.18).


Concerning the geographic distribution of aid, both countries have a substantial portion of their foreign assistance directed to Africa. For the 2014-2016 period, Brazilian expenditures on cooperation with African countries accounted for 25% of the total, while projects with

¹¹⁹ 'Studies have shown that tying aid increases the costs of goods and services by 15%-30% on average, and up to 40% for food aid'. Overseas Development Institute, *The Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid*. Available at: www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation.dcdndep/41537529.pdf (accessed on February 26, 2019).

Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Asia accounted for 26%, 7% and 10% of total resources, respectively (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 276).

In terms of US aid outlays, for the 2012-2016 period, 7% of bilateral ODA went to Latin America and the Caribbean, 34% to Sub-Saharan Africa, 12% to the Middle East and North Africa (which includes Morocco, West Sahara, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt), 11% to South and Central Asia, 4% to other Asian nations and Oceania, and 2% to Europe. Finally, 28% of bilateral ODA was unspecified by region (OECD, 2017, 2016, 2015b, 2014, 2013).

Figure 4.4. US bilateral ODA and Brazil IDC by region (2014-16)



Source: made by the author with data from IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 276; OECD, 2017: p. 282.

Inasmuch as the geographical categories are not the same, two main differences between Brazilian and US aid are especially noticeable. They relate to the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East. The United States granted only 7% of its bilateral aid to the former and 11% to the latter from 2014 to 2016. By contrast, Brazilian aid focused on its own region, which represented 26% of all disbursements, while the Middle East does

not even appear as a separate category. Even if one considers Brazilian expenditures in the context of their flagship modality, technical cooperation, the focus of Brazil's actions remains Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, which together accounted for 80% of the funds from 2005 to 2016 (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3. Brazilian government expenditures with international technical cooperation by region (2005-2016) in current reais

Regions	2005-2009*	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014-2016	Total	Share (per cent)
Africa	64.849.104	40.162.089	22.059.553	19.877.279	20.896.283	53.300.000	221.144.308	39%
Latin America & Caribbean	90.236.764	54.193.400	25.079.064	21.020.528	15.420.578	29.400.000	235.350.335	41%
Oceania	11.309.926	7.117.332	2.196.603	1.755.113	1.118.071	na	23.497.045	20%
Europe	2.899.327	203.352	1.195.047	1.184.626	1.277.571	na	6.759.923	
Asia & Middle East	1.494.738	na	506.220	753.503	361.537	na	3.115.998	
North America ¹	2.200.963	na	244.924	252.481	105.021	na	2.803.389	
Total	172.990.825	101.676.173	51.281.411	44.843.530	39.179.061	157.600.000	567.571.001	100%


Source: IPEA and ABC, 2010: p. 57; IPEA and ABC, 2013: p. 29; IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 285-286; IPEA and ABC, 2017: p.35.

na = information not available

* = the data on this period encompasses technical, scientific and technological cooperation, since the methodology of the 2010 COBRADI report did not account these funds separately.

Another key distinction in the foreign assistance portfolios of the US and Brazil is found in the growing importance of Asia for US aid, an increasingly important feature which is not present in Brazilian initiatives. Figure 4.5 shows the trend in the distribution of US aid. While Europe and Latin America have been losing ground, with the graduation of many Eastern European aid recipients, South and Central Asia are receiving more funds. Such evidence demonstrates the strategic importance attributed to Latin America by Brazil, which is not shared at the same level by the United States, normally more concerned with other regions of greater strategic interest.

Figure 4.5. Regional Distribution of US Aid in 1995, 2005 and 2015



Source: Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p. 14.

4.1. Comparing Aid Outlays

Brazilian cooperation is present in 159 countries in every continent, totaling an overall disbursement of 2.8 billion reais (the equivalent of 1.5 billion dollars) from 2011 to 2013, in which expenditures regarding international organizations are predominant (53%) (COBRADI Report 2017).

In absolute terms, the United States leads efforts to improve global food security, providing about half of global food aid and supporting agricultural development (Tandon et al., 2017).

Figure 4.6. US ODA and Brazil IDC in million dollars



Source: made by the author.

Note: US ODA is 2015 constant prices. The Brazilian IDC is in current reais converted to dollars by the PTAX rate, which is the average rate practiced by the interbank market collected by the Central Bank.

Table 4.4. US GDP and Foreign Aid (current USD)

Fiscal Year	GDP in trillion	Aid in million	Aid share of GDP
2005	13.094	35.460	0,27%
2006	13.856	37.254	0,26%
2007	14.478	39.726	0,27%
2008	14.719	46.746	0,31%
2009	14.419	46.629	0,32%
2010	14.964	48.397	0,32%
2011	15.518	48.945	0,31%
2012	16.155	50.079	0,30%
2013	16.692	45.659	0,27%
2014	17.428	43.086	0,24%
2015	18.121	49.190	0,27%
2016	18.624	49.470	0,26%
Average IDC share of GDP in percentage			0,28%

Table note: the aid funding is in obligations.

Source: adapted from Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p. 34 and World Bank, 2019c

Table 4.5. Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and International Development Cooperation (IDC) in current reais


Fiscal Year	GDP in million	IDC in million	Aid share of GDP
2005	2.170.585	532	0,02%

2006	2.409.450	685	0,03%
2007	2.720.263	700	0,03%
2008	3.109.803	744	0,02%
2009	3.333.039	849	0,03%
2010	3.885.847	1.625	0,04%
2011	4.376.382	985	0,02%
2012	4.814.760	1.004	0,02%
2013	5.331.619	857	0,02%
2014	5.778.953	449	0,01%
2015	6.000.570	366	0,01%
2016	6.266.895	3.177	0,05%
Average IDC share of GDP in percentage			0,02%

Source: made by the author (FGV/IBGE, 2017; IPEA/ABC, 2018).

Comparing absolute values can be unfair and misleading, when dealing with nations of very different realities and economies. For this reason, auxiliary elements need to be considered. For instance, aid as a percentage of GDP is a relevant index. As displayed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, for the period from 2006 to 2016, the average percentage of Brazil's IDC in relation to its GNI was 0.02%, while the assistance given by the United States remained around 0.28% of its GNI, so it is around 10 times larger than the Southern nation.

Figure 4.7. Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in million reais (current values) and IDC in percentage of GDP%



Source: made by the author (FGV/IBGE, 2017; IPEA/ABC, 2018).

The country's per capita income and exports of agricultural goods are other key factors that influence the amount of foreign aid a nation is capable and willing to offer. Brazil, as other emerging economies, has increased its participation in global agricultural markets, as well as its income per capita during the period studied (from 2000 until 2015). Growing income and reduced poverty boosted food consumption and imports, while increases in agricultural productivity led to growing exports (FAO, 2018: p. 5).

Table 4.6. Ten Major Exporters of Agricultural Products: Share of Total Export Value, 2016 and 2000

Rank	Ranking in 2016	Share in 2016	Ranking in 2000	Share in 2000
1	European Union	41.1	European Union	46.9
2	United States of America	11	United States of America	14
3	Brazil	5.7	Canada	3.9
4	China	4.2	Australia	3.7
5	Canada	3.4	Brazil	3.2
6	Argentina	2.8	China	3.0
7	Australia	2.5	Argentina	2.7
8	Indonesia	2.4	Mexico	1.9
9	Mexico	2.3	New Zealand	1.6
10	India	2.2	Thailand	1.5

Source: FAO, 2018: p. 6.

By contrast, in both periods (2000 and 2016), the United States was the second largest food importer, behind the European Union with around 10% of the market share, while Brazil is not even on the list of the 10 major importers (FAO, 2018). Over 44 percent of US agricultural imports are horticultural products such as fruits and vegetables. In addition, sugar and tropical products such as coffee, cocoa, and rubber accounted for just over 20 percent of agricultural imports in 2015. Indeed, imports of vegetable oils, processed grain products, red meat, and dairy products have grown significantly in recent years (USDA, 2019).

In relation to income per capita, according to the World Bank, the difference between the two countries is significant. In 2000, US per capita GDP was 36 thousand dollars, while Brazil's was 3.9 thousand dollars. In 2016, the former was 56.8 thousand dollars, and the latter was 8.85 thousand (World Bank, 2019). Thus, Brazilian per capita income grew from 10.8% of the US's in 2000 to 15.5% in 2016.

Another relevant aspect to notice is that the US leading role in the modern global aid system has been in place for a much longer time period. As seen above, the United States became a top donor after the Second World War, while Brazil, up until the 1990s, was still a net receiver of aid and only in the 2000s did it start to play a relatively more prominent role in the system, relatively speaking, losing its prominence once again in the mid-2010s.

4.2. Comparing Institutions

Both countries have recently gone through a process of pluralization of agencies and other players involved in their foreign aid initiatives. As previously noted, several authors highlighted this process in their studies.

In Brazil, civil society took on a greater role not only through the revitalization of CONSEA, but also by means of the creation of new governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Agrarian Development (Port. *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário* - MDA), and the greater input of other public institutions in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy and South-South cooperation (SSC) (Bry, 2017; Leite *et al.*, 2014). IPEA's 2017 report on foreign aid projects carried out from 2011 to 2013 listed 27 agencies which took part in SSC. However, as shown in the table below, ABC remained responsible for 71.6 percent of the aid's budget.

Table 4.7. Federal government expenditures with international technical cooperation by federal agency (2011-2013) in BRL

Federal Agencies	2011	2012	2013	Total	Share (per cent)
ABC	59,857,297	45,683,440	45,914,223	151,454,961	71.6
Embrapa	3,474,823	4,761,012	3,408,398	11,644,233	5.5
Aisa/MS	2,544,997	3,862,190	3,132,525	9,539,712	4.5
Anvisa	1,847,279	22,27,076	1,754,220	5,828,575	2.8
MDS	378,651	883,074	3,908,804	5,170,529	2.4
CPRM	1,172,933	1,610,606	1,122,451	3,905,990	1.8
Ipea	924,808	1,166,722	911,448	3,002,978	1.4
All others	6,189,559	935,953	1,627,193	2,624,901	8.8
Total	76,390,347	66,412,814	68,803,402	211,606,564	100

Source: IPEA, 2017: p. 26.

In the United States, the pluralization occurred through multiple channels, first because of the relative loss of prestige and autonomy of USAID, which was semi-integrated into the State Department, and, second, following the creation of competing entities, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). In 1998, USAID managed 64% of all US ODA; eight years later, this share was reduced to less than 45% (OXFAM, 2008: p.12).

Finally, due to the increased roles played by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the USDA. It is interesting to note that, from 1998 to 2008, the aid-share of the Department of Defense increased from 3.5% to 18% of total US ODA (Milani et al, 2013: p.8). In 2001, the DoD's foreign assistance funding was 4.4 billion dollars, but, in 2015, it had increased nearly fourfold, reaching 15.5 billion. This amount was still smaller than USAID's budget for that year, which was of 18.2 billion dollars (USAID, 2019a). This demonstrates that the US development agency remained the central player, but not by such a great margin, as in Brazil's case, where ABC's aid outlays are more than ten times greater than the one from the second main agency.

Some key distinctions between these agencies (USAID and ABC) are that USAID is much bigger, having more than a hundred offices globally, and, even after the semi-merge with the State Department, it still has its own staff. That is not the case of ABC, which has always been under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and does not have a staff of its own, since its personnel is comprised of diplomats and technicians from the Ministry and UN agencies, especially the UNDP. As a result, ABC has no foreign offices, since cooperation projects remain under the supervision of Itamaraty's diplomatic missions. This leads to the number of employees of the ABC being considerably smaller than the one of its US counterparts.

The smaller size of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency is to be expected, considering that the United States has been a major aid provider since 1945. Also important, ABC was founded mainly to take care of projects in which Brazil was on the opposite side of the spectrum, that is, as an aid beneficiary. 2010 represented the zenith of ABC, whether in terms of budget,

number of staff, or projects. That year, the agency had 56 employees from the MRE¹²⁰, supplemented by experts and technicians from the UN, mostly from UNDP. Although ABC' personnel coordinates technical cooperation programs, activities abroad are usually executed by civil servants who perform similar duties back home. If, on the one hand, this can make it easier for them to establish relations with local counterparts, who tend to consider them as 'foreign colleagues', on the other hand, even when they do not lack the development-specific expertise needed, they do not have an understanding of broader questions about promoting development in other geographical, historical and cultural contexts (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 6).

Thus, this is another distinction in relation to the profile of the assistance managed by USAID. The US Agency's personnel are well-versed in development strategies. But the budgetary restrictions it faces have led it to rarely employ its own staff to carry out the programs. Instead, the tasks are given to contractors, whether from NGOs, PVOs, IOs or the private sector.

Another contrasting feature between the aid-related institutions of both countries is the role of the Armed Forces in aid programs. Brazil does have international cooperation provided by the military, but it is mainly related to taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. Simultaneously to its rise as an aid-donor, Brazil sought to increase the participation of its Armed Forces in UN missions. As part of this effort, in 2010, it created the Brazilian Joint Centre for Peacekeeping (CCOPAB), located in Rio de Janeiro, to prepare military and civilian personnel to participate in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and mine clearance missions. 55% of the 2010 budget of Brazilian cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, was destined to military troops in Haiti (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 29).

Spearheading these efforts was the experience gathered with the Brazilian Force Command of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 to 2017. Although Brazil had taken part in many peacekeeping operations before, MINUSTAH was the first time when Brazil managed to keep a general as Force Commander during the whole duration of the

¹²⁰ Information acquired through Itamaraty's internal system for employees, Intratec (accessed on: March 12, 2019).

mission. Such accomplishment was important to Brazil's foreign policy goals, including projecting the country as a relevant player in international peace and security, capable of having a role in other important multilateral operations as well (Hamann and Teixeira, 2017: p. 2).

Beyond contributions to UN missions, Armed Forces initiatives are not included in Brazil's international development cooperation (IDC). That is very far from US practice, where the Department of Defense's role in foreign aid grew more substantial and varied since the mid-1990s with the multi-billion-dollar projects. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the primary DoD body responsible for aid-funded military assistance programs. These include state-building, humanitarian relief, and health activities, which once were under the exclusive jurisdiction of civilian aid agencies (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p. 2; 21-22).

The discrepancy in the military role in foreign aid is somewhat expected. The Armed Forces have long played a major role in US foreign policy and in US global power status. Brazil, on the contrary, has consistently tried to project an image of being a peace-loving/peaceful nation. The pacific resolution of international disputes is said to be one of key principles of Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Even Brazil's bid to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (which could be seen as ambiguous/contradictory) was not based on the country's military might, but first and foremost it was justified on Brazil's alleged capacity to be a mediator, a consensus-builder willing to promote constructive values in the world order, such as the fight against poverty and hunger (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 40).

4.3. Comparing Legislations

Comparing both legal frameworks in relation to aid provision, it should be stressed from the outset that those in the United States are much older and a lot more developed. If one takes into consideration only food aid programs signed into law, there are thirteen different normative guidelines in the United States, while Brazil's initiatives are under the single umbrella of ABC. Besides not having specific laws for individual initiatives, Brazil also does not have a comprehensive legal framework for its international assistance. The closest the country came to achieve that is Law 12.429/2011, which disciplined the delivery of in-kind donations to countries facing humanitarian crises. This law, however, did not authorize the

federal government to act on its own (it conditioned the distribution of aid to support provided by the World Food Program), nor did it allow the provision of other modalities of aid, such as cash-transfers.

Law 12.429 also restricted the Brazilian government's action by establishing that food aid can only be given inasmuch as it does not compromise food availability to nationals who are victims of adverse socio-economic events in Brazil's territory. This condition reflected concerns shared by legislators and public opinion alike that the country's resources should be employed domestically as a matter of priority instead of shipped abroad.

By contrast, restrictions imposed by US legislation are of a different nature. Although the US government is authorized to provide aid as cash-transfers or local procurement, the US legal system aims to ensure that a minimum percentage of aid funds are directed to pay for US agricultural commodities and shipping costs.

Another dissimilarity is that Brazilian foreign aid initiatives are much closer to its domestic policies. The emergence of Brazil as an international assistance provider is in a way related to relative positive results the country had achieved regarding some social indicators. Moreover, as a donor from the Global South, Brazil's cooperation purportedly aims to help countries facing similar domestic problems. US aid programs do not reflect domestic programs though. Since its inception, the US aid system was created to address foreign realities that are considered to be quite different from those prevailing in the United States. Whether to help rebuild war-torn Europe, with the Marshall Plan, or contain communism in Latin American, or to combat terrorism in the Middle East and Northern Africa, the US government dealt with regional and local circumstances that are very distinct from what it faced at home.

This leads to another distinction in legislative terms. US laws normally state the explicit goals of US aid, whether they are to boost US exports, create potential markets for US commodities, enhance national security, or create jobs, among others. By contrast, Brazilian legislation never mentions the role self-interest plays in providing aid. Programs are presented and justified based rather on 'solidarity' and other noble goals, in a language which tends to be a common feature of South-South cooperation narratives.

4.4. Comparing Presidential Diplomacy and Discourse

First and foremost, it is necessary to acknowledge the asymmetrical disparities of international roles played by the United States and Brazil and all the ensuing consequences for their leaders' political engagements and diplomatic rhetoric. The former is a developed global power and the world's biggest economy, holding the lion's share of the international aid system, while the latter is a developing nation and a regional power with limited resources to project power globally. However, Brazil's discourse sustains that it does not want it to be seen merely as a 'developing country'. It wishes recognition for its distinctive position vis-à-vis Southern countries in general, *vide* its historical bid to occupy a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Claims of Brazil being a 'middle-power', an 'emerging middle power', a 'middle global power', or 'system-affecting state' are abundant in IR literature (Bry, 2017; Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014; Malamud, 2011; Patience, 2014; Alexandroff and Cooper, 2010; Hurrell, 2009).

Regardless of Brazil's aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs being recognized as legitimate or debatable, the complex dimension of its global engagement is very different from that of the United States. The plethora of issues and crises which demand the White House's direct involvement is significantly wider than the one demanded of the Planalto Palace¹²¹. This clear disparity makes it more difficult for US presidents to devote overwhelming attention to just a few themes in most of their speeches. Thus, even when food aid received unprecedented attention by the US presidency, the overall presence of this theme in US official discourse was significantly scarcer than their occurrence in statements by the Brazilian leader.

A hasty conclusion could well point out that the higher incidence of hunger-related issues in Brazilian presidential diplomacy stems strictly from the fact that the country is a developing nation. On the one hand, it is undeniable that hunger and malnutrition are still a main concern of Brazil's domestic policies. The Latin American country has been a frequent member in FAO's map of hunger, having left in 2014 but in risk of going back to it in. It still had around 12 million people, or 5.7 percent of its population, facing hunger in 2018 (Araújo 2018). On

¹²¹ The official workplace of the President of Brazil.

the other hand, despite the fact that food insecurity has long been a domestic issue, it was seldomly the focus of Brazilian presidents' international attention. Thus, the relevance the theme gained in the years 2000 cannot be explained or justified solely on the basis of Brazil's internal development problems, as it is arguably more connected to a political shift in its leadership.

In Brazil, official speeches mentioning food security went from missing altogether to omnisciently present. Yet, following the country's political turmoil and economic recession from the 2012 onwards¹²², the theme lost steam and returned to the former pattern of barely being mentioned at all.

In the case of US presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama did give attention to the issue, but it remained a less prominent focus within their international priorities. If the importance attributed by the Republican administration of President Bush to US efforts in hunger alleviation came as a surprise, Obama's presidency created expectations that it would prioritize this area more than it actually did. The Democratic Party has historically held a more favorable position in regard to international assistance than its adversary. However, as described in Chapter I, these differences were no obstacle for the Republican-led Congress's approval of significant food aid, which withstood the global financial crisis of 2008.

Another major difference in the diplomatic discourse of these two countries' foreign aid is the importance attributed to 'solidarity'. This element gained centrality during the Lula administration, linked to the idea of 'non-indifference', although this was not a new concept in Brazil nor in the rest of the developing world. This principle was even present, to a lesser extent, in the diplomatic discourse of the preceding administration led by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; De Faria and Paradis 2011; Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 20).

By contrast, the concept of 'solidarity' is almost inexistent in US presidential diplomacy and rhetoric, or in official reports of governmental aid agencies. In all speeches analyzed of both Presidents Bush and Obama, only once was this term vaguely mentioned when talking about

¹²² According to the World Bank, after reaching a peak of 2.6 trillion dollars in 2011, Brazil's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined consecutively in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, when it amounted for 1.7 trillion in current values (World Bank, 2019d).

the Pope in a Catholic University¹²³. The ideology behind US foreign aid engagement seems to be closer to ideas related to US culture of philanthropism and a Christian moral obligation to help others in line with the Bible precept ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’.

Beyond historical and sociological reasons for each country’s discourse particularities, this difference in behavior confirms the expected stances of Southern and Northern nations. As discussed, the argument of solidarity as a reason for promoting international cooperation is neither new nor created by Brazil. The concept was brought forward in the High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation in Buenos Aires (BAPA) in 1979, and it has been widely used by developing nations to justify their humanitarian or development-led actions abroad. As an OECD DAC traditional aid donor, this rhetoric is unfamiliar to US diplomatic reasoning, which bases its ideological foundation on other principles.

Another distinction between the diplomatic rhetoric of both countries is found in Brazil’s claims to promote more horizontal forms of cooperation in opposition to the vertical aid provided by the United States. In reality, absolute horizontality is unachievable. The country with the highest level of relative development necessarily has the upper hand on setting priorities, as it is the one sharing knowledge. In this sense, the use of the term ‘partners’ instead of the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ would apply much more as a sign of political goodwill, that is, they show a willingness to act in a respectful manner but are not sufficient to ensure that there is a balanced relationship when aid practices are actually implemented (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 20).

4.5. Comparing Results and Impacts

In order to better assess the results achieved by each donor, it is important to lay down the foundation of the main issues when evaluating foreign aid and briefly review the literature and key points of the debate on aid effectiveness. After a downfall of aid flows in the 1990s, a series of High-Level Forums (HLF) were convened by the OECD to tackle issues related to aid effectiveness. The first of such meetings occurred in Rome, in 2003, and it focused on

¹²³ Bush’s Speech at the Cultural Center of Catholic University in Washington, D.C. March 22, 2001.

aid harmonization, that is, getting donor agencies committed to work with developing countries to better coordinate and streamline their activities at country level.

It was also at that Forum that the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was launched. The initiative set rules for delivering information on development and humanitarian aid (IATI, 2018), increasing the transparency of aid resources flowing into developing countries. In 2011, IATI members agreed on the first version of the IATI Standard¹²⁴ in order to improve coordination, accountability and effectiveness. So far, three countries¹²⁵ have adopted the standard and introduced mandatory rules for organizations receiving their aid to report their spending to IATI.

In 2005, France hosted the second High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness. The meeting resulted in the Paris Declaration, which was signed by 137 countries, the United States and Brazil included¹²⁶. The declaration adopted five principles to guide foreign aid efforts:

- Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption;
- Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems;
- Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication;
- Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured;
- Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development results. (OECD, 2019b).

Three years later, in 2008, the Third High-Level Forum in Ghana took stock of progress made by noting improvements in untying aid and coordinating technical cooperation. Less positive results were attained in aid predictability and reliability. To address these shortcomings and further improve aid impact, participants agreed upon the Accra Agenda for Action, which had a focus on improving ownership, promoting inclusive partnerships, delivering

¹²⁴ Since then IATI's standard has been updated twice. The change to version 2.01 occurred in October 2014 and aimed at making improving the data quality by making it more rigorous. On December 2015, IATI Standard version 2.02 released with new features focusing on improving data on humanitarian financing and reporting on the SDGs.

¹²⁵ Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands.

¹²⁶ Though the ratification by the Brazilian government is pending (OECD, 2019).

measurable impacts on development and building aid receivers' capacity to foster development (OECD, 2019b).

The implementation of these goals was monitored through a series of surveys, such as the OECD's 'Better Aid' series. Aid Effectiveness reports (OECD, 2011; 2012) showed that, despite some progress, only one out of the 13 targets established for 2010 was met¹²⁷. Recipient countries appeared to have gone further in implementing their commitments than donors, though this measurement varied considerably across nations and donor organizations (OECD, 2012).

A major reason why the Paris Agenda did not achieve its goals was its failure to grasp the political nature of foreign aid. The agenda was presented as a consensus, as a plan grounded on technical basis, in which state representatives shared a common vision on goals and the ways to achieve them. In reality, narrow and particular interests of states, sectors and institutions, within and between donor and recipient countries, led to disagreements over the nature of development and the means to attain it. Although these political disputes were rarely acknowledged in official documentation and statements, they influenced the level of engagement governments had with the resolutions agreed on the forum (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: p. 3)

In 2011, the next High-Level Forum (HLF 4) occurred in Busan, South Korea. For the first time, non-traditional donors sat alongside traditional ones to establish common principles to guide their practices as providers of development cooperation. Busan seemed to represent a fresh start in the pursuit of what was called 'development effectiveness'. It is not a coincidence that this shift occurred when South-South cooperation providers, such as China, India and Brazil, took part in the forum. Integrating emerging donors' perspectives played a major role in efforts to create a new framework for measuring foreign assistance's effectiveness. Even the term 'aid' was seemingly to become a pejorative word in public discourse, a fact reinforced by the statements given by Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, and Brian Atwood, Chair of the OECD-DAC, who respectively said "this is the first time that

¹²⁷ Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration (OECD 2011).

we can see the end of aid within a generation” and “mercifully, even the word ‘aid’ will bite the dust” (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: p. 4).

The Busan Forum resulted in the Global Development Partnership, a multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts in order to deliver long-lasting results that can ideally foster the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, n.d.). The initiative, which has the support of 161 countries and 56 international organizations, reaffirmed principles agreed upon during previous high-level forums, such as ownership, transparency and accountability, while it marked the inclusion of a more diverse set of development policies and actors. As Atwood, the DAC chairman, declared, the international development community was no longer comprised of donors and recipients but ‘partners’ (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 4).

The Global Development Partnership established mechanisms to track the implementation of its goals through a monitoring framework comprised of ten indicators. These indicators focused on strengthening developing countries’ institutions, increasing the transparency and predictability of development cooperation, enhancing gender equality, as well as supporting greater involvement by civil society, parliaments and private sector in development efforts (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: p. 10). The year 2015 was set as the target for achieving almost all goals.

In 2016, the Partnership announced the results of its monitoring. These had confirmed that progress was made towards achieving more effectiveness, especially on issues such as result-led focus for partnerships, strengthened national budgetary systems that better capture development cooperation flows and gender equality. By contrast, the evaluation report revealed specific areas where efforts were still required to overcome existing bottlenecks, such as the need for more inclusiveness and transparency by national governments (OECD and UNDP, 2016).

After this brief review of milestones of the aid effectiveness debate, it is clear that the rapidly changing development landscape has been leaving behind the old dichotomy between traditional and emerging donors. The current system of international cooperation seems to demonstrate that differences on aid’s impact are more related to the specifics of the modality

chosen rather than to the question of being *vertical* or *horizontal*. For instance, one criterion that has a major impact on aid effectiveness is targeting.

Targeting addresses questions of with whom, when, what and how aid exchanges are made. Most causes of aid inefficiency are in some degree associated with targeting. In order to set targets efficiently, there needs to be sound evaluation and monitoring systems of the assistance being provided. In turn, these systems will help indicate what should be the appropriate measures and resources for any particular situation and thereby avoid many of the targeting errors that afflict contemporary aid flows, such as ‘displaced international trade, depressed producer prices in recipient countries, labor supply disincentives, or delivery delays’ (Barret, 2002: p. 1-2; 25).

After assessing the concerns of aid effectiveness in general, this Dissertation will discuss how US and Brazilian aid performed in tackling these issues. The aid provided by the US government goes through a complex system of evaluation and monitoring, which are an integral part of aid programs. Impact and outcome reports are submitted to Congress indicating if targets are being met, if changes should be made and detailing budget expenses. The Food for Peace Act (FFP), in its Section 207(f), authorizes funds to cover costs associated with monitoring, impact evaluations and early warning assessments. In 2016, these funds amounted to 17 million dollars (USAID and USDA, 2016: p. 49-51).

The FFP also has the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Capacity metric, which aims to improve the effectiveness and quality of aid programs by providing more active oversight to guarantee their impact, in addition to training for FFP partners and development of guidelines for FFP staff and partners. In 2016, there were four M&E Advisors based in USAID regional offices in Africa, and four more based in Washington, DC. In addition to the FFP M&E team, USAID has around 115 additional field staff monitoring and evaluating FFP projects, as well as third party monitoring (TPM) systems to ensure food and other resources are reaching intended beneficiaries in countries where it is difficult for USAID staff to monitor safely (USAID and USDA, 2016: p. 49-51).

Similarly, the USDA has a program of result-oriented management (ROM) to ensure that policies and management decisions are driven by evidence-based strategy and to assess the

performance of its programs. The agency also reports on the results to external stakeholders, including Congress. All food assistance projects supported by the USDA, therefore, are made to adopt a range of monitoring processes and structures, which include performance indicators and detailed evaluation plans. Finally, the USDA's grantees are required to conduct independent, third party, program evaluations at baseline, interim, and final stages of their projects (USDA, 2013).

Regarding transparency, the US government has worked to increase the level of accountability of its foreign assistance through a variety of efforts. In 2011, it joined the IATI, in a process of rendering more data public, unlocking information on foreign aid programs' spending, strategy, implementation, and progress (Publish What you Fund, 2018). In the same year, as part of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, the United States announced a commitment to make its development aid finances and project information open and accessible to all by December 2015.

According to the Aid Transparency Index, aid given by US agencies displayed continued improvement, although at different rates. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was the top-rated agency, falling under the 'very good' category in the 2018 index. USAID's transparency was categorized as 'fair' in the 2016 Index, but in 2018 it jumped to the 'good' category. The programs led by the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the least transparent, being placed on the 'fair' category (Paxton, n.d.).

All in all, the available data suggests that US aid provision methods and strategies have not been uniform. While the United States has well-established planning, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess its aid initiatives, efforts to implement transparency are not consistent throughout the government. As a result, they should be cultivated, strengthened and extended to other aid and development programs.

By contrast, in Brazil, even monitoring and evaluation systems are still at their initial stages. Far from an isolated characteristic of Brazilian international cooperation, the lack of assessment reflects the existing deficit in public accountability at all state-levels and actions. Even Brazil's foreign policy, traditionally seen as one of government's most qualified sectors, has historically shown low levels of inclusiveness and transparency.

Brazil's governmental reports on its cooperation initiatives tend to focus more on administrative issues than on project results. Publications that do exist on the issue rarely mention accountability and transparency and fall short of meeting international standards on publicity of information, especially concerning the financing of their programs. At local level, there is no overall system to track information on projects and data is gathered on a need-case basis. Embassies often have limited information on projects they do not manage directly, and peer review of Brazilian cooperation is utterly deficient (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013).

Moreover, the fragmentation of Brazilian cooperation projects is also a factor making it difficult to evaluate results. Currently, there is no comprehensive plan connecting sectoral actions, which is essential to ensure any degree of success of all the country's aid-related actions. Adding to this bleak scenario, many of Brazil's bilateral aid programs take shape as a byproduct of presidential diplomacy, that is, they were agreed amid much fanfare during presidential visits and do not always comply with sound strategic planning procedures nor receive the appropriate bureaucratic follow-up by the government's agencies (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014; Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013).

In 2013, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ABC published a handbook (Port. *Manual de Gestão da Cooperação Técnica Sul-Sul*) providing standardized guidelines for the design, negotiation, approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of South-South technical cooperation initiatives. However, the degree to which its guidelines were followed is uncertain, since there is no mechanism to verify its actual execution. Thus, despite taking a step in the right direction, Brazil still has a long way to go until it can duly implement effective evaluation procedures.

In terms of transparency, ABC has evolved through the launching of an open database on the actions it coordinates, although the specific resources invested in each one of them are not specified. Complaints by think-tanks and researchers unable to access comprehensive information on specific projects, including on evaluation, are very common¹²⁸. Converging

¹²⁸ I contacted the Agency many times and was never granted access to research files in person. I was allowed to interview two diplomats in 2018, but they were not well informed on former aid programs, as they had just started their positions. Moreover, the files from CGFOME, the department responsible for humanitarian cooperation terminated in 2018 and whose responsibilities were absorbed by ABC, were completely missing.

with this perception, the 2012 Aid Transparency Index classified ABC as having poor transparency practices, with a below-average score, ranking in 49th place of 72 agencies¹²⁹. The index analyses 41 indicators on information collection and publication. ABC regularly collects information about 24 of them, sporadically publishes data on 17 of them, and does not assess three of them (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014; Transparency International, 2012).

In the 2012 index, Brazil was ahead of China, which ranked in seventy-first. They were the only emerging donors that took part in the assessment. Although Brazil appeared again the 2013 index, lowering its position to the 56th place, the country was not included in the index's 2016 and 2018 updates. In addition to these structural deficits of accountability, the flagship modality of the Brazilian government is precisely the most difficult to have its effectiveness assessed. Of all aid modalities, the results of technical cooperation are probably the most challenging to analyze, since they involve knowhow and intangible knowledge exchanges, which are hard to quantify. For instance, one of Brazil's main cooperation programs is the Network of Human Milk Banks, which provides technical support for the installation and training of milk banks around the world, through bilateral or multilateral agreements. The network was recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the initiatives that 'most contributed to the improvement of children's and adolescents' health in the world, collaborating effectively to reduce mortality and morbidity' (Campos, 2017).

However, unlike the United States, which assesses achievements derived from the adoption of the recommendations of its technical assistance (mentioned in Chapter 1), Brazil does not evaluate these gains, whether due to the intangibility of the results, like Bezerra Lima mentioned, or owing to the country's arguably lower expertise in impact evaluation. It is worth remembering that the first Cobradi report was released only in 2010 and refers to the aid given from 2005 onwards. Before Cobradi there was very little to report in this regard.

To conclude the discussion on aid effectiveness, a last aspect worth considering is the distinctive impact that tied and untied aid might have. For the last few decades, the results of

Embrapa, another key aid provider, was also contacted several times with no success. Even when I made a request following the procedures determined by the Access to Information Law (2.527/2011), which makes it mandatory for public organs to timely respond to inquiries, the answer I got was that the information was not available or nonexistent.

¹²⁹ See 2012 Publish What You Fund index, www.publishwhatyoufund.org/index/2012-index/brazil/ (accessed April 2013).

innumerable studies have demonstrated that local purchases and regionally sourced imports tend to be the most efficient approach to promote food security and poverty alleviation. Likewise, it has become widely accepted in the development community that in-kind donations are usually a less efficient way to provide aid, since they carry out substantial efficiency costs, conservatively estimated at least 30% on average (OECD, 2006).

Besides greater costs, giving in-kind aid as food (food aid) can have negative impacts on local food production. Chronically-food-insecure countries, whose governments are used to receiving food aid from foreign donors for many consecutive years, end up including food aid in their annual food-need assessments, thus reducing the need to invest more resources in local food production. Eventually, this leads to even greater food aid dependency.

4.6. Comparing Perceptions

The survey undertaken for this Dissertation gathered information about three donor-countries (United States, Brazil and China) in two receiving nations (Mozambique and Ethiopia). Although not present in the other parts of the comparison, China was included in the survey to allow more cross-reference comparisons between the countries studied, adding another useful element by incorporating views on Chinese cooperation. Many of these possibilities of comparative analyses will be developed, however, the main goal here is to compare the perception of the United States' aid by Ethiopians with the Brazilian one by Mozambicans. This may well be considered the soundest comparison, since it scrutinizes the main African beneficiary of each one of the two cases studied.

Before proceeding to the survey analyses, it is relevant to briefly present an overview of China's foreign aid background, in order to better understand the context of the perception retrieved.

4.6.1. Brief Background of Chinese Foreign Aid

After the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in 1949, its international engagement went from a more isolationist posture and a challenger of the *status quo*, to a proactive role, during the 1970s, with the PRC joining the UN in 1971, and the economic opening up process started by Deng Xiaoping. China's fast trajectory from underdevelopment to second largest world economy has left it with a self-perceived identity

somewhat dialectic: on the one hand, it sees itself as being a major power, but on the other, it identifies itself still developing nation (Shambaugh, 2013: p. 112).

China's path of increasing international prominence encompasses its rising share in foreign aid flows. There has been a somewhat consistent effort of Chinese government to increase its financing for development assistance, especially to African countries. However, Chinese initiatives in Africa vary immensely according to their origins, business associations, forms of financing, and interests involved. For instance, while some of the flagship programs of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) on cooperation for agricultural development fostered the establishment of Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) bolstering highly modernized and mechanized agriculture, others supported peasant smallholder farming. Therefore, similarly to what this research has found on Brazil's case, there are several forms of Chinese engagement in agriculture. The diversity of players and interests lead sometimes to conflicted and ambiguous policies (Scoones et al, 2016: p. 4).

Up until recently, China provided no official figures for the amounts of its aid, as it was considered a strategic matter and treated as a state secret (Brautigam, 2009: p. 2). This lack of transparency made that not much was known about the foreign aid given by China. This began to change in April 2011, when the Chinese government released its first official report, the White Paper on Foreign Aid. In 2014, another report with the same title was released. More recently, a laboratory at the College of William & Mary in Virginia announced the most extensive effort yet to measure official financing by China (AidData), covering investments between 2000-2014, to 140 countries, in 4300 projects, and with a budget of 350 billion dollars (AIDDATA, n.d).

With the establishment of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macau) in 2003, China has expanded assistance cooperation with Portuguese-speaking developing countries, including Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and East Timor, in the fields like culture, education, health, capacity building and agriculture. From 2010 to 2012, China offered 1.6 billion yuan of concessional loans to the above five countries and trained over 2,000 personnel for them (2nd White Paper, Xinhua, 2014).


In 2005, President Hu Jintao's speech at the UN Millennium Summit started a string of bold aid announcements which signaled Beijing's intentions to dramatically enhance its profile as an aid provider. In 2006, during the Third Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC), President Hu reaffirmed this intention with the promise to double grant assistance in Africa (AIDDATA, n.d), which would exceed World Bank lending to that continent (Chin, 2012: 584).

Despite being criticized for being neo-colonial or extractive, Chinese economic intervention in Africa goes well beyond resource extraction. China has a more balanced trade relationship and a broader investment portfolio with the continent than the United States. Moreover, China has no history of military interventions in Africa and it is also helping increase the technology access to Africans. To some, Chinese aid represents an alternative to traditional western sources of external financing by offering African 'the right to self-determination', which has so often been denied to them (Cook, 2012: p. 92).

4.6.2. Survey Results

The result of this comparison for the first pillar can be visualized below (Figure 4.8). Both donor countries got a generally positive evaluation, but the United States received an even greater affirmative feedback, as 87% of the interviewees showed a positive view of US efforts, in comparison to the 57% approval rating of Brazilian actions. The figure also shows how, even for Brazil's main cooperation partner, there still is a significant percentage (31%) of uninformed views about its aid presence in Mozambique. Finally, the United States did not receive any extremely negative review, while Brazil had 3%.

Figure 4.8 Perception on Food Availability Cross-Countries



Source: made by the author¹³⁰

When comparing the Perception Indexes (PI) on Food Availability (Table 4.8), it becomes clear that US aid is better evaluated than Brazil's and China's independently of the beneficiary country. The two non-traditional South-South partners have the same Food Availability PI in Mozambique (+0.53), which is surprising, considering the strong economic and political ties China has with that country. The Food Availability Perception Index (PI) of the US aid in Ethiopia is significantly more positive than China's, despite Ethiopia being the third main receiver of Chinese ODA, totaling 3.7 billion dollars from 2000 to 2014 (AIDDATA, n.d.). It was also unexpected that China's Food Availability PI was only slightly higher in Ethiopia than in Mozambique, considering that the former receives far more ODA and other official flows (OOF) from China. While total official commitments to Ethiopia amount to USD 14.8 billion, the ones to Mozambique account for only 2.8 billion for the same period (2000-2014) (*Id.*).

Table 4.8. Perception Index on Food Availability by country

	Ethiopia	Mozambique
USA	+1.13	+0.56


¹³⁰ The survey was analyzed using in several programs, such as R, Stata and Excel.

Brazil	+0.10	+0.53
China	+0.32	+0.22

Source: Made by the author

When asking about the second pillar, food stocks (Figure 4.9), results indicate similar opinions. The US-Ethiopia chart is exactly the same as the previous one, while the Brazil-Mozambique one changes slightly, with 3% of the respondents shifting from a moderately negative view to a neutral one.

Figure 4.9. Perception on Food Stocks Cross-Countries



Source: made by the author.

Brazil's Food Stock PI (Table 4.9) in Ethiopia is close to China's, despite the massive presence of Chinese funding relatively to the absence of Brazilian ones.

Table 4.9. Perception Index on Food Stocks by country

	Ethiopia	Mozambique
USA	+1.13	+0.53
Brazil	+0.28	+0.56


China	+0.30	+0.30
-------	-------	-------

Source: Made by the author.

Regarding the third pillar of food security, nutritional value, Brazil's evaluation in Mozambique did not change significantly from previous pillars (Figure 4.10). However, an increase in respondents who are unaware of this issue is noticeable both in the perception of the United States in Ethiopia and of Brazil in Mozambique. This is reminiscent of the low importance attributed to this matter in foreign aid programs of the past. Whether for the US model of donating food surpluses or for the Brazilian one of promoting the agribusiness production, securing the nutritional value of food aid was, for a long time, not a great concern.

Intertwined with the emergence of the concept of food security itself, nutrition became a matter of increasing attention in aid initiatives. As stated by the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dr. Eyasu Abraha Alle, the usual criticism received by food aid that it had low nutritional value is not true anymore. International ODA donors have pushed for increasing nutritional value of aid projects. Not only did this reflect the decrease of stunt rates, but it also pushed the government to change the way it was thinking about nutrition, which has shifted from a medical concern to one where agriculture plays a major role, as illustrated by the foundation of a Department of Nutrition inside the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Figure 4.10. Perceptions on the Nutritional Value Cross-Countries



- Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do very well for health.
- Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very healthy.
- I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.

Source: Made by the author.


Therefore, the survey seems to suggest that donations that foster access to nutrient-rich food have not yet been fully recognized by public opinion, which explains the decrease of the US Nutritional Value PI in Ethiopia (Table 4.10) when compared to the perception indexes of previous pillars.

Table 4.10. Perception Index on Nutritional Value by country

	Ethiopia	Mozambique
USA	+0.67	+0.68
Brazil	+0.27	+0.59
China	+0.17	+0.29

Lastly, correlations observed in general perception (Figure 4.11) show that both the United States and Brazil enjoy a generally positive view in their respective main beneficiaries. The central distinction between their evaluations was found in the higher degree to which Brazil's cooperation is still unknown (34% in comparison to 6% from the United States). Considering the most recent nature of Brazil's role as an aid provider, the results confirm what should be expected in terms of difficulties to reach out to a larger audience locally.

Figure 4.11. Overall Perception Cross-Countries



Source: Made by the author.

The PI on the overall perception (Table 4.11) shows that the United States has a higher score in Ethiopia (+0.9) than Brazil has in Mozambique (0.84), but the difference is very small. Two conclusions may be inferred from that. First, that traditional donors such as the United States might no longer carry the stigma of using aid as simply a neocolonialist exploitation tool to open markets and create dependence on their products. Second, that despite having a slightly worse evaluation than the United States, South-South approaches do work in a relative satisfactory fashion and some of them even produce the same results in terms of soft-power. The amount of resources (whether financial or human) the United States spends in its aid initiatives is exponentially greater than the one Brazil does. But, interestingly enough, the evaluations both of them receive from beneficiaries are only marginally different.

Table 4.11. Overall Perception Index by country

	Ethiopia	Mozambique
USA	+0.90	+0.93
Brazil	+0.26	+0.84
China	+0.19	+0.45

Source: Made by the author.

After analyzing and comparing the bilateral perception regarding each donor and its main beneficiary, other results found need to be discussed, as well as other correlations arising out of the survey. For instance, running the database in Stata, it was possible to ascertain that the level of knowledge from Ethiopian citizens about Brazilian and Chinese aid is fairly correlated [0.7242]. The correlation shows that those respondents who are more experienced with agriculture and food security know relatively well the role of the United States in Ethiopia but are not well aware of the role of Brazil and China. As the vast majority of participants in the survey (around 80%) have some level of knowledge and experience in the field, this finding suggests that Brazil and China have lower weight in foreign aid from a local perspective.


Moreover, China ranked last in the general Perception Index in both countries, with a lower index in Ethiopia than in Mozambique, despite greater financial flows to Ethiopia. Although discussing Chinese aid is not the goal of this Dissertation, these findings suggest that the massive outlays made by the Chinese government in its process of deepening its presence in the African continent have not always been translated into automatically generating a positive image to China's foreign aid in general.

Analyzing the Overall Perception Index (Table 4.11) and previous PIs, it is noticeable that, with the exception of the American PI on Food Availability and Food Stocks, all other PIs were below 1. Two reasons induce these results to be close to zero: either many respondents were unaware of the aid of a particular donor, or they had polarized opinions, thus the negatives nulled the positives. In most cases, the first option better explains the findings. For instance, Brazil's Overall PI in Ethiopia of 0.26 is explained solely by the first cause, as it did not receive negative opinions and most respondents (77%) were unaware of its aid to Ethiopia, which was expected as Brazil's aid to that country is almost non-existent. On the other hand, the Chinese Overall PI in Ethiopia, which is even lower than Brazil's, is caused by both negative ratings (10%) and ignorance of its aid initiatives (55%), as seen in Figure 4.11.

Another information that can bring additional insights stems from the perception of US aid in Mozambique, especially when compared to the Brazilian and Chinese ones in the same country. Even though Mozambique has not historically been a large-scale beneficiary of

cooperation from the United States, since the early 2000s the country has gained importance in the distribution of US assistance. It received more than a billion dollars each year from 2008 to 2018 (USAID, 2017b)¹³¹.

Figure 4.12. Mozambique's Overall Perception by Donor




Source: made by the author with the assistance of Rodolpho Vasconcellos.

Figure 4.12 provides suitable data to consolidate a few conclusions. First, the positive perception of US aid surpasses the ones of the two emerging donors. Second, among the three countries, China was the only one which had extremely negative perceptions. Third, Brazil's aid is the least known one, even though Mozambique is its main cooperation partner in Africa.

¹³¹ With the exception of 2011, when I received 981 million. All values in current dollars.

Figure 4.13. Ethiopia's Overall Perception by Donor



Source: made by the author with the assistance of Rodolpho Vasconcellos.

The comparison of the three donors' evaluations in Ethiopia (Figure 4.13) shows a very different picture. Brazilian 'invisible' cooperation seems not to have a presence relevant enough to support the inception of any opinion by most Ethiopians contacted¹³². This is clearly shown by the large number of 'c' answers, which are valued at zero, and it is also a logical explanation of why Brazil has a higher general Perception Index (0.26) than China (0.19) in Ethiopia¹³³. A striking 77% of respondents stated to have no opinion about it or believe it is 'not significant'. On the flip side, this shows that the perception is in tune with the real world: the Ethiopian nationals who took part in the survey were aware of what happens in practice, which means that there is a good knowledge about local realities on the

¹³² In an interview with First Secretary Adriana Telles, in charge of international cooperation at the Brazilian Embassy in Addis Ababa, she explained that cooperation partnerships between the two countries are still in their early development. In 2018, for instance, a small delegation of experts from Embrapa had paid a visit to explore future aid prospects.

¹³³ Although a higher percentage of participants were neutral or unaware of Brazil's aid, there were no answers rating Brazil negatively, unlike what happened with China, causing its score to drop more visibly.

part of the respondents. If that is the case, the study might serve rather as an additional incentive to donors, as it suggests that the population is sensitive to aid initiatives taking place, even in countries with a culture of secrecy and opacity such as Ethiopia.

Another element confirmed by Figure 4.13 is that China's performance is much lower than the United States' suggests. Despite the well-known growth of Chinese economic presence in Africa, there is still a long road to catch up in the area of foreign aid if Beijing is to become ever closer to the current view Ethiopians have of the United States.

Although to be generalizable the number of US cooperation recipient countries would need to be larger, the comparison of the different perceptions seemed to demonstrate that the United States, a traditional DAC member donor, enjoyed a more positive image than the emerging donors, a conclusion somewhat unexpected but even more revealing of the combined power of massive resources, long-established connections and two-way networks. Brazil's intermediary position suggests that its SSC rhetoric has helped the country to achieve at least a moderately positive view of its cooperation projects, which is perhaps a net benefit accrued from its efforts in view of existing limited capabilities and shortage of funds. Finally, perceptions on China, even if still mildly positive, did not seem to be proportional to the amount of its investments or its presence in the receiving countries.

Conclusion

As seen in throughout this Dissertation, both countries have a plethora of players from governmental agencies and other institutions involved in the formulation and implementation of their international assistance. As noted in the theoretical references, several authors (Milner, 1997; Putnam, Evans and Jacobson, 1993) highlighted this process in their studies on ‘two level game’, which that states are not unitary actors, but rather composed of several actors with distinct preferences, which share power for themselves by means of decision-making processes.

Contradicting Milner's premise that the chances of cooperation become more remote the more divided a government is, the process of pluralization of agencies and other players involved in foreign aid initiatives that the US and Brazil witnessed did not lead to a decline of foreign aid in the period studied, quite the opposite. The 2000s were a period of significant increase in both countries’ participation in international aid flows.

The analyses of the US’s and Brazil’s international cooperation confirm Milner’s (1997) argument on the power of domestic politics in influencing foreign aid initiatives. The domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors described by the author (Milner, 1997: p. 9) as a key driver for international cooperation are found in both countries. As seen, providing aid opens the possibility of bringing gains and fostering opportunities to the players involved. On the other hand, international factors also exerted influence in the design of foreign aid. For instance, the rhetoric of solidarity as a justification for SSC, widely used by the Brazilian government, was brought forward by the UN Buenos Aires’ Plan (BAPA) in 1979. Therefore, as stated Putnam, Jacobson and Evans (1993: p. 436) both games – domestic and international – influence decision makers.

Throughout the decades, US foreign aid served a myriad of political, diplomatic, economic and national security purposes. Whether to halt communism, terrorism or international criticism, to promote exports or give an outflow for agricultural surpluses, to open new markets or promote development, to build political alliances or shore up national security, aid has been a key tool in the period studied, both for the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. US aid approaches and practices were and still are heavily influenced by the

interests of the lobby of big agricultural producers and shippers, with their representatives in Congress, which help explain why this country focused its aid efforts on in-kind donations and resisted for so long adopting the DACs recommendation regarding local procurement.

Regarding Brazilian aid, its South-South cooperation programs aimed to offer a framework of mutual learning and joint benefits, which had as a key feature the emphasis on being horizontal exchanges between equal partners, respecting beneficiary countries' sovereignty, and non-conditional. In practice, programs were top-down initiatives operated within the dominant agenda of global agribusinesses. In this sense, Brazilian aid rarely supported sustainable agriculture or equitable development, nor did it promote potential avenues for collaboration or forms of participatory development or wide access to information by (and from) civil society groups. In this way, although there are examples of transnational networks (Risse-Kappen, 1995) in the case studied, as seen in the cooperation with Mozambique, their impact was limited.

The study of Brazil's SSC also showed how it was used for the international diffusion (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) of public policies, especially those destined to combat hunger. Rather than a mere technical exchange of agronomic expertise, Brazil's government encouraged the adoption of laws and programs inspired by their own. This phenomenon was not notably found in the foreign aid given by the US, which was to be expected in a North-South cooperation, characterized by reduced similarities between donor and beneficiary countries.

However, there was a substantial difference in the stages of policy diffusion described by Finnemore and Sikkink in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998) and the one led by Brazil. The authors argue that the diffusion occurs even without domestic pressure for such change, but in the Brazilian case, the diffusion was actively promoted by Brazil's internal players involved in the cooperation.

Despite efforts by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and other domestic actors, most projects reflected the dominant trends in contemporary agricultural development, seeking to promote market penetration and capital accumulation, which are similar to

accumulation imperatives of agribusiness elsewhere, be it as a South-South or North-South orientation (Amanor e Chichava, 2016; Ekman and Macamo, 2014).

Brazil's foreign aid efforts (or international cooperation initiatives) were crafted and led almost exclusively by governmental agencies, especially ABC, relying on technical assistance and technological transfers carried out by experts and civil servants (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013). Although agribusiness took part in these activities, it did not have a direct interest in using aid donations as a way to secure domestic prices, like what happened in the United States. As a governmental effort from a developing country, Brazil's foreign aid policies were shaped by the lack of financial resources, in tandem with a desire to play a more prominent political and diplomatic role than its scarce aid outlays would allow, hence the reason for its focus on technical cooperation as its flagship foreign aid modality, mainly undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Brazil's aim to play a bigger role worked partially, since its technical cooperation yielded considerable visibility and political significance during the studied timeframe, being a major instrument of its foreign policy, despite its relatively small budget. During the 2005-2015 decade, South-South relations played an important part in Brazil's strategy of diversification of diplomatic and economic relations, providing an expedient way for moving such an agenda forward (Russo, Cabral, and Ferrinho, 2013). Brazil's contribution to international development was also in line with the country's long-lasting disregard of hard power as a foreign policy tool and its search for legitimacy as a collaborative actor, capable of promoting alliances with other countries to foster peace and security, among other goals (Bry, 2017: p. 298).

For the most part, tangible results from Brazilian cooperation projects are still to be fully demonstrated, partly because they are too recent or too small to have produced any significant impact on the ground, but also because of the Brazilian government's apparent inability to tackle the complexities associated with evaluating projects' concrete impacts and net results (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 7). Brazilian international cooperation has been criticized for lacking an overall agenda or clearly stated objectives, leading many to consider it a model 'in the making'. This is evidenced by the contradictory models of agricultural development (family farm versus agribusiness) and the inconsistent nature of political and

diplomatic leadership depending on the government concerned. As promising the initiatives might have seemed, most projects stalled, affected by the country's political turmoil and economic recession in the period 2013-2016.

Final Considerations on Aid

The world has made great progress in reducing hunger on a global scale. In 2018, there were 216 million fewer hungry people than in 1990, even with a 1.9 billion increase in the world's population (WFP, n.d.-b). However, despite such important achievement, the world still has roughly 821 million undernourished people (HLPE, 2017). The 2018 edition of 'The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World' (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2018) reported that the share of undernourished people in the world population has been growing since 2016, reaching 10.9% in 2017. Even though from a historical perspective this percentage may seem negligible, taking into account continuing population growth, it implies that the number of people who suffer from hunger has been growing, thus threatening a return to levels from almost a decade ago (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2018: p. 2).

The end of the decade-long decline in undernourishment in the world is a sign that the challenge to efficiently tackle the multiple causes of food insecurity is far from over. The intensification of climate-related disasters, which include but are not limited to extreme heat, droughts, floods and storms, has doubled since the 1990s. The rise in food demand, projected to grow by at least 20% in the next 15 years (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2019)¹³⁴, will further challenge the international community's capacity to address hunger efficiently and can intensify food insecurity for millions of people.

In recent years, notwithstanding improvements in the implementation and assessment of aid, progress toward reducing the number of people in the world suffering from food insecurity has slowed. One explanation for this is that aid is increasingly channeled to deal with humanitarian crises, thus only temporarily alleviating hunger, instead of addressing the root causes of the problem. According to OECD surveys, the percentage of bilateral aid (ODA)

¹³⁴ For this and other estimates, visit: <http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/>.

given by DAC members allocated for humanitarian crises and influxes of refugees has risen from 16 to 28 from 2010-14 to 2015-18 (OECD, 2018: p. 272).

As seen in Chapter 2, US aid is no exception, with an increasing share of its relief assistance being directed to cope with emergency situations. In this context, instead of US food assistance being a tool to help prevent hunger, it has given way to feeding people who are already hungry. This trend was aggravated by the lower amounts of food US donations are able to buy. Prices of agricultural commodities and shipping fees have led to smaller purchasing power even in the face of higher outlays. By 2018, US food was not much more than a modest contribution in the global struggle against chronic food insecurity (Riley, 2017: p. 475).

If this is the case for the greatest world donor, one can assume that the impact of aid initiatives by developing countries, such as Brazil, is slim in halting world hunger and malnutrition. Not only has Brazilian cooperation significantly declined in the last few years, but also its own social indicators have faced setbacks, with the country threatening to return to FAO's hunger map. This is not to say, however, that international assistance is not an important mechanism in hunger alleviation. But its long-term effects and sustainability relies more on fostering local governments' active engagement, institutional strengthening and structural changes than in the donor's capacity to provide aid. Therefore, research undertaken for this Dissertation reinforces the view that the beneficiary's ownership and inclusivity in aid programs are of uttermost importance.

In this sense, although SSC has limited direct impact in reducing hunger and malnutrition, one of its key achievements might be in the conceptual dimension, by bringing to light in a critical manner how traditional aid was given in the past, and by fostering discussion on new and more inclusive models for the future. Today, even DAC donors avoid the terminology used decades ago. US governmental websites, documents, reports and speeches increasingly refer to beneficiaries as 'partners' and not as passive receivers. These changes in nomenclature in turn were translated into concrete transformations, by reforming old programs and creating new ones.

As traditional donors increasingly adopt concepts and methods typical of South-South cooperation, the classification of aid into *horizontal* or *vertical* does not serve as a precise indicator of the practice of a country's foreign assistance. Beyond this categorization, each country develops its own way of providing aid according to the particularities of its executive and legislative branches of government, as well as the role of its public opinion, lobbies, agricultural producers and other stakeholders. If in the United States, for decades, aid was used as a channel to get rid of food surpluses, in Brazil it has been used by the agribusiness sector as a way to diffuse its monoculture, export-led model¹³⁵.

Historically, nonetheless, the *vertical* vs. *horizontal* divide did contribute to make different perspectives on foreign assistance explicit, which ultimately influenced and transformed the global development system as a whole. This is demonstrated by the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2012), which is considered a turning point in the international development system. The new equilibrium set in Busan attributed a greater role to non-traditional players, a welcomed approach that contributed to move forward the debate from aid to development cooperation, hence representing a synthesis of how South and North development paradigms can be able to converge (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 6).

In sum, distinctive perspectives and approaches brought forth by developing countries were a key element in the transformation of the aid system that gained momentum in the years 2000s, with the high-level forums on aid effectiveness (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: p. 4). Consequently, Brazil's main contribution hitherto is mostly related to its role promoting much-needed diversity in the debate on how development cooperation should be framed and on the modalities of its delivery, as well as on offering recipient countries a richer array of solutions from which to choose.

Policy Recommendations

¹³⁵ Although this study did not focus on scrutinizing the influence of agribusiness in Brazil's international cooperation, it is widely recognizable its capacity to have an effect on the design, development and implementation of governmental policies and programs. Whether as a direct influence as members of the government itself or as an indirect through lobbying, the ruralists are a main power group in Brazil's politics, influencing its domestic and international relations. For instance, 207 federal deputies, which corresponds to 40% of the Chamber, are members of the Parliamentary Front of Agriculture (FPA). Source: <https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/especial/noticias/conheca-as-11-bancadas-mais-poderosas-da-camara/>

Although not a common practice in the Brazilian academic tradition, taking advantage of the knowledge acquired during the PhD exchange program at The Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, it seems appropriate that this Dissertation should put forward a few recommendations on policies and changes which may render Brazilian and US aid more efficient.

In the Brazilian case, its foreign assistance would largely benefit from granting more autonomy and power to ABC. Current legal obstacles for the agency to directly finance projects abroad, as well as budget constraints and staff reductions, have left the agency relatively weak. But even during ABC's years of bonanza, when funds were flowing in and projects were exponentially multiplied, structural problems plaguing its staffing remained. Unlike what occurs in its US counterpart, the Brazilian agency does not have a workforce of its own. Its leadership and personnel are comprised mostly of diplomatic staff temporarily occupying positions there and of experts and technicians borrowed from UNDP who also do not have permanent status. As a result, ABC's employees do not have the long-term institutional memory of the agency's development programs and are often contaminated by Itamaraty's mindset and focus on short-term political goals.

Accordingly, an initial policy recommendation would be to create a career of public employees and supporting staff exclusively dedicated to Brazil's foreign cooperation initiatives. This new category of civil servants would receive specific training and ensure the continuity, coherence and high quality of the programs, thus building up the institutional memory of ABC. Although not conceived to have monopoly over foreign assistance programs, this career would coordinate the participation of technicians, experts, farmers and public officials from other agencies. In turn, this would strengthen the impact of Brazil's initiatives and its overall role as aid-provider.

This is not a new idea though. Many scholars and government officials advocate for both granting ABC autonomy from Itamaraty and for the establishment of another foreign service career to occupy workstations in Brazil and abroad (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014; Milani *et al.*, 2013). In 2013, during the Dilma Rousseff administration, a proposal to separate ABC from MRE circulated in governmental circles. In an interview with a diplomat who served at a high position in the agency, the idea of a new career to make the agency more independent

had the support of the head of ABC, but faced resistance from Itamaraty, which would lose control over it. Unsurprisingly, it was under Rousseff that the proposal gained traction. The former President had a notorious disdain for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and her administration represented one of the lowest points in the domestic prestige of that diplomatic institution.

Representatives of civil society and scholars shared concerns by then over the possibility of putting Brazil's development cooperation under the same umbrella as trade and investment. However, there is an overall consensus that ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency be created, in order to overcome obstacles hampering Brazilian development cooperation. There are divergences regarding where the best locus for the new agency would be, but most experts emphasize the need for planning and coordination under one single institution responsible for data collection and accountability for all modalities.

In the US case, this Dissertation shares the points of view put forward by former USAID administrators Brian Atwood and Peter McPherson, who argue that the merge with the State Department has not contributed to foster US aid initiatives. The proliferation of agencies leads to duplicated efforts and confusion with regard to whom is the correct spokesperson for US aid initiatives. The expansion of the military role in foreign assistance is also seen as detrimental to the US long-term goals, as well as to food security and development cooperation in general. In addition to risking tarnishing US image, aid given by the Armed Forces reduces the chances of achieving sustainable results, since military staff can be well equipped to give or support delivery of humanitarian aid, but they otherwise lack specific training or expertise to actually foster international development in a comprehensive manner.

Consequently, one particular policy recommendation would be to strengthen USAID in terms of human and financial resources, while gradually decreasing funds and projects granted to the agency's civilian and military competitors in the bureaucratic landscape of the US government, bringing them to USAID's scope.

Historically, traditional donors have been criticized for tying their aid to political and economic conditionalities. The rise of South-South cooperation encouraged a discourse geared towards non-imposition of conditionalities, equal partnerships and respect for

sovereignty. This Dissertation argues that there should be a balance through which aid will not simply promote donors' interests, but, at the same time, it could be used to leverage the beneficiary's compliance with fundamental international norms, such as transparency or human rights. The US assistance to Ethiopia faced the criticism of neglecting the Meles Zenawi regime's human rights violations and strengthening its power¹³⁶. Brazil's assistance to African countries was criticized for similar reasons. Brazilian projects in Angola were seen as supporting Angola's former leader José Eduardo dos Santos in his almost four-decade-long monopoly of power. In this sense, no matter if it is horizontal or vertical cooperation, a standard set of norms and codes of conduct would prevent negative externalities caused by governmental and private actions from tarnishing aid's image and results.

Another difference supposed to exist between North- and South-led aid initiatives is that, while DAC donors choose beneficiary nations according to diplomatic and foreign policy goals, SSC is demand driven and solidarity based, providing untied aid. As seen in Chapter II, this claim does not hold water, since Brazil did prioritize its international assistance following a logic of market-access to its big companies and the private sector. Moreover, considering that even the wealthiest donors face limitations of human and capital resources, as well as pressure from Congress, lobbyists, civil society and others, a purely demand driven approach would not be plausible, as usually demands surpass resources.

Therefore, a reasonable recommendation for the Brazilian government would be to clearly define its thematic and geographical priorities, as well as the overall strategic goal of its aid system. Beyond establishing priorities and objectives, international cooperation should be treated as a public policy and a regulatory framework should be legally created as the result of inclusive dialogue between various stakeholders, in which aid's definition, scope, budget, aims, evaluation, accountability and purpose would be discussed. The fact that Brazil has only recently emerged as an international cooperation partner, along with the renewed participation of its civil society, should encourage the country to build a system that is both

¹³⁶ According to the BBC: 'For two decades, the West has been feeding Zenawi's regime with billions of dollars of development and humanitarian aid while filling the stomachs of starving Ethiopians with empty words and emptier promises. Western donors continue to lay out an all-you-can-eat aid buffet for Zenawi's regime while turning a blind eye, a deaf ear and muted lips to the misuse, abuse and disuse of their taxpayers' dollars.' Article: Ethiopian scholar urges West to stop aid 'misuse' in country (BBC, 2011).

coherent in its guiding principles and realistic regarding its real capacity to carry out programs in an efficient and purposeful way (Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014).

This would not only consolidate and give coherence to Brazilian SSC, but also make its programs more transparent. As previously examined, the lack of transparency caused a major backlash from domestic public opinion when corruption schemes emerged. A general guideline and pre-established goals for Brazil's SSC policy would not imply abandoning the demand-led dimension, but rather direct the demand of states towards a range of possibilities for programs and projects, whose contents would be systematized and evaluated periodically (Milani *et al.*, 2013: p. 42).

The United States already does this, as evidenced by the fact that, on most of its official websites and documents, the foreign policy goals and national interests boosted by its aid initiatives are unmistakably set. For instance, the report 'Shared Interest: How USAID enhances US economic growth' (2018) states that the primary objective of US foreign assistance is to promote the security of the United States (presumably first) and internationally. It goes even further by saying that, besides being 'vital to US national security', USAID's foreign assistance 'also benefits the US economy and workers' (p.1).

Moreover, it is recommended that the US government deepens its efforts in untying its aid. This is endorsed by innumerable studies that show that, in most circumstances, local and regional practices are preferable approaches to development assistance, inasmuch as they avoid the costs and risks associated with in-kind donations.

In a nutshell, it is suggested that aid evaluation and monitoring systems be strengthened and perfected, particularly in Brazil's case, so as to improve targeting and allow the achievement of better results. The usage of good evaluation and monitoring systems will help to demonstrate what is the appropriate response and approach for each particular situation, thereby halting the limitations and criticism faced by the current food aid system.

Lastly, the extent to which foreign aid will be able to benefit the populations of receiving countries depends on the ability of beneficiary governments to overcome structural obstacles – such as endemic corruption, poor management and weak institutions – and increase civil society participation into the formulation of aid programs (Cook, 2012: p. 93). Therefore, a final

recommendation would be that international cooperation initiatives help receiving governments to advance in their domestic reforms. Part of this process of supporting local governments could be achieved by providing the technical assistance and technology transfer needed for them to acquire more resilience and self-sufficiency.

In a nutshell, this Dissertation argued that, although different, *vertical* and *horizontal* approaches are part of a larger set: a changing development cooperation system, in which food aid has a declining role, and local production and participation is on the rise. Perhaps the most important contribution of emerging cooperation partners was to spur more inclusive discussions and approaches to bring about much needed changes in traditional foreign aid models.

Bibliography

ABC (n.d.-a) Sobre ABC: Histórico. Available at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/SobreABC/Historico> (accessed on: April 11, 2017).

ABC (n.d.-b). Quantitativos de Projetos e Atividades Isoladas de Cooperação por Ano. Available at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/QuantitativoProjetos> (accessed April 5, 2016).

ABC (n.d.-c). Evolução da Execução Financeira dos Projetos da ABC. Available at: <http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/EvolucaoFinanceira> (accessed April 5th, 2016).

ACDI-VOCA/USAID, 2017. *FEED Enhancement for Ethiopian Development Brochure. October 17, 2017.* Available at: <https://www.acdivoca.org/2017/10/feed-enhancement-for-ethiopian-development/>;

ACDI-VOCA, 2020. *Feed Enhancement for Ethiopian Development II (FEED II).* Available at: <http://www.acdivoca.org/projects/feed-enhancement-for-ethiopian-development-ii-feed-ii/>;

ACDI-VOCA, 2020b. *Who We Are.* Available at: <https://www.acdivoca.org/about/at-a-glance/> (accessed on: February 5, 2019).

Adams, Gordon. Trump national security staff merry-go-round reflects decades of policy competition and conflict. April 10, 2018. The Conversation Media Group Ltd, Australia. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/trump-national-security-staff-merry-go-round-reflects-decades-of-policy-competition-and-conflict-94236> (accessed on: December 23, 2018).

Admassie, A. and Abebaw, D., 2014. Rural poverty and marginalization in Ethiopia: a review of development interventions. In *Marginality* (pp. 269-300). Springer, Dordrecht.

African Development Bank Group, 2015. Ethiopia Country Strategy Paper 2016-2020. Available at: https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/ETHIOPIA_CSP_BPPS_EN.pdf

Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (2012). Embaixador Fernando José Marroni de Abreu: 'Brazilian Development Cooperation', KAS Cadenabbia, Italy, 12 November 2012.

Aguiar, Diana, and Pacheco, Maria Emília (Editors). *The South-South Cooperation of the people of Brazil and Mozambique*. Rio de Janeiro: FASE, 2016.

AIDDATA, n.d. China's Global Development Footprint. Available at: <https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance#first-panel> (accessed on June 20, 2019).

Akonor, K., 2007. Foreign aid to Africa: A hollow hope. *NYUJ Int'l L. and Pol.*, 40, p.1071.

Alden, C. and Alves, C., 2008. History & identity in the construction of China's Africa policy. *Review of African political economy*, 35(115), pp.43-58.

Alesina, A. and Dollar, D., 2000. Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?. *Journal of economic growth*, 5(1), pp.33-63.

Alexandroff, A.S. and Cooper, A.F. eds., 2010. *Rising states, rising institutions: Challenges for global governance*. Brookings Institution Press.

All Africa, 2014. Obama's U.S.-Africa Summit - Who's In, Who's Out. Available at: https://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00028610.html?aa_source=slider-cat-1-12 (accessed October 20, 2017).

Amanor, Kojo S., and Sérgio Chichava. 'South-south cooperation, agribusiness, and African agricultural development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique.' *World Development* 81 (2016): 13-23.

Amanor, K.S. and Chichava, S., 2016. South-south cooperation, agribusiness, and African agricultural development: Brazil and China in Ghana and Mozambique. *World Development*, 81, pp.13-23.

Amanor, K.S., 2013. South-south cooperation in Africa: Historical, geopolitical and political economy dimensions of international development. *IDS Bulletin*, 44(4), pp.20-30.

Amanor, Kojo Sebastian. 'Expanding Agri-business: China and Brazil in Ghanaian Agriculture.' *IDS Bulletin* 44.4 (2013): 80-90.

Amorim, C., 2011a. *Discursos, palestras e artigos do chanceler Celso Amorim, 2003-2010*. Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, Vol. 1.

Amorim, C., 2011b. *Discursos, palestras e artigos do chanceler Celso Amorim, 2003-2010*. Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, Vol. 2.

Amorim, C., 2010. Brazilian foreign policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview. *Revista brasileira de política internacional*, 53(SPE), pp.214-240.

Amorim, C. Memorandum No. 32. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Republic, Brasilia, February 6, 2007.

Amorim, C., 2004. Conceitos e estratégias da diplomacia do Governo Lula. *Diplomacia, estratégia e política*, 1(1).

Amorim, C. A diplomacia do Governo Lula. Aula Magna do Senhor Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Celso Amorim, no Instituto Rio Branco. Brasilia April 10, 2003. Available at: <http://www.mundorama.net/2003/04/10/aula-magna-do-senhor-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-embaixador-celso-amorim-no-instituto-rio-branco-a-diplomacia-do-governo-lula-brasilia-10042003/> (accessed November 8, 2016).

Amorim, C. Speech held by Ambassador Celso Amorim upon the transmission of the office of minister of foreign affairs in January, 2003. Available at: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-discursos/7547-discurso-proferido-pelo-embaixador-celso-amorim-por-ocasio-da-transmissao-do-cargo-de-ministro-de-estado-das-relacoes-exteriores> (accessed November 8, 2016).

Anderson, K., 2016. *Agricultural Trade, Policy Reforms, and Global Food Security*. Springer.

Anderson, Stephen and Farmer, Elisabeth, 2015. USAID Office of Food for Peace Food Security Country Framework for Ethiopia FY 2016 – FY 2020. Washington, D.C.: Food Economy Group.

Andrews, N., 2009. Foreign aid and development in Africa: What the literature says and what the reality is. *Journal of African Studies and Development*, 1(1), p.8.

Araújo, Thiago. Analistas: perto da volta ao Mapa da Fome, Brasil vive 'vergonha' com 52 mi de pobres. Sputnik News. October 17, 2018. Available at: <https://br.sputniknews.com/brasil/2018101712453863-pobreza-brasil-fome/> (accessed on: March 15, 2019).

Ashley, J.M., 2016. *Food security in the developing world*. Academic Press.

Atwood, J.B., McPherson, M.P. and Natsios, A., 2008. Arrested development: making foreign aid a more effective tool. *Foreign Affairs*, pp.123-132.

Awokuse, T.O., 2013. HAS FOOD AID TARGETING WORKED IN ETHIOPIA? A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE. *Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development*, 9(1), p.53.

Baker, Eva. Brazil gives as much aid as Canada and Sweden? Maybe not... AID DATA. July 29, 2010. Available at: <https://www.aiddata.org/blog/brazil-gives-as-much-aid-as-canada-and-sweden-maybe-not> (accessed on: July 22, 2019).

Barbosa, P.H.B., 2012. O viés instrumental da cooperação técnica horizontal brasileira.

Barbosa, R. (2013) 'Reforço para o 'Soft Power' Brasileiro', O Estado de S. Paulo, August 27, 2013. Available at: <https://opinioao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,reforco-para-o-soft-power-brasileiro-imp-,1068242> (accessed on: June 27, 2019).

Barrett, C.B., 2002. Food Aid Effectiveness: It's the Targeting, Stupid!. *Cornell University Applied Economics and Management Working Paper*, (2002-43).

Barrios Diaz, J.A.S., 2017. Jogo dos espelhos: rejeição e engajamento nas relações entre Brasil e Moçambique (1975-2015).

BBC, 2011. Monitoring Africa; London, August 16, 2011. Available at: <https://search.proquest.com/docview/883428966?accountid=11752> (accessed on: February 26, 2019).

Bedi, B.D.N.S., LEVERAGING ECONOMY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. *JOURNAL OF THE CENTRE FOR JOINT WARFARE STUDIES*, p.166.

Bender, Katja, Sonja Keller, and Holger Willing. 'The Role of International Policy Transfer and Diffusion for Policy Change in Social Protection—A Review of the State of the Art.' (2015).

Betto, Frei. 'A fome como questão política.' *Estudos Avançados* 17.48 (2003): 53-61.

Brasil, Pilar Figueiredo. O Brasil e a insegurança alimentar global: forças sociais e política externa (2003-2010). Dissertação de mestrado. UnB, 2013.

BRASIL, 2017. Programa Mais Alimentos Financiou 16 mil Tratores na Safra 2016-2017. Available at: <http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2017/08/programa-mais-alimentos-financiou-16-mil-tratores-na-safra-2016-2017> (accessed October 5th, 2017).

BRASIL, 2006. Law N° 11.346. September 15, 2006. Available at: <http://www4.planalto.gov.br/consea/conferencia/documentos/lei-de-seguranca-alimentar-e-nutricional> Accessed November 12, 2016.

BRASIL *et. al.*, 2004. New York Declaration on action against hunger and poverty New York, September 20, 2004. Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Declaration_de_New_York_sur_l_action_contre_la_faim_et_la_pauvrete_20_septembre_2004.pdf (accessed December 5, 2016).

Birdsall, N. and Fukuyama, F., 2011. The post-washington consensus-development after the crisis. *Foreign Aff.*, 90, p.45.

Brautigam, D., 2015. *Will Africa Feed China?*. Oxford University Press.

Brautigam, D., 2009. *The dragon's gift: the real story of China in Africa*. Oxford University Press.

BRICS Policy Center, South-South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre, Brazilian Agency of Cooperation. Paths for Developing South-South Cooperation Monitoring and Evaluation Systems. Brasília, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1st edition, Brasília, 2017.

Bry, S.H., 2016. Brazil's Soft-Power Strategy: The Political Aspirations of South-South Development Cooperation. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 13(2), pp.297-316.

Burges, Sean W. *Brazil in the world: the international relations of a South American giant*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Bush, George W., 2007. State of the Union Address to the 110th Congress, January 23, 2007. Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001 – 2008. Available at: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf

Bush, George W., 2008. State of the Union Address to the 110th Congress, Second Session. United States Capitol Washington, D.C. January 28, 2008. Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001 – 2008. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf

Cabral, L., Favareto, A., Mukwereza, L. and Amanor, K., 2016. Brazil's agricultural politics in Africa: More food international and the disputed meanings of 'family farming'. *World Development*, 81, pp.47-60.

Cabral, L., Russo, G. and Weinstock, J., 2014. Brazil and the Shifting Consensus on Development Co-operation: Salutory Diversions from the 'Aid-effectiveness' Trail?. *Development Policy Review*, 32(2), pp.179-202.

Cabral, L. and Shankland, A., 2013. Narratives of Brazil-Africa cooperation for agricultural development: new paradigms?. *China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) Project, Working Paper, 51*, pp.1-27.

Cabral, L., Shankland, A., Favareto, A. and Costa Vaz, A., 2013. Brazil–Africa agricultural cooperation encounters: Drivers, narratives and imaginaries of Africa and development. *IDS Bulletin, 44*(4), pp.53-68.

Cabral, L. and Weinstock, J., 2010. Brazilian technical cooperation for development: drivers, mechanics and future prospects. *London: Overseas Development Institute*.

Campos, R.P.D., Lima, J.B.B. and Forero Gonzalez, M.J., 2012. Questões conceituais e metodológicas sobre os estudos da cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional.

Campbell, John. Obama’s Overdue Trip to Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. June 24, 2013. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/obamas-overdue-trip-africa> (accessed on: January 12, 2018).

Campos, J., 2017. More than 200 human milk banks in Brazil and on three continents: network celebrates growth and success. FIOCRUZ. August 16, 2017. Available at: <http://www.fiotec.fiocruz.br/en/news/4232-more-than-200-human-milk-banks-in-brazil-an-three-continents-network-celebrates-growth-and-success> (accessed on: February 19, 2019).

Caramani, D., 2008. *Introduction to the comparative method with Boolean algebra* (Vol. 158). Sage publications.

Castro, Augusto. Agência Senado. Diretor do BNDES diz que financiamento em outros países é decisão de governo. August 30, 2017. Available at: <https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2017/08/30/diretor-do-bndes-diz-que-financiamento-em-outros-paises-e-decisao-de-governo>; <https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2018/06/01/brasil-fez-manobras-irregulares-para-dar-desconto-de-r-735-mi-em-seguro-de-emprestimos-a-venezuela-e-outros-paises-diz-tcu.htm> (accessed on July 20, 2019).

Castro, F.M. de Oliveira, 2009. *1808-2008: 1979-2008* (Vol. 2). Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

Castro, J.D., 1965. *Geografia da fome; o dilema brasileiro: pão ou aço*.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS), 2019. *Cash-Based Approaches and Local Regional Procurement (LRP)*. Baltimore, Maryland. Available at: <https://www.crs.org/get-involved/advocate/public-policy/global-hunger/cash-based-approaches-and-lrp> (accessed on: November 6, 2018).

Cervo, A.L., 2008. *Inserção internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros*. Editora Saraiva.

Cervo, A.L. and Bueno, C., 2002. História da política exterior do Brasil.

Cervo, A.L., 1994. Socializando o desenvolvimento: uma história da cooperação técnica internacional do Brasil. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 37(1), pp.37-63.

Chin, G. and Quadir, F., 2012. Introduction: rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(4), pp.493-506.

CIA, n.d. The World Factbook: Ethiopia. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html> (accessed on: January 23, 2019).

Clough, M., 1992. *Free at last?: US policy toward Africa and the end of the Cold War*. Council on Foreign Relations.

Cochrane, L. and Tamiru, Y., 2016. Ethiopia's productive safety net program: power, politics and practice. *Journal of International Development*, 28(5), pp.649-665.

Coelho, N.B.R. and Inoue, C.Y.A., 2018. When Hunger meets Diplomacy: Food Security in Brazilian Foreign Policy. *Meridiano 47*, 19.

Coêlho, D.B., 2012. Political competition and the diffusion of conditional cash transfers in

Brazil. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 6(2), pp.56-87.

Coêlho, D.B., 2013. A agenda social nos governos FHC e Lula: competição política e difusão do modelo renda mínima. In *Federalismo e políticas públicas no Brasil* (pp. 179-210).

Coêlho, D.B., 2012. Minimum Income in Brazil: A new model of innovation diffusion. *Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of reform*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Collier, D., 1993. The comparative method. *Political Science: The State of Discipline II*, Ada W. Finifter, ed., American Political Science Association.

Cook, C.W., 2012. *China and the US in Africa: Comparing their Impacts on Development* (Doctoral dissertation).

Costa Leite, I., Suyama, B., Trajber Waisbich, L., Pomeroy, M., Constantine, J., Navas-Alemán, L., Shankland, A. and Younis, M., 2014. *Brazil's engagement in international development cooperation: the state of the debate* (No. IDS Evidence Report; 59). ids.

Cornut, Jérémie. 'Analytic eclecticism in practice: A method for combining international relations theories.' *International Studies Perspectives* 16.1 (2015): 50-66.

CUT. Fetraf-Sul participa de lançamento do programa mais alimentos em Brasília. July 4, 2008. Available at: <https://cut.org.br/noticias/fetrafr-sul-participa-de-lancamento-do-programa-mais-alimentos-em-brasilia-1468/>

Dauvergne, P. and BL Farias, D., 2012. The rise of Brazil as a global development power. *Third World Quarterly*, 33(5), pp.903-917.

de Brito, L., Chaimite, E., Pereira, C., Posse, L., Sambo, M. and Shankland, A., *Revoltas da Fome: Protestos Populares em Moçambique*.

Decree de 21 de Junho de 2006. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2006/Dnn.dnn10864.htm (accessed August 12, 2017).

De Haan, A., 2011. Will China change international development as we know it?. *Journal of International Development*, 23(7), pp.881-908.

De Negri, F.O. and Cavalcante, L.R.O., 2014. Produtividade no Brasil: desempenho e determinantes.

DOD, 2008. US Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates to the US Global Leadership Campaign, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches> (accessed on: December 18, 2018).

DOD, 2005. The November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, the *Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. Available at: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/300005.htm> (accessed November 25, 2018).

Department of State, n.d. USAID and PL-480, 1961-1969. Office of the Historian. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480> (accessed October 24, 2018).

Department of State, n.d.-b. Travels President Barack Obama. Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/obama-barack>;

Department of State, n.d.-c. Travels President George W. Bush. Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute. <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels/president/bush-george-w> (accessed October 20, 2017).

De Renzio, P. and Hanlon, J., 2007. *Contested sovereignty in Mozambique: The dilemmas of aid dependence* (No. 2007/25). GEG Working Paper.

Devereux, S., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Slater, R., Tefera, M., Brown, T. and Teshome, A., 2008. Ethiopia's productive safety net programme (PSNP): 2008 assessment report. *IDS, Sussex*.

Devereux, S., Sabates-Wheeler, R., Tefera, M. and Taye, H., 2006. Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP): Trends in PSNP transfers within targeted households. *Brighton, UK, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Institute of Development Studies and Indak International Pvt. LC*.

Dias, I.D.M.T., 2018. O Brasil como promotor do desenvolvimento e a cooperação em segurança alimentar e nutricional na CPLP: atores e dinâmicas da transferência de políticas.

Dreher, Axel et al. (2018) Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqx052

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2017. Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData.

Dunne, T., Hansen, L. and Wight, C., 2013. The end of International Relations theory?. *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), pp.405-425.

Eberstadt, N. and Schultz, T.W., 1988. Foreign aid and American purpose.

The Economist (2016). Brazil's gargantuan corruption scandal goes global. December 22, 2016. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/21712445-american-authorities-reach-record-bribery-related-settlement-two-huge-companies> (accessed November 2st, 2017).

The Economist (2010). The miracle of the cerrado. August 26, 2010. Available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/16886442> (accessed September 9, 2016).

Ekman, Sigrid-Marianella Stensrud, and Carmen Stella Macamo, 2014. *Brazilian development cooperation in agriculture: A scoping study on ProSavana in Mozambique, with implications for forests*. Vol. 138. CIFOR.

Embrapa, n.d. Quem Somos. Available at: <https://www.embrapa.br/quem-somos> (accessed September 9, 2016).

Escobar, A., 1997. The making and unmaking of the third world through development. *The post-development reader*, pp.85-93.

Ethiopia. MoFED. Ethiopia: Building on Progress A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005/06-2009/10) Volume I: Main Text. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) September, 2006 Addis Ababa.

Faria, C.A.P.D. and Paradis, C.G., 2013. Humanism and solidarity in Brazilian foreign policy under Lula (2003-2010): theory and practice. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 7(2), pp.8-36.

FAO, n.d. IR1 – América Latina e Caribe sem Fome. Escritório Regional da FAO para a América Latina e o Caribe. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/americas/perspectivas/apoyo-iniciativa/pt/> (accessed November 11, 2016).

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2019. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019. Safeguarding against economic slowdowns and downturns. Rome, FAO. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/> (accessed on: February 11, 2019)

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2018. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018. Building climate resilience for food security and nutrition. Rome, FAO. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/I9553EN/i9553en.pdf> (accessed on: February 15, 2019)

FAO, 2018. The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2018. Agricultural trade, climate change and food security. Rome.

FAO, 2017a. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, 2017. Available at: <http://www.worldhunger.org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-facts-and-statistics/>. May 23rd, 2017.

FAO, 2017b. The future of food and agriculture – Trends and challenges. Rome.

Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6583e.pdf>; <http://www.worldhunger.org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-facts-and-statistics/>. May 23rd, 2017.

FAO, 2017c. Committee on World Food Security (CFS). February 17, 2017. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-home/about/en> (accessed: November 12, 2016).

FAO, 2011. Address by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on world food security. May 6, 2011. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/74085/icode/> (accessed October 20, 2017).

FAO, 2006. Policy Brief, June 2006. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/13128-0e6f36f27e0091055bec28ebe830f46b3.pdf> .

FAO, 2002. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World of 2001*. Available at: <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/003/y1500e/y1500e00.pdf>. Accessed on: June 5th, 2017.

FAO, 1985. *The State of Food and Agriculture, 1984* (Rome: FAO, 1985), 1. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-ap664e.pdf>

Fellet, João, 2013. ‘Embrapa está revendo presença na África, diz presidente.’ In: BBC Brasil, February 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2013/02/130122_embrapa_entrevista_2_jf_cc.shtml.

Fellet, João, 2012a. ‘Brasil testa Papel de Potência Global em Angola.’ In: BBC Brasil. September 17, 2012. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2012/09/120917_angola_especial_abre_jf.shtml. (accessed December 12, 2013).

Fellet, João, 2012b. ‘Com BNDES e Negócios com Políticos, Odebrecht ergue ‘Império’ em Angola.’ In: BBC Brasil. September 18. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2012/09/120917_odebrecht_angola_abre_jf_ac.shtml (accessed December 12, 2017).

FGV and IBGE, 2017. Centro de Contas Nacionais - diversas publicações, período 1947 a 1989; IBGE. Diretoria de Pesquisas. Coordenação de Contas Nacionais. Available at https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/media/com_mediaibge/arquivos/7531a821326941965f1483c85caca11f.xls

FtF, n.d. Ethiopia. Available at: <https://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/ethiopia/> (accessed on: February 11, 2019).

Fingermann, N.N., 2014. *A cooperação trilateral brasileira em Moçambique: Um estudo de caso comparado: o ProALIMENTOS e o ProSAVANA* (Doctoral dissertation).

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., 2001. Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics. *Annual review of political science*, 4(1), pp.391-416.

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., 1998. International norm dynamics and political change. *International organization*, 52(4), pp.887-917.

Fonseca, A. B.; Inoue., C. Y. A., 2010. *As Redes Transnacionais de Sociedade Civil e a Política Exterior Brasileira de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional*. Master in Diplomacy, Instituto Rio Branco.

Fraudorfer, Markus, 2015. *Brazil's Emerging Role in Global Governance: Health, Food Security and Bioenergy*. Londres: Palgrave Macmillan.

GAFFSP, 2017. Global Agriculture & Food Security Program Annual Report. Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.gafspfund.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/GAFSP_2017AR_1.pdf (accessed on: January 11, 2019).

GAIN Report Number ET 1605. Addis Ababa USDA's School Feeding Program in Ethiopia is Making a Difference. Approved by Michael G. Francom. Prepared by FAS Post and Washington Staff. Date: 2/5/2016. Available at: https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/USDA%E2%80%99s%20School%20Feeding%20Program%20in%20Ethiopia%20is%20Making%20a%20Difference_Addis%20Ababa_Ethiopia_2-5-2016.pdf

GAIN Report Number ET1517. USDA's Food for Progress Program Opens Path for US Wheat Sales _Addis Ababa_Ethiopia_6-16-2015. Available at: https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/USDA%E2%80%99s%20Food%20for%20Progress%20Program%20Opens%20Path%20for%20US%20Wheat%20Sales%20_Addis%20Ababa_Ethiopia_6-16-2015.pdf

Gardini, G.L., 2016. Brazil: what rise of what power?. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 35(1), pp.5-19.

Gelan, A.U., 2007. Does food aid have disincentive effects on local production? A general equilibrium perspective on food aid in Ethiopia. *Food policy*, 32(4), pp.436-458.

Gill, P., 2010. *Famine and foreigners: Ethiopia since live aid*. Oxford University Press.

Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, n.d. About the Partnership. Available at: <http://effectivecooperation.org/about/about-the-partnership/> (accessed on June 20, 2019).

Gonzalez, M.J.F. and Pereira, R.M., 2012. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional (Cobradi): o Brasil e os fundos multilaterais de desenvolvimento.

Goulet, F. and Sabourin, E., 2012. South-South cooperation between Africa and South American emerging countries: The case of agriculture and rural development. *Poverty in Focus*, (24), pp.20-22.

Haile, T., G., 2015. Comparative Analysis for the SDPRP, PASDEP and GTP of the FDR of Ethiopia. *Global Journal of Business, Economics and Management*, 5(1), 13-24. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.18844/gjbem.v5i1.61>

Hamann, Eduarda P.; Teixeira, Carlos Augusto R. (orgs), 2017. Brazil's participation in MINUSTAH (2004-2017): perceptions, lessons and practices for future missions. Special Issue - A Collection of Articles. Igarapé Institute, CCOPAB, Rio de Janeiro.

Hanrahan, C.E., 2013. Agricultural Export Programs: Background and Issues. *Congressional Research Service*.

Hanrahan, C.E., 2010. Local and regional procurement for US international emergency food aid. *Congressional Research Service*, pp.7-5700.

Harris, G.T., 2017. *Why Africa Matters to US National Security*. Atlantic Council. Available at:http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Why_Africa_Matters_to_US_National_Security_0524_web.pdf.

Heid, Markham. Experts Say Lobbying Skewed the U.S. Dietary Guidelines. Time Magazine. January 8, 2016. Available at: <http://time.com/4130043/lobbying-politics-dietary-guidelines/> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

Hermes, Felipe. 20 obras que o BNDES financiou em outros países. Mises Brasil. December 4, 2014. Available at: <https://mises.org.br/Article.aspx?id=1985&comments=true> (accessed on: July 20 2019).

Hillard, L. Shendruk, A., 2019. Funding the United Nations: What Impact Do US Contributions Have on UN Agencies and Programs?. *Council on Foreign Relations*. April 2, 2019. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs> (accessed on: January 12, 2020).

HLPE, 2017. 2nd Note on Critical and Emerging Issues for Food Security and Nutrition. A note by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, Rome. Available at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/Critical-Emerging-Issues-2016/HLPE_Note-to-CFS_Critical-and-Emerging-Issues-2nd-Edition__27-April-2017_.pdf (accessed on: July 22, 2019)

Ho, Melissa D. and Hanrahan, Charles E., 2011. US Global Food Security Funding, FY2010-FY2012.

House Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Hearing. Publication info: Congressional Documents and Publications; Washington, (Jul 9, 2015).

Hurrell, A., 2009. Os BRICS e a ordem global. *Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV*, pp.43-73.

Hurrell, A., 2006. Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?. *International affairs*, 82(1), pp.1-19.

Hyden, G., 2008. After the Paris Declaration: Taking on the issue of power. *Development policy review*, 26(3), pp.259-274.

IATI, 2018. How IATI works. Available at: <https://iatistandard.org/en/about/iati-process/> (accessed on: March 20, 2019)

IMF, 2019. IMF Data Mapper. Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD> (accessed on: July 29, 2019)

IPEA; ABC, 2018. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: levantamento 2014 – 2016, Brasília.

IPEA, 2017. Brazilian cooperation for international development: 2011-2013. Editor: João Brígido Bezerra Lima, Brasília.

IPEA, 2013. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional : 2010 / Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Brasília.

IPEA; ABC, 2013. Manual de Gestão da Cooperação Técnica Sul-Sul. Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Brasília.

IPEA, 2012. TD 1719 - Cooperação Brasileira Para o Desenvolvimento Internacional (COBRADI): O Brasil e os Fundos Multilaterais de Desenvolvimento. Available at: http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15103

IPEA, 2010. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional : 2005-2009 / Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Brasília.

Jallow, S.M., 1994. The relationship between food aid and food production in sub-Saharan Africa.

Jallow, Saba Momodou, 1992. The relationship between food aid and food production in sub-Saharan Africa. Dissertation Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences of West Virginia University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by Saba Momodou Jallow Morgantown West Virginia.

Juma, C., 2015. *The new harvest: agricultural innovation in Africa*. Oxford University Press.

Júnior, W.M., 2015. *Política externa e cooperação técnica: As relações do Brasil com a África durante os anos FHC e Lula da Silva*. Editora D'Plácido. NINA, Alexandre. A Ação contra a Fome e a Pobreza. In: O Brasil e a ONU. FUNAG: Brasília, 2008.

Kahler, M., 2013. Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo. *International Affairs*, 89(3), pp.711-729.

Katzenstein, P. and Sil, R., 2008. Eclectic theorizing in the study and practice of international relations. In *The Oxford handbook of international relations*.

Kenkel, K.M. and Cunliffe, P. eds., 2016. *Brazil as a rising power: Intervention norms and the contestation of global order*. Routledge.

Kennedy, John F., 1961. Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Departments and Agencies. Food for Peace Program, 1961: January-March. Available at: <https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/078a/JFKPOF-078a-010> (accessed October 24, 2018). Cf, also <http://aiddata.webflow.io/blog/geography-of-us-food-aid-a-steep-road-ahead-for-reform> (accessed October 18, 2017).

KEOHANE, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. EUA: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Keohane, R.O., 1988. International institutions: Two approaches. *International studies quarterly*, 32(4), pp.379-396.

KEOHANE, R. & NYE, J. *Power and interdependence – world politics in transition*. Boston: Little, Brown e Co, 1986.

Kimenyi, Mwangi S. Obama's Africa Trip: Symbolism and Substance. The Brookings Institution. July 8, 2013. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/obamas-africa-trip-symbolism-and-substance/> (accessed on: January 12, 2018).

King, G., Keohane, R.O. and Verba, S., 1994. *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*. Princeton university press.

Kirwan, B., and M. McMillan, 2007. 'Food Aid and Poverty'. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 89(5): 1–23.

Knecht, T., 2010. *Paying attention to foreign affairs: How public opinion affects presidential decision making*. Penn State Press.

Kragelund, P., 2011. Back to BASICS? The Rejuvenation of Non-traditional Donors' Development Cooperation with Africa. *Development and change*, 42(2), pp.585-607.

Lancaster, C., 2008. *Foreign aid: Diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

Lancaster, C., 2008a. *George Bush's foreign aid: transformation or chaos?*. CGD Books.

Leite, P.S., 2011. *O Brasil e a cooperação Sul-Sul em três momentos de política externa: os governos Jânio Quadros/João Goulart, Ernesto Geisel e Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva* (Vol. 527). Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão.

Lentz, E.C., Barrett, C.B. and Gómez, M.I., 2012. The impacts of local and regional procurement of US Food Aid: Learning alliance synthesis report. *Chapter in Final Report: A* <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3671ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr3671ih.pdf>.

Lentz, E., Barrett, C.B. and Hoddinott, J., 2005. Food aid and dependency: implications for emergency food security assessments.

Lessa, Antônio Carlos, Leandro Freitas Couto, and Rogério de Souza Farias. 'Política externa planejada: os planos plurianuais e a ação internacional do Brasil, de Cardoso a Lula (1995-2008).' *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 52.1 (2009).

Lima, João Brígido Bezerra, Campos, Rodrigo Pires, Júnior, José Romero Pereira. *Cooperação para o desenvolvimento: uma nova abordagem. Desafios do Desenvolvimento*. IPEA, 2014. Ano 11. Edição 81 - 05/10/2014. Available at:

http://www.ipea.gov.br/desafios/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3077&catid=2

Lijphart, A., 1971. Comparative politics and the comparative method. *American political science review*, 65(3), pp.682-693.

Lijphart, Arend. 1975. Comparable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research. *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (2), pp. 158-177.

Liska, G., 1960. *The new statecraft: foreign aid in American foreign policy*. Chicago U. of Chicago P.

Litta, H., 2011. *Regimes in Southeast Asia*. Springer.

Lugar, R.G., 2006. Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign. *Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations*.

Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio. Speech of the President of the Republic at the Third World Social Forum, January 23, 2003.

Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio. Inaugural speech of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the Nacional Congress, January 1, 2003. Available at: <http://tools.folha.com.br/print?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww1.folha.uol.com.br%2Ffolha%2Fbrasil%2Fult96u44275.shtml&site=emcimahora> (accessed November 7, 2016).

Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 2003a. Inaugural speech of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva no Parlatório do Palácio do Planalto January 2, 2003. Available at: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u44292.shtml> (accessed November 7, 2016).

Lumsdaine, D.H., 1993. *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989*. Princeton University Press.

Machado, Renato Luiz Abreu. O que é o Consea? May 29, 2017. Planalto. Available at: <http://www4.planalto.gov.br/consea/aceso-a-informacao/institucional/o-que-e-o-consea> (accessed: November 15, 2016).

Maggetti, M. and Gilardi, F., 2013, April. How policies spread: A meta-analysis of diffusion mechanisms. In *ISA 54th annual convention, San Francisco* (pp. 3-6).

Malamud, A., 2011. A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53(3), pp.1-24.

Maluf, R.S., Santarelli, M. and Prado, V., 2014. A cooperação brasileira em segurança alimentar e nutricional: determinantes e desafios presentes na construção da agenda internacional. *R. Janeiro, CERESAN/UFRRJ*, p.43.

Manning, R., 2006. Will 'Emerging Donors' Change the Face of International Co-operation?. *Development policy review*, 24(4), pp.371-385.

Mares, David R., and Harold A. Trinkunas. *Aspirational power: Brazil on the long road to global influence*. Brookings Institution Press, 2016. \ Margolies, A. and Hoddinott, J., 2012. Mapping the impacts of food aid: current knowledge and future directions. UNU-WIDER, Sweden.

Margesson, R., 2013. *International Crises and Disasters: US Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms*. Congressional Research Service.

Mawdsley, E., Savage, L. and Kim, S.M., 2014. A 'post-aid world'? Paradigm shift in foreign aid and development cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum. *The Geographical Journal*, 180(1), pp.27-38.

McBride, James. How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid? Council on Foreign Relations. October 1, 2018. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid> (accessed on: December 28, 2018).

MCC, n.d. About MCC. Available at: <https://www.mcc.gov/about> (accessed on: November 15, 2018).

MCC, 2016. Next: A Strategy for MCC's Future. Available at: <https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/next>. (accessed on: October 30, 2019).

MDA, 2015. Mais Desenvolvimento para Moçambique. October 7, 2015. Available at: <http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/noticias/mais-desenvolvimento-para-mo%C3%A7ambique>; https://www.agrolink.com.br/noticias/mais-desenvolvimento-para-mocambique_223919.html. (accessed October 20, 2017).

MDA, 2010. Fome Zero: A experiência brasileira/ José Graziano da Silva; Mauro Eduardo Del Grossi; Caio Galvão de França (orgs.), Brasília.

MDS, 2014a. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome. PAA: 10 anos de aquisição de alimentos. Brasília, DF: MDS; Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional; Secretaria de Avaliação e Gestão da Informação.

MDS, 2014b. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome. Avaliação de Políticas Públicas: reflexões acadêmicas sobre o desenvolvimento social e o combate a fome. BRASIL Sem Miséria, Brasília.

MDS, 2007. Fome Zero Exemplo para o Mundo. December, 2007. Available at: <http://www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias/2007/dezembro/fome-zero-exemplo-para-o-mundo>. Accessed: August 25, 2015.

Mendonça, W. and de Faria, C.A.P., 2015. A cooperação técnica do Brasil com a África: comparando os governos Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) e Lula da Silva (2003–2010). *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 58(1), pp.5-22.

Mergos, G. and Papanastassiou, M. eds., 2017. *Food Security and Sustainability: Investment and Financing Along Agro-Food Chains*. Springer.

Milani, C., 2017. ABC 30 anos: história e desafios futuros. *Brasília: Agência Brasileira de Cooperação*.

Milani, C.R. and Pinheiro, L., 2013. Política Externa Brasileira: Os Desafios de sua Caracterização como Política Pública. *Contexto Internacional*, 35(1).

Milani, C.R., Lopes, L.L. and Suyama, B., 2013. *Políticas de Cooperação Internacional para o Desenvolvimento no Norte e no Sul: que lições e desafios para o Brasil?*. São Paulo:

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Milner, H.V., 1997. *Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations*. Princeton University Press.

Milner, H., 1992. International theories of cooperation among nations: Strengths and weaknesses. *World politics*, 44(3), pp.466-496.

Modi, R. and Cheru, F. eds., 2013. *Agricultural development and food security in Africa: the impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments*. Zed Books Ltd.

Morais de Sá e Silva, M., 2011. Conditional cash transfers and education: United in theory, divorced in policy. *PhD diss., Columbia University*.

Morgenthau, Hans. A Political Theory of Foreign Aid, *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (June 1962).

Mosca, J. and Bruna, N., 2015. ProSAVANA: discursos, práticas e realidades. *Observador Rural*, 31.

MRE, 2011. Balanço MRE. 2003-2010. Available at: https://i3gov.planejamento.gov.br/textos/livro6/6.1_Politica_Externa.pdf.

MRE, 2007a. Política Externa Brasileira. Vol. I. Discursos, artigos e entrevistas do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2007). Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático, Brasília.

MRE, 2007b. Política Externa Brasileira. Vol. II. Discursos, artigos e entrevistas do Ministro Celso Amorim (2003-2007). Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático, Brasília.

MRE, 2007. *South-South Cooperation Activities Carried Out by Brazil*. Brazilian Cooperation Agency.

Mussa, S., 2010. *How does food aid impact agricultural production and household supply to agriculture in Ethiopia?* (Doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University).

Narlikar, A., 2010. *New powers: how to become one and how to manage them*.

New Alliance, n.d. About. Available at: <http://new-alliance.org/about> (accessed on: January 12, 2018).

Nye, Joseph. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*(London: Basic Books, 1990)

Obama, Barack. Transcript of Obama's G20 Press Conference. CBS News. April 2, 2009. Available at: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-obamas-g20-press-conference/> (accessed on: January 11, 2019).

Oliveira, G.Z., 2015. Política Africana Do Brasil: Mudança Entre Lula E Dilma?. *Conjuntura Austral*, 6(29), pp.29-48.

OECD (2020), Net ODA (indicator). doi: 10.1787/33346549-en (Accessed on 13 January 2020). Available at: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>; <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>.

OECD, 2019. Endorsements to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/countriesterritoriesandendorsementstotheparisdeclarationandaaa.htm> (accessed on: March 12, 2019).

OECD (2018), *Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One Behind*, OECD Publishing, Paris <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2018-en>

OECD (2017), *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2017: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2017-en-fr

OECD (2017), *Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development*, OECD Publishing, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2017-en>

OECD (2016), *Converged Statistical Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System (crs) and the Annual DAC Questionnaire Chapters 1-6*. Available at: [http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DCDDAC\(2016\)3FINAL.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DCDDAC(2016)3FINAL.pdf)

OECD/UNDP (2016). Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2016 Progress Report. Retrieved on 09 Dec 2016 from <http://effectivecooperation.org/2016/11/2016-monitoring-report-released/>.

OECD (2016), *Development Co-operation Report 2016: The Sustainable Development Goals as Business Opportunities*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2016-en>. (accessed on: March 11, 2019).

OECD (2015). *Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region – Africa* (Paris: OECD, 2015), <https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202015.pdf>, 2.

OECD (2015b), *Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2015-en>. (accessed on: March 11, 2019).

OECD (2014), *Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-en>. (accessed on: March 11, 2019).

OECD (2013), *Development Co-operation Report 2013: Ending Poverty*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2013-en>. (accessed on: March 11, 2019).

OECD (2012), *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration, Better Aid*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264125780-en>.

OECD (2011). Aid Effectiveness 2005-10: Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration.

OECD (2011), *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2011: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators*, OECD Publishing, ^[1]http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2011-en-fr OECD (2018), *Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One Behind*, OECD Publishing, Paris <https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2018-en>

OECD (2006). The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid. *Does Tying Matter?* DOI:

<https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264013476-en>

Okumu, D.A, Aling. H. P, Mitamita, S. J, Masai, Ng'eno. W., 2018. *Analysis of United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa*. International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research. Vol. 6, Issue 3, pp: (432-440), Month: July-September.

ONU Brasil, n.d. IPC-IG/PNUD. Available at: <https://nacoesunidas.org/onu-no-brasil/ipc-igpnud/> (accessed November 11, 2016).

OXFAM AMERICA (2008). *Smart Development: Why US foreign aid demands major reform*. Boston/Washington. Available at: <http://www.oxfam-america.org/files/smart-development.pdf>.

Oliveira, G.Z., 2015. Política Africana Do Brasil: Mudança Entre Lula E Dilma?. *Conjuntura Austral*, 6(29), pp.29-48.

Paraguassu, L. (2013) 'Dilma quer Agência de Comércio para Fortalecer Balança', O Estado de S. Paulo, June 15. Available at: www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso%2cdilma-quer-agencia-de-comercio-para-fortalecer-balanca-%2c1042690%2c0.htm (accessed June 12, 2018).

Patience, A., 2014. Imagining middle powers. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(2), pp.210-224.

Patriota, T. C., & Pierri, F. M., 2014. Brazil's cooperation in African agricultural development and food security. In F. Cheru, & R. Modi (Eds.), *Agricultural development and food security in Africa: The impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investment* (pp. 125–144). London: Zed Books.

Paxton, Sally, n.d. United States of America. *Publish What You Fund*. London, UK. Available at: <https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/donors/us/> (accessed on June 20, 2019).

Perch, L. and Bradley, D., 2012. Overview: Agricultural Futures y the Role of South-South Cooperation. *Poverty in Focus*, 24, pp.3-5.

Perkowski, Mateusz. USDA: A captive agency? Capital Press, Salom, Oregon. December 18, 2014. Available at: https://www.capitalpress.com/nation_world/nation/usda-a-captive-agency/article_da1abcd7-fdd3-5dec-86ca-8b87944ee8b0.html (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

Phillips, Macon. President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address. The White House. January 21, 2009. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address> (accessed on: January 12, 2019).

Pierri, F.M., 2013. How Brazil's Agrarian Dynamics Shape Development Cooperation in Africa. *IDS Bulletin*, 44(4), pp.69-79.

Pinto, G.L., Belmonte, Í. and Padua, C.D.A., 2015. Exportações brasileiras de máquinas e equipamentos agrícolas para a África: análise da situação atual e do ambiente de negócios.

Puente, C.A.I., 2010. A cooperação técnica horizontal brasileira como instrumento de política externa: a evolução da técnica com países em desenvolvimento—CTPD—no período 1995–2005. *Brasília: FUNAG*.

Putnam, R.D and Evans, P.B., Jacobson, H.K. eds., 1993. *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (No. 25). Univ of California Press.

Putnam, R.D., 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International organization*, 42(3), pp.427-460.

PT. Resolutions of the 2o Nacional Congress (1999). Fundação Perseu Abramo (www.fpabramo.org.br). Available at: <http://novo.fpabramo.org.br/uploads/resolucoesIIcongresso.pdf> (accessed November 7, 2016).

PT. Founding Manifest (1980). Fundação Perseu Abramo (www.fpabramo.org.br). Available at: <http://www.pt.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/manifestodefundacaopt.pdf>; <http://novo.fpabramo.org.br/content/congressos-nacionais-do-pt-resolucoes-0> (accessed November 7, 2016).

PT. Moções do 1o Congresso Nacional (1991). Fundação Perseu Abramo (www.fpabramo.org.br). Available at: <http://novo.fpabramo.org.br/content/congressos-nacionais-do-pt-resolucoes-0>. (accessed November 7, 2016).

Publish What you Fund, 2018. Aid Transparency Index 2018 US Brief. Available at: <https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/reports/2018-US-Brief.pdf> (accessed on: March 12, 2019).

Puente, Carlos Alfonso I., 2010. A cooperação técnica horizontal brasileira como instrumento de política externa: a evolução da técnica com países em desenvolvimento–CTPD–no período 1995–2005. *Brasília: FUNAG*.

Radelet, S., 2003. Bush and foreign aid. *Foreign Affairs*, pp.104-117.

Rahmato, D., Pankhurst, A. and van Uffelen, J.G. eds., 2013. *Food security, safety nets and social protection in Ethiopia*. African Books Collective.

RBA. Trabalhadores do Campo Repudiam Fim do Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário. Rede Brasil Atual. June 10, 2016. Available at: <https://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/politica/2016/06/trabalhadores-do-campo-repudiam-fim-do-ministerio-do-desenvolvimento-agrario-5117/>. (accessed October 20, 2017).

Rebello, Aiuri. Brasil fez manobras irregulares para emprestar dinheiro com desconto para outros países, aponta TCU. UOL, São Paulo. June 6, 2018. Available at: <https://www.bol.uol.com.br/noticias/2018/06/01/brasil-fez-manobras-irregulares-para-dar-desconto-de-r-735-mi-em-seguro-de-emprestimos-a-venezuela-e-outros-paises-diz-tcu.htm> (accessed on: July 22, 2019)

Reij, C., 2015. How Ethiopia Went from Famine Crisis to Green Revolution. *World Resources Institute, Washington DC*. Available at: <https://www.wri.org/blog/2015/07/how-ethiopia-went-famine-crisis-green-revolution> (accessed on: October 30, 2019).

Ribeiro, C.O., 2007. *Relações político-comerciais Brasil-África (1985-2006)* (Doctoral dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo).

Rickman, Ari. Booker, Salih. The future is African — and the United States is not prepared. The Washington Post, June 6, 2018. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/06/09/the-future-is-african-and-the-united-states-is-not-prepared/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a76131b7fc9a (accessed on: December 23, 2018).

Riddell, R.C., 2008. *Does foreign aid really work?* Oxford University Press.

Riley, B., 2017. *The Political History of American Food Aid: An Uneasy Benevolence*. Oxford University Press.

Risse, T., 1995. *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: non-state actors, domestic structures and international institutions* (Vol. 42). Cambridge University Press.

Rodney, W., 1973. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.

Rodrigues, Fernando. Livro mostra como Lula, o Itamaraty e BNDES ajudaram empreiteiras na África. UOL Notícias. August 3, 2015. Available at: <http://fernandorodrigues.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2015/08/03/livro-mostra-como-lula-o-itamaraty-e-bndes-ajudaram-empresiteiras-na-africa/> (accessed September 8, 2016).

Rossi, A. (2013) 'Governo Dilma Implementa 'Agenda África' para Ampliar Relações', O Estado de S. Paulo, October 29. Available at: <https://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,governo-dilma-implementa-agenda-africa-para-ampliar-relacoes,1090701> (accessed June 12, 2018).

Rotberg, R., 2013. *Africa emerges: Consummate challenges, abundant opportunities*. John Wiley & Sons.

Rotberg, R.I. ed., 2009. *China into Africa: Trade, aid, and influence*. Brookings Institution Press.

Rossi, Amanda. Governo Dilma Implementa 'Agenda África' para Ampliar Relações. Estadão. October 29, 2013. Available at: www.estadao.com.br/noticias/cidades,governo-dilma-implementa-agenda-africa-para-ampliar-relacoes,1090701,0.htm (accessed on: June

23, 2018).

Rousseff, Dilma. Discurso da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, durante Compromisso Constitucional perante o Congresso Nacional. Biblioteca da Presidência da República. January 1st, 2011. Available at: <http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/dilma-rousseff/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-durante-compromisso-constitucional-perante-o-congresso-nacional> (accessed on: October 20, 2018).

Russo, G., Cabral, L. and Ferrinho, P., 2013. Brazil-Africa technical cooperation in health: what's its relevance to the post-Busan debate on 'aid effectiveness'?. *Globalization and health*, 9(1), p.2. <https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1744-8603-9-2>

Rye Olsen, G., 2017. The ambiguity of US foreign policy towards Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 38(9), pp.2097-2112.

Sá, Eduardo. O poder do agronegócio sobre os Estados na Rio+20. May 4, 2012. Brasil de Fato. Available at: https://www.brasildefato.com.br/node/9444/#.T7kh_RvMPUk.twitter (accessed October 27, 2017)

Salomão, A. and Matose, F., 2007. Towards community-based forest management of miombo woodlands in Mozambique. *Managing the Miombo woodlands of Southern Africa*, pp.1-36.

Santander, G. and Alonso, J.A., 2018. Perceptions, identities and interests in South–South cooperation: the cases of Chile, Venezuela and Brazil. *Third World Quarterly*, 39(10), pp.1923-1940.

Saraiva, J.F.S. ed., 2001. *Relações internacionais: Entre a ordem bipolar e o policentrismo (de 1947 a nossos dias)* (Vol. 2). Ibrri.

Sartori, G., 1991. Comparing and miscomparing. *Journal of theoretical politics*, 3(3), pp.243-257.

Schnepf, R., 2016. *US International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues* (Vol. 9). Congressional Research Service.

Schraeder, P.J., Hook, S.W. and Taylor, B., 1998. Clarifying the foreign aid puzzle: A comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish aid flows. *World politics*, 50(2), pp.294-323.

Schreiber, Mariana. Dilma viaja menos da metade que Lula ao exterior. BBC Brasil. January 21, 2015. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2015/01/150113_dilma_viagens_internacionais_ms_lgb. (Accessed November 12, 2016).

Schultz, T.W., 1960. Value of US farm surpluses to underdeveloped countries. *Journal of Farm Economics*, 42(5), pp.1019-1030.

Schwab, Tim. USDA Censoring Anti-Monsanto Science? A USDA hotline is blowing up with complaints from government scientists about censorship of science, begging the question: Who does the USDA work for? Consumers and farmers—or Monsanto? Food & Water Watch. March 9, 2016. Available at: <https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/news/usda-censoring-anti-monsanto-science-0> (accessed on: January 21, 2019).

Scoones, Ian, *et al.* 'A new politics of development cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian engagements in African agriculture.' *World development* 81 (2016): 1-12.

Sen, A., 1981. *Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation*. Oxford university press.

Serafino, N.M., 2008, December. The Department of Defense role in foreign assistance: Background, major issues, and options for Congress. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.

Shambaugh, D.L., 2013. *China goes global: The partial power* (Vol. 111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shankland, A. and Gonçalves, E., 2016. Imagining agricultural development in south–south cooperation: The contestation and transformation of ProSAVANA. *World Development*, 81, pp.35-46.

Shepherd, Jack, Ph.D. Boston University, 1989. Food aid as an instrument of US foreign policy: The case of Ethiopia, 1982-1984. (Volumes I and II)

Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P.J., 2010. Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: Reconfiguring problems and mechanisms across research traditions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), pp.411-431.

Silva, J.G.D., Belik, W. and Takagi, M., 2001. Projeto Fome Zero: uma proposta de política de segurança alimentar para o Brasil. *São Paulo: Instituto da Cidadania*.

Souza, A., 2014. Brazil's development cooperation in Africa: a new model?'. In *Fifth BRICS Academic Forum Partnership for Development Integration & Industrialization* (pp. 96-107).

Stolte, C., 2015. *Brazil's Africa strategy: role conception and the drive for international status*. Springer.

Stolte, C., 2012. *Brazil in Africa: Just another BRICS country seeking resources?*. London: Chatham House.

Stolte, C., 2014. Brazil's South-South cooperation with Africa 2003-2013. A decade of Brazilian outreach towards its Atlantic neighbourhood. *CEBRI Artigos*, 2(9), pp.7-21.

Stolte, C., 2015. *Brazil's Africa strategy: role conception and the drive for international status*. Springer.

Stuenkel, O., 2017. *Post-Western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order*. John Wiley & Sons.

Stuenkel, O. and Taylor, M.M. eds., 2015. *Brazil on the global stage: power, ideas, and the liberal international order*. Springer.

Stuenkel, 2014. South-South cooperation: Does the IBSA Fund matter? January 27, 2014. Available at: <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2014/01/27/south-cooperation-matter/> (accessed November 1st, 2017).

Sugiyama, Natasha Borges. *The Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

Takagi, Maya, 2006. A implantação da política de segurança alimentar e Nutricional no Brasil: seus limites e desafios. Campinas, SP.

Takagi, M., Silva, J.G. and Grossi, M.D., 2001. Pobreza e fome: em busca de uma metodologia para quantificação do problema no Brasil. *Texto para discussão*, (101).

Tandon, S., Landes, M., Christensen, C., LeGrand, S., Broussard, N., Farrin, K. and Thome, K., 2017. *Progress and Challenges in Global Food Security* (No. 1476-2017-3897).

Tarnoff, Curt., 2018. Millennium Challenge Corporation Curt Specialist in Foreign Affairs April 18, 2018 Congressional Research Service 7-5700, RL32427.

Tarnoff, C. and Lawson, Marian L., 2018. Foreign Aid: An Introduction to US Programs and Policy. April 25, 2018. Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R40213.

Tarnoff, C. and Lawson, M.L., 2016, June. Foreign aid: An introduction to US programs and policy. Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service.

Tarnoff, C., 2015. US Agency for International Development (USAID): background, operations, and issues. *CRS Report (Congressional Research Service)*.

Taylor, I., 2009. *China's new role in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Thousand days Org, n.d. About Our Story: *Since day one, we've been fighting to give mothers and children a healthy first 1,000 days*. Available at: <https://thousanddays.org/about/our-story/>.

Tomazini, C.G. and Leite, C.K.D.S., 2016. Programa Fome Zero e o paradigma da segurança alimentar: ascensão e queda de uma coalizão?. *Revista de Sociologia e Política*, 24(58), pp.13-30.

Transparency International, 2012. Transparency and Accountability in Development: Where Do We Stand? Poverty and Development. November 20, 2012 Available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/transparency_and_accountability_in_development_where_do_we_stand (accessed on: March 20, 2019)

Tumusiime, E. and Cohen, M.J., 2017. Promoting country ownership and inclusive growth? An assessment of Feed the Future. *Development in Practice*, 27(1), pp.4-15.

UFRGS, Rede SAN, n.d. Moçambique adotará programa brasileiro Mais Alimentos África. Available at: <http://www.ufrgs.br/redesan/news/mocambique-adotara-programa-brasileiro-mais-alimentos-africa> (accessed October 20, 2017).

UNPD (2020). Human Development Indicators. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ETH> (accessed on: November 5, 2019)

UNDP (2016). Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/HDR2016_EN_Overview_Web.pdf (accessed: October 20, 2017).

UNDP (2013). Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to South-South and Triangular Cooperation (2008-2011). Available at: <http://ssc.undp.org/content/dam/ssc/documents/Key%20Policy%20Documents/BAPA.pdf>. (accessed on: May 20, 2017).

UNDP (2011). PROSAVANA-TEC - RESUMO EXECUTIVO. Available at: <http://www.undp.org.br/Extranet/SAP%20FILES/MM/2011/14740/PROSAVANA-TEC%20-%20RESU-MO%20EXECUTIVO.pdf> (accessed: October 28, 2017).

UN News (2011). UN and Brazil launch initiative to combat hunger among school children. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/11/394262-un-and-brazil-launch-initiative-combat-hunger-among-school-children> (accessed on: January 12, 2020).

UNOSSC (2018). About South-South and Triangular Cooperation. Available at: <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/about/about-sstc/> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

UNOSSC (2016). Good Practices in South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sustainable Development - Volume 1. United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, New York. <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/library/publications/good-practices-in-sstc-for-sustainable-development/>

USAID (2020). HISTORY OF USAID IN ETHIOPIA. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/ethiopia/history-usaid-ethiopia> (accessed on: February 4, 2019)

USAID (n.d.) The US Government's Global Food Security Research Strategy. Available at: https://www.feedthefuture.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/GESS_ResearchStrategy.pdf (accessed on: November 18, 2018).

USAID (n.d.-b) USAID HISTORY. 2012 - 2017 Archive for the United States Agency for International Development. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/usaid-history> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

USAID (2019). REPORTS AND DATA. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/reports-and-data> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

USAID (2019a). US Foreign Aid by Agency. Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/agencies> (accessed on: December 29, 2018).

USAID, 2019b. US Foreign Aid by Country: Ethiopia. Available at: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/ETH?fiscal_year=2005&implementing_agency_id=1&measure=Disbursements (accessed on: February 4, 2019).

USAID (2018). Shared Interest: How USAID Enhances US Economic Growth. Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/FINAL_Version_of_Shared_Interest_6_2018.PDF.

USAID (2018a). THE BILL EMERSON HUMANITARIAN TRUST. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/bill-emerson-humanitarian-trust> (accessed on: November 6, 2018).

USAID (2018b). EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS. April 3, 2018. Available at' <https://www.usaid.gov/open/efsp/fy2017> (accessed on: January 9, 2019).

USAID (2018c). Office of Press Relations. STATEMENT BY ADMINISTRATOR MARK GREEN ON THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY ACT. Friday, October 12, 2018. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/oct-12-2018-administrator-green-reauthorization-global-food-security-act> (accessed on: October 31, 2019).

USAID (2018d). MISSION, VISION AND VALUES. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values> (accessed September 17, 2017).

USAID (2017). EFSP Report. Emergency Food Security Program Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Report to Congress. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/PA00SW3C.pdf>

USAID (2017). Performance Evaluation of Title II Funded Development Food Assistance Programs in Ethiopia. Agriculture Knowledge, Learning, Documentation and Policy project (AKLDP Ethiopia).

USAID (2017a). Office of the Administrator. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/leadership> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

USAID (2017b). Aid Trends. Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-trends.html> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

USAID (2017c). U.S. Foreign Aid by Agency. Available at: <https://explorer.usaid.gov/agencies> (accessed on: December 29, 2018).

USAID and USDA (2016). US International Food Assistance Report Fiscal Year (FY) 2016.

USAID (2014a). Use of International Disaster Assistance Funds For Local and Regional Procurement, Cash, and Food Vouchers Under The Emergency Food Security Program Report To Congress FY 2014.

USAID (2014b). BUREAUS. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus> (accessed on: November 20, 2018). USDA, 2019a. Food for Progress. Available at: <https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/food-progress> (accessed on: November 3, 2018).

USAID-Ethiopia (2012). Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2011 – 2015: Accelerating the Transformation Toward Prosperity. PUBLIC VERSION: March.

USA (2017). Library of Congress. Major Foreign Aid Initiatives Under the Obama Administration: A Wrap-Up. *Congressional CR8 REPORT*. *Research* name redacted. Specialist in Foreign Assistance Policy January 4, 2017

USA (2016). BIFAD. The US Government’s Global Food Security Research Strategy (n.d). Available at: https://www.feedthefuture.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/GESS_ResearchStrategy.pdf (accessed December 5, 2016).

USA (2008). Library of Congress. The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress (name redacted), Coordinator Specialist in International Security Affairs December 9, 2008.

USA (1985). Library of Congress. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 5-057 0. House of Representatives Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, October 16, 1985.

USA (1961). FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 [Public Law 87–195; Approved September 4, 1961]. Available at:

<https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Foreign%20Assistance%20Act%20Of%201961.pdf>

(accessed on: July 22, 2019).

US Congress, 2016. S.1252 - Global Food Security Act of 2016, 114th Congress (2015-2016). Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1252>

(accessed on: January 12, 2018).

USDA (n.d.) About FAS. Available at: <https://www.fas.usda.gov/about-fas> (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

USDA (n.d.-b). USDA Programs. Available at: [https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/search?f\[0\]=field_topics:49](https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/search?f[0]=field_topics:49) (accessed on: November 20, 2018).

USDA, 2019. Agricultural Trade. August 20, 2019. Available: <https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/agricultural-trade/> (accessed on: March 5, 2019).

USDA, 2019b. McGovern-Dole Food for Education Program. Available at: <https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/mcgovern-dole-food-education-program> (accessed on: December 24, 2018).

USDA (2016). Farm and Food Support Under USDA's Section 32 Program. Updated October 17, 2016 Congressional Research Service RL 34081. Available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov> (accessed December 5, 2016).

USDA (2015). Budget Summary and Annual Performance Plan FY 2015. Available at: <https://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/FY15budsum.pdf>.

USDA (2013). Monitoring and Evaluation Policy Food Assistance Division, Office of Capacity Building and Development 5/6/2013. <https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2014-03/evalpol.pdf>

USDA (2012). USDA Celebrates 150 Years. Available at: <https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/history> (accessed on: November 23, 2018).

Valler Filho, W., 2007. *O Brasil e a crise haitiana: a cooperação técnica como instrumento de solidariedade e de ação diplomática*. Thesaurus Editora.

Vaz, A.C., 2015. International drivers of Brazilian agricultural cooperation in Africa in the post-2008 economic crisis. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 58(1), pp.164-190.

Vaz, A.C., 2004. Brazilian foreign policy under Lula: change or continuity. *FES Briefing Paper*, pp.1-2.

Vasconcelos, F.D.A.G.D., 2005. Combate à fome no Brasil: uma análise histórica de Vargas a Lula. *Revista de Nutrição*.

Vigevani, T. and Cepaluni, G., 2007. Lula's foreign policy and the quest for autonomy through diversification. *Third World Quarterly*, 28(7), pp.1309-1326.

Vilas-Bôas, J.C., 2011. Os investimentos brasileiros na África no governo Lula: um mapa. *Meridiano 47-Boletim de Análise de Conjuntura em Relações Internacionais*, (128).

Vilela, E. and Neiva, P., 2011. Temas e regiões nas políticas externas de Lula e Fernando Henrique: comparação do discurso dos dois presidentes. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 54(2), pp.70-96.

Wasserman, S. and Faust, K., 1994. *Social network analysis: Methods and applications* (Vol. 8). Cambridge university press.

White House (2016). The White House Summit on Global Development. July, 2016. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/campaign/globaldevelopment> (accessed on: January 14, 2019).

White House (2014a). U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit 2014. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/us-africa-leaders-summit> (accessed on: January 13, 2019).

White House (2014b). Statement by the Press Secretary Announcing the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. Office of the Press Secretary. January 21, 2014. Available at:

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/21/statement-press-secretary-announcing-us-africa-leaders-summit>

White House (2012). Remarks by the President at Symposium on Global Agriculture and Food Security. Office of the Press Secretary. May 18, 2012. Available at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/18/remarks-president-symposium-global-agriculture-and-food-security> (accessed October 20, 2019).

White House (2006). The National Security Strategy. March 2006. Available at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed October 20, 2018).

White House (2005). President Bush's Second Inaugural Address. January 20, 2005. Available at: <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172> (accessed October 20, 2018).

Whittaker, A.G., Smith, F.C. and McKune, E., 2008. *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*. Industrial Coll of The Armed Forces Washington DC.

Wilson, Scott. Obama says global development is in wealthy nations' interest. The Washington Post. September 23, 2010. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/22/AR2010092205610.html> (accessed January 20, 2019).

Wolf, S.M., 2014. Effect of Food Aid Delivery Mode on Food Production in Recipient Nation. Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science, Department of Agriculture, Illinois State University.

Wolf Jr, Charles, Xiao Wang, and Eric Warner, 2013. *China's foreign aid and government-sponsored investment activities: Scale, content, destinations, and implications*. National Defense Research Inst. Santa Monica-CA.

World Bank, 2019. GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) - United States, Brazil. Available: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2016&locations=US-BR&start=2000> (accessed on: March 5, 2019).

World Bank, 2019b. Country Ethiopia. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia> (accessed on: February 11, 2019).

World Bank, 2019c. GDP (current US\$) - United States. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&locations=US&start=2005> (accessed: January 23, 2019)

World Bank, 2019d. GDP (current US\$) - Brazil. Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BR> (accessed on: March 20, 2019).

WFP, n.d. Centre of Excellence Against Hunger. Available at: <http://www1.wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-against-hunger> (accessed August 10, 2017).

WFP (n.d.-b) Zero Hunger. Available at: <https://www1.wfp.org/zero-hunger> (accessed on June 10, 2019).

WFP USA, 2020. Ethiopia. Available at: <https://www.wfpusa.org/countries/ethiopia/> (accessed on: February 11, 2019).

WFP, 2014. Relatório Anual 2014: Lutando contra a Fome no Mundo. Centro de Excelência contra a Fome.

WFP, 2011. Revolution: From Food Aid to Food Assistance. World Food Programme. September 3, 2011. Available at: https://issuu.com/fundacionalimerka/docs/from_food_aid_to_food_assistance (accessed on: January 10, 2020).

World Meter, 2020. Ethiopia Population. Available at: <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ethiopia-population/> (accessed: January 23, 2019)

Wraith, Stephanie. Geography of US Food Aid: A Steep Road Ahead for Reform. AID DATA. July 23, 2013. Available at: <http://aiddata.webflow.io/blog/geography-of-us-food-aid-a-steep-road-ahead-for-reform> (accessed October 18, 2017).

Yamano, T., 2000. Food aid's effects on household behavior in rural Ethiopia. *Food aid's effects on household behavior in rural Ethiopia*.

Yngve, A., Oshaug, A., Margetts, B., Tseng, M., Hughes, R. and Cannon, G., 2010. World Food Summits: what for, and what value?. *Public health nutrition*, 13(2), pp.151-152.

List of Annexes

Annex I. People contacted and interviewed for this Dissertation¹³⁷

Adriana Telles Ribeiro, First Secretary, Embassy of Brazil in Adis Ababba. Meeting at the Embassy in August, 2018.

Allison Lombardo, management consultant at Deloitte and helps public sector clients tackle strategic and operational challenges. For nine years, Allison served in high-level policy roles in the Office of the US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan at the State Department, leading initiatives on peace talks in the region. During the Obama Administration, Allison served as the Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2013-2014). From 2016-2017, she served as a policy advisor to the Administrator of US Agency for International Development (USAID) on humanitarian issues, public-private partnerships, and international development policy and in the USAID Global Development Lab's Center for Transformational Partnerships. Informal talk in September, 2018.

Andrea Saldanha da Gama Watson, Ministra de Segunda Classe, former employee of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Interview in September, 2016.

Benjamin Creutzfeldt, Wilson Fellow at the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States & Latin American Program. Informal meeting in October, 2018.

Benjamin Soares, scholar of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa. He is a co-editor of *Africa*, the journal of the International African Institute (London), and he also co-edits the International African Library book series (Cambridge). Lecture in October, 2018.

Bianca Fadel, former employee from CGFOME. Worked there from 2013 to 2016. Interviewed by phone in November, 2016.

Carlos Alexandre Fernandes Considera, Brazilian Foreign Service Officer, worked at the

¹³⁷ Excluding those who were contacted only to answer the survey mapping the perception of foreign aid. Those people are listed on Annexes IX and X.

Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Informal talks over the years 2016 to 2018.

Daniel Balaban, Director e Representative of the Centre of Excellence against Hunger of the United Nations World Food Programme. Interview in November, 2016.

Eric Silla, Professor. Course attended at Johns Hopkins (Fall Term, 2018).

Eyasu Abraha Alle, Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, interview on August 20, 2018 in Addis Ababa.

Grant T. Harris, CEO of Harris Africa Partners LLC and advises companies and organizations on strategy, policy, and mitigating risk with respect to doing business in Africa. For four years, Harris served as the principal advisor to President Barack Obama on issues related to Africa, serving as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the White House from August 2011 to August 2015. Informal talk in September, 2018.

Helen Asfaw, Ethiopian Energy Market Accelerator-Manager at Precise Consult International. Meeting in August, 2018 and online communications throughout 2018.

Jenny Gelman, Research and Instruction Librarian at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Meeting at Washington in September, 2018.

João Brígido Bezerra Lima, Planning and Research Technician of the Directorate of Studies and Economic Relations and International Policies (Dinte) of Ipea. Interview by phone in February, 2019.

Jorge Chediek, UNOSSC Director and Envoy of the Secretary-General on South-South Cooperation. Contacted during GSSD EXPO from the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation in November, 2018.

José Romero Pereira Júnior, Researcher of the Research for National Development Program (PNPD) at Dinte / Ipea. Professor of the University Center of the Federal District (UDF). Informal talks by phone on February 22, 2019.

Mark Swayne, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (SHA) within ASD for Special Operations/Low – Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Policy. SHA develops defense policy for embassy security, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, peacekeeping, stability operations, international rule of law, prevention of atrocities, human rights, lethal autonomous weapons systems, and women, peace and security. Mark previously served as the Director for North-West-Central Africa and Horn of Africa Regional Director in OUSD Policy. Lecture in October, 2018.

Michael Tetelman, Deputy Director of the Global Education, Employment and Engagement (G3E) business unit at FHI 360, a global non-profit human development organization. Lecture in November, 2018.

Milton Rondó, Diplomat, former head of CGFOME. Interviewed in October, 2016.

Samuel Damesa, Ethiopian Community Development Council Case Manager. Informal talks during the second semester of 2018.

Susan D. Page, American Ambassador, lecture on November 6, 2018.

Thiago Melamed de Menezes, First Secretary, Political Sector of the Embassy of Brazil in Addis Ababa. Meeting at the Embassy in August, 2018.

Yonatan Holz, Analyst at Olgoonik Solutions, LLC/ Graduate Student at The Johns Hopkins University – SAIS. Informal talks during the second semester of 2018.

Yoon Jung Park, PhD Associate Director China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Johns Hopkins University. Meeting in September, 2018.

Annex II. Decree nº 807 of April 22nd, 1993

Institui o Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar CONSEA e dá outras providências.

O PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA, no uso da atribuição que lhe confere o art. 84, inciso VI, da Constituição, e considerando a prioridade absoluta conferida à política de segurança alimentar, em especial às medidas que visem à redução dos problemas da fome e do desemprego;

Considerando a complexidade e o inter-relacionamento dos fatores que determinam o quadro carencial das pessoas e comunidades menos favorecidas;

Considerando a multiplicidade de instituições governamentais e não-governamentais envolvidas nas atividades de atendimento às necessidades alimentares da população;

Considerando a necessidade de serem estabelecidos mecanismos eficazes de coordenação intersetorial e interinstitucional para assegurar coerência e consistência à programação;

Considerando a imprescindibilidade de uma instância capaz de propor estratégias de mobilização, programação e articulação das ações a serem implementadas pelos setores governamentais e não-governamentais, DECRETA:

Art. 1º Fica instituído o Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar CONSEA, de caráter consultivo, vinculado à Presidência da República.

Art. 2º Compete ao CONSEA propor e opinar sobre:

I - ações voltadas para o combate à fome e o atingimento de condições plenas de segurança alimentar no Brasil, no âmbito do setor governamental e não-governamental;

II - medidas capazes de incentivar a parceria e integração entre os órgãos públicos e privados, nacionais e internacionais, visando a garantir a mobilização e racionalização do uso dos recursos, bem como a complementariedade das ações desenvolvidas;

III - campanhas de conscientização da opinião pública para o combate à fome e à miséria, com vistas à conjugação de esforços do governo e da sociedade;

IV iniciativas de estímulo e apoio à criação de comitês estaduais e municipais de combate à fome e à miséria, bem como para a unificação e articulação de ações governamentais conjuntas entre órgãos e pessoas da Administração Pública Federal direta e indireta e de entidades representativas da sociedade civil, no âmbito das matérias arroladas nos incisos anteriores.

Art. 3º O regimento interno do CONSEA, a ser adotado pela maioria absoluta dos seus membros e aprovado pelo Presidente da República, disciplinará o funcionamento do conselho.

Art. 4º O CONSEA será integrado:

I - pelo Ministro-Chefe da Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República;

II - pelo Ministro de Estado da Fazenda;

III - pelo Ministro de Estado Chefe da Secretaria de Planejamento, Orçamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República;

IV - pelo Ministro de Estado da Saúde;

V - pelo Ministro de Estado da Educação e do Desporto;

VI - pelo Ministro de Estado do Trabalho;

VII - pelo Ministro de Estado do Bem-Estar Social;

VIII - pelo Ministro de Estado da Agricultura;

IX - por 21 representantes de entidades ou personalidades da sociedade civil, designados pelo Presidente da República.

Parágrafo único. Os trabalhos do conselho serão considerados relevantes e o exercício da função de Conselheiro não será remunerado, vedada a percepção de vantagens pecuniárias de qualquer natureza.

Art. 5º A Secretaria de Planejamento, Orçamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República assegurará o apoio técnico e administrativo indispensável ao funcionamento do CONSEA.

Art. 6º Este Decreto entra em vigor na data de sua publicação.

Brasília, 24 de abril de 1993; 172º da Independência e 105º da República.

ITAMAR FRANCO

Yeda Rorato Crusius

Este texto não substitui o publicado no D.O.U. de 22.4.1993

Annex III. Law Project 737/2007**PROJETO DE LEI 737/2007 de 17/04/2007**

Dispõe sobre ações humanitárias internacionais empreendidas pelo Poder Executivo com a finalidade de prevenir, proteger, preparar, evitar, reduzir, mitigar sofrimento e auxiliar outros países ou regiões que se encontrem, momentaneamente ou não, em situações de emergência, de calamidade pública, de risco iminente ou grave ameaça à vida, à saúde, à garantia dos direitos humanos ou humanitários de sua população.

O CONGRESSO NACIONAL decreta:

Art. 1º Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a proceder a ações humanitárias internacionais com a finalidade de prevenir, proteger, preparar, evitar, reduzir, mitigar sofrimento e auxiliar outros países ou regiões que se encontrem, momentaneamente ou não, em situações de emergência, de calamidade pública, de risco iminente ou grave ameaça à vida, à saúde, à garantia dos direitos humanos ou humanitários de sua população.

§1º Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a empregar os meios necessários e suficientes que visem a implementar as ações humanitárias internacionais previstas no **caput**.

§2º Entre as ações previstas no § 1º, incluem-se a permissão de uso e doação de bens móveis, inclusive alimentos do estoque público do Governo Federal, bem como aqueles que integram o patrimônio dos órgãos ou entidades da administração pública federal, acompanhados de termo de desafetação com fundamento nesta Lei, assim como a doação de recursos financeiros.

§ 3º As doações em espécie, realizadas a título de ações humanitárias internacionais, bem assim as despesas decorrentes da aplicação desta Lei, correrão à conta das dotações orçamentárias constantes em programação específica.

§4º Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a proceder a convênios, ajustes ou acordos com o Distrito Federal, os Estados, os Municípios, com as fundações, privadas ou públicas, com organizações não-governamentais, com organismos internacionais ou outros países para os fins do disposto no **caput**.

Art. 2º O Poder Executivo regulamentará o disposto nesta Lei.

Annex IV. Memorandum No. 32. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the Republic, Brasilia, February 6, 2007.

EM No 00032 CGFOME/AFEPA/DNU/ABC/DTS/DPB/COF - MRE-PEMU- AAPS

Brasília, 06 de fevereiro de 2007.

Excelentíssimo Senhor Presidente da República,

Em decreto, publicado em 21 de junho de 2006, foi criado o Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial (GTI) sobre Assistência Humanitária Internacional. Sob a coordenação do Itamaraty, o GTI tem buscado tornar possível o envio de assistência humanitária brasileira para os países mais necessitados - de forma rápida e eficiente - , sobretudo na América Latina e Caribe. Nesse sentido, o GTI elaborou o anteprojeto-de-lei, em anexo, que supre importante lacuna legislativa, visto que não há, atualmente, lei que permita a doação de alimentos, medicamentos e outros bens procedentes de estoques públicos brasileiros a terceiros países.

2. Sempre que realizada operação de assistência humanitária ao exterior, é necessária a prévia publicação de Medida Provisória que autorize o envio. Esta situação impede que se atue com a agilidade necessária em casos de emergência, atrasando e até mesmo inviabilizando o envio das doações.

3. O GTI analisou as necessidades de todos os Ministérios envolvidos em operações de assistência humanitária, contemplando suas necessidades na proposta em anexo. O presente anteprojeto-de-lei incorpora, portanto, as formalidades legais necessárias para que o Brasil se converta em país provedor de assistência em situações de crise humanitária.

Respeitosamente,

Assinado eletronicamente por: Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim

Annex V. Law N. 12.429 of June 20th, 2011

CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS Centro de Documentação e Informação

LEI No 12.429, DE 20 DE JUNHO DE 2011

Autoriza o Poder Executivo a doar estoques públicos de alimentos, para assistência humanitária internacional.

A PRESIDENTA DA REPÚBLICA

Faço saber que o Congresso Nacional decreta e eu sanciono a seguinte Lei:

Art. 1º A União é autorizada a doar, por intermédio do Programa Mundial de Alimentos das Nações Unidas (PMA), ao Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia, à República de El Salvador, à República da Guatemala, à República do Haiti, à República da Nicarágua, à República do Zimbábue, à República de Cuba, aos países da Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa, à Autoridade Nacional Palestina, à República do Sudão, à República Democrática Federal da Etiópia, à República Centro-Africana, à República Democrática do Congo, à República Democrática Somali, à República do Níger e à República Democrática Popular da Coreia os produtos nos respectivos limites identificados no Anexo desta Lei, desde que não comprometa o atendimento às populações vitimadas por eventos sicionaturais adversos no território nacional. ([‘Caput’ do artigo com redação dada pela Lei no 12.688, de 18/7/2012](#))

§ 1º As doações serão efetivadas por meio de termo firmado pela Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento - CONAB e correrão à conta de dotações orçamentárias da Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos - PGPM e do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos - PAA.

§ 2º Caberá ao Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento:

I - caso haja necessidade premente, autorizar o beneficiamento dos produtos em alimentos prontos para consumo humano; e

II - disponibilizar, por intermédio da CONAB, os produtos, livres e desembaraçados, dentro dos navios nos portos do Rio de Janeiro, no Estado do Rio de Janeiro, de Santos, no Estado de São Paulo, de Paranaguá, no Estado do Paraná, de Itajaí, no Estado de Santa Catarina, e de Rio Grande, no Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, por meios próprios ou de terceiros, correndo todas as despesas decorrentes, inclusive na forma de equivalência em produto, à conta de dotações consignadas no orçamento da União.

§ 3º O frete e demais despesas de transporte serão cobertos pelo PMA, que poderá ser ressarcido na forma de equivalência em produto.

§ 4º Em casos excepcionais, nas situações em que o PMA não puder arcar de forma integral com as despesas de transporte, os referidos custos deverão ser cobertos pelas dotações orçamentárias mencionadas no § 1º.

Art. 2º As despesas com as doações previstas no art. 1º desta Lei não deverão afetar a implementação eficiente da PGPM e do PAA.

Art. 3º Caberá ao Ministério das Relações Exteriores definir os quantitativos e respectivos destinatários dos produtos identificados no Anexo desta Lei, em coordenação com o PMA.

Parágrafo único. Atendida a demanda dos países previstos no art. 1º desta Lei, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores poderá destinar os estoques remanescentes a outros países atingidos por eventos sócionaturais adversos ou em situação de insegurança alimentar aguda, observados os limites previstos naquele artigo.

Art. 4º Esta Lei entra em vigor na data de sua publicação.

Brasília, 20 de junho de 2011.

DILMA ROUSSEFF
Antonio de Aguiar Patriota
Milton Elias Ortolan
Afonso Florence

(Anexo com redação dada pela Lei no 13.001, de 20/6/2014)

PRODUTOS A SEREM DOADOS	LIMITES
Arroz	Até 1.000.000 (um milhão) de toneladas
Feijão	Até 100.000 (cem mil) toneladas
Milho	Até 100.000 (cem mil) toneladas
Leite em pó	Até 10.000 (dez mil) toneladas
Sementes de hortaliças	Até 1 (uma) tonelada

Annex VI. Transcript of the announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma

Addis Ababa, 25 May 2013

For us, the relationship with the African continent is very important. As they say here, you know, we also consider that there is an African renaissance in recent years, I would say even, in the last decade. This African renaissance is responsible for significant growth rates in Africa, including, reviews of the IMF show that among the countries that will grow, are African countries. We have had an intense relationship with African countries, both in the bilateral relationship as the bi-regional relationship. This applies to relationships that we have established between Africa and Latin America, between the African Union and Mercosul. But above all, I believe that, here in Africa, we have had a strong commitment to expand our cultural, commercial and investment relations. Many Brazilian companies invest here in Africa, and also increases our business relationship. To make possible and to make this relationship more fluid, including Brazil, which had a number of debts with African countries, who were debtors of Brazil since the 70s and 80s, we came systematically solving this problem for a more effective relationship. That is why we have sent debt forgiveness, not full the full debt, but part of the debt. We have forgiven the debt of nine countries and forward three more. Nine are now, I would say, the complete process, some of them being submitted to the Senate, and three are nearing completion. This is very important so that we can indeed establish new standard of relationship at this time, that is, the twenty-first century, and not be charging so much debt that we and they consider, actually, passed. Also, today I'm here to announce two major instruments so that we can expand relations with Africa. One of them, Brazil will create... We have an agency, called ABC, but this agency is a department of the Foreign Ministry, in fact. All major countries have international trade agencies. We will create an international trading agency for Africa and Latin America. It is a funding agency, but also a commercial agency, it is also an agency to enable investments. In short, it is an agency that has a very large scope. This agency aims to create a mechanism through which the initiatives that Brazil takes do not have to go through other multilateral bodies. You can even do in partnership with the UN, but often our actions in Africa are performed by one of these international agencies, and not by us directly, even though they are our resources. Hence the reason for this agency cooperation, trade and investment with African countries. Further concern is to enable adequate funding. There is no one in the world who expands their trade relations without supplier credits. And those who are selling [right?], ensure the buyer, which is another key element of this relationship. We... I believe we just had a very intense process of expanding both the Brazilian private investment here in Africa, with Embrapa, with bus production companies, and even large contractors, as well as those companies that set forth, for example, to ensure construction material, as explained to me in a meeting earlier today. Anyway... it all has to set a framework for expansion of investment. And we are very grateful to African countries because we believe that for the election of our representative at the WTO we had a great support. I do not know how much, but we have a review of a great support from these countries. I had four bilateral meetings: with Guinea, with Gabon, Kenya and Congo Brazzaville. I could not do more because we had no time, despite having several countries asking us for schedule, which shows that we also have a relationship, I think so, seen by Africans as qualitatively adequate. A relationship that we call South-South, in which you see mutual benefits, and no relation of superiority, or that uses business relationship for other purposes. So, I also believe that this aspect, of being extremely friendly, in the Brazilian relationship, is very important. Now one thing is true. We are the

largest country of the African descent of the African Diaspora. We admittedly have half our population of African descent. Also why we have common roots. A very important vein in the formation of our nationality, it has a strong root in diverse culture, too, because Africa is not a single, but diverse culture here in this region of the world. That's basically it.

Source: Costa Leite *et al.*, 2014: p. 88. Available at:
www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=d7tPg39k2XE

Annex VII. Article 'Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.' *Economist*, 17 July 2010, p. 52+. The Economist Historical Archive.

52 **The Americas**

The Economist July 17th 2010



Brazil's foreign-aid programme

Speak softly and carry a blank cheque

BRASILIA

In search of soft power, Brazil is turning itself into one of the world's biggest aid donors. But is it going too far, too fast?

ONE of the most successful post-earthquake initiatives in Haiti is the expansion of *Lèt Agogo* (Lots of Milk, in Creole), a dairy co-operative, into a project encouraging mothers to take their children to school in exchange for free meals. It is based on Bolsa Família, a Brazilian welfare scheme, and financed with Brazilian government money. In Mali cotton yields are soaring at an experimental farm run by Embrapa, a Brazilian research outfit. Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction firm, is building much of Angola's water supply and is one of the biggest contractors in Africa.

Without attracting much attention, Brazil is fast becoming one of the world's biggest providers of help to poor countries. Official figures do not reflect this. The Brazilian Co-operation Agency (ABC), which runs "technical assistance" (advisory and scientific projects), has a budget of just 52m reais (\$30m) this year. But studies by Britain's Overseas Development Institute and Canada's International Development Research Centre estimate that other Brazilian institutions spend 15 times more than ABC's budget on their own technical-assistance programmes. The country's contribution to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is \$20m-25m a year, but the true value of the goods and services it provides, thinks the UNDP's head in Brazil, is \$100m. Add the \$300m Brazil gives in kind to the World Food Pro-

gramme; a \$350m commitment to Haiti; bits and bobs for Gaza; and the \$3.3 billion in commercial loans that Brazilian firms have got in poor countries since 2008 from the state development bank (BNDES, akin to China's state-backed loans), and the value of all Brazilian development aid broadly defined could reach \$4 billion a year (see table on next page). That is less than China, but similar to generous donors such as Sweden and Canada—and, unlike theirs, Brazil's contributions are soaring. ABC's spending has trebled since 2008.

This aid effort—though it is not called that by the government—has wide implications. Lavishing assistance on Africa helps Brazil compete with China and India for soft-power influence in the developing world. It also garners support for the country's lonely quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Since rising powers like Brazil will one day run the world, argues Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Neto, the foreign ministry's secretary-general, they can save trouble later by reducing poverty in developing countries now.

Moreover, aid makes commercial sense. For example, Brazil is the world's most efficient ethanol producer, and wants to create a global market in the green fuel. But it cannot do so if it is the world's only real provider. Spreading ethanol technology to poor countries creates new suppliers, boosts the chances of a global market

Also in this section

- 53 The Caribbean's foreign police chiefs
- 53 Venezuela's "communes" law
- 54 An improbable Argentine alliance
- 54 Ecuador's indigenous movement

For daily analysis and debate on the Americas, visit Economist.com/americas

and generates business for Brazilian firms.

The effort matters to the world's aid industry, too—and not only because it helps offset the slowdown in aid from traditional donors. Like China, Brazil does not impose Western-style conditions on recipients. But, on the whole, western donors worry less about Brazilian aid than they do over China's, which they think fosters corrupt government and bad policy. Brazilian aid is focused more on social programmes and agriculture, whereas Chinese aid finances roads, railways and docks in exchange for access to raw materials (though Brazilian firms are busy snapping up commodities in third-world nations, too).

Marco Farani, the head of ABC, argues there is a specifically Brazilian way of doing aid, based on the social programmes that have accompanied its recent economic success. Brazil has a comparative advantage, he says, in providing HIV/AIDS treatment to the poor and in conditional cash-transfer schemes like Bolsa Família. Its tropical-agriculture research is among the world's best. But Brazil also still receives aid so, for good or ill, its aid programme is eroding the distinction between donors and recipients, thus undermining the old system of donor-dictated, top-down aid.

And all this has consequences for the West. Some rich-country governments cautiously welcome what Brazilians call "the diplomacy of generosity", just as they do the soft-power ambitions of which aid is part. After all, if (as seems likely) emerging markets are to become more influential, Brazil—stable, democratic, at peace with its neighbours—looks more attractive and tractable than, say, China or Russia.

But if aid is any guide, a lot will have to change before Brazil occupies the place in the world that its president, Luiz Inácio ▶▶

Caribbean crime-fighting

Help wanted

Wracked by violence, the islands recruit foreign police chiefs

ALONG with league tables for sun and sand, English-speaking Caribbean countries dominate the world's violence rankings. Jamaica suffers the planet's second-highest murder rate, and St Kitts and Nevis ranks third. Safety concerns have driven the middle classes into gated compounds and tourists into all-inclusive resorts. Crime-fighters compete with rappers for celebrity: most people can name half a dozen lawyers, judges or police chiefs.

Facing growing demands for law and order, the islands' leaders are now looking abroad for help. This month Trinidad and Tobago tapped Dwayne Gibbs, who hails from Edmonton in frigid north-western Canada, as its new police chief. Antigua and Barbuda has also turned to Canada, hiring a team from the country to head its police. The Jamaican force has three British assistant commissioners.

There is good reason to import foreign managers. Caribbean police forces were set up in colonial times to catch mango thieves and quell native unrest. They are being overwhelmed by well-armed gangs, international drug traffickers and systemic corruption. Absenteeism is one problem; brutality is another. In October Guyanese police applied flaming alcohol to the genitals of a 15-year-old boy held for interrogation; two policemen were later charged with malicious wounding.

Moreover, reforms are hard to implement, because many countries designed their constitutions to shield police from politicians' meddling.

Recruiting outsiders is something of a last-ditch attempt to shake up the islands' inward-looking policing culture. But it has pitfalls. Avoiding the "brash white foreigner" tag is key. In St Lucia John Broughton, a British commissioner, was charged with assault after a tiff with a long-serving superintendent. He was replaced with a local. "The greatest threat is resistance from local colleagues," says Mark Shields, a British former police officer in Jamaica. "If you don't have their hearts and minds, you are on a hiding to nothing."

Expatriates also have to be vetted just as carefully as locals. In 2007 Guyana appointed Bernard Kerik, a former New York police chief, as the president's security adviser. He was later sentenced in America to four years in jail for tax evasion and corruption.

Mr Gibbs faces an uphill battle. The police association wants a local for the job. The prime minister's security adviser complains that \$16m a year is already spent on 55 British contract police working on gang-related murders. Administrative hiccups seem likely to delay his contract for several weeks. He may be thankful for that breathing space.

▶ Lula da Silva, aspires to. Brazil seems almost ambivalent about its aid programme. The country still has large pockets of third-world poverty, and sending money abroad could be controversial. Brazilian law forbids giving public money to other governments, so legal contortions are inevitable. The ABC aid agency is tucked away in the foreign ministry, where its officials are looked down on as "Elizabeth Arden" diplomats (London–New York–Paris), not the "Indiana Jones" adventurers required. At least some aid, for example to Venezuela, seems to have been inspired by Lula's soft spot for leftist strongmen. And the exponential increase in aid—the value of humanitarian contributions has risen by 20 times in just three years—means that both people and institutions are being overwhelmed. Stories abound of broken promises, incompetence and corruption.

Slowly, though, things are changing. Dilma Rousseff, the presidential candidate from Lula's party, is thought to be mulling over the idea of a new development agency to raise aid's profile, if elected. As Mr Fa-

rani says, Brazil needs more aid officials, with more operational independence and a greater emphasis on policy aims, not just piecemeal projects. Until it gets those, Brazil's aid programme is likely to remain a global model in waiting—a symbol, perhaps, of the country as a whole. ■

New kid on the block

Brazil's foreign-aid commitments, 2010, \$m

Brazilian Co-operation Agency	30
Other technical co-operation	440
Humanitarian aid	30
To UNDP	25
To World Food Programme	300
To Gaza	10
To Haiti	350
Total direct aid	1,200
BNDES loans in developing countries 2008-Q1 2010	3,300
of which new loans, Q1 2010	1,500

Source: The Economist

Venezuela's politics

Commune-ism

CARACAS

Yet another method to entrench the president's power


WHEN Jorge Urosa, the archbishop of Caracas, said recently that Hugo Chávez was installing a "Marxist-communist" regime in Venezuela, the country's leftist president called him a "troglodyte" and accused him of "instilling fear in the people." Yet Mr Chávez, an avowed socialist, is openly seeking to introduce what looks like a novel form of communism. After taking over the courts and provoking an opposition boycott of legislative elections, he is now targeting state and municipal governments, currently the last bulwark against his rule among elected officials. By forcing them to compete for resources with pliable "communes", he may starve them to death.

In June his legislative allies approved on first reading a draft bill creating the commune, a "socialist local entity...on the basis of which socialist society is to be built," with legislative, judicial and executive functions. The communes are supposed to be partly self-sufficient, thanks to a "socialist productive model", outlined in a separate bill, that will replace the existing capitalist economy. But in practice, the state will provide most of their resources, determine which communes can register, and impose "development" laws and decrees.

Darío Vivas, the vice-president of congress, says the bill will "develop popular participation in the most democratic way possible." But the opposition calls it a scheme to increase Mr Chávez's power. Each commune will "regulate social and community life [and] guarantee public order, social harmony and the primacy of collective over individual interests." Their courts will have jurisdiction over all residents, even though the communes are exclusively intended for socialists. Meanwhile, states and municipalities will be forced to transfer part of their revenues to the communes. Since communes can span municipal borders, they could move public funds from opposition-led districts to government-friendly ones.

The project flies in the face both of the constitution and of public opinion. Mr Chávez first tried to establish communes through a constitutional-reform package in 2007, which was narrowly rejected in a referendum. Many key articles in the proposed communes law were taken from the failed reform. Mr Vivas insists that "if we were to ask those questions today", the reforms would pass. But recent surveys suggest the reverse. According to a June study ▶▶

Annex VIII. Share of FAT resources without BNDES financing from 1995 to 2017, as percentage of total BNDES disbursements



Source: <https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/transparencia/fundos-governamentais/fundo-de-amparo-ao-trabalhador-fat/fat-dados-financeiros> (accessed on June 20, 2019).

Annex IX. Survey on Ethiopia's Foreign Aid Perception



Ethiopia - Foreign Aid Perception

Title and Institution (no name required)

Number of responses: 22

Text answers:

Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources

Lecturer, Ethiopian civil service university

Arbaminch university

Lecturer , Aksum University

Lecturer Adama Science and Technology University

Dr, Addis Ababa Science and Technology University

Associate Attorney, Zee Law Office

Exploremovalley

Program Director at American Relief Agency for the Horn of Africa

Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, The Hunger Project Ethiopia

THP-E

Fire watch

MSc Bangor University

Mr,Precise Consult International PLC

Mr
Young Men Christian Association YMCA
Financial assistance
PhD Embassy of Argentina in Addis Ababa
Dr. Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
chief public health expert, FMOH
Oromiya Regional health Bureau, Ethiopia
Public health Officer, Ministry of health,ethiopia

1. How would you rate your knowledge and experience in the area of agriculture and food security?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
I have extensive knowledge and experience. I have worked, researched and/or known the area for more than 10 years.	7	22.58%
I have reasonable knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 5 years.	7	22.58%
I have limited knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 3 years.	9	29.03%
I have no knowledge and experience. I have never researched or worked in this area.	8	25.81%

2. How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security received by Ethiopia from the US government?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
I have extensive knowledge and experience. I have worked, researched and/or known the area for more than 10 years.	4	12.9%
I have reasonable knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 5 years.	10	32.26%
I have limited knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 3 years.	9	29.03%
I have no knowledge and experience. I have never researched or worked in this area.	8	25.81%

3. How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security received by Ethiopia from the Chinese government?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
I have extensive knowledge and experience. I have worked, researched and/or known the area for more than 10 years.	1	3.23%
I have reasonable knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 5 years.	3	9.68%
I have limited knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 3 years.	5	16.13%
I have no knowledge and experience. I have never researched or worked in this area.	22	70.97%

4. How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security received by Ethiopia from the Brazilian government?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
I have extensive knowledge and experience. I have worked, researched and/or known the area for more than 10 years.	1	3.23%
I have reasonable knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 5 years.	1	3.23%
I have limited knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known the area for up to 3 years.	4	12.9%
I have no knowledge and experience. I have never researched or worked in this area.	25	80.65%

1. How would you rate China's external agricultural aid in relation to the formation of food stocks?

Number of responses: 30

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Projects help to greatly increase its food supplies.	3	10%
Some projects help to increase its food supplies.	8	26.67%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	16	53.33%
Some projects hamper the formation of food stocks.	1	3.33%
Projects make it very difficult for Ethiopia to increase its food supplies.	2	6.67%

2. How would you rate Chinese agricultural aid in relation to food availability?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Projects greatly increase the availability of food for Ethiopians.	2	6.45%
Some projects increase the availability of food for Ethiopians.	10	32.26%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	17	54.84%
Some projects hamper the availability of food for Ethiopians.	0	0%
Projects make it very difficult for Ethiopians to to access food.	2	6.45%

3. How would you rate Chinese agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional value of food?

Number of responses: 29

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do very well for health.	1	3.45%
Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very healthy.	6	20.69%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	19	65.52%
Food from external aid has reduced nutritional value.	3	10.34%
Food from foreign aid has no significant nutritional value and is therefore harmful to health.	0	0%

4. How would you rate your overall perception of China's foreign aid in agriculture?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
It is very positive.	1	3.23%
It is predominantly positive, but it has flaws.	10	32.26%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	17	54.84%
It is predominantly negative, but it has qualities.	0	0%
It is very negative.	3	9.68%

1. How would you rate Brazil's external agricultural aid in relation to the formation of food stocks?

Number of responses: 28

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Projects help to greatly increase its food supplies.	4	14.29%
Some projects help to increase its food supplies.	2	7.14%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	21	75%
Some projects hamper the formation of food stocks.	0	0%
Projects make it very difficult for Ethiopia to increase its food supplies.	1	3.57%

2. How would you rate Brazilian agricultural aid in relation to food availability?

Number of responses: 28

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Projects greatly increase the availability of food for Ethiopians.	2	7.14%
Some projects increase the availability of food for Ethiopians.	3	10.71%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	21	75%
Some projects hamper the availability of food for Ethiopians.	0	0%
Projects make it very difficult for Ethiopians to access food.	2	7.14%

3. How would you rate Brazilian agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional value of food?

Number of responses: 29

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do very well for health.	1	3.45%
Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very healthy.	7	24.14%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	20	68.97%
Food from external aid has reduced nutritional value.	1	3.45%
Food from foreign aid has no significant nutritional value and is therefore harmful to health.	0	0%

4. How would you rate your overall perception of Brazil's foreign aid in agriculture?

Number of responses: 30

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
It is very positive.	1	3.33%
It is predominantly positive, but it has flaws.	6	20%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	23	76.67%
It is predominantly negative, but it has qualities.	0	0%
It is very negative.	0	0%

1. How would you rate American external agricultural aid in relation to the formation of food stocks?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Projects help to greatly increase its food supplies.	10	32.26%
Some projects help to increase its food supplies.	17	54.84%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	2	6.45%
Some projects hamper the formation of food stocks.	2	6.45%
Projects make it very difficult for Ethiopia to increase its food supplies.	0	0%

2. How would you rate American agricultural aid in relation to food availability?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Projects greatly increase the availability of food for Ethiopians.	10	32.26%
Some projects increase the availability of food for Ethiopians.	17	54.84%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	2	6.45%
Some projects hamper the availability of food for Ethiopians.	2	6.45%
Projects make it very difficult for Ethiopians to to access food.	0	0%

3. How would you rate American agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional value of food?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do very well for health.	7	22.58%
Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very healthy.	12	38.71%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	7	22.58%
Food from external aid has reduced nutritional value.	5	16.13%
Food from foreign aid has no significant nutritional value and is therefore harmful to health.	0	0%

4. How would you rate your overall perception of the US foreign aid in agriculture?

Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
It is very positive.	5	16.13%
It is predominantly positive, but it has flaws.	21	67.74%
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.	2	6.45%
It is predominantly negative, but it has qualities.	3	9.68%
It is very negative.	0	0%

Annex X. Survey on Mozambique's Foreign Aid Perception



Mozambique - Foreign Aid Perception

Cargo e Instituição

Number of responses: 29

Text answers:

directr ex

Reformado do Ministério de Agricultura

Director executivo Capemi

Oficial de programa de AMPARAR e ADAP SF.

Oficial de programas na Livaningo

Director Executivo da Associação Moçambicana Para Promoção do Cooperativismo Moderno (AMPCM)

Assistente de pesquisa

Diretor nacional - ONG KULIMA

Chefe do Departamento de Estatísticas de Bens e de Ambiente/ Instituto nacional de moçambique

Coordenadora do Programa Terra, Vida e Ecossistemas na Justiça Ambiental

Cordenador do Programa de Governacao e Direitos Humanos- JstaPaz

Delegado regional do IIAM-Centro Zonal Nordeste (IIAM é Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique)

Delegada da Cidade Maputo-KULIMA

Director Executivo

Directora Executiva

Director Executivo da IMPDS - Iniciativa Moçambicana para a Promoção do Desenvolvimento Sustentável

Administrador. TOWANI Consultoria e Serviços, Lda

Coordenador Executivo - UNAC

PPOSC-N

Consultor do MASA

Coordenador Temático de Formação e Pesquisa

Oficial de Programas na Agencia Japonesa de Cooperacao Internacional

Coordenador de comunicacao e divulgacao. Centro Terra Viva

Gestor e Assessor de Programas- NCBA-CLUSA- Mocambique

Representante da We Effect

Delegado Regional da ORAM para as provincias de Nampula e Cabo Delgado

teste

ORAM

Universidade Eduardo Mondlane

1. Como você classificaria seu conhecimento e sua experiência na área de agricultura e segurança alimentar?

Number of responses: 34

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Tenho amplo conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquiso e/ou conheço a área há mais de 10 anos.	18	52.94%
Tenho razoável conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquiso e/ou conheço a área há até 5 anos.	8	23.53%
Tenho restrito conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquiso e/ou conheço a área há menos de 3 anos.	4	11.76%
Não tenho conhecimento e experiência. Nunca trabalhei nem pesquisei nesta área.	4	11.76%

2. Como você classificaria seu conhecimento sobre a ajuda internacional na área de segurança alimentar recebida por Moçambique proveniente do governo chinês?

Number of responses: 33

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Tenho amplo conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquiso e/ou conheço a área há mais de 10 anos.	7	21.21%
Tenho conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquiso e/ou conheço a área há até 5 anos.	10	30.3%
Tenho restrito conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquiso e/ou conheço a área há menos de 3 anos.	12	36.36%
Não tenho conhecimento e experiência. Nunca trabalhei nesta área, nem a conheço.	4	12.12%

3. Como você classificaria seu conhecimento sobre a cooperação internacional na área de segurança alimentar recebida por Moçambique proveniente do governo brasileiro?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Tenho amplo conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquisa e/ou conheço a área há mais de 10 anos.	5	15.63%
Tenho conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquisa e/ou conheço a área há até 5 anos.	13	40.63%
Tenho restrito conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquisa e/ou conheço a área há menos de 3 anos.	11	34.38%
Não tenho conhecimento e experiência. Nunca trabalhei nesta área, nem a conheço.	3	9.38%

4. Como você classificaria seu conhecimento sobre a ajuda internacional na área de segurança alimentar recebida por Moçambique proveniente do governo norte-americano?

Number of responses: 30

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Tenho amplo conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquisa e/ou conheço a área há mais de 10 anos.	12	40%
Tenho conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquisa e/ou conheço a área há até 5 anos.	5	16.67%
Tenho restrito conhecimento e experiência. Trabalho, pesquisa e/ou conheço a área há menos de 3 anos.	8	26.67%
Não tenho conhecimento e experiência. Nunca trabalhei nesta área, nem a conheço.	5	16.67%

1. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa chinesa na área agrícola em relação à formação de estoques de alimentos?

Number of responses: 33

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os projetos promovidos ajudam muito Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	4	12.12%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes ajudam Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	11	33.33%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	11	33.33%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes dificultam a formação de estoques de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	5	15.15%
Os projetos promovidos dificultam muito Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	2	6.06%

2. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa chinesa na área agrícola em relação à disponibilidade de alimentos?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os projetos promovidos aumentam muito a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	4	12.5%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes aumentam a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	10	31.25%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	11	34.38%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes reduzem a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	3	9.38%
Os projetos promovidos reduzem muito a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	4	12.5%

3. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa chinesa na área agrícola em relação ao valor nutricional dos alimentos?

Number of responses: 33

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os alimentos produzidos com a ajuda externa são ricos em nutrientes, com valor nutricional, e fazem muito bem para a saúde.	6	18.18%
Os alimentos produzidos com a ajuda externa têm valor nutricional, ainda que não sejam muito saudáveis.	4	12.12%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	18	54.55%
Os alimentos provenientes da ajuda externa têm reduzido valor nutricional.	3	9.09%
Os alimentos provenientes da ajuda externa não têm nenhum valor nutricional significativo, chegam a ser prejudiciais à saúde.	2	6.06%

4. Como você classificaria sua percepção geral da ajuda externa provida pela China na área agrícola?

Number of responses: 33

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Acho que é muito positiva.	9	27.27%
Acho que é predominantemente positiva, mas tem defeitos.	8	24.24%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não acho significativa.	7	21.21%
Acho que é predominantemente negativa, mas tem qualidades.	7	21.21%
Acho que é muito negativa.	2	6.06%

1. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa brasileira na área agrícola em relação à formação de estoques de alimentos?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os projetos promovidos ajudam muito Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	5	15.63%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes ajudam Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	13	40.63%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	10	31.25%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes dificultam a formação de estoques de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	3	9.38%
Os projetos promovidos dificultam muito Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	1	3.13%

2. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa brasileira na área agrícola em relação à disponibilidade de alimentos?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os projetos promovidos aumentam muito a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	5	15.63%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes aumentam a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	13	40.63%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	9	28.13%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes reduzem a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	4	12.5%
Os projetos promovidos reduzem muito a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	1	3.13%

3. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa brasileira na área agrícola em relação ao valor nutricional dos alimentos?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os alimentos produzidos com a ajuda externa são ricos em nutrientes, com valor nutricional, e fazem muito bem para a saúde.	7	21.88%
Os alimentos produzidos com a ajuda externa têm valor nutricional, ainda que não sejam muito saudáveis.	9	28.13%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	12	37.5%
Os alimentos provenientes da ajuda externa têm reduzido valor nutricional.	4	12.5%
Os alimentos provenientes da ajuda externa não têm nenhum valor nutricional significativo, chegam a ser prejudiciais à saúde.	0	0%

4. Como você classificaria sua percepção geral da ajuda externa provida pelo Brasil na área agrícola?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Acho que é muito positiva.	12	37.5%
Acho que é predominantemente positiva, mas tem defeitos.	6	18.75%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não acho significativa.	11	34.38%
Acho que é predominantemente negativa, mas tem qualidades.	3	9.38%
Acho que é muito negativa.	0	0%

1. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa norte-americana na área agrícola em relação à formação de estoques de alimentos?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os projetos promovidos ajudam muito Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	6	18.75%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes ajudam Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	12	37.5%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	9	28.13%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes dificultam a formação de estoques de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	3	9.38%
Os projetos promovidos dificultam muito Moçambique a aumentar seus estoques de alimentos.	2	6.25%

2. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa norte-americana na área agrícola em relação à disponibilidade de alimentos?

Number of responses: 32

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os projetos promovidos aumentam muito a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	5	15.63%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes aumentam a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	14	43.75%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	10	31.25%
Os projetos promovidos às vezes reduzem a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	0	0%
Os projetos promovidos reduzem muito a disponibilidade de alimentos para os moçambicanos.	3	9.38%

3. Como você classificaria a ajuda externa norte-americana na área agrícola em relação ao valor nutricional dos alimentos?

Number of responses: 32



Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Os alimentos produzidos com a ajuda externa são ricos em nutrientes, com valor nutricional, e fazem muito bem para a saúde.	9	28.13%
Os alimentos produzidos com a ajuda externa têm valor nutricional, ainda que não sejam muito saudáveis.	9	28.13%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não é significativa.	10	31.25%
Os alimentos provenientes da ajuda externa têm reduzido valor nutricional.	3	9.38%
Os alimentos provenientes da ajuda externa não têm nenhum valor nutricional significativo, chegam a ser prejudiciais à saúde.	1	3.13%

4. Como você classificaria sua percepção geral da ajuda externa provida pelos EUA na área agrícola?


Number of responses: 31

Answer	Times chosen	Percentage
Acho que é muito positiva.	10	32.26%
Acho que é predominantemente positiva, mas tem defeitos.	11	35.48%
Não tenho opinião a respeito. Não acho significativa.	8	25.81%
Acho que é predominantemente negativa, mas tem qualidades.	2	6.45%
Acho que é muito negativa.	0	0%


Annex XI. Additional Charts on Mozambique's and Ethiopia's Perception on Food Security Aid





Perception of Chinese aid to Mozambique on food security.



Perception of American aid to Ethiopia on food security.





Source: All charts were made by the author with the assistance of Rodolpho Vasconcellos.

Annex XII. Photos from events and meetings attended.

South-South Global Thinkers at UN Headquarters, New York, September 2018.



South-South Global Thinkers at UN Headquarters, New York, September 2018.



2018 Global South-South Development Expo at the UN Headquarters in New York from 28 to 30 November, 2018.



2018 Global South-South Development Expo at the UN Headquarters in New York from 28 to 30 November, 2018.



LSE-PKU Summer School, Beijing, August 2018.



Interview with the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, H.E Dr. Eyasu Abraha Alle, on August 21, 2018.