Universidade de Brasília (UnB)

Humberto Mayese Correa

Joaquim Nabuco: status, stigma, civilization and Brazil's place in the international society

Brasília

2019

Humberto Mayese Correa

Joaquim Nabuco: status, stigma, civilization and Brazil's place in the international society

Dissertation submitted to the *Instituto de Relações Internacionais* (IREL) in order to obtain the title of Master of Arts in International Relations from the *Universidade de Brasília*.
Area of concentration: International Relations History.
Counsellor: Prof. Vânia Carvalho Pinto, PhD.

Brasília

2019

Humberto Mayese Correa

Joaquim Nabuco: status, stigma, civilization and Brazil's place in the international society

Dissertation submitted to the *Instituto de Relações Internacionais* (IREL) in order to obtain the title of Master of Arts in International Relations from the *Universidade de Brasília*.
Area of concentration: International Relations History.

Approved in: 16/07/2019

Examination Board

_____
Vânia Carvalho Pinto, PhD – Counsellor
IREL, Universidade de Brasília (UnB)

_____
Sônia Cristina Hamid, PhD
Instituto Federal de Brasília (IFB)

_____
Rogério de Souza Farias, PhD
IREL, University of Brasília (UnB)

For my grandfather, Mauro Garcia Corrêa (1932-2019)

Acknowledgments

Realizo meus agradecimentos em português, único idioma capaz de expressar fielmente os sentimentos de um brasileiro.

A conclusão de um mestrado jamais é um esforço puramente individual. Trata-se de um empreendimento coletivo, coadjuvado por todos educadores de quem cruzei o caminho desde muito antes, na Escola Canarinho, em Itatiba/SP. A todos esses mestres – na real acepção da palavra –, expresso meu agradecimento.

Nenhum professor me inspirou ou impactou tão significativamente minha trajetória como a Prof. Vânia Carvalho Pinto, minha orientadora desde os tempos de graduação. Agradeço-lhe em especial o incentivo, a crença em minhas capacidades quando a perdi e o incondicional apoio nos momentos mais difíceis de minha trajetória no mestrado.

Agradeço a Rogério de Souza Farias, pela troca de ideias, apoio e obras emprestadas, bem como ao Prof. Antônio Carlos Lessa, pela compreensão, dicas e oportunidade de aprendizado no período de meu estágio docência.

Agradeço a todos meus amigos que me apoiaram – talvez suportar seja a palavra mais adequada – durante a empreitada do mestrado. Agradeço em particular àqueles que fizeram parte do dia a dia desse processo: Anna Paula, Fernanda e Raissa, pela leitura de meu trabalho e pelas críticas sempre pertinentes; Lorena, pela revisão do texto final; Mariana, Mirella e Rebeca por sempre me receberem de braços abertos e pela companhia nas longas horas de estudo. Aproveito para agradecer, também, os colegas de CEGRI pelas dicas ao longo dos anos.

Em uma jornada marcada por percalços de naturezas diversas, não conseguiria ter chegado a este ponto sem a ajuda de profissionais aos quais serei sempre grato: doutores Denise e Roberto, Lúcia e Marisa.

Finalmente, agradeço à minha família, alicerce por vezes fisicamente distante, mas sempre presente. Aos meus pais, Claudiana e Mauro, por proporcionarem minha formação e por frequentemente sacrificarem seu bem-estar pelo meu; ao meu irmão Pedro, em especial pela convivência cotidiana dos últimos meses; e aos meus avós, Maria Helena, Vera, Francisco e Mauro, meus maiores incentivadores. Esse trabalho, antes de tudo, é para vocês.

Vinte e oito anos.
Antigamente a cada 19 de agosto eu fazia um novo plano de vida e pretendia uma reforma radical. Hoje limito-me a desejar que eu possa fazer algum progresso neste novo ano, e ter um sentimento mais claro do que realmente me seria concedido executar com perfeição [...] fazer alguma coisa, em vez de planejar muitas: é hoje meu único desejo, e Deus queira que eu o veja realizado.

Joaquim Nabuco, 19.08.1877

ABSTRACT*

There has been a growing body of literature in International Relations (IR) addressing the role that civilizational discourse plays in international society, both in the present and in the past. Particular attention has been given to the 19th century, as it represents the historical moment when Europe asserted its hegemony over the rest of the world. Nevertheless, this literature has by and large neglected the place of Latin America in the 19th century international order. It is often assumed that Latin America was from its independence part of the "family of civilized nations". I borrow from the sociological concepts of status and stigma to argue that this view is misleading, for it underestimates the stigma of civilizational backwardness Latin American nations faced. European governing elites never considered its former colonies as equals in terms of international status. The argument is developed through the analysis of the political trajectory and writings of Joaquim Nabuco (1849-1910), a leading figure in Brazilian politics from the early 1880s until his death. By exploring the biography of a statesman, I opt for an approach in which the concepts of civilization, status and stigma are channeled into a lived socio-historical experience. This upward approach reattach abstract international phenomena to individual lives. A preoccupation with Brazil's international status and stigmatization binds Nabuco's political action together throughout his political career, so that the empirical chapters analyze how he dealt with Brazil's stigma in different moments of his trajectory. Nabuco first rose to public prominence during the 1880s, as he led the Brazilian abolitionist movement in Parliament. Nabuco tried to shame Brazilian politic elites by stressing the stigma the maintenance of slavery impinged upon Brazil. Therefore, abolitionism tried to cope with Brazil's stigma by pushing for the elimination of the attribute through which Brazil was stigmatized, i.e., slavery. Abolition took place in 1888, and after the fall of the Monarchy in the following year, Nabuco became part of the monarchist movement in Brazil. Nabuco's monarchism upheld the narrative constructed during the Imperial period (1822-1889) in which Brazil intended to pass as a civilized country, in contrast to the "barbarian" Latin American republics. Nabuco's discourse did not seek to improve Brazil's status in the present; on the contrary, it bolstered stigma against the country. Nabuco reconciled with the Republican regime in 1899, and eventually became Brazil's first ambassador in the United States in 1905. He then staunchly embraced Pan-Americanism, grounded on the belief that the development of close ties with Washington would render status dividends to Brazil before the United States and the European powers. I conclude that despite Nabuco's efforts to overcome Brazil's stigma, the country remained stigmatized and enjoyed a low status within the stratified international society of the time.

Keywords: Joaquim Nabuco; civilization; stigma; status; Latin America; Brazil.

* This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) and by the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq).

RESUMO[†]

O papel de discursos civilizacionais na sociedade internacional, tanto no passado quanto no presente, tem sido objeto de estudos nas Relações Internacionais (RI). Atenção particular tem sido dada ao século XIX, momento em que a Europa afirmou sua hegemonia perante o resto do mundo. Contudo, a literatura em geral tem negligenciado a posição da América Latina na ordem internacional. É comumente presumido que o continente foi, desde sua independência, parte da "família de nações civilizadas". Por meio do uso dos conceitos sociológicos de estigma e status, esta dissertação argumenta que tal visão é enganosa, uma vez que subestima o estigma de atraso civilizacional que nações latino-americanas enfrentavam. Na realidade, elites governantes na Europa nunca consideraram suas ex-colônias como iguais em termos de status internacional. O argumento é desenvolvido por meio da análise da trajetória política de Joaquim Nabuco (1849-1910). Ao explorar a biografia de um estadista, opta-se por uma abordagem em que os conceitos de civilização, status e estigma são canalizados em experiências sócio-históricas vividas. Essa abordagem de baixo para cima dá vida a fenômenos internacionais abstratos, reconectando-os às realidades sociais efetivamente vividas. Uma preocupação com status e estigmatização do Brasil conecta a ação política de Nabuco ao longo de sua trajetória, e os capítulos empíricos analisam como ele lidou com o estigma brasileiro em diferentes momentos de sua carreira. Nabuco ganhou fama nos anos 1880 ao liderar o movimento abolicionista brasileiro no parlamento imperial. Nabuco tentou envergonhar as elites brasileiras ao enfatizar o estigma resultante da manutenção da escravidão no Brasil. Assim, o abolicionismo tentou lidar com o estigma Brasileiro pressionando pela eliminação do atributo pelo qual o Brasil era estigmatizado, qual seja, a escravidão. Após a abolição, em 1888, e com a queda da monarquia em 1889, Nabuco tornou-se parte do movimento monarquista no Brasil. O monarquismo de Nabuco sustentava a narrativa, construída durante o Império, por meio da qual o Brasil tentava se passar como país civilizado, em contraste com os "bárbaros" vizinhos latino-americanos. O discurso de Nabuco não objetivava elevar o status brasileiro no presente; ao contrário, potencializava o estigma contra o país. Nabuco se reconciliou com o regime republicano em 1899, e eventualmente seria nomeado como o primeiro embaixador do Brasil nos EUA, em 1905. Ele então defendeu com firmeza o Pan-Americanismo, baseando-se na crença de que o desenvolvimento de relações próximas com Washington renderia dividendos ao Brasil em termos de status perante as potências europeias. Conclui-se que apesar dos esforços de Nabuco em superar o estigma brasileiro, o país continuou a ser estigmatizado e gozar de baixo status dentro da sociedade internacional do período.

Palavras-chave: Joaquim Nabuco; civilização; estigma; status; América Latina; Brasil.

† O presente trabalho foi realizado com apoio da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) e do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq).

Contents

Joaquim Nabuco (1849-1910): a short biographical note

Joaquim Aurélio Barreto Nabuco de Araújo was born in Recife on 19 August 1849 to Ana Benigna de Sá Barreto Nabuco de Araújo and José Thomás Nabuco de Araújo Filho. He lived his first years under the care of his godmother – Ana Rosa Falcão de Carvalho – in *Massangano*, an inactive sugar-cane estate in Pernambuco. After her death, in 1857, Nabuco moved to Rio de Janeiro to live with his parents; his father had recently became a Senator for life of the Empire. In 1866, Nabuco began his studies in the Faculty of Law of São Paulo; three years later, he moved to Recife, where he graduated in 1870, before returning to Rio de Janeiro.

Between 1873 and 1874, Nabuco traveled to Europe, following the aristocratic tradition of the *grand tour*. Shortly before departing to the old continent, he met Eufrásia Teixeira Leite, with whom he would maintain an intermittent romantic relationship for the next fourteen years. In 1876, he was named diplomatic attaché to the United States. In March 1878, less than a month after Nabuco was designated a position in Brazil's legation in London, his father passed away. Before his passing, Senator Nabuco de Araújo had arranged his son's candidacy to Parliament, which was in time well-succeeded.

Throughout his tenures in Parliament, Nabuco defended the causes of religion freedom, secularism, and federalism. However, it was abolitionism that defined his political legacy. In 1879, Nabuco denounced an English-owned mining company for illegally employing slaves in the province of Minas Gerais. The episode called the attention of the *British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society* (BFASS), with which Nabuco kept close contact throughout the 1880s. In 1880, he presented his first (and unsuccessful) project for abolishing slavery, clashing against the wishes of the mainstream bloc of the Liberal Party. In the same year, he founded the *Sociedade Brasileira contra a Escravidão* (Brazilian Society against Slavery, SBCE). He then traveled to Europe to propagate the abolitionist cause. Isolated from his party, Nabuco lost a re-election bid in 1881. He relocated to London to work as correspondent for the *Jornal do Commercio*. He also wrote his abolitionist manifesto, *O Abolicionismo*, which was published in 1883. In 1884, he returned to support the emancipationist cabinet of Manual Sousa Dantas (1884-85). Between November 1884 and January 1886, Nabuco faced four elections and by the end of this period, he was out of Parliament. Nabuco continued his abolitionist campaign during the Conservative cabinet led by the Baron of Cotegipe (1885-88), first in the press and, from 1887, again in Parliament. On 13 May 1888, Princess-Regent Isabel signed the *Lei Áurea* (Golden Law), abolishing slavery in Brazil.

In April 1889, Nabuco married Evelina Torres Soares Ribeiro, with whom he had three sons and two daughters. Months later, on 15 November, the Republic was installed. Nabuco refused to join the new regime. He left Brazil for London in December 1891, fearing persecution

from the military government then led by Floriano Peixoto. He returned to Brazil within a few months, but kept distance from the public scene until civilian rule was restored in 1894. In 1895, Nabuco returned to the written press and published three books in the following years, including the 3-volume biography of his father. In 1896, he authored the manifesto of a "monarchical party", but he soon had a falling out with his associates. In the following year, Nabuco was among the founders of the *Academia Brasileira de Letras* (Brazilian Academy of Letters, ABL).

In 1899, Nabuco ended his decade-long political ostracism by accepting an offer to become Brazil's lawyer in the Guyana Border Question, a territorial litigation against the United Kingdom. From 1900, he was also Brazil's plenipotentiary minister in London. The dispute was concluded in 1904 after the arbitration of the king of Italy. Nabuco was then named Brazil's first ambassador to the United States, to where he moved in 1905. In the following year, Nabuco visited Brazil for the last time to chair the Third Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro. In 1908, Nabuco received *honoris causa* doctorate degrees from the Yale and Columbia universities. On 17 January, 1910, Joaquim Nabuco died in Washington from complications of *polycythemia vera*. Nabuco was honored with three funerals, one in the American capital, one in Rio de Janeiro, and the other in Recife, where he was buried.

Introduction

My God, how does one write a biography?
Virginia Woolf[1]

"All animals are equal", a famous passage of George Orwell's *Animal Farm* goes, "but some animals are more equal than others". The same could be said about interstate relations in the international realm. Formal sovereign equality, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, does not translate into equal political, economic or social ties among states. This contention is hardly novel. Yet, for decades it has been downplayed by the idea of international anarchy, a theoretical assumption that has been the bedrock of mainstream International Relations Theory (IRT). In the classic Waltzian formulation, states are only different in relation to the "distribution of capabilities" among them; no relation of authority or subordination is recognized (Waltz 1979, 97-9). Against this axiom, a growing body of IRT scholars claims that *hierarchy* is the ubiquitous aspect of international relations[2].

In fact, it would be more accurate to say that multiple *hierarchies* coexist in the international realm, each resulting from a particular axis of inequality ruling relations among actors – states and non-states. One distinct manifestation of hierarchy in international society is stratification through *status*. In Sociology, Max Weber (1978 [1922]) first argued that status, a social phenomenon associated to prestige and honor, created inequalities just as class differences did when linked to the economic order (Bottero 2005, 39-43). Weber's insights have remained influential, and status has become the subject of considerable research in IRT[3].

In this dissertation, I build on emergent scholarship in IR that focuses on hierarchies and status. I am particularly interested in the mechanisms and processes through which stratification takes place, and in how states attempt to raise their standing in status orders whose unequal structures are unfavorable to them. In order to do so, I exploit the concept of *stigma*, introduced in Sociology by Erving Goffman (1963). Stigmatized individuals deviate from expected normative standards of a society; in other words, they are seen as different from the "normals" (Goffman

[1] Quoted in Hermione Lee (2009, 122).
[2] See, among others, John M. and J. C. Sherman (2005), Edward Keene (2014, 2002), David Lake (1996), Ann Towns (2010) and the volume edited by Ayse Zarakol (2017b). For a critique on both conceptions of international structure, see Jack Donnelly (2017, 2009).
[3] See for instance, Marina Duque (2018), Richard Lebow (2008), Jonathan Renshon (2017) and the volume organized by T. V. Paul, Deborah W. Larson and William C. Wohlforth (2014).

1963, 4-5). Ayse Zarakol (2011) has brought the concept to International Relations (IR), and the theoretical framework developed here is heavily indebted to her groundbreaking research[4].

In broad terms, nations have historically been stigmatized in the international society due to their perceived backwardness or failure to attain a (Western) ideal of modernity (Zarakol 2011, 6-7). Modernity engenders a totalizing kind of socialization, based on a universalist ontology underpinned by the belief that "rationality" sustains every human dynamic[5] (Zarakol 2011, 39-40). Modernity was fashioned as the mirror image of Enlightenment Europe, and it has ever since become associated with "the West". The earliest narrative used to stigmatize non-European countries was based on the concept of *civilization*[6]. From the late 18th century onwards, European nations came to presume they had reached the apex of human moral and political advancement, i.e., they were "civilized". Looking at non-European countries, every deviation from Europe's mirror image were deemed "barbarian" and inferior.

The atrocities of the two World Wars and the process of decolonization rendered the ideal of civilization obsolete. Former colonial countries (rightly so) carried the memory of the civilizational narrative that discriminated them (Towns 2016, 79). Nevertheless, scholars have noted a revival of the civilizational discourse in international society following the end of the Cold War[7]. This in turn has sparkled new research on how such discourse was originally conceived and employed in the 19th and early 20th centuries[8]. These studies have relied heavily on the theoretical and analytical framework developed by the English School of IR, which had originally borrowed the concept of *standard of civilization* from 19th century international jurists in order to explain the expansion of the European international society in that period (Gong 1984; Watson 1992). Therefore, most of the new literature has found inspiration in the English School historical analyses of civilization, while introducing insights from fields as varied as post-colonialism, feminism, constructivism and post-structuralism.

The theoretical and analytical discussion that underscores this dissertation is the interplay between the concepts of *hierarchy and stratification, status, stigma and civilization*. I follow the path of

[4] There are, however, important nuances separating Zarakol's theoretical premises and the framework developed here. They will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.

[5] For the emergence of modernity and the Cartesian-Newtonian rationality, see Stephen Toulmin (1992).

[6] The secular notion of civilization replaced Christendom as the ideological gatekeeper between Europe and the rest of the world, even though civilization remained anchored in Christian mores (Gong 1984, 15). However, there is no perfect identification between civilization and Christianity. While civilization is a modern and totalizing ideal, Christianity never appealed to many non-Christians polities that later internalized the stigma of civilizational backwardness. Moreover, the Brazilian case examined in this dissertation illustrates that stigma based on civilization existed even within the Christian world.

[7] Human rights, democracy, market capitalism and the environment have been pointed out as constituents of a contemporary standard of civilization. See Barry Buzan (2014b) for a review and bibliographical data.

[8] See, for instance, Brett Bowden (2009), Barry Buzan (2014b), Edward Keene (2014), Andrew Linklater (2016), Carsten-Andreas Schulz (2014), Shogo Suzuki (2009), and Ann Towns (2009).

authors such as Edward Keene (2014), Ann Towns (2010) and Ayse Zarakol (2011), each of whom have weighted the ingredients for the theoretical blend differently. I offer my own take on the amalgam and apply it to the empirical case of Brazil during the era of "expansion" of international society (Bull and Watson 1984). "Classical" English School scholars of the period payed little attention to Brazil's or Latin America's place within the international society (Schulz 2014, 839). The neglect results from the assumption that, after their independence, Latin American states unproblematically became part of the "family of civilized nations" (Watson 1992, 267). Even in recent literature – which usually question the classical narrative of expansion – there is scant mention of Latin America. However, a closer look at the dynamics of international society during the 19th and early 20th centuries indicates that its core (Europe) did not view American states in equal footing in terms of civilization or status (Schulz 2014, 840). This dissertation aims to address the existing gap in literature.

Most of the English School's work on the standard of civilization, as well as IR literature on status and stigma, are state-centric. I take a different approach, opting to examine these themes through the lens of the political trajectory of a single individual: Joaquim Nabuco (1849-1910). The choice of an individual level of analysis based in the biographical method remains marginalized in IR, though increasingly less so (Farias 2017). In this sense, through the study of Nabuco, I uphold the broader move within Social Sciences, aiming to "bring the individual back" into meaningful social analyses (see Chamberlayne, Bornat and Wengraf 2000; Loriga 2011; Rustin 2000). Michael Rustin (2000, 35-6) has argued that even though individualism is at the very foundation of Western culture and philosophy, social sciences have historically been antipathetic to approaches that emphasize the individual. Individual qualities and idiosyncrasies have generally been regarded as hindrances to the production of "valid" social knowledge. As per this view, Science should be concerned with social facts, aiming to identify timeless patterns and repetitions. Little room should be given to the individual besides that of a confirming, typical instance of a larger social phenomena. Taken at face value, the sole-individual case is considered causeless and thus not scientifically explainable (Loriga 2011, 43). IR has been no exception to the rule, as the so-called systemic-level of analysis has long dominated the discipline's "positivist" or "rationalist" stance (see Singer 1961, Temby 2015, Buzan 1995).

Advocates of biography and other methodologies that emphasize the individual have criticized the poverty and narrowness of the positivist approach. Historians, in particular, have noted that positivism regarded history as being devoid of individual subjects, thereby "desertifying" the past (Loriga 2011, 12-3). In the same vein, sociologists have argued that societies are presented as "disembodied structures" (Payne and Payne 2004, 24). These arguments share the

broader acknowledgement that social research has become detached from lived social realities (Chamberlayne, Bornat and Wengraf 2000, 1; Leckie 2004, 13-4). Reclaiming the individual as the reference for social analysis "invokes what [Charles] Wright Mills defined as the essence of the 'sociological imagination' – the drive and ability to link biography and history and to locate their intersections within social structures" (Oakley 2010, 429). To undertake a study centered on individuals is to consider them in relation to the social setting that surrounds them, thus bringing agency and structure together (Payne and Payne 2004, 24). It also paves the way to amplifying the task of the social researcher by investigating how social trends are interpreted, resisted and signified by individuals (Roberts 2002, 5). Moreover, it recognizes that individuals are creators of meanings that make sense out of social existence (Loriga 2011, 222; Roberts 2002, 6). Ultimately, individual-oriented studies are a heuristic methodological enterprise, which enables society to be studied "from the individual 'upwards', rather from the social structure 'downwards'" (Rustin 2000, 45).

Therefore, by choosing Nabuco as the subject of study, I consciously opt for an approach in which the themes of civilization, status and stigma are channeled into a lived socio-historical experience. I seek to elucidate how the realities engendered in the international realm had an impact on individual lives and political choices. This upward approach reattaches abstract international phenomena to social realities and individual lives. In this sense, the analysis of Nabuco's political trajectory allows for a fruitful dialogue between the ideals he espoused throughout his life and the theoretical and analytical structure that drives this dissertation. Nabuco was both a well-traveled and cosmopolitan individual; therefore he internalized the Eurocentric mental and normative frameworks that stigmatized Brazil by means of the civilizational discourse. A preoccupation with Brazil's international status and stigmatization binds his political action together, as each empirical chapter of this dissertation will discuss. Furthermore, because Nabuco was part of the Brazilian governing elites (even though his capacity of translating his political beliefs into international political action remained limited, at best), he participated in what Zarakol (2011, 18) referred to as the "endogenous dynamics" through which stigma management takes place within a stigmatized state. In short, Nabuco's writings remain an important source for the analysis of Brazil's place in the 19th century international society, an examination that has yet to be done in IR.

Two other reasons underpin the choice of Joaquim Nabuco as subject of analysis. The first is the relative ease of access to sources. To study the life or the political ideals of Joaquim Nabuco is hardly an innovative endeavor. He has been the subject of countless studies by historians, political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, literary critics, and international relations scholars. The availability of primary sources on Nabuco is likely unparalleled amidst that on his

contemporaries. The books he wrote are public domain; many articles in the press and public speeches have been collected and published (and others are available in the online database of Brazil's National Library[9]). There are also published volumes of his private diaries and letters. In the context of a M. A. research – in which the time-factor plays a crucial role – the convenient access to sources was a relevant reason.

Secondly, existing analyses of Joaquim Nabuco's career tend to give us a sometimes-polarized view on his character and legacy. On the one hand, authors like Célia Azevedo (2001) and Alexandra Isfahana-Hammond (2008) have argued that academic researchers on Nabuco – past and present – have a tendency to portray him as a heroic figure, rarely deserving more than bland criticism. Both Azevedo and Isfahana-Hammond had the assessment of Nabuco's abolitionism in mind. Curiously, an opposite trend is discernible among Brazilian IR scholars regarding Nabuco's Pan-American diplomacy, where evaluations on Nabuco are mostly negative (see, for instance, Moniz Bandeira 1978 and Bueno 2003). The bluntest view in this direction is expressed by Amado Cervo (2003, 19), who has called Nabuco "politically subservient" to the United States. Mystification and demonization thus converge in the analysis of Nabuco's work, having more to do with the personal political preferences of those who carry out the analysis rather than with a broader assessment of the author's work. Against this background, my goal here is to attempt to analysis Nabuco's political trajectory based on the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 1, without prior normative judgement or commitment, thus evading extreme, dogmatic views[10].

The main objective of this dissertation is to answer *how* Joaquim Nabuco attempted to cope with Brazil's stigma of civilized backwardness within a stratified international society based on status differentials. The central proposition developed henceforward is that Nabuco endeavored to elevate Brazil's standing in the concert of nations through the embedment of a civilizational discourse in the three national causes he fought for in different periods of his life: abolitionism, monarchism and Pan-Americanism. The structuring of the dissertation follows each one of these topics. In order to substantiate the empirical discussion, Chapter 1 presents the theoretical and analytical framework broadly outlined in this introduction. The remaining chapters are centered on Nabuco's career. They follow a chronological order, as the causes he advocated for are better defined temporally. However, the chapters themselves are not strictly chronological per se; the focus lies on Nabuco's ideas and concepts. Chapter 2 addresses Nabuco's career as an

[9] The database is available at <http://bndigital.bn.gov.br/hemeroteca-digital/>.
[10] This is not to say there are no "balanced" views on Nabuco's trajectory available in literature. See, among others, Angela Alonso (2007), Ricardo Salles (2002), and Leslie Bethell (2016). Furthermore, I do not claim I am producing actual "neutral" knowledge, a contentious and flawed objective when researching in the Social Sciences.

abolitionist, thanks to which he rose to public prominence from 1879 to 1888. Chapter 3 begins with the fall of Monarchy in 1889. Nabuco sided with the fallen regime, inaugurating his "monarchist decade" and leading him to political ostracism. In 1899, he finally joined the ranks of the Republic, and Chapter 4 examines his trajectory as a diplomat, which lasted until his death, in 1910. The emphasis falls on his embracement of Pan-Americanism. The conclusion of this dissertation compares the successive ideals Nabuco embraced throughout his life, underlining his awareness of Brazil's stigma of civilizational backwardness, and the different kind of responses he gave to this state of affairs.

1 Theoretical-analytical framework: stratification, status, stigma, and civilization

[…]
Take up the White Man's burden —
Have done with childish days —
The lightly proffered laurel,
The easy, ungrudged praise.

Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers!

Rudyard Kipling, *The White Man's Burden*

This chapter presents the theoretical and analytical framework that will structure the study of Joaquim Nabuco's political trajectory. The framework developed here largely borrows from the so-called English School of International Relations (IR) – dealing both with its earlier scholars (Bull 1977, Bull and Watson 1984, Gong 1984, Watson 1992) and more contemporary sources[1] (Buzan 2014b, Keene 2014, 2002, Schulz 2014, Suzuki 2010, Zarakol 2011). It also employs concepts first developed in Sociology and which have been brought to IR studies in the past decades, such as that of status (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014; Duque 2018) stigma (Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 2011) and the "established-outsiders" social dynamics (Zarakol 2011).

The argument advanced in this chapter is that the 19th century world order was an *international society*, which was dominated culturally, socially and politically by European powers. In this *hierarchical* and *stratified* society, different states enjoyed distinct *status* based on the idea of *civilization.* As a member of the Brazilian elite, Nabuco experienced the *stigma* Brazil faced as a low-status, second cousin with the "family of civilized nations". In this sense, I propose that Nabuco's public career and political writings can be analyzed through the combined lenses of the aforementioned concepts, as it will be presented at the end of this chapter.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the nature of the 19th century international society, of which Brazil became part in the aftermath of its independence in 1822. It is argued that the international society was organized in a hierarchical (as opposed to anarchical) manner, and this hierarchy was defined mainly in terms of status. The following section advances the claim that the concept of civilization was the main international status-marker in the

[1] Whether such contemporary sources can correctly be assigned as part of the English School is open to debate. I include them in the English School tradition for they employ typical concepts first introduced by its earlier scholars, such as *international society* and *standard of civilization*, among others. For reviews on the historical development of the English School, see Barry Buzan (2014a), Brunello Vigezzi (2005) and Tim Dunne (1998).

period. It argues that the standard of civilization enabled a group of allegedly "civilized states" to erect political, social and symbolic boundaries by stigmatizing "non-civilized states". In the third section, the discussion shifts to the examination of Latin America's stand in the 19th century international society, with a focus on Brazil, arguing that the stigma of "barbarism" lingered, hampering the "completion" of civilization in the continent. The fourth section combines the insights from the previous sections and puts forward an analytical scheme through which the political thought and trajectory of Joaquim Nabuco are to be analyzed in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.

1.1 The nature of the international society: hierarchy and stratification

Hierarchy among states was a defining structural feature of the 19th century international society. This claim counters the theoretical axiom that the Westphalian international system was (and remains) anarchical in nature. The assumption of anarchy as the "ordering principle" of international politics is owed to Kenneth Waltz's influential legacy. However, following post-modernists reviews in the 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Ashley 1984; Walker 1993), the anarchical premise started being increasingly questioned. In this sense, there has been a growing body of literature that emphasizes the role of hierarchies in international politics (e.g., Hobson 2014, Hobson and Sharman 2005; Keene 2014, 2002; Lake 2009, 1996; Towns 2010; Zarakol 2017b). All of these authors propose that hierarchies are ubiquitous in the international arena and that they generate distinct social, political and behavioral dynamics when compared to other structural arrangements (Zarakol 2017a, 1-2).

These authors criticize Waltz's (1979) assumption of anarchy on theoretical, meta-theoretical and empirical grounds. Jack Donnelly (2009, 51-2) points out that Waltz's dichotomy between anarchy and hierarchy is conceptually flawed. In Waltz's view, anarchy means the absence of government; it is thus linked to the international realm. In turn, hierarchy is defined as a system where "units […] stand vis-à-vis each other in relations of super- and subordination" (Waltz 1979, 81); therefore linked to domestic politics (Waltz 1979, esp. Ch. 5 and 6). The dichotomy does not hold, even in conceptual grounds. If anarchy means the absence of government, then hierarchy should correspond to its presence, but there can be relations of subordination without government, which is but an *example* of a hierarchical relationship (Donnelly 2009, 52). As the two concepts are not dichotomist, nor do they form a continuum (as they refer to different phenomena), they can coexist: in the Westphalian international society, states may be formally

equal with no authority over them (i.e., stand in a relation of anarchy) and at the same time engage in social relations of subordination (i.e., hierarchy).

The idea of international society was introduced by Hedley Bull in the 1970s. Bull (2002 [1977], 13) defined it as "[…] a group of states, conscious of certain common interests, and common values […] they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions". Bull's definition has been criticized for setting too high a standard for what constituted a society, since it presumed a sense of "common purpose" or "we-ness" was necessary for a society to exist (Zarakol 2011, 20; Towns 2010, 42). In reality, societies exist regardless of a "sense of community"[2] (Zarakol 2011, 20). A better litmus test for acknowledging the existence of a society is verifying whether actors share normative standards or are bound by "webs of shared meaning" (Reus-Smit 2013 quoted in O'Hagan 2017, 185). In these cases, social agents share the same ontology, habitus and recognize the "other" as part of the same social framework (Zarakol 2011, 20-1). In the case at hand, it is safe to argue that Brazil – and Latin America – was bound by the same normative standards as Europe, as it has been colonized by European powers between the 16th and early 19th centuries and achieved independence through the hegemony of white elites[3].

Hierarchical relations are inherent to any society, as social agents face unequal access to power, status and economic resources. Differential access stimulates unequal relations among agents, patterning material and social hierarchies (Bottero 2005, 3). Inequalities among actors give rise to *stratification*, defined as the hierarchical organization of social difference along a dimension of inequality (Bottero 2005, 5). Whereas inequality refers to differences in access to ideational and material resources, stratification is concerned with how such inequality persists and is reproduced, as well as its consequences on the relations among social agents (Bottero 2005, 3). In this sense, German sociologist Max Weber presented a still influential account of stratification; he proposed a multidimensional model of stratification based on three distinct orders. In each order, power is derived from a different dimension of inequality: the economic order is sustained by class; the social order, by status; and the political order, by party (Weber 1978 [1922], 926-39). Although the three orders are often connected – for example, upper-class individuals usually exert considerable political power and enjoy high-status – they are governed by different principles (Bottero 2005, 40). To offer an example from international relations history: the post-World War II settlement attributed to Britain and France a great-power status, which was materialized in a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. Such status, however, exceeded by far British and French

[2] For instance, white supremacists do not feel they have anything in common with persecuted minorities, yet they are part of the same society (Zarakol 2011, 20).
[3] Haiti, whose independence was achieved through a rebellion of former black slaves, is the exception to the rule.

material/economic prowess at the time (Kissinger 1994, 394-422). In what concerns our case at hand, while material differences between Europe and the rest of the world certainly produced an important role in creating and sustaining hierarchies in the 19th century international society (Neumann 2014), material resources matter only indirectly when understanding status, depending on how much symbolic value is given to such resources (Larson, Paul and Wohlforth, 2014; Duque 2018, 578). Tellingly, the 19th century standard of civilization did not explicitly mention material strength as an attribute required for joining the international society (Zarakol 2011, 66n).

Weber defined status as "*an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges*" (1978 [1922], 305, emphasis added). In order to have social honor recognized by their peers, actors must lead a specific *style of life* that singularizes a social circle (Weber 1978 [1922], 932, emphasis in the original). These *status groups* underline their internal cohesion by erecting symbolic and social barriers against outsiders (Bottero 2005, 41). This is what Weber (1978 [1922], 43-44) called *social closure*. Through it, like-minded agents engage in a self-reinforcing process of creating subordination over outsiders based on a shared distinctiveness or resource – either ideational or material (Duque 2018, 581; Bottero 2005, 42). In other words, status groups depend on the existence of outsiders who are not only different, but also inferior to them (Zarakol 2011, 82-4).

1.2 *Civilization in the expanding European international society of the 19th century: the "civilized established" and the "stigmatized outsiders"*

"Civilization" was the main status-marker of the expanding European international society (Keene 2014); but what is civilization? The concept is notoriously slippery and any scholar is confronted with a dilemma between getting entrapped in definitional debates and risking analytical clarity (O'Hagan 2017, 187). A way out of this predicament is given by Martin Hall and Patrick Jackson (2007, 8), who argue that "[we must] stop thinking about civilizations as if they were structures or things, and start thinking about them as if they were processes and relations". As per this concept, civilization is an enduring process through which boundary-setting discourses create contextual difference between civilized and non-civilized – usually defined as "barbarian" or "savage" – categories (Hall and Jackson 2007, 6-8; Towns 2016, 86-7). Therefore, the term civilization has no intrinsic "essence" because "no social entity has an existence separate from its relation to other entities"[4] (Towns 2016, 86). Thus, civilization can only exist contextually and relationally: it is an instance of "Self vs. Other" discursive construction.

[4] This approach to the concept of civilization stands in opposition to the one advanced in Samuel Huntington's (1996, 1993) *clash of civilizations* thesis. Huntington supports an essentialist/primordial view on civilization (Bowden 2004;

Two uptakes follow from this "discursive/processual" definition of civilization. First, civilization is not static, but rests on a constant state of flux through which boundaries are constantly negotiated and redrawn in a contested, power-laden arena (Hall and Jackson 2007, 8). In other words, civilizational discourse is fraught with disputes over meaning and symbolic resources. Second, the process of differentiation between civilized and uncivilized categories creates hierarchies among countries, societies and individuals. The symbolic boundary inter-subjectively produced by civilizational discourse results in effective social distancing in the international arena through the attribution of status (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168-9).

The word *civilisation* first appeared in French and English dictionaries roughly at the same time in the mid-18th century, in the context of the so-called Enlightenment. The term captured the moment when Europeans became reflectively aware of their (perceived) position in human history, which was based on the belief of Europe's inherent superiority over other social orders around the world, past or present (Bowden 2004, 45). Civilization came to embody Europe's self-attributed political, social, cultural and scientific exceptionalism (Hobson 2014, 559-65, Zarakol 2011, 49-53).

Henceforth, civilization characterized an ideal and the final stage of human progress, the climax of a linear historical progression, from an initial stage of savagery to civilization, with barbarity occupying a place in-between (Towns 2016, 87). Civilization was intrinsically tied to the concept of "modernity". Civilization was a monopoly of those who were aware of the scientific method and applied "rationality" in all aspects of life (Zarakol 2011, 49-50). In sum, European societies became the benchmark against which all other nations were measured (Bowden 2004, 32).

1.2.1 Civilization and the English School: from expansion to exclusion

Understanding civilization in the aforementioned terms undermines the traditional "expansion story" that underpins early English School historical analysis of the period. The original rationale stressed that a "standard of civilization" existed to gatekeep the adoption of European institutions and habitus by non-European states, so that they could become an integral member of the international society (Gong 1984; Watson 1992, 273). In order to take part in the international society, one must be civilized. Increasing socialization with European powers would

Hall and Jackson 2007; Towns 2016). According to this perspective, civilizations are coherent sociocultural entities defined by shared "language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective self-identification of people" (Huntington 1996, 43). Thus, each civilization has a defined core and form a meaningful entity with specific features (Hall and Jackson 2007, 6).

result in the internalization of civilized norms. In this sense, Shogo Suzuki (2010, 12-4) notes that the expansion thesis rather non-problematically accepts civilization as a "good norm" (see also Hobson 2014).

More recent accounts, informed by the processual/discursive view on civilization, have highlighted the exclusionary practices embedded in the ideal of the standard (Buzan 2014; Keene 2014, 2002; Linklater 2016; Schulz 2014; Suzuki 2010; Towns 2014, 2009; Zarakol 2011). These authors underscore the hierarchies created by the standard of civilization, which established a fissure between civilized Europe and the uncivilized, or lesser-civilized, rest, effectively legitimating the claim of the former having a "higher political, moral and legal standing" over the latter (Buzan 2014b, 577). Therefore, authors have also shifted the analytical emphasis from the idea of expansion to the concept of stratification, and from the description of processes of entrance into the society to the analysis of exclusionary practices against outsiders (Zarakol 2011; Keene 2014, 2002).

Zarakol (2011) argues that relations between European and non-European powers resembled the "established-outsider" figuration originally presented by German and British sociologists Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson (1994) in their famous *Winston Parva study*[5]. Europeans (i.e., "the established"), who formed a powerful and cohesive social group, thought of themselves as better societies because they shared the virtue of civilization, which separated them from non-Europeans (i.e., "the outsiders"). Importantly, *the so-called outsiders shared the judgement passed by the established*. In other words, decision-makers in outsider states felt shame due to the perception of their home country as not civilized.

Elias and Scotson's insights shed additional light on the interrelation between civilization and status, while further undermining the traditional English School account on the standard of civilization. The "established-outsider" dynamics suggests that the concept of civilization was an exclusionary and stratifying mechanism, rather than an inclusive or functional gatekeeper (Suzuki 2010, Ch. 1). If participation in the "family of civilized nations" was open to everyone, then the original status group would relinquish the privileges it sought to protect through the creation of symbolic and social boundaries based on the concept of civilization. In practice, this meant that joining the "civilized club" was a much more protracted and ambiguous process than earlier

[5] In the *Winston Parva study*, Elias and Scotson (1994) studied the social dynamics of a fictionalized city. Having divided the city in three zones (1, 2 and 3), the study focuses the analysis on the working-class residential Zones 2 and 3. Albeit sharing the same social characteristics, inhabitants of Zone 2 established themselves as "respectable", and looked down on those in Zone 3. The authors argue that this was possible because Zone 2 was an old settlement, thus more cohesive, which enabled them to protect themselves and bar Zone 3 individuals from participating in public life. Strikingly, Zone 3 inhabitants accepted their inferiority and lack of virtue, feeling shame for it, even though they did not believe the criticism described them personally.

English School accounts recognized. Exclusion, not inclusion, was the defining feature of the 19th century international society.

If the process of joining the civilized-status group was made difficult, why did non-European states relentlessly sought to join in? Literature on status in IR has emphasized that states generally seek to improve their status position (Paul, Larson and Wohlforth 2014; Duque 2018). In part, this is because status entails privileges – following Weber's definition presented in Section 1.1. In our case, civilized status granted respect for a state's sovereignty, its political institutions and territorial integrity – interventionism and imperialism were considered legitimate practices against "barbarian" or "savage" states (Keene 2002, 3-4). While there are different ways to seek status in the international arena, non-European polities in the 19th century had their choices limited to a strategy based on "social mobility", i.e., on emulating the core states of the system (Larson and Shevchenko 2014 quoted in Carvalho Pinto 2019, 5). This is because, as we have discussed above, non-European elites internalized the mindset according to which their countries were judged inferior. The result was a collective psychology that led these elites to try to reform their institutions and mores in order to mimic the core of the international society. In other words, the outsiders did not want to remain as such. Finally, having their civilized status recognized meant becoming ontologically secure, i.e., "having a consistent sense of self and having that sense affirmed by others" (Zarakol 2010, 6). Thus, non-European elites, after internalizing a modern worldview according to which they fell short of attaining civilization, became insecure about their own identity. In this context, seeking a civilized status meant not only prestige and respect for sovereign equality, but also having a state's identity securely held[6].

1.2.2 The role of stigma in the 19th century international society

The role that stigma played in the exclusionary dynamics of the 19th century international society has been underlined by authors such as Zarakol (2014, 2011) and Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014). The concept of stigma was introduced in Social Sciences by Canadian-American sociologist Erving Goffman. He defined stigma as the "discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity" (Goffman 1963, 3). A stigmatized individual is seen as less than human due to the possession of an undesired differentness or to a perceived deviance from expected normative standards (Goffman 1963, 4-5). By contrast, those who do not depart from the normative expectations are called "normals". The stigmatized individuals share the normative standards that render them

[6] For detailed discussions on ontological security in International Relations, see Catarina Kinvall (2004), Jeniffer Mitzen (2006), Brent J. Steele (2008), and Zarakol (2017c, 2010).

abnormal and discreditable. In this sense, stigma differs from discrimination because the stigmatized *internalize* the norms used against them (Zarakol 2011, 4).

The concept of stigma enriches our understanding of the standard of civilization and of the 19th century international order in two ways. First, it allows us to analyze European and Non-European relations beyond the mere discursive process of "othering", as it gives material and social significance to the process through which the "Other" is constructed as non-civilized. In other words, stigmatization is more than a discursive process; it is also material and embodied (Adler-Nissen 2014, 146). Stigmatization is thus the processual link that knits the civilizational discourse and the creation of effective social boundaries: stigma comes hand-in-hand with status attribution.

Second, the concept of stigma opens up an important avenue for agency in the "receiving end" of an established-outsider relation within a stratified society. In a few words, agency can be defined as the capacity of a person (or any other social entity) to "intervene in the world in a manner that is deemed […] to be independent or relatively autonomous" (McNay 2016, 40). In this sense, agency is conspicuously absent in the traditional accounts of the standard of civilization, which tend to put forward an excessively functional-structuralist view of the socialization of non-European states into the international society (Suzuki 2010, 14-6). In other words, joining the international society has been traditionally conceptualized as a natural process, determined solely by structure, in which all polities must follow an universal trajectory if they were to attain modernity. By contrast, stigma theory enables the expression of agency by stigmatized actors, since while their stigmatized condition results from structural constraints that shape socialization, stigma-coping strategies require us to consider the endogenous dynamics of societies that give rise to relatively autonomous responses vis-à-vis the international society (Zarakol 2011, 18).

1.3 Latin America, civilization and international society

Latin American states, including Brazil, were among the stigmatized actors of the international society in the 19th century. This reality, however, is absent from most of the existing literature, as Latin America's standing in the international society has generally been either neglected or treated unreflectively (Schulz 2014, 839). This is mainly because the standard of civilization was largely crafted to account for Europe's contact with the non-Western societies of Asia, Middle East and Africa (Buzan 2014, 64-7). In a dichotomist "inside-outside" ranking of states, many have opted to include Latin America into the civilized club. For instance, Adam Watson argues that recently independent American nations were "white settler states", *ipso facto*

members of the "family of civilized nations" of the 19th century[7] (Watson 1992, 267; Bull and Watson 1984, Ch. 9). Similarly, Barry Buzan contends that American states were firmly situated within the civilized lot as offshoots of European culture (Buzan 2014a, 66). Perhaps more surprisingly, critics of the traditional English School, such as Zarakol (2011), have also treated Latin America's position quite unproblematically by reiterating Watson's thesis of "white settler states" and affirming that American states were seamlessly incorporated into the West (Zarakol 2011, 47n).

This view oversimplifies the intricate relations between Latin America and Europe during the 19th century. It would be a mistake to argue that Europeans regarded Latin Americans as equals in status; there rests little doubt that European nations viewed Latin American states as inferiors (Schulz 2014, 853-4). In *Democracy in America* (1835), Alexis de Tocqueville defined Spanish and Portuguese Americans as "the *last-born children of civilization*", who "relied upon the guidance of their older brothers [the Europeans]" (as quoted in Schulz 2014, 854, emphasis added). In the same direction, prominent British statesman Lord Palmerston justified continued European intervention in the continent by remarking that "[these] *half-civilised governments*, such as those in China, Portugal, Spanish America, require a dressing-down every 8 or 10 years to keep them in order" [8] (as quoted in Schulz 2014, 853, emphasis added). In the much-fanfared "World Exhibitions" of the second half of the 19th century, Brazil and other Latin American countries were treated as colonial, exotic and economically laggard (Bethell 2012, 156). In this sense, not only was Latin America marginalized in European discourse but this fact was also regularly framed in civilizational terms (Schulz 2014, 837).

It is perhaps wiser to argue that Latin America occupied an (undertheorized) *in-between position* in the international society: while it was not a complete outsider, neither was it a member of the core (Keene 2014; Schulz 2014). Latin America was part of the international society, but its nations were second-class members in terms of civilizational standing, occupying an inferior position within a stratified international society, even if one superior to African and Asian polities. That is to say the 19th-century international society did not make all outsiders equal. If European nations were the established, and Asian and African polities were the outlying outsiders, Latin America can be thought as the *periphery* within the established, or the partial insiders. Figure 1.1

[7] Watson (1992, 267) does note that these American states were "cousins" of the family, hence implying some notional distance and hierarchy, but does not develop the point further.

[8] Both quotations can be interpreted as part of a process of "infantilization" of Latin America (see Epstein 2012). Through this lens, the continent was to learn – either by guidance or punitive measures – the norms of civilization from the European "grown-ups". This parallels what Hobson (2004, 228) called the "Peter-Pan theory" of the East, which imagined the East "as an innocent child who would never grow up of his/her own accord", therefore justifying Western action because "[…] only the paternal West could and should emancipate or redeem the child-like East […]" (Hobson 2004, 228-9).

depicts the social structure of the 19th century international society and its relation to stigma and status. The closer to the core of the society, the higher the status enjoyed. Only European powers were the "normals"; but while both the periphery and the outsiders were stigmatized, the latter was so more than the former.

Figure 1.1 – The 19th century international society



Source: elaborated by the author.

Latin America's incomplete belonging to the "family of civilized nations" is also perceptible when one analyzes the cultural anxieties its elites held *vis-à-vis* their identity and status. Full identification with the core was never securely held. The European contempt showed towards Latin America cut deep into the elites, who were profoundly identified with European values. Instead of generating resentment, disregard engendered keen political and cultural effort by elites to secure Latin America's civilized credentials, both to internal and external audiences. Brazilians, for instance, took pride in the facts that Emperor Pedro II of Brazil descended from European royalty and that he often communicated with European intellectuals, such as French novelist Victor Hugo, while the Paraguayan War (1865-1870) was framed as a conflict of civilization against barbarism (Bethell 2012, 162). In the same vein, Carlos Calvo, a renowned Argentinian jurist writing in the 1860s, argued that there was "absolute ignorance in Europe of our state of

civilization and progress" (Obregón 2006a, 990). The "last-born children of civilization" tried to demonstrate to their European "older brothers" they had grown up.

At the same time, however, Latin American elites also often conceptualized their nations as lagging behind in the march of civilization. Any local "deviation" to Europe's "unified and perfected" civilization was deemed barbarian (Obregón 2006b, 252). These included the constant civil wars and economic crises, the permanence of colonial institutions (e.g., clerical privileges, slavery), the emergence and perpetuation of militaristic and personalist leaders – the *caudillos* – and the "Iberian heritage" (seen as decadent in comparison with thriving "Anglo-Saxon" culture). An influential work in this sense was Domingo Sarmiento's *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism* (1845), perhaps the most influential literary work of Spanish American culture (Williamson 2009, 289-90; González Echeverría 2003, 1). For Sarmiento, the path to civilization lied on the adoption of European political culture and institutions; but Latin America still had to overcome the perils of barbarism, illustrated by the rule of tyrannical *caudillos* (Williamsom 2009, 290-1). Faced with their countries' civilizational backwardness, Latin American elites embarked on a self-attributed mission to "complete civilization" in the continent (Obregón 2006b, 252).

1.4 Civilization, status and stigma: making sense of Joaquim Nabuco's political trajectory and its importance for the case at hand

The two kinds of Latin American reactions to the "stigma of civilizational backwardness", i.e., showcasing civilized credentials and recognizing the un-civilized debris still lingering in the continent, are examples of what Goffman (1963) and Zarakol (2011) call stigma-coping strategies. To cope with stigma is also to seek status, in the same way that leaving stigma behind is a necessary condition to improve one's status position in the international order. Civilization binds status and stigma together: civilization was both a status-marker and discursive process through which stratified relations were (re)produced. Those who the established labeled as uncivilized were stigmatized as backward.

When facing stigma, the stigmatized actor has two broad strategic choices: either to "attempt normalcy" or to embrace stigma (Zarakol 2011, 96). Each strategy, in turn, gives way to two possible courses of action. An agent may attempt normalcy either through "corrective action" – i.e., by fixing one's stigmatized attributes –, or through "passing", which take place when discredited actors accept the normative grounds that inform stigmatization, but denies being

different from the normals, thereby attempting to "pass" as normal[9]. When embracing stigma, one may break with reality, rejecting the existing norms and creating a new normative reality based on its social identity[10]. Finally, agents also embrace stigma by interpreting it as a blessing in disguise, thereby reinterpreting a negative characterization as a positive one (Zarakol 2011, 96-8). Figure 1.2 summarizes the typology presented above, based on Goffman (1963) and Zarakol (2011).

Figure 1.2 – Stigma-management strategies

Strategy	Sub-strategy	Available to Latin American elites in the 19th century?
Attempt normalcy	Corrective action	Yes
	"Passing"	Yes
Embrace stigma	Break with reality	No
	Blessing in disguise	No

Source: elaborated by the author based on Goffman (1963) and Zarakol (2011).

In our case at hand, the broader strategy of embracing stigma can be discarded outright. As we have discussed, Latin American elites viewed emulation of European sociopolitical and cultural institutions as the only path to civilization. While a strategy of embracing stigma as a blessing in disguise through the valorization of cultural authenticity and *latinidad* did begin to take roots in Latin America after the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the publication of José E. Rodó's *Ariel* (1900), this worldview would only become a dominant force in the 1920s, following the Mexican Revolution (see Williamson 2009, Ch. 9 and 15). Thus, we are left with the two alternatives that correspond to the strategy of attempting normalcy: corrective action and passing. As we have discussed above, these alternatives differ in method; nonetheless, they both aspire to the same outcome: successful emulation of the civilized norms displayed by Europe, thereby elevating their status in the international society.

[9] Zarakol (2011, 97) argues that "passing" is common in international relations when states attempt to clung to a shared past with the "normals" and disavowing historical periods of similarity, as exemplified by Greece in the 19th century and Eastern European states after the end of the Cold War.

[10] In international history, the examples of Soviet Union and Cuba best exemplify this strategy (Adler-Nissen 2014, 165-9; Zarakol 2011, 96).

1.4.1 Stigma-management and Joaquim Nabuco

In studying Nabuco's political trajectory, we are offered a rich illustration of the dynamics that interconnected status, stigma and civilization in the 19th century international society . By doing so, I claim the individual perspective as a reference for social analysis, opting for an upward approach that links the abstract phenomena of civilization and stigma to lived social experience. In this sense, in each of the three following chapters, a biographical approach to Nabuco's political trajectory is interwoven with the analytical framework developed heretofore. Simply put, the individual and the international (or the systemic) are in a continuous interplay.

The resulting *tension* between the two levels is welcome as it evades two opposite tribulations. On the one hand, there may be a tendency is to disembody social and political structures (Payne and Payne 2004, 24), thereby distancing the individual from scientific analysis, which becomes totalizing and impersonal at the same time (Loriga 2011, 33-48). On the other hand, some perspectives may saturate the individual with agency, detaching it from the surrounding social context and excessively relying on the individual as the sole constructor of its universe and life trajectory (Vilas-Boas 2014, 136). Therefore, I seek the middle ground, focusing neither on the general nor on the particular, but on their connection (Loriga 2011, 226). The individual take gives theory the necessary dimension of lived social experience, while theory makes it possible to apprehend the social density of a life (Loriga 2011, 219).

The remaining chapters of this dissertation will identify which stigma-coping strategies Joaquim Nabuco followed throughout his political career, more particularly in three distinct moments of his life: abolitionism (during the 1880s), monarchism (1890s) and Pan-Americanism (1900s). Even though Nabuco never had enough authority or influence to coordinate state action on his own, he was a member of Brazil's governing elites and was involved in the political and intellectual debates of the period. Putting it differently, he was part of the aforementioned endogenous dynamics of stigma-management in a stigmatized state of the international society.

Figure 1.3 summarizes the process through which Joaquim Nabuco managed Brazil's stigma in the international realm. The scheme explores the interplay between Nabuco, civilizational discourse, status claims and stigma-coping. As I have argued above, coping with stigma and seeking status were part of the same process in the stratified international society of the 19th century, a process which was mediated by the invocation of civilizational discourse. I have also shown that in the Latin American context, of which Nabuco was part, embracing stigma was not an available strategy due to the normative attachment to European civilizational standards. In this sense, civilizational discourse was used solely for pursuing the two strategies linked to attempting

normalcy, i.e., corrective action and passing. Through either of these strategies, Nabuco sought to put forward a status claim regarding Brazil's standing in the international society in terms of civilization.

Figure 1.3 – Joaquim Nabuco, civilization, stigma-management and status



Source: elaborated by the author based on Adler-Nissen (2014) and Zarakol (2011).

2 Abolitionism as civilization: Nabuco and the stigma of slavery, 1879-1888

> *In name of the past and future, I denounce […] the one institution that only needs to be called by its name to be condemned – slavery […]*
> *Yes! To everyone I denounce this damned slavery as the fratricide of a race, the parricide of a nation!*
>
> Rally speech in Teatro Santa Isabel (Recife), 30.11.1884[1]

Joaquim Nabuco was a key actor and symbol within the Brazilian abolitionist movement. He acted as a broker between the public space and the Parliament, and between domestic movement and transnational abolitionist networks (Alonso 2010). His contribution to the movement was also two-fold: in the one hand, Nabuco was a propagandist, having written the movement's main political book, *O Abolicionismo* (1883), as well as other political manifestoes, opuscules and press articles. On the other, Nabuco acted in the political process of abolition by following the British strategy of parliamentary abolitionism and by striving to create transnational alliances in order to strengthen the cause in Brazil.

Although both Nabuco's trajectory within the movement and his abolitionist works have been extensively analyzed (see Alonso 2015, 2007; Azevedo 2003; Viana Filho 1985; Costa 1999, to name a few), an examination of Nabuco's abolitionism based on IR scholarship on stigma, status and civilization is still missing. To do so is the objective of this chapter, the argument being that Nabuco equated slavery to and barbarism, and, conversely, abolitionism to civilization. Nabuco embedded civilizational discourse into the fight against slavery, thus appealing to a preexisting political repertoire of the Imperial elites. Nabuco sought to generate a sentiment of shame among these elites, one that directly clashed with their self-image of civilization after the European mirror-image (Vieira 2017). In that sense, Nabuco argued that, in order to signal for a higher status in the international order, that of a civilized power, Brazil needed to wash away the stigma of slavery. As we have seen in Chapter 1, this corresponds to Zarakol's (2011) stigma-coping strategy of attempting normalcy through a corrective action, i.e., abolition.

This chapter is divided into five parts. The first section briefly addresses the transformation of slavery into a stigma in the 19th-century international society. Addressing this topic is necessary for slavery had been a naturalized institution during most of the Modern Age; the processes of the emergence of the concept of civilization and that of stigmatization of slavery, although interrelated,

[1] Quoted in Nabuco (2010 [1884c], 159).

were not one and the same. Because civilization and abolitionism were not natural synonyms, pro-slavery groups had discursive room based on traditional legitimacy to resist abolitionist discourse and action. In other words, stigma on slavery had to be constructed. The second section presents a snapshot of the deep roots of slavery in the Brazilian Imperial society and applies the discussion in the previous section to argue that civilization and slavery were not clashing notions even after Brazil had ended slave trade in 1850; in reality, pro-slavery politicians used civilizational discourse to circumstantially justify the continuity of slavery well into the 1860s. Against this background, the third section analyzes the emergence of the abolitionist movement during the discussion of what would come to be the 1871 *Lei do Ventre Livre* (Free Womb Act). After 1871, Brazilian debate on slavery stagnated for almost a decade; abolitionist movement only reemerged in 1879, and Joaquim Nabuco soon became a leading figure within it. In this sense, Section 2.4 discusses Nabuco's abolitionism under the prism of civilizational discourse. It presents Nabuco's discourse and how he stressed Brazil's stigma by promoting a feeling of shame among the Brazilian elites. Moreover, it follows his search for foreign allies with the goal of pressing the Brazilian political system for abolishing slavery, in what has been called the *boomerang method* (Alonso 2015). The final section offers an appraisal on the subjects of slavery, civilization, status and stigma in Brazil.

2.1 Slavery as a stigma in the international society

In the end of the Middle Ages, Western Europe experienced a tendency to freer labor relations (Osterhammel 2009, 838). However, the intensification of European colonization of the Americas in the 17th century reversed that trend. A pattern emerged in which slavery was prohibited by law in the metropoles, but sanctioned in overseas colonies (Drescher 2009, 66-7)[2]. Slavery was thus a legitimate institution and interwoven with European law. Up until the early 18th century, questioning was minimal and restricted to isolated aspects of the institution, not touching its overall legitimacy (Drescher 2009, 64). In other words, slavery was largely a non-issue.

While it has been argued that this picture changed drastically with the Enlightenment, in fact most philosophers of the period gave dearth attention to slavery and rarely did the institution clash with their humanist and moral ideals (Osterhammel 2009, 840-1). For instance, in the *Two Treatises of Government,* John Locke declares at one point that slavery is vile, but later upholds the legitimate and lawful right of West Indian farmers to own slaves (Drescher 2009, 77). Among the main French philosophers of the period, Montesquieu is perhaps the only one to dedicate a

[2] Portugal and Spain were exceptions to the rule: there, slavery was permitted in the metropolis until 1542 and 1761, respectively (Drescher 2009, 61-66).

significant part of his work to criticize slavery. He declares it immoral by principle, but still concedes that coerced labor was in accordance to "natural reason" in territories under tropical climates (Drescher 2009, 81; Ré 2009, 184-6). Among the British, a more unequivocal condemnation is found in the moral political economy of Adam Smith, who claimed, in *The Wealth of Nations*, that slave labor was less productive than free labor, thus a hindrance to human progress (see Ré 2009, 233-7).

In this sense, while Enlightenment did pave the way to the delegitimization of slavery, the theme was not prominent nor was its association with barbarianism innate to Enlightened thought. Other sources were also to inspire early antislavery societies in Great Britain, the birthplace of modern abolitionism. One of them was a change in Christian morality initiated within Quaker circles, later spreading to other dissenting denominations (Drescher 2009, 210-4; Osterhammel 2009, 841). To Jurgen Osterhammel (2009, 841-2), antislavery become widespread in British society in the 1790s as an ideological response to the French Revolution: Britain needed a "transnational universalist" cause to counter Revolutionary France's championing of civil rights[3]. In other words, abolitionism became a symbol of British moral advancement and humanitarian virtue.

After it abolished slave trade (1807) and slavery (1833), the United Kingdom pushed for abolitionism in the international system. Abolitionism and the civilizational discourse behind it were not epiphenomena artificially created to cloak British economic interests. While there is no scholarly consensus on the exact weight of economic and moral motives behind British international anti-slavery activism, there is a broad agreement that noneconomic factors played a significant role[4] (Osterhammel 2009, 841; Davis 2006, Ch. 2). Moreover, British promotion of abolitionism abroad resulted largely from domestic pressure groups with no stake in foreign trade (Drescher 2009, 228-31).

Leaving motivations aside, the most important outcome of the British international campaign for abolition was the undermining of the perspective of continuity of slavery as a legitimate institution in the international society. Throughout the first half of the 19th century, London managed to arrange bilateral treaties – through both negotiation and coercion – that restricted or banned slave trade in the Atlantic Ocean. It did so believing that in hampering influx, slave labor would be condemned to economic decadence, an assumption vindicated in Brazil in

[3] Whereas in 1789 the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen had declared that "men are born free and equal in rights" France only abolished slavery in 1794. It would reinstate it after the rise of Napoleon.
[4] For a discussion on British abolitionism, see Eric Williams (1994 [1944]), Seymour Drescher (1977, 2002) and David Eltis (1987). For a summary of the debate, see Thomas Bender (1992) and David Brion Davis (2006, Ch. 12).

the medium-term, but not in the United States[5]. Britain also successfully obtained a multilateral condemnation of slavery in the Congress of Vienna (1815).

Ultimately, Britain's international anti-slavery campaign helped to shape a diffuse perception that the lingering presence of slavery in overseas territories tainted Europe's self-image of superior civilization. Effectively, no "Western European country that wanted to be seen as civilized could long afford to remain outside the ongoing dynamic [of abolitionism]" (Osterhammel 2009, 844). From the 1840s until the 1860s, an international wave of abolitionism swept the Western world: France outlawed slavery in 1848; the Netherlands followed suit in 1863. Most Latin American countries, with the exception of Brazil and Spanish-ruled Cuba and Puerto Rico, had abolished slavery by the early 1850s. The fatal blows came in the early 1860s. The American Civil War resulted in the disintegration of the largest slave society in the Western Hemisphere; this in turn led to the end of slave trade to Cuba in 1867, putting an end to Transatlantic trafficking. Meanwhile, Russia abolished serfdom in 1861, thus terminating the practice of coerced labor in the European continent[6]. By the mid 1860s slavery had thus become universally abject and unambiguously condemned as barbarian debris that had no place in a civilized international society. In short, it had become a stigma.

2.2 Civilization and slavery in Brazil: circumstantial slavery and the rhetoric of reaction

By the time of its independence, Brazil was a slave society. In 1831, its population was estimated in five million, of which between one third and a half were slaves (Costa e Silva 2012, 36) – forty years later, slaves still amounted to 15% of the total population (Alonso 2015, 33). The transatlantic influx of slaved individuals to Brazil reached its peak in the first half of the 19th century: more than two million disembarked between 1801 and 1850[7].

Slavery was not limited into plantations, being widespread in the urban environment as well. Having slaves was the main status-marker in colonial and imperial Brazil (Costa e Silva 2012, 44-5, Alonso 2015, 28-9). Slavery also enjoyed strong social legitimacy among the non-elites. Not surprisingly, then, slavery was barely put into question in the wake of Brazil's independence in

[5] The United States had banned slave trade in 1807, but high birth rates increased the number of slaved individuals from around 1.1 million in 1810 to 3.9 million in 1860. Statistics on Brazil's demography are complicated because only one census was taken, in 1872, counting 1.5 million, down from 1.7 million estimated for 1864 (Reis 2000, 91). In 1887, in the eve of abolition, there were around 700,000 (Carvalho 2010, 317).

[6] Portugal kept slavery in its African colonies up until 1869 and Spain maintained slavery in Puerto Rico and Cuba until 1873 and 1886, respectively. In practice, European states promoted other forms of unfree labor in their Imperialist ventures in Africa and Asia well into the 20th century.

[7] Data retrieved from and available at <https://www.slavevoyages.org/>. For more on slave trade to Brazil, see Luiz Felipe de Alencastro (2018).

1822[8]. It was not until the 1860s that it came under real fire. In the previous decades, Brazil had been pressured by the United Kingdom to banish slave trade, culminating in a definitive halt in transatlantic slave trafficking in 1850 (Bethell 1970). Nevertheless, no one questioned the legitimacy of the *institution* of slavery; rather, it was recognized as part of the "natural order" of things (Bethell 1970, 338, Alonso 2002, 2015, 28-9).

The situation changed in the second half of the 1860s. As we have seen above, after slavery was abolished in the United States, it survived only in Brazil, Cuba and Puerto Rico. Gradually, slaveholders and pro-slavery politicians (they were often the same individuals) justified the continuity of slavery by arguing that Brazil's "specific circumstances" made the postponement of abolition the wisest choice (Alonso 2015, 60). "Nobody here [in Congress] supports the perpetuity of slavery", argued Paulino José Soares de Sousa, one of the leaders of the pro-slavery wing of Congress in 1871, but

> […] the solution [to the problem of slavery] cannot be determined by absolute principles […] the relevant topics in the debate are the appreciation of the circumstances of the country […]: it is everyone's duty to avoid unreflectively exposing the country to a violent crisis[9].

Angela Alonso (2015, 59) called the reasoning behind this kind of discourse *circumstantial slavery*. This rhetoric attempted to subvert the growing connection between civilization and abolitionism, claiming any resolution in the direction of emancipation would be dangerous, as it risked unleashing social chaos and undermine the existence of civilization in Brazil. In this sense, abolitionism was dismissed as a foreign idea that sought to impose sociopolitical processes to which Brazil was not yet prepared to go through. Ending slavery would condemn Brazil's rural economy based on slave labor. Rodrigo Silva, another member of Congress, proclaimed: "it is of little importance whether other legislators from other countries had practiced it [abolition]. Our circumstances are very special […]"[10] . Some were more poignant; the Marquis of Olinda declared that "[…] the idea of emancipation, as adorable as it may be, opens the door to thousands of disgraces […] European authors and statesmen do not conceive the situation countries that have slavery. *Their ideas are of no use here"* [11] .

It was also argued that slavery was a form of Christian charity whose goal was to save a damned (African) soul. This was no new argument; as early as the 15th century, Portugal and Spain

[8] The only major political figure of the independence period who openly questioned slavery was José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, who raised the matter in the Constitutional Assembly in 1823, but failed to muster support.
[9] Quoted in Angela Alonso (2015, 60-1).
[10] Quoted in Alonso (2015, 60).
[11] Quoted in Alonso (2015, 65, emphasis added).

obtained a papal sanction to enslave "African infidels" so they could "save" their souls (Drescher 2009, 61-2). Another version of this discourse held that captivity in America was preferable to African intestine tribal wars and fetishism (Alonso 2015, 57). Slavery made the barbarian black African the object of a civilizing work. To this logic, slavery was civilization.

Finally, Brazilian pro-slavery groups relied on the recurring myth that slavery was not as brutal in Brazil as it was in the United States or European colonies elsewhere (Osterhammel 2009, 847; Salles 2014, 62). Brazilian slave-owners proudly portrayed themselves as benevolent civilizers who treated slaves cordially and led a harmonious patriarchal society (Alonso 2015, 58). Slave-owners portrayed freedom from slavery negatively, as a form of treason to the slave-master, who had cared to the slave's needs and provided for them. In this sense, the narrative goes that slavery in Brazil was not only exceptional, but in fact beneficial to the slave. According to a fictional character of José de Alencar's *O Tronco do Ipê*, Brazilian slave society was even superior to that of free-labor in Europe: "I wish […] the English philanthropists could watch this spectacle [a Christmas party of slaves], so that their reclamations would have formal rebuttal, and they would see that London's proletariat does not have the comfort and joy of our slave"[12].

Taken together, these rationales enabled José de Alencar (who besides a literary writer was a staunch conservative politician) to modulate his arguments within a civilizational discourse: "you, the propagandists, the emancipationists in trance, are nothing but *the emissaries of the revolution, apostles of anarchy*. You are the retrogrades, that wish to see the country's progress receded […]". Emancipationist measures were, in short, "*iniquitous and barbarian*"[13]. Alencar's strategy was clear: to disrupt the association between abolition and civilization by associating the latter to revolution, chaos and wickedness. Slavery was no stigma.

2.3 The Free Womb Act (1871)

Most of the quotes presented in the last section came from the heated parliamentary debate on a bill that led to the *Lei do Ventre Livre* (Free Womb Act, 1871 – also known as Rio Branco Law), which heralded the end of slavery in Brazil. The act established that all children born of slave mothers thereafter were to be free[14]. The act also facilitated manumission through the creation of an Emancipation Fund and it legalized the accumulation of wealth in order to "buy

[12] Quoted in Alonso (2015, 58).
[13] Quoted in Alonso (2015, 65-6).
[14] The children were to stay with their mothers (who remained slaves) until the age of eight years. At that moment, the slaveowner could hand in the children to the State in exchange for a compensation or keep them under his services until these *ingênuos* completed 21 years. Since the compensation was small, most slaveowners kept the children (Salles 2014, 73). By 1882, only eleven thousand individuals had been freed under the law's provisions (Alonso 2015, 187).

freedom" (*pecúlio*). Despite its limited scope[15], the Free Womb Act was a decisive step in Brazil's long road towards the end of slavery. After 1871, the debate on abolition was no longer on whether slavery would end, but how it would become a reality (Carvalho 2010, 318). Contrary to the 1850 Law, which largely resulted from British pressure, the 1871 Act was a product of domestic dynamics in which direct political pressures from the outside played a minor role (Carvalho 2010, 314; Drescher, 1988, 448).

What accounts for the (partial) erosion of the political and social legitimacy of slavery in Brazilian society by 1871? An important point concerns an ongoing structural process thanks to which less and less Brazilians had a stake in the perpetuation of slavery (Alonso 2015, 29). The end of transatlantic slave trafficking in 1850 raised slave prices in the medium term. As a result, there was a transference of slaves from the decadent plantations of the Northeast region to the dynamic coffee estates of the Southeast. Likewise, many slaves and from the urban centers were sold to rural plantations, where their toil could generate more wealth to slaveowners (Drescher 1988, 445-6). In concentrating more in the hands of the richest families, slavery bestowed even more status to slave-owners, but, paradoxically, it diminished its hold on society, as less families and businesses depended on slave labor (Alonso 2015, 29; Salles 2014, 72). In other words, slavery was becoming less ingrained in society.

We can stablish a more immediate cause in the political crisis of 1868[16], which severely fractured Brazil's political establishment. Besides paving the way to criticism against imperial institutions unprecedented in public sphere against (Alonso 2002; Basile 1990, 264-9), the crisis' aftermath legitimized debate on slavery within the institutional space, as Liberals and moderate conservatives embraced the cause of (gradual) abolitionism (Alonso 2015, 39). In 1869, the manifesto of the new Liberal Party – led by Senator Nabuco de Araújo, Joaquim Nabuco's father – stated that gradual emancipation was an "imperious and urgent exigence of civilization" (Alonso 2002, 73).

Moreover, Brazil felt the weight of the changing international environment, which now stigmatized Brazil over slavery. D. Pedro II himself was among the first to notice the winds of change. In 1864, he wrote a note to Zacarias de Gois e Vasconcelos – then the head of government

[15] Some of the act's provisions were hardly put in practice (Alonso 2015, 119). For instance, the law prohibited cruel punishments, but they remained commonplace – it would reappear in several abolitionist bills until the approval of a specific act against flogging in 1886. Moreover, the Emancipation Fund remained modest at best (Carvalho 2010, 317-8). More importantly, the act ratified the reasoning according to which the slaveowners were entitled to receive compensation for releasing slaves (Schwarcz and Starling 2015, 300-1).

[16] Political instability affected Brazilian politics since 1862, when the Progressist League – an alliance of moderate conservatives and liberals – rose to power. The league, which became a party in 1864, never enjoyed a secure support in Parliament. In 1868, in the midst of the Paraguayan War, D. Pedro II intervened and dissolved the Progressist Cabinet of Zacarias de Gois e Vasconcelos, naming a Conservative ministry in its place. Since the Conservatives were a minority in Congress, the move sparked outrage, resulting in a large-scale political crisis.

– expressing that the events of the American Civil War extolled them to "think about the future of slavery in Brazil, so that what happened to us in the case of slave trade is not repeated"[17]. In other words, Brazil needed to deal with the matter before being obliged to do so by external pressure. The outbreak of the Paraguayan War later that year postponed the issue, but it did not remain forgotten. In 1866, Abílio Borges, one of the founders of Brazil's abolitionist movement, managed to convince a group of French politicians and intellectuals to write a petition to D. Pedro II asking for the abolition of slavery. The emperor answered by committing himself to the cause, conditional only on "form and opportunity" (Bethell and Carvalho 2008, 15-6). On the emperor's initiative, the topic of emancipation was included in his *Fala do Throno*, his annual address to Parliament, in 1867, but failed to make headway (Salles 2014, 64-7). In 1870, with the end of the war and the approval of a similar *ventre livre* act in Spain, the issue of slavery made entered the political agenda.

Approving a law that freed the offspring of slave mothers was the primary task of the cabinet led by José Maria da Silva Paranhos, the Viscount of Rio Branco, which came to power in 1871. Hailing from a moderate and reformist faction of the Conservative Party, Rio Branco faced enormous opposition both in the Liberal Party within the ranks of the Conservative Party, but was ultimately successful in his task. At the same time, the fledgling debate on slavery and the 1868 political disruption enabled the emergence of a Brazilian abolitionist movement. The movement successfully expanded the debate on slavery to extra-parliamentary spaces, such as political conferences, civic ceremonies and literary meetings (Alonso 2015, 67-70).

2.4 Nabuco and the abolitionist movement

After the approval of the Free Womb Act in 1871, the issue of slavery went silent in Brazilian politics (Schwarcz and Starling 2015, 300-1). Many of its secondary provisions, such as the education of the *ingênuos* (the free sons of slave mothers) and the public financing for the Emancipation Fund, were poorly enforced when not entirely ignored (Alonso 2015, 119; Carvalho 2010, 315-8). Abolitionist activism also waned significantly. Many politicians voted for the Rio Branco Law because it was a gradualist law, which would let slavery "die by itself" in the following decades[18]. Furthermore, the political rift among the Conservatives during the debates on the law made its enforcement a risky enterprise for as long as the party remained in power (Alonso 2015, 119).

[17] Quoted in Ricardo Salles (2014, 62).
[18] Nabuco estimated that according to the law, slavery would only end in 1932 (Nabuco 2003 [1883, 175]).

It was only in 1878, when D. Pedro II named a Liberal cabinet after a decade of continuous conservative rule that this political lethargy was finally broken. The Liberal Party officially (but not whole-heartedly) supported abolition, which was enough to give fresh liveliness to the abolitionist movement. Nonetheless, that was not the only factor behind the comeback of slavery into the top of the political agenda. In 1879, the first *ingênuos* born after 1871 would come of age, either to be sold to the state or kept under the slaveowner's "tutelage". The moment represented a litmus test for the effectivity of the Free Womb Act (Alonso 2015, 120). Moreover, in the international realm, the Spanish Parliament began discussing the future of slavery in Cuba; as the Caribbean island was Brazil's sole company in the slaver camp, the discussions in Madrid had repercussion in Rio de Janeiro[19] (Alonso 2007, 96).

Joaquim Nabuco was one of the protagonists of the new generation of abolitionists that came to the limelight in 1878-9. Before being elected to the Chamber of Deputies at age twenty-nine in 1878, he had shown limited interest in the cause of abolition in particular or in politics in general (Bethell and Carvalho 2008, 13-4)[20]. Nonetheless, Nabuco embraced the issue soon after he debuted in parliament in 1879. He first gained notoriety by denouncing an English-owned mining company for illegally employing slaves in the state of Minas Gerais. Nabuco's speech came to the knowledge of the *British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society* (BFASS), the world's largest anti-slavery association, which sent a letter congratulating him for defending "the cause of freedom" (Bethell and Carvalho 2008, 46). Nabuco answered assuring the BFASS of his commitment to the struggle for emancipation, stating that it stood above any party or political alliance (Bethell and Carvalho 2008, 56). His campaigning had begun.

2.4.1 Civilizational discourse and shaming

In his abolitionist struggle, Nabuco's primary objective was to undermine the legitimacy of slavery, which remained a rightful institution in the eyes of part of the society. Nabuco knew the Empire's self-image of being a civilized country resonated deeply in the elites, so he relentlessly argued that slavery was barbarous and incompatible with civilization. The only way Brazil could

[19] The Emancipation Act of 1880 replaced slavery in Cuba by the *patronato*, a form of indentured servitude that was set to expire in 1888. Abolition was effectively carried out in 1886 (see Drescher 2009, 333-48; Corwin 1968).

[20] There is no empirical support for Nabuco's version of his abolitionism deriving from a moral and sentimental commitment when visiting his childhood home of *Massangana* in 1869, as described in his autobiography *Minha Formação* (Bethell 2016, Ch. 2, Bosi 2010). Nevertheless, Nabuco had in fact been in touch with the issue from a young age: he used to translate British abolitionist articles for his father (Bethell and Carvalho 2008, 17). More significantly, in his last year as a Law student in Recife, Nabuco defended Tomás, a slave who had killed his owner and sentenced to death – Nabuco managed to commute the punishment to a life sentence (Bethell 2016, 72). The case inspired him to write an essay denouncing slavery, but he never completed it.

claim to be civilized before the world as to take the "corrective action" of abolishing slavery (Zarakol 2011). In terms of status, Nabuco's goal was to seek social mobility for Brazil in the international society by casting aside a perceived inferior social identity represented by slavery (Hogg and Abrams 1998 quoted in Carvalho Pinto 2019, 5).

Nabuco thus spared no strong words for condemning slavery, employing vivid metaphors to stress its backwardness and aberrancy. In a public letter to Adolpho de Barros, Nabuco argued that slavery was "the most monstrous aggregate of crimes to ever existed in the world, no more than a more civilized form of savage cannibalism" (Nabuco 1881a, 5). Likewise, when campaigning in Recife in 1885, he condemned slavery as an "inhuman and cruel institution, a perpetual violation of all fundamental truths of science and religion, of legal jurisprudence and moral, the cause for atrophy that weights for centuries in the development of nations, an institution that corrodes and degrades everything […]" (Nabuco 2010 [1884c], 158). For these reasons, slavery had no place in the modern world, as it "belong[ed] with fossil institutions and only exists in our period in a backward portion of the globe" (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 107). "The cardinal principles of civilization", he concluded, "reduce slavery to a brutal fact" (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 108).

Against this backdrop, Nabuco often asserted that Brazil's hold on civilization was meagre and ambiguous. At times, he recognized that Brazil was a civilized country, but as which the permanence of slavery there corresponded to a scandal (Nabuco 2011 [1883], 11). He also pointed out that abolition was necessary for Brazil "definitively enter into the civilization of the century", because the permanence of slavery proved that civilization in Brazil was "a shallow and exterior layer" (Nabuco 1881d, 2). The manifesto of the *Sociedade Brasileira Contra a Escravidão*, SBCE (Brazilian Anti-Slavery Society, BASS), which Nabuco founded in 1880, calls out the stigma Brazil faced:

> Can an intelligent and sensible nation, full of incentives of its own, passively watch as slavery holds it at an the appalling backward position in relation to the whole world? […] Brazil, an American and modern nation, made the last advocate of the barbarian right to slave, dishonor and maim the vanquished! Never! (SBCE 1880, 10).

One common feature of these excerpts is a discursive strategy that seeks to provoke a feeling of *shame* in his audience. As we have seen in Chapter 1, shame is an integral part of both the established-outsider social dynamics and of stigmatization processes, as stigmatized actors and those who are outside the core of society recognize their own inferiority. Shame also indicates the stigma-coping strategy of attempting normalcy through a corrective action[21]. Insisting in the

[21] While shame is an immediate result of stigma, it may not be an enduring condition. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, a stigmatized actor may "pass" as normal, refusing to believe it is bound by the negative assessments. It may also

"shame card" was thus a method for reinforcing the internalization of stigma for making the case for the pursuit of corrective measures, i.e., abolition.

Significantly, the word *vergonha* (shame) is explicitly employed at times. In *O Abolicionismo*, Nabuco reminds the reader that the Imperial Constitution of 1824 made no mention of slavery, prompting him to ask: "until when will we have an institution that obliges us to falsify our Constitution, our laws, treaties, statistics and books, so that we can hide the *shame* that burns our faces and which the *whole world is seeing*?" (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 119n, emphasis added). The act of freeing the slaves, the immediate task of abolitionism, was itself described by Nabuco as a mere "work of reparation, *shame* or regret" (Nabuco 2011 [1883], 12, emphasis added). In the press, he wrote in 1881 that slavery was "the crime, the disgrace and the *shame* of the country" (Nabuco 1881a, 6, emphasis added). Even when not openly employing the word shame, Nabuco addressed its implications to Brazil's low status. He stated that Brazilians "should be horrified to see the foundation of barbarianism that exists in our country underneath the sheer layer of civilization" (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 52). Slavery "demoralized" Brazil; it proved daily to be a "source of inferiority, innervation and backwardness". In short, remaining a slave country was a "dark stain that demeaned our civilization" (Nabuco 2011 [1883], 12; 2010 [1884b], 135; 1881c, 2).

The fact that Brazil was the last stronghold of slavery in the West (slavery in Cuba would only end in 1886, but its termination was already provided by Law since 1880) was a source of shame in itself, and Nabuco often pressed this issue. To voters of Recife he declared he wished they could all "confess to be Brazilians without being reproached for being the last representatives in America, and in almost the entire world, of a homicide and inhuman institution that was the true hell of history" (Nabuco 2010 [1884a], 114). Tellingly, Nabuco sometimes equaled Brazil to other countries which, in both European and Brazilian imaginaries, were by definition inferior in civilizational progress. Therefore, slavery downgraded Brazil in the international order:

> Twenty [more] years of slavery, on the other hand, means, during this whole time, having Brazil's name infected, associated with Turkey's, dragged through the mud of Europe and America, *object of derision* in Asia […] and Oceania […] (Nabuco 2011 [1883], 163, emphasis added).

Nabuco's remarks remind us of how susceptible Brazilian elites were to the country's image abroad. As we have discussed before, this was a result of the elites' ontological insecurity regarding their hold of civilization, an anxiety to meet the fantasied mirror-image of Western Civilization (Vieira 2017). In this sense, Nabuco appeals to foreign accounts of Brazil's slave society. In *O*

wear the stigma as a badge of pride, breaking with reality or reinterpreting the stigmatized attributed as a virtue (Goffman 1963, 10). In all these instances, shame eventually disappears.

Abolicionismo, he recalls Charles Darwin's voyage to Brazil in 1832; upon leaving the country, the famous naturalist wrote in his diary: "on the 19th of August we finally left the shores of Brazil. Thank God, I shall never again visit a slave-country" (Darwin 1832 quoted in Nabuco 2003 [1883], 196). This statement leads Nabuco to argue that Brazil was seen by the civilized world as no more than a country of slaves: "Brazil and slavery have become synonyms" (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 197).

2.4.2 Internationalizing shame: the "boomerang method"

Aware of the Brazilian sensitivity to external opinion, Nabuco launched what Alonso (2010) called a *cosmopolitan abolitionism*. Throughout the 1880s, he acted as a broker between the Brazilian abolitionist movement and the transnational abolitionist network. Nabuco sought to make the Brazilian cause known to other anti-slavery groups in Europe and the Americas and to raise the profile of the movement domestically. Alonso (2015, 2014, 2010) called this strategy the *boomerang method*: faced with a refractory state, reformists look for allies outside domestic frontiers, partners that in turn could pressure – directly or indirectly – the state to undertake the reforms[22] (Alonso 2014, 123). I would add that such pressure often took the form of highlighting the stigma impinged on Brazil for maintaining slavery, therefore increasing the feeling of shame among Brazilian elites.

In 1880, during Nabuco's first tenure in Parliament (1879-81), Nabuco met the United States chief diplomat in Brazil at the time, Henry W. Hilliard, a former Confederate who had become an enthusiast abolitionist after the Civil War. Nabuco convinced Hilliard to exchange open letters in the Brazilian press with him on the issue of emancipation. The diplomat praised the leadership of Abraham Lincoln and attributed American material prosperity to the end of slavery (Alonso 2015, 164-5). Weeks later, the SBCE threw Hilliard a banquet – carefully planned to make an impact in the press – and named him an "honorary member" of the Society. The *Hilliard Affair* outraged Conservative politicians and intellectuals, who accused the diplomat of meddling in Brazilian domestic affairs and Nabuco of committing treason. The parliament called an extraordinary session to debate issue; meanwhile, Hilliard was quietly transferred from Brazil (Bethell 2016, 80-1; Alonso 2007, 119). In any case, Nabuco had achieved his goal: helping to make abolition part of the public agenda.

[22] In reality, Nabuco was not the first Brazilian abolitionist to make use of the *boomerang method*. As we have seen, Abílio Borges had persuaded French intellectuals in 1866 to write a petition to D. Pedro II asking for the end of slavery, which aided in sparking the political debate that led to the Rio Branco Act. In this sense, what Nabuco did was to build on Borges' repertoire and expand it.

Less than a month after the controversial banquet, Nabuco set off to Europe. The so-called "Abolitionist Mission" sought to muster international support for the cause. Nabuco's first stop was Lisbon, where he was received in Congress and praised by politicians, intellectuals and the press alike. In Madrid, he met Rafael Maria de Labra y Cadrana, a key figure of Cuban abolitionism, and became an honorary associate of the Spanish Abolitionist Society. There Nabuco declared that abolitionism was the cause of "all the peoples of the world", because it was "associated to the [universal] struggle for human freedom […]" (Nabuco 1881b, 3). The next stop was Paris, where he met Victor Schoelcher, the veteran leader of the French abolitionist movement. A few weeks after Nabuco had left France, Schoelcher criticized Brazilian slavery in a public address: "the Emperor of Brazil, who is said to be a liberal man*, must experience a cruel humiliation* for being the only sovereign in the civilized world who reigns over slaves" (Alonso 2010, 62, emphasis added). In short, slavery humiliated Brazil.

Nabuco's final destination was London, where the BFASS threw him a public breakfast attended by 150 people, including 11 members of parliament. The trip sedimented Nabuco's relationship with the BFASS; thereafter, he would remain in close contact with the society, of which he became a corresponding member. Throughout the 1880s, the BFASS – mainly through its secretary, Charles Allen, whom Nabuco befriended – would use its leverage to publish information on the Brazilian abolitionist movement in the British press, especially in *The Times*, which swayed a significant influence over both the British public opinion and the Brazilian political elites (Bethell 2016, 85-6).

Nabuco would be defeated in his reelection bid shortly after returning to Brazil in 1881. Frustrated, he relocated to London, to work as an international correspondent to *Jornal do Commercio* (along with other intermittent occupations). The geographical distance gradually alienated him from his former leading role the abolitionist movement back home (Alonso 2007, 155-9). Nevertheless, he kept the transnational engine going: he often attended the monthly meetings of the BFASS, exchanged information with Cuban abolitionists and Schoelcher, and fed the British press with news of Brazilian abolitionism (Alonso 2010, 64-5). Moreover, in 1883 he represented BFASS in an international congress on international law, successfully proposing a motion typifying slavery as a form of piracy, a barbarian institution under international law (Alonso 2015, 188).

In 1884, Nabuco returned to Brazil. The reason for doing so was the rise of a liberal-reformist cabinet led by Manuel de Sousa Dantas, which proposed an emancipatory bill [23]

[23] The Dantas Reform had four pillars: to ban interprovincial slave trade, to free slaves aged sixty or more, to revitalize the Emancipation Fund, and to concede a minimum wage to freed slaves (paid by former owners) as well as to guarantee small rural estates for them (Alonso 2015, 241-4).

supported by the abolitionists. Nabuco came back both to reclaim his leadership role in the movement and to articulate for the approval of the bill within political circles. He continued resort to the *boomerang method* to achieve these goals. In August of that year, in a meeting celebrating the 50th anniversary of the end of slavery in the British colonies, the Prince of Wales (who was a patron of the BFASS) lamented the continuity of slavery in Brazil; he argued it was "a curse [Brazil] has inherited from its Portuguese colonizers […] [In Brazil] slaves live worse than beasts of burden" (Garrison [Joaquim Nabuco] 1884). News of the meeting were first made public in the Brazilian press by Nabuco himself, who wrote under the pseudonym "Garrison" in a reference to the American abolitionist leader. In the end, Dantas failed in approving the reform; he was replaced by a more moderate liberal, Counselor Antonio Saraiva, who sided with the Conservatives and approved a watered-down version of the reform, now facing abolitionist opposition. In order to approve the bill in the Senate, Saraiva was replaced as cabinet leader by the Baron of Cotegipe, a staunch pro-slavery Conservative politician.

Under the Cotegipe cabinet (1885-8), political tensions grew and the government resorted to force to contain abolitionist "agitation". Still, Nabuco recurred to the boomerang method hoping to break the political deadlock. In 1887, he fulfilled his personal dream of meeting William Gladstone (thanks to his contacts in the BFASS), from whom he obtained an expression of sympathy for the abolitionist movement in Brazil (Alonso 2010, 68). Gladstone's political prestige notwithstanding, his Liberal Party had been out of office since 1886, so the political impact of the declaration was limited. Even so, it was enough to prompt Cotegipe to censor a newspaper that published news on the meeting (Alonso 2015, 322).

Nabuco's last resort to the boomerang method took place on the eve of abolition. In 1887, D. Pedro II traveled to Europe for medical treatment due to ill-health; Princess Isabel was left to rule in his stead. As government crackdown escalated, the movement radicalized, and more slaves were escaping than ever. In October, the Army declared it refused to keep chasing fugitive slaves. The declaration opened a crack on the edifice of slavery, but the final blow had not yet been given. Nabuco seized the opportunity and traveled to Rome in the end of the year, hoping to convince Pope Leo XIII to issue a bull condemning slavery. The Church had historically been supportive of slavery and Isabel was deeply religious, so Nabuco calculated that the Pope's pronouncement would tip the scale in favor of the movement (Bethell and Carvalho, 33-4). In the audience, which took place on 10 February 1888, the pope expressed his sympathies for abolitionism and promised to issue an encyclical shortly[24].

[24] Cotegipe's diplomacy managed to postpone the publication; but since the Pope's position was immediately revealed by Nabuco in the press, much of the potential damage had already been done.

Interestingly, Nabuco's move backfired among the abolitionists, who were by and large secularists, when not anti-religious (Alonso (2007, 227; 2010, 69). If religion was fundamental for the stigmatization of slavery in the British context in the early 19th century, the Church held very limited sway on the normative framework for delegitimizing slavery among Brazilian abolitionists – Nabuco was an exception, not the rule. In any case, even among the other intended audiences (Catholics and the Princess), Nabuco's efforts revealed to be mostly innocuous; most of the Brazilian clergy had already declared for abolition throughout 1887 (Alonso 2015, 333), and just a day after Nabuco's meeting with the Pope, Princess-Regent Isabel had made public statement in favor of abolition. The Cotegipe administration fell shortly afterwards, giving way to a cabinet whose overt goal was to approve immediate and uncompensated abolition, which was signed into law by the Princess-Regent on 13 May 1888.

2.5 Abolitionism as civilization: an appraisal

This chapter has elucidated how Joaquim Nabuco's abolitionism was fraught with civilizational discourse. Nabuco insisted that slavery was a major impediment to Brazil's standing as a civilized nation. Like his counterparts in the Brazilian elite, he was not only aware of but had also internalized the stigma Brazil faced in the international society. To Nabuco, slavery was a total institution (Alonso 2015, 2014), a complete social system that corrupted, debilitated and degraded the whole nation (Nogueira 2000, 172). To him, abolitionism was far more than an issue of humanitarianism and of redressing the injustice and the crime committed against a race. This is not to say these issues were not important to him, they were, but the flag of civilization gave abolition the centrality and urgency it had for Nabuco. Ending slavery was a necessary condition to be fully part of the "family of civilized nations". In other words, and as argued above Nabuco's abolitionism followed the stigma-coping strategy of "corrective action" – its underlying objective was to convert Brazil into one of the "normals", getting rid of an inferior social identity which downgraded its international status.

Moreover, for part of the Brazilian elites spearheaded by Nabuco, abolition represented a *status-signalling* move through which Brazil claimed for a higher international status (see Carvalho Pinto 2019). This positioning was previously precluded by the maintenance of slavery. In this sense, on 21 May 1888 – just eight days after the extinction of slavery – the parliament addressed Princess Isabel in the traditional response to the *Fala do Throno*. It declared that Brazil "[has] gotten rid of ominous legacy […] [it] had kept unto this day". Brazil had eliminated "the only repugnant exception to our homeland's moral law and to liberal spirit of modern institutions". The statement

continued, proudly stating that abolition "testifies our social and political advancement, and *it should augment the consideration Brazil deserves from the civilized nations* […]" (Falas do Throno…1889, 861, emphasis added). This address sheds light both on how important external evaluation was to the image Brazilian elites had of their own country and on the confidence that they had on Brazil's deserved increased status.

The expectations of increased international status as a result of abolition revealed to be unsubstantiated. Granted, the move did not go unnoticed in Europe; for instance, the BFASS sent Princess Isabel a letter offering its "congratulations to your Imperial Highness upon this great and crowning act of emancipation, the carrying out of which […] *frees the Continent of America from the stigma of Slavery* […]" (Bethell and Carvalho 2008, 361-2n, emphasis added). However, even this congratulatory note is a reminder that Brazil was the *last* (Western) country to take action against slavery, almost a quarter of a century after the United States did so and more than fifty years after Britain. Arguably, such belatedness made Brazilian abolition, in the European eyes, not an act of emancipation, but an overdue move by a backward country; in other words, even if abolition meant Brazil was not barbarian, it was not enough to render status gains in the international arena as a civilized country. This line of thought is consistent with Goffman's (1963, 9) warning that even when correction of stigmatized behavior is possible and successful, often it does not result in a fully normal status for the stigmatized actor. The taint of once having an undesirable attribute remains, perpetuating stigma (Zarakol 2011, 97).

Brazil's taint was reinforced by the diffusion of racialist theories in the last decades of the 19th century (see Miskolci 2013, Schwarcz 1993). The stigma of *owning* black individuals became one according to which the mere *existence* of a large share of a black population consisted in a stigma. Nonetheless, the subject of race as stigma did not caught Nabuco's attention after 1888; in fact, his concerns with Brazil's stigmatization in the international society soon turned elsewhere. For on 15 November 1889, the Monarchy was no more.

3 The republican descent into barbarism: Nabuco's monarchist decade, 1889-1899

> *I am a staunch monarchist and with the Monarchy I begin once again the life of sacrifice I had with abolitionism.*
>
> Letter to the Baron de Penedo, 06.01.1889[1]

> *I lament the suicidal attitude of the current generation, dragged on by a verbal hallucination, that of one word* – Republic*, discredited before the whole world when preceded by its qualifier* – South-American *[…]*
>
> *Agradecimento aos Pernambucanos,* 1891[2]

The proclamation of the Republic, just eighteen months after the abolition of slavery, unseated the political elites that had prevailed during the Brazilian Empire. The new regime's first decade was fraught with political and economic crises, resulting in what Renato Lessa (2015) named "the Decade of Chaos". Not until the Campos Sales presidency (1898-1902) did institutional politics know the degree of stability it had enjoyed during most of D. Pedro II's five-decade-long reign. For monarchists, the entropy Brazil experienced during the 1890s put a halt to the era of civilization enjoyed under the monarchical regime. By becoming a Republic, Brazil was no longer different from its Hispanic-American neighbors, which Imperial elites viewed as barbarian societies marked by endemic political infighting, militarism, and authoritarianism. And as long as Brazilian political life remained strained, the monarchist ideology was vindicated by the facts on the ground.

Joaquim Nabuco shared the negative outlook on Brazil's future as a Republic. He refused to join the ranks of the new regime and remained loyal to the Monarchy throughout the 1890s. As a result, he lost the political prominence he had enjoyed in the 1880s, for monarchism never became a powerful force in Brazilian politics. Nabuco portrayed his days during the 1890s as a life of little political interest and of dedication to the Letters, to his family and to the rediscovery of Catholicism (Nabuco 2015 [1900], 229). This is only half-true; while he did not participate in institutional politics, many of his essays and books attacked – either directly or more subtly – the Republic, and defend the monarchical regime and its legacy (Needell 1991, 170-2). In the end, they were political interventions driven by the political circumstances and events of the time (Alonso 2012, 73).

[1] As quoted in Joaquim Nabuco (1949a, 180-1).
[2] As quoted in Nabuco (1891).

The objective of this chapter is to analyze how discourses of civilization were present in Nabuco's monarchist publications throughout the 1890s[3]. Its main contention is that the ideal of civilization was key to the constitution of a dichotomy where Brazil's monarchical past equaled civilization and its republican present meant a descent into barbarism. The dichotomy was expressed in a large measure through the monarchist association of the newly-established regime to the stigmatized Republican countries in Latin America. By becoming a Republic, Brazil had its standing in the international society downgraded.

The chapter is structured in four sections. The first one presents the twin pillars of the Empire's self-image of civilization: anti-Republicanism and anti-Americanism. This narrative was the basis of what Alonso (2009) has called monarchism *de plume*, a modality of political and intellectual contestation of the Republic in the 1890s, which will be introduced in the second section. The following section scrutinizes Nabuco's political interventions within the monarchism *de plume*, and briefly examines the contextual changes that led to Nabuco's reconciliation with the Republic in 1899. The final section offers an assessment of Nabuco's monarchism regarding civilizational discourse and stigma-management.

3.1 The imperial imaginary on Brazil and Latin America: civilization and barbarism

Nabuco's monarchism was a byproduct of the imagery that underpinned Brazil's national identity during the Empire period (1822-89). In Chapter 1, I have discussed how civilizational discourse was part of the stigmatizing process of Latin America in the international society. Latin American nations were thrown into the barbarian lot, but the Brazilian elites held an institutional and symbolic differential they essayed to take advantage of: a monarchical regime. Unlike its republican neighbors, then, Brazil could claim civilizational proximity to Europe because of the maintenance of a European dynasty. In this sense, Brazilian elites believed they represented a *civilization in the tropics*, thus addressing the stigma of civilizational backwardness by "passing" as normals. Brazilian Imperial elites would agree with its European counterparts in saying that Latin America was a continent of barbarianism, but to them Brazil was not really a part of Latin America (Bethell 2010, 461).

[3] I have deliberately excluded Nabuco's autobiography, *Minha Formação* (2015 [1900]) from this chapter's analysis. The first reason results from chronology: the book was published *after* Nabuco reconciled with the republican regime. Moreover, there the degree of subjectivity of the book is significantly higher than that of the other works examined. Neither Angela Alonso (2012, 2009), Ricardo Salles (2012), nor Stephanie Dennison (2006) include *Minha Formação* in their analyses of Nabuco's monarchism during the 1890s.

The national identity forged by Imperial elites conflated anti-Americanism and anti-republicanism. The national *self* highlighted a process of continuity to the European civilizing process. By contrast, Latin American republics became Brazil's external *other* (Salgado Guimarães 1988, 6-8). Because in Hispanic-American countries political order was upended during the process of independence, they disrupted the civilizing legacy of colonization and monarchical order. Their republican regimes brought about chronical political and economic instability, *caudillismo*, civil wars and the absence of political and civil freedoms. Therefore, they came to represent everything Imperial Brazil was not: barbarism, anarchy and political unruliness (Salgado Guimarães 1988, 7; Preuss 2012, 97). In other words, Brazil was a "*monarchical island of civilization*" surrounded by a Spanish-speaking republican space, which [was] equated to barbarism" (Preuss 2012, 97, emphasis added).

Conversely, republican ideals that began to blossom in the late Imperial society were deeply enmeshed with Americanism. The United States inspired Brazilian republicans more than its Hispanic neighbors, but there was a growing recognition of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay in light of their prosperity from the 1870s (Preuss 2011, 37-46; 2012, 98-103). In any case, republicans questioned the traditional narrative by declaring that the Republic, not the Monarchy, stood for civilization. In this direction, after 1889, the new regime zealously embraced Americanism as government policy, while monarchists, in their critique of the new political status quo, upheld the Imperial intellectual tradition of conflating anti-republicanism and anti-Americanism.

3.2 The proclamation of the Republic and monarchism de plume

Regime change in 1889 was not followed by any significant organized resistance from the monarchist camp. Those who did not defect to the ranks of the Republic considered the coup a *fait accompli*. These monarchists – unable and unwilling to take in arms to defend the overthrown regime – took the political dispute into the intellectual sphere by means of interventions in the forms of personal declarations, manifestos, press articles and books (Alonso 2009, Janotti 1991). Alonso (2009) named them "monarchists *de plume*".

Monarchists *de plume* criticized the new regime from two main departure points. On the one hand, they criticized the regime change achieved by a coup, and the Republic's militaristic character[4] – monarchists saw it as typical of the instability, immorality and *caudillismo* of Latin

[4] Brazil saw a succession of military governments from 1889 to 1894. The provisionary government installed after the 1889 coup was led by Deodoro da Fonseca, who was elected constitutional President in 1891. Later that year, Deodoro would be forced to resign, leading to a 3-year rule by former Vice-President Floriano Peixoto.

American republics (Alonso 2009, 139). The primacy of force, they argued, contrasted with the prevalence of liberalism and rule of law during the Monarchy. In this sense, they grieved the loss of the country's international respect among civilized nations, shattered by the Republic's disorderliness (Janotti 1991, 230). On the other hand, Monarchists lamented the replacement of the aristocratic way of life by a society of *parvenus* and *arrivistes*, who quickly came to the forefront in the financial bonanza of 1890-91. To monarchists, the men of the republican elite were thoroughly opposed to the *finesse* that characterized the civilized gentlemen of the Empire (Alonso 2009, 141).

Because the nascent Republic embraced Americanism, monarchist denunciation of the Republic was enmeshed with a strong sense of anti-Americanism. The most complete conflation between the two themes was Eduardo Prado's *A Ilusão Americana* [The American Illusion] (1893). For Prado, Americanism was a chimera: by proclaiming the Republic in hopes of achieving the prosperity enjoyed in the United States, Brazil would fall prey to the instability and authoritarianism of most of its Hispanic neighbors (Ricupero 2018, 215-8).

The monarchism *de plume* was itself a product of the Monarchy's demise. No coherent "monarchist doctrine" had ever developed before 1889 – there were only separate identities such as "Reformist", "Liberal", "Conservative", whose cleavages were dissolved after the coup (Alonso 2009, 133, Janotti 1991). As a result, the elements sustaining monarchist discourse were ultimately defined by the actions of the new Republic. Monarchism remained anchored in circumstantial, fragmentary issues and fell short of developing a singular and autonomous identity, remaining dependent on republicanism as its mandatory reference (Janotti 1991, 240).

3.3 Nabuco and "monarchism de plume"

Nabuco was one of the most prolific monarchists *de plume* of the 1890s. Civilizational discourse underpinned Nabuco's public interventions during that decade. The rhetoric of civilization featured in two topics extensively discussed by the author. The first regards Nabuco's stigmatization of the Republic proclaimed in 1889. To Nabuco, post-1889 Brazil resembled other barbarian Latin American nations, with whom Brazil now shared a common fate. Secondly, Nabuco somewhat obliquely compares the Monarchy's legacy of greatness to the negligible achievements and poor leadership of the Republic. Each theme loosely corresponds to a different phase of Nabuco's work, the former from 1889 to 1895 and the latter from that year until 1899. This rough chronological division also illustrates Nabuco's oscillation from sharp denunciation of the Republic to a more subtle criticism (Salles 2012, 135).

3.3.1 The republican delusion (1889-95)

After the proclamation of the Republic, Nabuco initially thought of undertaking a monarchist electoral campaign – similar to what he had done defending the abolitionist cause – but, short of political allies and personal will, he stepped back (Alonso 2007, 248-9). Instead, in March of 1890, he wrote an open letter to his constituencies affirming his refusal to take part in republican politics because he considered it would be "politically and morally improper" to do so (Nabuco 2010 [1890b], 246). This was the first of several short essays published in the press in which Nabuco criticized the fledging regime.

In consonance with the imperial tradition, Nabuco condemned the Republic's Americanism. Nabuco argued that republican will to emulate North American political institutions was naïve, for the national character of the United States differed fundamentally from the Latin American countries. In the latter, the lack of a monarch – whose apolitical and uninterested power constrained the political system from above – led parties and despots to rule with unchecked arbitrariness. Latin America was the "region of perpetual despotism", a "labyrinth of personal governments", their "ultra-liberal constitutions" notwithstanding (Nabuco 1891, 5; 1890a, 8). Historical experience had shown that the price for order of republicanism in Latin America was liberty; only a monarchical regime could provide both values, and Brazil renounced them vainly in order to become "part of America" (Nabuco 1895b, 26). He disdained those who believed that the Republic in Brazil would be fundamentally different from the barbarian experience of its neighbors: "how could we have nurtured the belief [...] that we [Brazilians] as a Republic would not go through the *via dolorosa* along which Latin America is sluggishly dragging herself?" (Nabuco 2010 [1890b], 253).

Nonetheless, the stigma Nabuco held against the new Republic was not a stigma against general republican political values. As Christian Lynch (2012, 297) elucidates, Nabuco distinguishes between several concepts of Republic. In one sense, Republic meant "any community directed to the common good, ruled by civic virtue, austere habits and the rule of law" (Lynch 2012, 297); this is what Lynch calls a *substantive republic*. In another sense, Republic meant simply a form of government whose opposite was Monarchy; a *formal republic*. Bearing this difference in mind, Nabuco claimed that the Empire was *more republican* (in the substantive sense) than the regime installed in 1889, which had suspended all liberties previously guaranteed by the Empire (Nabuco 2010 [1890b], 250; 258). Declaring that he personally subscribed to the republican ideal, he argued that the natural and legitimate successor of a parliamentary monarchy in Brazil should

have been a civil democracy, not the military dictatorship Brazil lived under (Nabuco 1890a, 5). Brazil was no *true* republic, but a *pseudo-republic* like others in Latin America, flawed and sterile in nature because it resulted from illiberal and unrepublican foundations: militarism, "pan-Yankeeism", jacobinism, positivism and slavery (Nabuco 1890a, 5; 1895b, 28).

No longer a normal, established state of the family of civilized nations, Brazil was coming increasingly closer to the barbarianism typical of the continent. In a letter to the Baron of Rio Branco in 1890, Nabuco wrote:

> We have entered into the series of personal, militaristic governments, and from there will result the degradation of the army, the bankruptcy by thievery and speculation – just as in other republics of the same type –, the government in the "States" of true *caudillos*, surrounded by a *gang* of illiterates, and finally [territorial] dismemberment, if the national sentiment does not react at the eleventh hour (Nabuco 1949a, 188, emphasis in the original).

In other words, Brazil's hold on civilization was weakening. "We are in the republican whirlwind of America. We are a corpse spinning in the maelstrom of anarchy", he wrote in 1891 in his diaries, adding that Brazilians were seeing their country "become a Venezuela, a Mexico, an Argentina, a Chile; propriety of the despot of the day. It is as if the world had returned to fetishism or cannibalism!" (Nabuco 2006, 292-3). In October of 1893, while the mutinied Navy was shelling Rio de Janeiro – in what was the most delicate political moment of the decade – he bemoaned: "I am increasingly convinced that civilization in Brazil has ended with the Monarchy" (Nabuco 2006, 326).

After the military government ended in 1894, with the election of civilian Prudente de Moraes as President, Nabuco's pessimism waned somewhat. In 1895, he publicly recognized that the "age of terror" had ran its course. Still, the Republic would always be an "inferior type of government and society", so that "*the more civilized Brazil [becomes], the more it will be inclined to monarchy*; the more barbarian, the more it will be uninterested in it" (Nabuco 1895b, 25-8, emphasis added). Yet, the Canudos War (1896-7), in which rebels were (wrongly) accused of monarchism, engendered a new wave of anti-monarchist persecution. Appalled, Nabuco wrote to André Rebouças, his former colleague in the abolitionist campaign: "this is what our country has been reduced to. Out of the honest and serious people we were they drew this sanguinary and epileptic scum that governs us today […]" (Nabuco 1949a, 274).

For all Nabuco's criticism of Latin America, he recognized that Brazil's destiny had become tied to the broader fate of the continent; Brazil now belonged to it. Nabuco believed Latin America was still to be civilized, having been kept under permanent misrule and anarchy since independence, which resembled the African continent (Nabuco 1895a, 307). The crucial question,

then, was how civilization would be "introduced" in Latin America. Nabuco ruled out European recolonization and the establishment of protectorates in the manner of those that were being established in Africa and Asia at the time. Europe would rather "let the New World fall into bankruptcy […] without considering for a moment territorial compensations or the expansion of its sphere of influence across the Atlantic" (Nabuco 1895a, 308). He also considered Washington's tutelage through Monroism unlikely. To Nabuco, the United States believed annexing any Latin American country would disbalance its system of government and "deteriorate its race"; in the same vein, bringing the continent to its sphere of influence would only bring speculation and political corruption (Nabuco 1895a, 308-9). It is telling that Nabuco seems to discard foreign tutelage on the argument that Latin America would have a demeaning effect on European or North American levels of civilization. In comparing Latin America to Africa, Nabuco further stigmatized the former.

To Nabuco, the solution to the issue of civilization in Latin America lied instead on enlightened portions of elites inside each Latin American country. Freedom had become a common, continental cause, and the moralization of a single country could create a positive effect for the cause of civilization in the region (Nabuco 1895a, 309-10). In this direction, Nabuco suggested the creation of a continental "Liberal League", but did not develop the point.

Nabuco's acknowledgment that Brazil and the remainder of Latin America shared a common future is significant because it means a departure from the Imperial imagery and stigma-coping strategy of "passing". As we have seen, the monarchical elites rejected the stigma of civilizational backwardness impinged on Brazil due to its association with the newly founded states in the American continent. By stating Brazil's closeness to Europe, with the goal to pass as normals, these elites distanced Brazil from Hispanic America. In this sense, in order to maximize Brazil's international status, monarchical elites shared and promoted the stigmatization of Hispanic America. However, Nabuco now accepted, even if unwillingly and in dismay, the old republican trope that Brazil was indeed "from America" (Preuss 2011, 106). Consequently, Brazil's borders no longer represented the imaginary line separating civilization from barbarism (Preuss 2011, 27-8). To overcome stigma and seek status through "passing" had thus become untenable. For better or worse, Brazil, the "*us*", was now part of "them", Latin America. Ori Preuss (2011) read this new state of affairs as a relation of *close otherness*. As Chapter 4 will further explore, this did not mean Nabuco left his stigmatization of Hispanic America behind.

An alternative strategy Nabuco employed to stress the Republic's de-civilizing nature was to associate it to slavery. Just two days after the Monarchy fell, he stated in his diaries that the Republic was "the vengeance" of pro-slavery sectors of society (Nabuco 2006, 286). Later, he

argued in a political essay that the Republic "resulted from one of the more vicious junctions that history can mention: the one between Slavery and Praetorianism" (Nabuco 1891, 6). Nabuco underscored that "pro-slavery resentment" had compromised the efforts to create a Brazilian nation of genuine and free people (Nabuco 2010 [1890b], 248). Instead, the country was moving in the opposite direction, not least because the United States, the Republic's role model, was the most racially unequal society of the civilized world (Nabuco 1895b, 9). In this sense, the proclamation of the Republic, whose adherents claimed to be Brazil's version of [17]89, thus upholding the civilizing legacy of the French Revolution, was in fact the abjuration of the true work of civilization in Brazil: the emancipation of slaves in 1888. In Nabuco's words, "the future will tell which was our true 89 [Abolition or the Republic's proclamation], or at least the one closest to the Declaration of the Rights of Man" (Nabuco 2010 [1890b], 257).

3.3.2 The edifying imperial legacy and the sterile Republic (1895-99)

Nabuco's interventions in the political debate before 1895 generally took the form of short opinion articles and open letters. After 1895, he turned to longer essays. Three books resulted from this change of course: *Balmaceda* (1895a), *Intervenção Estrangeira durante a Revolta de 1893* [Foreign Intervention during the 1893 Revolt] (1895c), and *Um Estadista no Império* [A Statesman in the Empire] (1897-99). These books share a common spirit: the reassertion of the Monarchy's superiority over the Republic, both in political and civilizational terms. In these works, Nabuco cloaked himself under the position of a historian analyzing past and contemporary political events (Alonso 2012; Salles 2012).

Both *Balmaceda* and *Intervenção Estrangeira* are a response to the events of the Navy Revolt of 1893-94[5]. *Balmaceda* addresses the topic more indirectly, as its overt subject is Juan Manuel Balmaceda's presidency in Chile, which culminated in a civil war 1891 (at the loss of which he committed suicide). Nabuco highlights that Imperial Brazil and pre-Balmaceda Chile were "genuine exceptions in South America", safe-havens of civilization and freedom among the continent's "rough waves filled with blood" (Nabuco 1895a, 3-4). Balmaceda's rise to power changed the status quo; his modernizing reforms and personalist style of government led to clashes between the Executive and the Legislative. Nabuco draws a parallel with President Deodoro da

[5] In September 1893 the Brazilian Navy, stationed in the Guanabara Bay, mutinied and successively shelled Rio de Janeiro. The legalist victory came after the United States intervened in support of Peixoto's government, breaking the naval blockade and supporting the formation a Legalist Navy. For a detailed discussion on the topic, see Steven Topik (2009, esp. Ch. 7 and 8).

Fonseca's conflict with Congress in 1891, when he attempted to close the Legislative but was forced to resign weeks later (Alonso 2012, 83).

Nabuco also criticizes the new elites brought into power by Balmaceda. The president sidelined the traditional aristocracy and favored "a personal party, anonymous and composed of inferior elements of society" (Nabuco 1895 quoted in Alonso 2012, 82). Balmaceda opened the "doors [of social power] so that everyone [came] in, like the [Brazilian] Republic did on 15 November [1889]" (Nabuco 1895 quoted in Ricupero 2018, 224). In other words, *arrivistes* replaced the "good society". The presence of a dichotomy between civilization and barbarity is again felt in between the lines.

The main parallel of the book rests on the similarities between the Chilean Civil War of 1891 and the Navy Revolt of 1893-94 in Brazil. Nabuco argues that, in Chile, the liberal sector broke ranks with Balmaceda and, led by the Navy, was able to topple the regime, thus restoring civilization. Conversely, Floriano Peixoto successfully repressed the rebellion and dashed the hopes of a return to civilization – the forces of barbarianism won. Nabuco's implicit conclusion is that the basis of democracy in Brazil was more fragile than in Chile; in the latter, society was able to contain the arbitrariness of a despot, whereas the former failed (Ricupero 2018, 225).

A Intervenção Estrangeira denounces Floriano Peixoto's handling of the Navy Revolt more pronouncedly. The book also distils Nabuco's anti-Americanism. Its main argument is that Washington's intervention was the key factor behind the revolt's defeat (Alonso 2012, 90). The gravity of the situation lay first on the fact that, by accepting such intervention, Peixoto gave away national sovereignty, which is the cornerstone of a country's status in the international society. Secondly, Brazil had naively trusted the uninterested support of a foreign power, ignoring that "protection" and "intervention" are "always the mode through which the shadow of a protectorate is first cast over an independent state" (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 126). In this sense, Nabuco warns that the United States was not a force for civilization, for it had come to the aid of a "South American despotism" (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 121).

It is also important to note that, from the beginning, the Revolt was associated with monarchical restauration, even though the mutinied explicitly denied this was their goal (Chaves Flores 2018, 62). Nabuco reiterated the rebel's version (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 138); yet the book is built upon such association, particularly its final chapter, where the Republic is embodied by its ruthless dictator, Peixoto, while Saldanha da Gama, the revolt's leader, personifies the virtues of the Monarchy (Alonso 2012, 86). Nabuco offers a vivid portrayal of the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism. Peixoto is described as an "old terrorist" who had the "ordinary fiber of the old *caudillos* from the River Plate" (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 128).

According to Nabuco, his telegrams during the revolt "breathe the hate and the animosity of Rosas against the *salvajes asquerosos unitarios* [savages and filthy unitarians][6]" (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 133, emphasis in the original). The President "brings to mind a combination of Robespierre and Francia"[7], resembling "not a great general, but a great jailer, a great inquisitor" (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 141). Conversely, Admiral Saldanha da Gama, whom Nabuco had personally known since the 1870s, is portrayed as a "noble figure in his manners and distinctions, and could well appear the bravest, the most generous and the most human leader of the most advanced nation of the world" (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 142). Gama was a human leader, uncapable of brutal acts, a true patriot: "if chivalry, in the highest sense of the word […] is the quality by excellence, it is in Saldanha da Gama that Brazil finds in this age its noblest type" (Nabuco, 2003 [1895c], 142). Nabuco then poses a rhetorical question: "who shall Brazilians admire more", Floriano Peixoto, "a force destitute of all attributes of humanity", or Saldanha da Gama, who "embodied them all"? (Nabuco 2003 [1895c], 140-1).

Nabuco distances himself from the political events of the 1890s in *Um Estadista no Império*. The book, published in three volumes, is a biography of his father, Senator and State Counsellor Nabuco de Araújo. However, in the end, Nabuco de Araújo's life serves as the narrative axis for a broader history of the Imperial order (Alonso 2007, 278). A laudatory tone underpins the book: Nabuco describes D. Pedro II's reign as a period when civilization was at its zenith; a time of national greatness that was lost, having been interrupted by the destructive forces of the present, i.e., the Republic (Salles 2012, 126-7).

By rejoicing the civilizational legacy of the Monarchy and the brilliance of its statesmen, Nabuco belittled the present and made the moral and political sterility of the Republic plain (Salles 2012, 123). He associates the present to the unstable years of the Regency Period (1831-40), when Brazil had a "republican experience"[8], pictured as a "total disaster" (Nabuco 2010 [1897-99], 344), which threatened national unity and almost led the nation to political and territorial disintegration (Needell 1991, 171). What saved the country was the *de facto* restoration of Monarchy with the coronation of the 14-year-old D. Pedro II. In Nabuco's view, D. Pedro's ascension to power accredited Brazil as "a free nation before the eyes of the world", in opposition to the "American republics, with their dynasties of dictators, 'half bandits, half patriots'", which formed, with rare

[6] Juan Manuel de Rosas was the governor of Buenos Aires from 1829 to 1832, and from 1835 until his deposition in 1852. Rosas was the archetype of the River Plate *caudillo* in the mind of Imperial elites.
[7] José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francía was a Paraguayan dictator and *caudillo* who ruled the country from 1814 until his death, in 1840.
[8] In 1831, D. Pedro I abdicated the throne in favor of his son, Pedro, who was only five years old. Because royal prerogatives over the political system were temporally suspended and, from 1835 on, regents were elected, this turbulent period was known in the Imperial imaginary as a *republican experience* (Basile 1990, 228).

exceptions, "the most extensive series of degrading governments among the peoples of European descent" (Nabuco 1949a quoted in Salles 2012, 127-8). Again, monarchical Brazil features as a civilized nation among barbarian neighbors. Furthermore, Nabuco's comparison suggests that the choice between Monarchy and Republic – between civilization and barbarism – had been given to Brazil before, but while in 1840 the former path was chosen, thus unleashing the "Brazilian Great Era", now the nation had opted for latter direction, resulting in the barbarity of the 1890s (Salles 2012, 127-8).

3.3.3 Joining the Republic (1899)

The publication of *Um Estadista no Império* proved to be the last act of Nabuco's monarchism, for, in March of 1899, he accepted the government's offer to defend Brazilian rights over the Pirara region in a territorial dispute against the United Kingdom. The monarchist then joined the regime he had criticized for the better part of the decade. Why? For one thing, the Republic in 1899 was significantly different from what it had been previously, particularly if compared to the military governments of 1889-4. The year of 1898 had marked a turning point regarding the political and economic stabilizations of the country, thanks to the rise of a civilian-oligarchic government led by Campos Sales (Lessa 2015). Nabuco expressed optimism regarding the Sales administration, praising the warm welcome the elected President had enjoyed in Europe, to where he traveled shortly before taking office (Nabuco 1949a, 284). In this sense, Nabuco privately considered accepting a public position if offered (Nabuco 1949a, 280); he seemed to enjoy the rumor in the press accounting that he could be named Foreign Minister: "it would really be an earthquake!", he wrote his brother-in-law. In the end, Nabuco was offered no Ministry, but accepted the more modest proposal anyway.

The former monarchist felt the need to justify his decision in the plan of ideas as well. Nabuco clung on patriotism. The cause was "national" before it was political; his involvement in it, a "painful sacrifice" that nonetheless he felt compelled to commit to defend Brazil's rights against "foreign pretensions" (Nabuco 1949b, 7, 8-9, 19). In *Minha Formação* (1900), he invokes the memories of his father and the political generation of which Nabuco de Araújo was part to legitimate his own decision of joining the Republic: "they would never established a dilemma between monarchy and the homeland, because the homeland could not have any rival" (Nabuco 2015 [1900], 227). In short, Nabuco had completed his transition from militant monarchism to a mere sentimental fidelity to the Empire, which was enough to accommodate himself within the Republic situationism (Alonso 2007, 291; Needell 1991, 177-8).

3.4 Monarchism as civilization: an appraisal

This chapter has shown that the concept of civilization was at the basis of Joaquim Nabuco's monarchist discourse during the 1890s. However, the way civilization was framed was different of what took place during the abolitionist campaign. To argue that abolition meant civilizational development was consistent with the evolutionist theory of history: slavery was a barbarian debris and should be left behind, paving the way for Brazil's definitive entrance into civilization. Monarchism subverted this civilizational equation. To Nabuco, Brazil was actually receding in civilizational terms under the Republic. In this sense, monarchical nostalgia and republican catastrophism underpinned his work during the 1890s. Nabuco believed Brazil's era of civilization lay in the past, in the Empire, whose greatness was unparalleled but that was now lost. Brazil was left with the political sterility that resulted from republicanism in Latin America, living under the permanent shadow of barbarism.

Nabuco's attitude during the 1890s offers us a rather curious application of the analytical framework developed in Chapter 1. First, Nabuco does not cope with Brazil's stigma in order to overcome it. Rather, by attacking the republican regime, he takes the side of the stigmatizing actors; in other words, he potentializes the discourse according to which Brazil is characterized as a backward and barbarian country, one that instead of making headway toward a civilized status is actually receding to a barbarian standing. Nevertheless, Nabuco's discourse does echo (and is a continuity of) a stigma-management strategy undertaken by the Brazilian Empire: that of passing. As stated before, the Monarchy tried to pass as a normal country by accepting the stigmatizing discourse over Latin America but refusing it applied to Brazil. However, whereas this discourse had a strategic function for as long as the Monarchy existed, it ceased to fight stigma from the moment the country's political institutions began to resemble that of its neighbors. Secondly, and as consequence of the previous point, Nabuco's monarchism was devoid of status-seeking objectives; rather, the status claims Nabuco put forward by bolstering a stigmatizing discourse were negative. Namely, either by criticizing the Republic or by exultating the Imperial legacy, Nabuco downgraded Brazil's present status in the international society. In short, there was no intention whatsoever of raising Brazil's international standing.

A final point worth stressing regards the external view on Brazil's regime change in terms of status and stigma. Because the intellectual and political debate between monarchists and republicans in the 1890s was mostly a domestic matter, further research would be necessary to study the stigmatizing side (i.e., that of the "normals") of the equation. The discussion undertaken in Chapter 1 has shown that there existed a stigma against South American republics in Europe,

and their political and economic turmoil were seen as the predicament of civilization in the continent. However, there is little sign that European statesmen and elites subscribed (or gave much thought) to the narrative according to which Imperial Brazil was essentially different than its neighborhood. It is true enough that D. Pedro II was esteemed and personally contributed to enhance the country's status, and that his downfall had a negative impact on Brazil's image. For instance, in 1894, *The Times* stated that after the "benevolent and peaceful" reign of D. Pedro II, Brazil had fallen in the hands of "speculators and adventurers" (Cervo and Bueno 2011, 169).

Nevertheless, Brazil still carried, independently of the political system it adopted, the weight of exoticism, rurality, miscegenated population and, of course, the enduring legacy of slavery. To complicate things further, a large-scale financial crisis outbroke in Argentina in 1890, resulting in massive European disinvestment in Latin America, and severely tarnishing the continent's reputation, Brazil's included (Franco 2014). This also makes it harder to discern how much of Brazil's discredit and lower status during the 1890s was actually a consequence of regime change, as both crises, political and economic, became one thing in the mind of external observers (Cervo e Bueno 2011, 171).

4 Civilization in Latin America: Nabuco and Pan-Americanism, 1899-1910

> A Ilusão Americana*, the book by Eduardo Prado, that so many times I told him I would write […] I told him I wished someone wrote it. It is a propaganda genre in which there is much to do.*
>
> Diaries, 05.12.1893[1]
>
> *Prado's* A Ilusão Americana *is a little book that does us great harm, entertaining the [Brazilian] public spirit with mistrust against this country [the United States], our only possible ally.*
>
> Letter to Graça Aranha, 17.12.1905[2]

In the later years of his life, Joaquim Nabuco became an Americanist. His conversion to the cause was gradual, taking place between his nomination as Brazil's representative to the Guyana Border Question, in 1899, and his appointment as Brazil's first ambassador to the United States, six years later. Once Nabuco embraced Pan-Americanism – advocating Brazil's proximity to Washington but not necessarily to other Latin American republics –, he defended it with vigorous zeal. The epigraph above exemplifies his change of spirit between the 1890s and 1900s, which resulted in a large measure from his reckoning with European Imperialism in the Guyana Border Question.

At the turn of the century, the *Age of Empire* (Hobsbawm 1989) was at its apex. Europe freely intervened in other continents and denied Asian and African polities their full sovereignty; it was at that time that European international lawyers created the idea of a *standard of civilization* to justify Europe meddling in "barbarian" states around the world. During the litigation, Nabuco realized that European powers stigmatized Brazil and that South America faced the possibility of being partitioned just like Africa and parts of Asia had recently been (Pereira 2012, 154). It was necessary to prove Brazil's status as a civilized nation in order to safeguard its territorial integrity.

These status-seeking imperatives drove Nabuco closer to the United States. He came to believe that the Monroe Doctrine was an effective instrument to inhibit European intervention in the American continent. He also hoped that the association with an emerging great power would grant Brazil significant status benefits: Washington would recognize Brazil as an equal partner in terms of civilizational progress, leading Europe to abandon its stigmatization of Brazil. Therefore,

[1] Quoted in Nabuco (2006, 346).
[2] Quoted in Nabuco (1949b, 235).

the main contention of this chapter is that, as Brazil's first ambassador to the United States, Joaquim Nabuco promoted Pan-Americanism as an instrument to increase Brazil's status and evade stigmatization in an Imperialist international society, having its civilized standing recognized by the great powers.

This chapter also introduces a new character to our story: José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior, the Baron of Rio Branco, who presided over the Ministry of Foreign Relations (*Itamaraty*) from 1902 to 1912. Rio Branco's chancellorship consolidated Brazil's political alignment to the United States; as a result, bilateral relations experienced unprecedented densification. In a classic study of the period, E. Bradford Burns (1966) spoke of an *unwritten alliance* between Washington and Rio de Janeiro. As part of this rapprochement, Rio Branco created Brazil's embassy in Washington and named a still-hesitant Joaquim Nabuco to run it. It is impossible (or analytically impoverishing, at best) to examine Nabuco's Pan-Americanism without relating it, even if limitedly, to Rio Branco's thoughts and policies, since every action Nabuco undertook as ambassador overlapped with Rio Branco's attitude on the matter. Even though both men shared the same assumptions regarding the necessity and convenience of developing closer ties with the United States, they sometimes disagreed on what course of action to take.

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first one deals with the period Nabuco spent working in the Guyana Border Question (1899-1904), presenting how he became increasingly deluded with Europe. The second section discusses the political and strategic foundations of Nabuco's and Rio Branco's Pan-Americanism, while the following section examines the role Latin America played in it. The fourth section examines how Nabuco and Rio Branco hoped to increase Brazil's status through Pan-Americanism, and it addresses two specific topics: Nabuco's social diplomacy and promotion of the Brazilian image abroad, and the Third Pan-American Conference, hosted by Brazil in 1906. The fifth section analyzes European and American reception to Brazil's status-seeking efforts during the *Panther Affair* (1905-06) and the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907). The final section offers an appraisal of Pan-Americanism in terms of stigma-management.

4.1 The Guyana Border Question and delusion with Europe

Following his nomination as Brazil's representative in the Guyana Border Question (also known as the Pirara Question), Nabuco departed to London, where he would reside until 1905[3]. The dispute dated back to the 1830s, when London established an Anglican mission in the Pirara

[3] From 1900 onwards, Nabuco was also Brazil's Plenipotentiary Minister in the United Kingdom.

region, an area Brazil considered its territory (Goes Filho 2015, 323-4). In 1842, London and Rio de Janeiro decided to neutralize the disputed area, a *status quo* that lasted until the early 1890s, when negotiations resumed. In 1901, both parties agreed to submit the matter to the arbitration of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy.

As Brazil's representative, Nabuco was responsible for submitting the country's memoire claiming its right over the entire territory under litigation. The arbitration sentence was issued in 1904 and was considered a diplomatic defeat for Brazil and a personal one for Nabuco. It gave Britain three-fifths of the disputed lands, which was more than London had previously offered in bilateral negotiations (Goes Filho 2015, 325). Crucially, Britain had gained access to the Amazon River basin, which was interpreted as a major geopolitical setback to Brazil[4].

The result taught Nabuco lasting lessons on international politics. Nabuco's main concern was that the sentence had dangerously applied political and legal principles derived from the Berlin Congress of 1884-85, which ruled territorial claims of European powers in Africa, to the South American sub-continent (Nabuco 1949b, 175)[5]. The Italian king left implicit that neither Brazil nor the United Kingdom had a perfect right to the contested territory because there was no "effective occupation" (Nabuco 1949b, 171; Pereira 2012, 154). "Based on these principles", Nabuco wrote Rio Branco shortly after the result came out, "we would lose a good half of our territory" (Nabuco 1949b, 171).

The Guyana Border Question was thus decisive to Nabuco's delusion with Europe. However, even before the sentence was issued, his experience as Brazil's Plenipotentiary Minister in London had exposed him to the general derision of the English court and of European diplomats for South America (Alonso 2007, 303; Ricupero 2012, 169). The best illustration of his consternation is a humoristic little poem he wrote at the time:

> Au Palais Buckingham, dîner diplomatique
> On n'attend que le Roi. Sir Thomas, liste en main,
> S'approche...le Lord Chamberlain
> Et lui dit: "Vous avez oublié l'Amérique...
> L'Amérique?...on pâlit, on va se trouver mal
> On cesse de manger...
> Mais Sir Thomas, continuant sa phrase:
> "Du Sud...". Éclats de rire, appétit general.[6]

[4] In hindsight, Synesio Sampaio Goes Filho (2015, 326-7) argues that the scale and meaning of this setback was exaggerated. London did little to further its presence in Guyana and the access to the basin was peripheral.

[5] Nabuco disavowed a popular hypothesis within Brazilian circles according to which the young Italian king had favored London in order to avoid displeasing the world's greatest power (Nabuco 1949b, 170). However, as Rubens Ricupero (2017, 304-5) argues, Italy had belatedly joined the Imperialist race, so it tended to promote international legal doctrines that disregarded historical primacy and legal documents.

[6] Quoted in Ricupero (2012, 169). A free translation follows:
At the Palace of Buckingham, diplomatic dinner / Only the King is awaited. Sir Thomas, list in his hands / Approaches…Lord Chamberlain / And says to him: "You have forgotten America" / America? …Paleness, we will

Therefore, Nabuco realized that, no matter the diplomatic effort to raise the country's profile, European powers and societies still stigmatized Brazil. The comparisons to Africa signaled that Europe did not see Brazil as a civilized, sovereign equal. On the contrary, it seemed Brazil was a possible target of the Imperialist "civilizing mission" over barbarian societies (Santos 2018, 375). In 1902, he had written Tobias Monteiro that the British press was "disgusting[ly]" discussing the European "partition of South America as if it was Africa" (Nabuco 1949b,139-40). In the same year, he told Rio Branco that an article in *The Spectator* stated that Brazil remained an "undeveloped land" with its "black, native and mixed-blood populations"; it was the "white man's burden*"* to civilize it. According to Nabuco, the fact that Europeans did not consider that Brazil "was or could ever be a white nation", capable of "assuming the white man's burden" itself, should "outrage us all" (Nabuco 1949b, 127-8). Behind Nabuco's words was the frustration of being powerless to validate Brazil's civilized credentials before Europe. In his diaries, he contended: "were it not for the American scarecrow, I am sure Europe would already be treating South America as China, Asia and Africa" (Nabuco 2006, 473). In time, this propelled Nabuco to embrace the scarecrow.

4.2 The foundations of Pan-Americanism

In 1905, Nabuco was named Brazil's first Ambassador to the United States, an office he still held when he died, five year later. The installation of an embassy in Washington was no small feat for Brazilian diplomacy: embassies were not common in the early 20th century diplomatic network, except among great powers. At the time Brazil raised its legation to the status of an embassy, there were only six others in Washington (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Mexico). The move symbolized both a critical juncture of Brazil's diplomatic history – the shift of the foreign policy's axis from Europe to the Americas (Bueno 2003, 155; Ricupero 2012, 170) – and Brazil's signaling for a higher international status.

The threat of European Imperialism was the main driver of Nabuco's Americanism and played an important role in shaping Rio Branco's[7]. Brazil had felt its weight even before the Guyana Border Question. In 1895, the United Kingdom invaded the uninhabited Brazilian island of Trindade claiming *terra nullius*. The argument echoed the Berlin Congress principle that only effective occupation guaranteed sovereignty. After diplomatic pressure and Portuguese mediation,

be in a difficult position / All stop eating… /But Sir Thomas continues his phrase /"South America"… / Loud laughter, general appetite.

[7] The extent to which Rio Branco's Americanism was a consequence of European Imperialism remains subject to discussion; nevertheless, there is a broad consensus Imperialism was a relevant factor. Other reasons include economic imperatives, and the importance of good relations to give Rio Branco a freer hand in negotiating border questions with South American neighbors. See Clodoaldo Bueno (2003) for a detailed discussion.

the British backed down. At around the same time, military skirmishes between Brazil and France outbroke in the disputed area of Amapá, and Paris veiledly threatened to occupy the region (Santos 2018, 217-8). Ultimately, the parties agreed to take the matter to arbitration – Rio Branco would successfully defend Brazil's claim.

The way out of European Imperialism was found in the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by the United States in 1823 in the wake of Latin American independence. The doctrine exhorted European powers to remain aloof from the political affairs of the Western Hemisphere, in so far as not to violate the independence of its nations (Burns 1966, 146). For most of the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine remained, above all, a declaration of principles, as the United States lacked the political will and military and economic capacity for enforcing it (Freeman Smith 1986, 84-5; Charlip and Burns 2017, 151-2). Nevertheless, from the late 1880s on, the United States responded to European Imperialism with its own version of expansionism. The Pan-Americanist ideology behind it gave a new impetus and meaning to Monroism (Dennison 2006, 154). Washington's hegemony over the continent, at the expense of European influence, was consolidated upon the declaration of the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904. Washington stated that it was up to the United States, not to Europe, to intervene in the American continent (Bethell 2016, 188). Revealingly, the message's wording is embedded in a civilizational discourse. It legitimized Washington's interventionism in case of "general loosening of the ties of civilized society" in Latin American countries.

In contrast to most of their Latin American counterparts, Rio Branco and Nabuco did not view American Imperialism as a threat. On the contrary, they presumed stronger ties with the United States could dissuade European powers from intervening in Brazilian affairs, as they would risk facing American opposition. Washington's interventionist policies thus were a shield for Brazil. To Nabuco, the choice before Brazil was clear: either Monroism or European recolonization (Nabuco 2006, 588). In 1906, during his only visit to Brazil after leaving it in 1899, Nabuco sought to assuage anti-American feeling in a speech in the *Cassino Fluminense*: "no, gentlemen, no; there is no *American danger!* There is nothing to fear from the United States". He added that both countries were linked by "ties stronger than any alliance […] *by the same ideal of civilization* and mutual trust" (Nabuco 1906, 100, emphasis added). In short, both security and civilization tied them together.

Nabuco argued that the Monroe Doctrine had separated Europe from the Western Hemisphere "as the moon is separated from the Earth"[8]. The continents were, in effect, two political systems (Pereira 2012). The Americas, in opposition to the belligerent character of

[8] Quoted in Stephanie Dennison (2006, 159).

Europe, was "the Continent of Peace" (Nabuco 1906 quoted in Ricupero 2012, 174-5). In this sense, Pan-Americanism was key for harmonizing American nations around the goals of peace, civilization and progress. Although founded on harmonious coexistence, Nabuco believed the system had a leader, the United States; but he saw American leadership as legitimate, since it was recognized by Latin America, in contrast to the aggressive European Imperialism (Pereira 2012, 158-9).

4.3 Brazil, Latin America and Pan-Americanism

Washington's leadership meant that in Nabuco's mind the American system was hierarchical. Brazil was to be a continental "Vice-President" (Dennison 2006, 156). Its role was to act as a privileged intermediary between Latin America and the United States (Burns 1966, 174). In this sense, Pan-Americanism was coupled to the enduring belief of Brazil's superiority to Hispanic America (Silveira 2003, 255-6). Brazil was pictured as the first among equals, the responsible for upholding civilization in South America, where it should exercise the role of natural leader and "moral hegemon" (Burns 1966, 172; Bueno 2003, 156). In the words of a Brazilian press columnist of the time: "there are two *foci* of civilization in the American continent, one in the north, the other in the south" (Burns 1966, 172).

Brazil's lasting claim to superiority over Latin America meant it sought a higher status compared to its neighbors, while giving continuity to the stigma-coping strategy of passing; just as in the Empire, Brazil accepted Latin American countries were prone to stigmatization, but Brazil stood above Hispanic-American countries. This led Brazil to back Washington policies most of the times when Latin and North Americans clashed. For instance, when Venezuela attempted to call for a Latin American conference in 1905, excluding the United States, and to form a Latin American "league of states", Rio Branco (correctly) viewed this move as a hostile action against Washington. He told Oliveira Lima, Brazil's Plenipotentiary Minister in Caracas, that

> The league […] would be completely innocuous to the great republic of the north [the United States] and merely prejudicial to the allied nations, in great part stalled and weakened by the political convulsions, intestine wars, military *pronunciamentos* and periodical, when not successive, dictatorships[9].

However, Nabuco and Rio Branco would clash over their views regarding the triangular balance between Brazil, the United States and Latin America. These cracks resulted from Nabuco's

[9] Quoted in Santos (2018, 388).

unswerving support of Washington, while Rio Branco was aware that circumstances could lead to a separation of Brazilian interests from the American ones. He was thus ready to water down Americanism if necessary. The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 presents us with the most drastic example of their disagreement. Nabuco thought it was natural for him to represent Brazil in the Hague, since he considered the conference an opportunity to promote his Americanism (Santos 2018, 410). Instead, Rio Branco named Ruy Barbosa, then the Senate's Vice-President. Rio Branco initially instructed Barbosa to follow Washington's agenda. However, to their surprise, the United States proposed the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration, in which only the great powers would have permanent seats. Rotative seats would be attributed to other countries based on geographic region and on rank – Brazil was categorized as a third-rank nation, behind smaller European countries (Burns 1966, 122). Feeling humiliated, Rio Branco instructed Barbosa to attempt altering the ranking criteria so that Brazil could be included in the "first class", but neither the United States nor any European power backed Brazil (Santos 2018, 411-4). Barbosa then broke with Washington's project, advocating in favor of the sovereign equality of nations: all countries had to be represented in the Court if it was to exist. Barbosa's action was supported by other Latin American delegations, and in light of such opposition, the project failed. The episode increased Brazil's prestige in Latin America; in Britain and in the United States, Barbosa's individual performance was sometimes lauded, but the idea of sovereign equality and Brazil's position were called "a little ridiculous, to say the least" (Dennison 2006, 180-2).

Nabuco's first reaction to the developments in the Hague was to congratulate Barbosa and to question the American stance (Nabuco 1949b, 283-4). Soon, however, he realized the damage the conference had done to bilateral relations between Washington and Rio de Janeiro. He expressed his dismay to Graça Aranha, his protégé: "[I'd rather] a thousand times we had not gone to the Hague rather than having our intelligence with the United States weakened and shaken" (Nabuco 1949b, 288). Likewise, he warned Rio Branco that alignment to Washington was indispensable: "were the American people to be convinced we wish them ill, our integrity would not be of much value. How could we defend Fernando de Noronha better than Colombia defended Panama[10]?" (Nabuco 1949b, 300). Simply put, Brazil's international status and territorial unity depended on Pan-Americanism.

Nabuco also emphasized his disapproval of the sovereign equality thesis (Bethell 2016, 218). He chided Rio Branco and Barbosa for defending that Brazil could have the same political

[10] In 1903, after the Colombian Congress rejected a treaty with Washington on the construction of a canal linking the Atlantic and the Pacific, the United States sponsored an uprising in Panama, whose political independence was quickly recognized by the Roosevelt government. A bilateral treaty secured the construction of the Panama Canal and made the country a virtual American protectorate (Freeman Smith 1986, 101).

and legal weight as "any Central American *republiqueta*" (Nabuco 1949b, 294). "It is one thing for Brazil […] to strive to enter the running circle of the civilized world", he reasoned, "it is something else to claim for itself, Haiti, Honduras, Panamá etc., the same international status great powers have" (Nabuco 1949b, 288). In other words, by pursuing the doctrine of equality, Brazil was in practice giving up its special status that set it apart (and above) the rest of Latin America (Dennison 2006, 201).

4.4 Pan-Americanism and the quest for status

As we have examined before, Pan-Americanism appealed to Nabuco and Rio Branco because they both realized Europe did not regard Brazil as sovereign or civilized equals. The choice of aligning with Washington in detriment to Europe or other Latin American states is in conformity with IR literature on status. Marina Duque (2018, 581) argues that status largely results from peer attribution, so that states enjoy higher status because other nations recognize it. In this sense, status is self-reinforcing, for states tend to follow others in status-recognition. This leads us to the idea of social closure, which we have discussed in Chapter 1. Because of "inside/outside" social barriers existing in any society, stablishing a connection with "club members" is important in the process of joining such club. Intimate relations with the United States could therefore be a shortcut to a higher status. Both Nabuco and Rio Branco had understood no European country was inclined to recognize Brazil's condition as a civilized power. If the United States treated Brazil as an equal partner, there were greater chances the Europeans would do so as well. In short, alignment with the United States was at the roots of Brazil's status-seeking strategy.

In order to improve status, Rio Branco's Americanist strategy called for an active promotion of Brazil's image abroad. Promoting social diplomacy was the way to do so in a routinely basis. Nabuco was the best man for the job: the reputation he enjoyed in terms of social skills was (and remains) nothing short of legendary. In his early twenties, Nabuco was known as *Quincas, o Belo* (Quincas, the beautiful); he outrivaled most of his colleagues in etiquette and charm and his dandy attitude contrasted with the more provincial, crude style of the previous generation (Alonso 2007, 28-30). His aristocratic skills were further improved thanks to his close relationship with Brazil's long-time chief minister in London, the Baron of Penedo, at whose house Nabuco was a frequent guest in the 1870s and 1880s. Penedo was known for the lavish *soirées* he hosted at the Brazilian legation, as well for actively participating in the Court of St. James. From Penedo, Nabuco learned that social skills mattered almost as much as a country's material capabilities when it came to making diplomacy on the ground.

In 1905, Nabuco was 55 years old, but he remained a towering figure (Alonso 2007, 301). In the coarse Washington diplomatic culture, "Dom Nabuco" shone like a lone and bright star. The parties at the Brazilian embassy soon became famous in the political and diplomatic circuits and had positive repercussion in the local press. In time, Nabuco became one of the most well related figures in the North-American capital (Alonso 2007, 314-5). He was acquainted with President Theodore Roosevelt and befriended Secretary of State Elihu Root, gaining to Brazil the sympathy of the main American foreign policy-makers (Roosevelt's second term ended months before Nabuco died). Upon his death in 1910, Nabuco was granted the rare honors of a State Funeral – attended by President William Taft, Secretary of State Philander Knox, Supreme Court judges, Senators and other diplomats – and of having the US War Navy offered to take his body back to Brazil. In a time when the ambassadors personified their country's image, Nabuco contributed more than any other individual towards rendering prestige to Brazil in the United States (Santos 2018, 364).

4.4.1 The "Pan-American Campaign"

Nabuco also dedicated much of his energy to the diffusion of Pan-Americanist ideals among the American public opinion. In his "Pan-American campaign", Nabuco sought twin goals: to praise Pan-Americanism and Monroism, particularly the United States civilizing and leading role, and to promote Brazil's image through the celebration of its political culture and of the distinct aesthetic value of the Portuguese language (Jackson 2008).

To Nabuco, the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism increased awareness both in the United States and Latin America regarding their common destiny – in time, such consciousness would create a distinct Pan-American public opinion (Nabuco 2010 [1908a], 552-5). More than once did Nabuco emphasize that the United States and Latin America also upheld a common heritage: "we are all sons of Colombo […], all sons of Washington" (Nabuco 1908b, 3; 1907, 7-8). George Washington was the forebear of the "spirit of continental freedom" (Nabuco 1907, 8). Washington's legacy was complemented by Abraham Lincoln, to whom the entire Latin America owed an immense debt for having "forever reaffirmed the liberal character of American civilization" (Nabuco 1909, 168).

Nabuco thus believed the United States was the beacon of civilization for the continent. Upon receiving his credentials from President Theodore Roosevelt, he declared he hoped to "see an increase in the huge moral influence that the United States exerts over the *march towards*

civilization […][11]". Elsewhere, he celebrated American absorption of immigrants, its democracy, the equality of social conditions, the educational system and the respect women enjoyed in the country (Nabuco 2010 [1908c], 535-44). For these reasons, deeper ties with the United States "could only be beneficial to Latin-American nations", who would gain from the North American "high civilization" (Nabuco 2010 [1908a], 550). Pan-Americanism was therefore a "civilizing force" that would "remove from the continent the danger of internecine war" and "cure the old evils among American Republics" (Nabuco 1907, 4-6). Tellingly, these evils were not really American, but *Latin American*: the contact with the United States would regenerate the rest of the continent.

Latin American evils were not Brazilian either: Nabuco attempted to call the American public's attention to the grandiosity of Brazil and to the similarities of the two countries' history and political culture. In both nations, a spirit of nationality could be traced back to colonial times, a characteristic that allowed them to avert the political and territorial disintegration seen in the rest of the continent (Nabuco 2010 [1908d], 517). Nabuco also compared Brazilian figures to American ones; in his view, D. Pedro II was a "crowned Benjamin Franklin" (Nabuco 2010 [1908d], 525). Finally, Nabuco trusted the civilizing mission behind Pan-Americanism would always find natural support in Brazil, a country that, in his view, had always been loyal to the continent (Nabuco 2010 [1908d], 527).

Some of Nabuco's conferences discussed Portuguese Renaissance poet Luís de Camões and his national epic, *Os Lusíadas*. In doing so, Nabuco's goal was to honor the Portuguese language, thus distinguishing it from Spanish, spoken in the rest of Latin America (Dennison 2006, 189). In this sense, Nabuco presented Portuguese as a "noble language" that deserved respect for its aesthetic qualities and cultural value. Nabuco's ultimate goal was to leave a dignified and unforgettable impression of Brazil on the American audience (Jackson 2008, 346).

In a nutshell, by promoting the Portuguese language, as well as Brazil's social and political culture, Nabuco sought to raise Brazil's intellectual profile and reiterate the country's place in the concert of civilized nations. Brazil, according to Nabuco, had inherited the best of the Old World – a noble language that was singular in Latin America – and of the New – the absorbed Americanism and continental solidarity (Dennison 2006, 191). In short, Brazil was a *locus* of civilization in America.

[11] Quoted in Dennison (2006, 160). Emphasis added.

4.4.2 The Third Pan-American Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 1906)

The most concrete result of Nabuco's Pan-Americanism was the Third Pan-American Conference, hosted by Brazil in 1906 and presided by Nabuco himself. The idea of a Pan-American conference was originally devised by Secretary of State James Blaine (1889-92)[12]. His goals were to give a political spin to the ideal of greater unity and harmony among American Republics and to use the conference as an instrument to expanding Washington's trade and investment in Latin America (Topik 2009, Ch. 2). The first conference was held in Washington between 1889 and 1890 and a second one took place in Mexico in 1902. From there onwards, Pan-American Conferences would take place every four years.

The 1906 Conference was attended by Secretary of State Elihu Root, marking the first international trip ever made by a sitting American Secretary of State. Nabuco credited the unprecedented trip to the positive impression he had caused in the American government (Nabuco 1949b, 243; Santos 2018, 385). Nonetheless, it seems that Washington's main goal was to offset the negative and Imperialist image brought about by the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Panama affair, and the Roosevelt Corollary (Dennison 2006, 170; Santos 2018, 386). There was also an interest in furthering economic bonds with South America: from Brazil, Root visited several other American countries (Santos 2018, 385). In any case, the two feats – hosting the conference and Root's presence – increased Brazil's prestige.

From the onset, it was clear that displaying Brazil's credentials to America and the world was more important to the Brazilian government than actually advancing a meaningful agenda for the meeting. Rio Branco wrote to Nabuco that he had no interest in proposing any subject in particular; in fact, the program was to be restricted to universally-agreed themes and broad declarations of principles (Santos 2018, 387). Nabuco himself believed the paramount purpose of the conference was to give the spirit of Pan-Americanism an "opportunity to flourish" (Dennison 2006, 170). Back in Rio de Janeiro, Rio Branco promoted several awe-inspiring structural improvements to the *Itamaraty* palace. The Monroe Palace (named so after Nabuco's suggestion) was constructed especially to host the Conference. Moreover, the Brazilian government was eager to show the world the new face of Rio de Janeiro in the wake of its recent urban and sanitary reforms (Santos 2018, 391-3). In short, hosting the conference was a status-seeking enterprise, one

[12] The first attempt to establish political coordination based on the idea of American solidarity was Símon Bolivar's Congress of Panama in 1826. Attended by Gran Colombia, Mexico, Peru and the Federal Republic of Central America, it failed to achieve any meaningful political results. Bolívar's Americanism did not include the United States and deeply mistrusted (Imperial) Brazil; similar conferences were sporadically organized throughout the 19th century, all of them without success. See Santos (2004) for a review of Brazil's relations to these conferences.

that aimed to attract international attention to the country's civilizational progress. This sentiment was captured by the Brazilian press: "the eyes of the world are turned to this capital", an article in the *Correio da Manhã* stated in the opening day of the conference, "and Brazil is proud and satisfied for having that honor and for deserving it"[13].

The conference enjoyed nearly universal adherence – only Venezuela and Haiti were absent. Loyal to his reputation and style, Nabuco organized an extensive parallel social program. It included several picnics and feasts, a garden party, a lavish ball in *Itamaraty* and excursions to the city of Petrópolis and to the Corcovado (Alonso 2007, 323). The Conference was nominally successful; there was only mild political disagreement (Dennison 2006, 170). As would be expected after the watering down of its agenda, the event was also of little importance in terms of policy development (Santos 2018, 394). Nonetheless, Brazil collected considerable symbolic dividends in terms of status. It had succeeded in hosting a large international conference for the first time, favorably impressing its foreign guests.

4.5 The Panther Affair*, the Second Hague Peace Conference and the limits to status-seeking*

The Third Pan-American Conference took place in the interval between two episodes that put into question the capacity of Americanism to overcome Brazil's stigmatization and to increase the country's status: the *Panther Affair* and the aforementioned Second Hague Peace Conference. On 27 November 1905, officers and sailors of the German gunboat *Panther* disembarked at the port of Itajaí to apprehend a German national charged with desertion. The operation took place without the consent of the Brazilian government, thus breaching the country's sovereignty. When (confusing) reports of the incident were published in the press, a diplomatic crisis between Brazil and Germany outbroke.

Rio Branco's reaction was swift and energic. He telegraphed Brazil's legation in Berlin, instructing it to protest against the incident. He also summoned the German Minister in Rio in order to demand him the restitution of the alleged deserter (as he had been unlawfully captured in Brazil's territory) and that he pressed for a formal apology. Then, he ordered three Brazilian cruisers to sail to Southern Brazil with orders to intercept the *Panther* in the event Germany refused to comply with Brazil's demands. Lastly, he telegraphed Nabuco, instructing him to stoke Monroist sentiment in the American press; he also informed the ambassador Brazil would resort to force, if necessary (Peixoto 2011, 48; Santos 2018, 380-1).

[13] Quoted in Santos (2018, 395).

Rio Branco's fulminant response is explained by the symbolism that lie behind the episode. European powers recurrently violated sovereignty in their Imperial periphery, but such occurrences would never take place *among* European countries, for sovereignty was the backbone of civilization. Therefore, not reacting to the incident would amount to accepting that Brazil was not among the civilized nations (Santos 2018, 381). A political editorial published in *O Paiz* on 12 December illustrates the national commotion: German nationals were confusing "perfectly organized, cult and advanced" countries such as Brazil with "primitive territories, inhabited by barbarian tribes". In short, Brazil's place in the international order was at stake.

The matter was ultimately settled in accordance to Rio Branco's wishes. Germany expressed its regret for the episode, clarifying it never meant to breach Brazil's sovereignty; Berlin also informed that the officers involved in the episode would face legal charges in Germany. Three factors concurred with the favorable outcome. In the first place, German government had treated the case as a "tempest in a teapot" from the beginning, so it opted for a conciliatory approach (Peixoto 2011, 62). Secondly, official investigations conducted by both countries concluded that the incident was less grave than initially reported – no one had been abducted and the deserter voluntarily returned to the vessel (Santos 2018, 381-2).

The third factor is more controversial: the role played by the United States. By the time the *Panther* incident occurred, there was a strong anti-German sentiment in the United States; it was believed the "German danger" threatened Washington's position in Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, the *Panther* had already been involved in previous incidents in Venezuela and Haiti, both of which had resulted in widespread criticism in the American press. This background helps explaining that, when Rio Branco asked Nabuco to encourage support for Brazil in the press, Washington's reaction proved to be overwhelming. In reality, Nabuco extrapolated Rio Branco's instructions and personally informed the State Department of the Brazilian account of the facts; however, he did not ask for Washington's diplomatic intervention on the matter (Bueno 339-40; Burns 1966, 105). Root, nevertheless, mentioned it to the Germany ambassador in Washington and briefed the American embassy in Berlin about the incident. Root's actions did not amount to an intervention, but they did convey the message that the American government was interested in the case, which could have led Berlin to act cautiously. According to E. Bradford Burns (1966, 107), "although the Monroe Doctrine had not been invoked, its presence was felt". American and Brazilian presses insinuated that the episode proved Brazil's submission to Washington (Bueno 2003, 340-1; Santos 2018, 382). In response, Rio Branco vehemently dismissed the rumors Nabuco had asked for Washington's intervention; he knew Brazil's status would not be improved if the country remedied a violation to its sovereignty by an

Imperial power by welcoming the tutelage of another. Conversely, the American government never bothered to dismiss the claims it had intervened, as it was within its interest to affirm its position over Germany (Santos 2018, 382).

It has been argued that Brazil's growing friendship with the United States was pivotal in solving the case favorably to Brazil's sovereignty, even if Washington's involvement was only indirect (Burns 1966, 107). In other words, closer ties to the United States had paid off in terms of Brazil having its status respected or even increased as a result of a perfect understanding with a great power. However, this argument misses a crucial point: had Germany placed Brazil in equal civilized footing, such incident would not have taken place to begin with. Germany's backing down might have had more to do with the American status than Brazil's. In short, the legacy for Brazil's international standing was ambiguous at best.

The lessons from the Second Hague Peace Conference were more unequivocal. We have previously discussed how the United States and European powers had categorized Brazil as a third-rank power during the conference. Rio Branco resented such treatment and told Barbosa that Brazil would never sign a treaty that demoted it to the "third, fourth or fifth category" (Santos 2018, 414). The biggest blow to Rio Branco (and Nabuco) was Washington's stance. The fact that European nations underrated Brazil's status despite its recent status-seeking efforts was bad enough; but Rio Branco was sure he could count on Washington's endorsement. The reality proved the contrary true, exposing the flaws and misjudgments behind Nabuco's and Rio Branco's Americanist strategy. The Conference also illustrated the dissonance between the image Brazilian elites had of their country and its real relevance in Washington's policy (Santos 2018, 416-7). Just as Europe had done before, at no time did the American decisionmakers think of Brazil as an equal partner in terms of status. Brazil remained stigmatized, categorized on par with its Latin American neighbors.

4.6 Pan-Americanism as civilization: an appraisal

Relations between Brazil and the United States would gradually deteriorate after the Hague conference for the remainder of Rio Branco's tenure; but Nabuco's faith in Pan-Americanism never wavered. In the preparatory meetings for the Fourth Pan-American Conference, to be held in Buenos Aires in 1910, Nabuco proposed a motion recognizing the Monroe Doctrine as a "noble and uninterested initiative" that had brought lasting peace to the Americas. Negative reception by other delegations killed the initiative (Santos 2018, 454-5). Nabuco did not live to see the conference.

Unlike his abolitionist campaign, which conditioned Brazil's civilized standing to the *future* emancipation of slaves, or his 1890s monarchism, which placed civilization in Brazil in a lost *past*, Pan-Americanism stressed that Brazil had, *in the present*, civilized credentials that entitled the country to a higher international status. By seeking status in the international society, Nabuco adopted the strategy of passing in order to overcome the stigma of civilizational backwardness associated with Brazil. Just as the Empire resented being labelled barbarian and relentlessly tried to prove the contrary, Nabuco believed Brazil was unjustly treated and should have its civilized status recognized.

Passing meant accepting that the world was indeed divided between civilized and uncivilized nations, while affirming Brazil belonged to the former group. In this sense, whereas Nabuco feared European Imperialism, he did not repudiate the Imperialist order *per se*. That was particularly in Rio Branco's thoughts – he once declared that a weak nation that was uncapable of self-government had "no reason to exist and must give way to a stronger, better organized, progressist and virile nation"[14]. Nabuco was less vocal on the matter, but his attitude in the aftermath of the Hague conference gives little room for any interpretation other than that he believed Brazil was unquestionably superior to its neighbors and should be treated accordingly. The normative worldview according to which international politics was hierarchical and oligarchical was not questioned (Santos 2018, 479-80).

Ultimately, the Americanist strategy failed to remove Brazil's stigma in the international society. The Second Hague Peace Conference was an unmistakable testimony of Brazil's continued stigma and inferior status in the faces of Europe and the United States. Even if we accept the argument that recognition of a higher status by Washington could lead European countries in the same direction, facts on the ground demonstrated that the rapprochement between the two countries was largely a product of an unilateral reaching out on Brazil's part (Burns 1966, 203-4). Though the United State surely appreciated Brazilian validating acts in its support, it had no interest in cultivating a special relationship with Brazil or in accommodating its interests in light of Brazil's, (Santos 2018, 416-7, 484-6). To Nabuco's disappointment, there never was an *unwritten alliance*.

[14] Quoted in Santos (2018, 368).

Concluding Remarks

> *This year I have entered the 60s. The Nabucos do not go far in life and my spiritual mood is that of someone who would wish to go to sleep, were not for wife and children. Love aside, the feeling I have is that I have done my time and I must give my place to another. I say all of this giving thanks to God.*
>
> Letter to the Baroness of Penedo, 26.10.1909[1].

The objective I pursued in this dissertation was to examine the processes through which Joaquim Nabuco sought to deal with Brazil's stigma in the international society in order to elevate its status. The theoretical model designed in Chapter 1, and applied in the remaining chapters, focused more on the stigma-coping processes than on the outcome of resulting status claims. Future research could analyze in more detail changing external perceptions of Brazil's status. Nonetheless, there is enough evidence to argue that, despite Nabuco's continued efforts to the contrary, Brazil remained a stigmatized country in the international society.

In a way, there was only so much Nabuco and Brazilian decisionmakers could do. The hierarchical structure of the international society constrained the position Brazil could strive in the period. All stigma-coping strategies adopted throughout Nabuco's life assumed European civilization was to be emulated; as a result, Brazil's status-seeking action sought to uplift its standing within the international society. However, social mobility is conditional on the willingness of existing members to accept new ones. As both our analytical and empirical discussion elucidated, that was not the case in the 19th century international society, where the standard of civilization was an exclusive, not inclusive gatekeeping mechanism.

Regardless of their ultimate outcome, Nabuco's Abolitionist, monarchist and Pan-Americanist campaigns reflect the mentality of the bulk of Brazil's – and Latin America's, more generally – elites of the 19th century. On the one hand, these groups internalized the stigma of civilizational backwardness emanating from Europe and, to a lesser degree, from the United States. On the other, they reacted against it. Brazilian elites relentlessly sought to affirm their country's civilized credentials before the world. This was true under the Monarchy, when, for example, D. Pedro II measured no efforts to promote the image of a modern and cosmopolitan Brazil in the "Universal Exhibitions"[2], and under the Republic, whose Paris-inspired urban reform of Rio de

[1] Quoted in Nabuco (1949b, 339-40).
[2] For a discussion on D. Pedro II, the Monarchy and the "Universal Exhibitions" of the second half of the 19th century, see Schwarcz (1999, 385-407).

Janeiro in the beginning of the 20th century[3] was proudly presented to the world in the Third Pan-American Conference in 1906.

Yet, even to the eyes of these elites, "civilization" in the New World stood on shaky ground, making their nation's grasp of it always unstable. The continued efforts to distance Brazil from the rest of the continent are exemplary in this sense: Brazilian elites duly accepted South America was a place of barbarism, but Brazil was *different*. This attitude is also a powerful evidence that the hierarchical and stratifying nature of the international order – the cornerstone upon which stigma was built – was extensively acknowledged. What men like Nabuco questioned was the Brazilian position within that hierarchy; the discourse of civilization was never called into question.

In this sense, in the three distinct "moments" of his public life, Nabuco faced the issue of stigma by the broader strategy of attempting normalcy, leaving aside the paths related to embracing one's stigma ("breaking with reality" or accepting it as a "blessing in disguise"). Nevertheless, he addressed stigma in different contexts and with distinct goals. Nabuco's abolitionism corresponds to the stigma-management strategy of undertaking "corrective action" in order to fix the stigmatizing attribute, in this case, slavery. In accordance to the Imperial elites of the time, he considered that Brazil was in essence a civilized country, but believed slavery represented a barbarian institution whose lingering existence prevented Brazil from seeking a higher status in the international society. Interestingly, in contrast to his later political writings, stigma against Latin America features only secondarily in Nabuco's abolitionism. He did claim that Brazil had become "the Paraguay of slavery" (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 27); more often, however, he appealed to South America to stress that Brazil lagged behind, as the last country where slavery still stood (Nabuco 2003 [1883], 197)[4].

Conversely, Nabuco's monarchism in the 1890s was not only deeply anti-American, but also ran against the grain in terms of stigma-management presented by stigma theory. Instead of coping with the stigma his country faced, Nabuco sustained and bolstered it. Nabuco's attitude is best comprehended when we consider that derision for Latin America was at the foundations of the national identity forwarded by the Monarchy. Brazil was civilized *because* monarchical regime made it different from the rest of the continent and superior to it. Through this narrative, imperial elites sought to "pass" as normals, accepting the established stigmatizing discourse against Latin America while refusing to believe that the stigma applied to Brazil as well. Monarchism is thus an exception in Nabuco's career because it is devoid of status-seeking objectives; rather, it reads as

[3] The Pereira Passos' urban reform (1902-6) had a revealing slogan: "*O Rio civiliza-se!*", or , in a free translation, "Rio civilizes!".

[4] For more details on the relationship between Brazil and South America during the former's process of abolishing slavery, see Preuss (2012, 2011).

lamentation or nostalgia. Nonetheless, his monarchism is still concerned about Brazil's status before the civilized world.

"Passing" was also the approach behind Nabuco's Pan-Americanism during the 1900s. Nevertheless, there were two differences between monarchism and Pan-Americanism. First, his negative stance towards Hispanic-American countries subsided somewhat, even though it did not disappear[5]. While he asserted Brazil's superior status over most of them, he now believed in a common destiny (and shared heritage) with Latin America; the future of civilization in the continent depended on a collective policy, namely Pan-Americanism. The United States, which Nabuco had sharply criticized in his *Intervenção Estrangeira*, became the touchstone of Brazil's path to civilization. Secondly, Nabuco's Pan-Americanism was a propositional policy – it claimed Brazil's civilized status *in the present*. This also differentiates Pan-Americanism from abolitionism: the latter encompassed domestic change to eliminate stigma, while the former rejected that any stigma of civilizational backwardness was applicable to Brazil to begin with.

After Nabuco's death, Brazil would continue to undertake a foreign policy that sought to seek status, but the results remained discouraging. The most telling example was the *débacle* in the League of Nations in 1926, when the country had its claim to a permanent seat in the League Council snubbed, revealing once again the gulf that existed between the country's self-image and the status European powers attributed to it[6]. Even after civilizational discourse was delegitimized in the international society, following the interwar period and World War II, the Eurocentric value system and stigmatization processes were maintained under a framework of "economic development" according to which Brazil and Latin America were "underdeveloped" (Zarakol 2011, 87-91).

The study of Joaquim Nabuco's political ideals and trajectory permitted us to grasp how stigmatized actors viewed their own condition and attempted to act upon it. Nabuco's changing of positioning throughout the decades elucidates that there has never been a single strategy option available to political actors. Nabuco had an elevated opinion of Brazil – like most of the elites around him did –, but there was a crucial dissonance between their status-seeking strategies and the enduring stigma Brazil faced. In the end, Nabuco attempted to play in a higher league than the owners of the game were inclined to allow.

[5] By the time Nabuco died, Brazilian stigma over Latin America was slowly beginning to fade. In 1905, Manuel Bonfim, almost twenty years Nabuco's junior, published *América Latina: Males de Origem*, in which he criticizes the stigmatizing view of Hispanic America and stresses the ties of solidarity that linked Brazil to the continent. However, his work had limited impact in the time it was published (Ventura 2000). It would take decades before Brazilian society identified itself with Latin America, a process which arguably remains incomplete (Bethell 2010).

[6] For specific studies of Brazil's participation in the League of Nations, see Eugênio Vargas Garcia (2000) and Norma Breda dos Santos (2003).

Reference List

Newspapers and official documents

Falas do Throno (1823-1889)
Jornal do Commercio (1881-1885)
O Abolicionista (1880-1)
O Paiz (1905)

Works by Joaquim Nabuco

Garrison [Joaquim Nabuco]. "A Escravidão e o Brasil perante o mundo". *Jornal do Commercio*, August 26th, 1884.

Nabuco, Joaquim. 1881a. "Carta do presidente deputado Joaquim Nabuco ao vice-presidente conselheiro Adolpho de Barros". *O Abolicionista*, January 1st, 1881.

____. 1881b. "O Presidente Joaquim Nabuco em Madrid". *O Abolicionista,* May 1st, 1881.

____. 1881c. "Discurso do Presidente Joaquim Nabuco em Londres". *O Abolicionista*, June 1st, 1881.

____. 1881d. "Circular do Presidente Joaquim Nabuco". *O Abolicionista*, August 1st, 1881.

____. 2003 [1883]. *O Abolicionismo*. Brasília: Senado Federal

____. 2010 [1884a]. "Discurso em São José", November 5th, 1884. In *Essencial Joaquim Nabuco*, organized and introduced by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 113-20. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.

____. 2010 [1884b]. "Discurso no Corpo Santo", November 28th, 1884. In *Essencial Joaquim Nabuco*, organized and introduced by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 129-36. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.

____. 2010 [1884c]. "Discurso de encerramento", November 30th, 1884. In *Essencial Joaquim Nabuco*, organized and introduced by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 146-59. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.

____. 1890a. *Por que Continuo a ser Monarchista: Carta ao Diário do Comércio*. Londres: Abraham Kingdom & Newnham.

____. 2010 [1890b]. "Resposta aos eleitores de Recife e Nazaré". In *Joaquim Nabuco: Essencial* organized by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 243-264. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.

____. 1891. *Agradecimento aos Pernambucanos*. [s.l.]: [n.a.].

____. 1895a. *Balmaceda*. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Leuzinger.

____. 1895b. *O Dever dos Monarquistas: Carta ao Almirante Jaceguay*. Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Leuzinger.

____. 2003 [1895c]. *A Intervenção Estrangeira Durante a Revolta de 1893*. Brasília: Edições do Senado Federal, v. 21.

____. 2010 [1897-9]. "Um Estadista no Império". In *Joaquim Nabuco: Essencial* organized by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 333-514. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.

_____. 2015 [1900]. *Minha Formação*. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira.
http://www.dominiopublico.gov.br/pesquisa/DetalheObraForm.do?select_action=&co_obra=15695.
_____. 1906. "A República é Incontestável", discurso pronunciado no Cassino Fluminense, Rio de Janeiro, em 19 de julho de 1906. http://digitalizacao.fundaj.gov.br/fundaj2/modules/busca/listar_projeto.php?cod=13#
_____. 1907. "Lessons and Prophecies of the Third Pan-American Conference", address delivered by Mr. Joaquim Nabuco, Ambassador from Brazil, before the Liberal Club of Buffalo, on February 20, 1907. http://www.dominiopublico.gov.br/pesquisa/DetalheObraForm.do?select_action=&co_obra=15699
_____. 2010 [1908a]. "A Aproximação das Duas Américas". In *Essencial Joaquim Nabuco*, organized and introduced by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 548-557. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.
_____. 1908b. "Address of the Brazilian Ambassador, Senhor Nabuco, at the Laying of the Corner-Stone of the New Building of the American Republics in Washington on May 11, 1908".
_____. 2010 [1908c]. "A parte da América na civilização". In *Essencial Joaquim Nabuco*, organized and introduced by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 531-547. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.
_____. 2010 [1908d]. "O sentimento de nacionalidade na história do Brasil". In *Essencial Joaquim Nabuco*, organized and introduced by Evaldo Cabral de Mello, 517-530. São Paulo: Penguin Classics Companhia das Letras.
_____. 1909. "Centenário de Lincoln". http://www.dominiopublico.gov.br/pesquisa/DetalheObraForm.do?select_action=&co_obra=15662
_____. 1949a. *Cartas a amigos*, collected and noted by Carolina Nabuco, vol. 1. São Paulo: Instituto Progresso Editorial S.A.
_____. 1949b. *Cartas a amigos*, collected and noted by Carolina Nabuco, vol. 2. São Paulo: Instituto Progresso Editorial S.A.
Nabuco, Joaquim. 2006. *Diários*, edited, prefaced and noted by Evaldo Cabral de Mello. 2 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi.
Sociedade Brasileira Contra a Escravidão, SBCE. *Manifesto ("Ao Paiz")*. 1880.

Secondary sources (books and articles)

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. 2014. "Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society". *International Organization* 68, no. 1: 143-176.
Alencastro, Luiz Felipe. 2018. "África, Números do Tráfico Atlântico". In *Dicionário da Escravidão e* Liberdade, organized by Lilia M. Schwarcz and Flávio Gomes, 119-135. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras. Ebook.

Alonso, Angela. 2002. *Ideias em Movimento: A Geração 1870 e a Crise do Brasil Império*. São Paulo: Paz & Terra.

_____. 2007. *Joaquim Nabuco: os salões e as ruas*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

_____. 2009. "Arrivistas e Decadentes: O debate politico-intelectual na primeira década republicana". *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 85: 131-148.

_____. 2010. "O Abolicionista Cosmopolita". *Novos Estudos CEBRAP 88*: 55-70.

_____. 2012. "A Década Monarquista de Joaquim Nabuco". In *Joaquim Nabuco na República* organized by Angela Alonso and Kenneth David Jackson, 73-97. São Paulo: Hucitec Editora.

_____. 2014. "O Abolicionismo como Movimento Social". *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 100: 115-137.

_____. 2015. *Flores, Votos e Balas: O movimento abolicionista brasileira (1868-1888)*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

Ashley, Richard. 1984. "The poverty of neorealism". *International Organization* 38, no. 2: 225-286.

Azevedo, Célia Maria Marinho. 2001. "Quem Precisa de São Nabuco?" *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* 23, no. 1: 85-97.

_____. 2003. *Abolicionismo. Estados Unidos e Brasil, uma história comparada*. São Paulo: Annablume.

Basile, Marcello Otávio N. de C. 1990. "O Império Brasileiro: Panorama Político". In *História Geral do Brasil* organized by Maria Yedda Linhares et al., 188-301. 9 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.

Bender, Thomas, ed. 1992. *The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolition as a Problem in Historical Interpretation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bethell, Leslie and José Murilo de Carvalho (org.). 2008. *Joaquim Nabuco e os Abolicionistas Britânicos: Correspondência 1880-1905*. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.

Bethell, Leslie. 1970. *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2010. "Brazil and Latin America". *Journal of Latin American Studies* 42, nº 3: 457-485.

_____. 2012. "O Brasil no Mundo", translated by Denise Bottmann. In *História do Brasil Nação: 1808-2010*, edited by Lilia Moritz Schwarcz, vol. 2 "A Construção Nacional" coordinated by José Murilo de Carvalho, 131-177. Madrid, Rio de Janeiro: Fundación MAPFRE and Editora Objetiva.

_____. 2016. *Joaquim Nabuco no Mundo.*: Abolicionista, jornalista e diplomata. Rio de Janeiro: Bem-Te-Vi.

Bosi, Alfredo. 2010. "Joaquim Nabuco, the memoirist". *Estudos Avançados* 69: 87-104.

Bottero, Wendy. 2005. *Stratification: social division and inequality*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bowden, Brett. 2004. "The ideal of civilisation: its origins and socio-political character". *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 7, no. 1: 25-50.

_____. 2009. *The empire of civilization: the evolution of an imperial idea.* Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.

Bueno, Clodoaldo. 2003. *Política Externa da Primeira República: Os anos de apogeu – de 1902 a 1918*. São Paulo: Paz & Terra.

Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson, eds. 1984. *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bull, Hedley. 2002 [1977]. *The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics*. 3rd edition. New York: Palgrave.

Burns, E. Bradford. 1966. *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and Brazilian-American relations.* New York and London: Columbia University Press.

Buzan, Barry. 1995. "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered". In *International Relations Theory Today*, edited by Steve Smith and Ken Booth, 198-216. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

_____. 2014a. *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

_____. 2014b. "The 'Standard of Civilization' as an English School Concept". *Millenium* 42, no. 3: 576-594.

Carvalho, José Murilo de. 2010. *A Construção da Ordem: a elite política imperial. Teatro de sombras: a política imperial*. 5 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Carvalho Pinto, Vânia. "Signalling for Status: UAE and Women's Rights". *Contexto Internacional* 41, no. 2: 1-19.

Cervo, Amado and Clodoaldo Bueno. 2011. *História da política exterior do Brasil*. 4ed. Brasília: Editora UnB.

Chamberlayne, Prue, Joanna Bornat and Tom Wengraf. 2000. "Introduction: the biographical turn". In *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science*, edited by Prue Chamberlayne, Joanna Bornat and Tom Wengraf, 1-30. London and New York: Routledge.

Charlip, Julie and E. Bradford Burns. 2017. *Latin America: An Interpretative History*. 10 ed. Boston: Pearson.

Chaves Flores, Elio. 2018. "A consolidação da República: rebeliões de ordem e progresso". In *O tempo do liberalismo oligárquico: da Proclamação da República à Revolução de 1930* (O Brasil Republicano; 1), organized by Jorge Ferreira and Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, 43-80. 10ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Corwin, Arthur F. 1968. *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Costa e Silva, Alberto da. 2012. "População e Sociedade". In *História do Brasil Nação 1808-2010* directed by Lilia Moritz, vol. 1 "Crise Colonial e Independência, 1808-1830 coordinated by Alberto da Costa e Silva, 35-73. Madrid, Rio de Janeiro: Fundación MAPFRE and Editora Objetiva.

Davis, David Brion. 2006. *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dennison, Stephanie. 2006. *Joaquim Nabuco: Monarchism, Panamericanism and Nation-Building in the Brazilian Belle Epoque*. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Donnelly, Jack. 2009. Rethinking political structures: from 'ordering principles' to 'vertical differentiation' – and beyond. *International Theory* 01, 1: 49-86.

_____. 2017. "Beyond Hierarchy". In *Hierarchies in World Politics*, edited by Ayse Zarakol, 243-265. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Drescher, Seymour. 1977. *Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

_____. 1988. "Brazilian Abolition in Comparative Perspective". *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, n. 3: 429-460.

_____. 2002. *The Mighty Experiment: Free Labor versus Slavery in British Emancipation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____. 2009. *Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dunne, Richard. 1998. *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*. London: MacMillan.

Duque, Marina G. 2018. "Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach". *International Studies Quarterly* 62: 577-592.

Elias, Norbert and John L. Scotson. 1994. *The established and the outsiders: a sociological enquiry into community problems*. London, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Eltis, David. 1987. *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Epstein, Charlotte. 2012. "Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?". *International Studies Perspectives* 13: 135-145.

*Falas do Throno desde o Anno de 1823 até o Anno de 1889. Acompanhadas dos Respectivos Votos de Graças da Câmara Temporária...*1889. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional.

Farias, Rogério de Souza. 2017. "Biografia como método nas Relações Internacionais: uma abordagem voltada para o Ensino". *Meridiano 47: Journal of Global Studies* 18: 1-12.

Franco, Gustavo H. B.. 2014. "A primeira década republicana". In *A Ordem do Progesso: Dois Séculos de Política Econômica no Brasil* organized by Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, 29-44. 2ed. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.

Freeman Smith, Robert. 1986. "Latin America, the United States and the European powers, 1830-1930". In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, v. 4 edited by Leslie Bethell, 83-119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goes Filho, Synesio Sampaio. 2015. *Navegantes, bandeirantes, diplomatas: um ensaio sobre a formação das fronteiras do Brasil*. 2 ed. Brasília: FUNAG.

Goffman, Erwin. 1963. *Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Gong, Gerrit. 1984. *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. Oxford: Claredon Press.

González Echeverría, Roberto. 2003. "Facundo: An Introduction". In *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism* by Domingo Sarmiento, 1-16. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hall, Martin and Patrick Jackson. 2007. "Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory". In *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations*, edited by Martin Hall and Patrick Jackson, 1-12. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1989. *The Age of Empire (1875-1914)*. New York: Vintage Books.

Hobson, John M. and J. C. Sharman. 2005. "The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change". *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1: 63-98.

Hobson, John M. 2004. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

____. 2014. "The Twin Self-Delusions of IR: Why Hierarchy and Not 'Anarchy' Is the Core Concept of IR". *Millenium* 42, no. 3: 557-575.

Huntington, Samuel. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations?". *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3: 22-49.

____. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Isfahani-Hammond, Alexandra. 2008. *White Negritude: Race, Writing, and Brazilian Cultural Identity*. New York: Palgravemacmillan.

Jackson, Kenneth David. 2008. "A statesman in the Academy: Joaquim Nabuco at Yale". *Estudos Avançados* 22, n. 62: 335-349.

Janotti, Maria Monaco. 1991. "The Monarchist Response to the Beginnings of the Brazilian Republic". *The Americas* 48, nº 2: 223-243.

Keene, Edward. 2002. *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 2014. "The Standard of 'Civilization', the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-century International Social Space". *Millenium* 42, no. 3: 651-673.

Kinvall, Catarina. 2004. "Globalization and religious nationalism: self, identity, and the search for ontological security". *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5: 741-767.

Kissinger, Henry. 1994. *Diplomacy*. New York, London, Toronto, Sidney: Simon & Schuster.

Lake, David A. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations". *International Organization* 50, no. 1: 1-33.

____. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lamont, Michèle and Virág Molnár. 2002. "The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences". *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 167-195.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Leckie, Shirley A. 2004. "Biography Matters: why historians need well-crafted biographies more than ever". In *Writing Biographies: Historians and their Craft*, edited by Lloyd E. Ambrosius, 1-26. Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press.

Lee, Hermione. 2009. *Biography: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Lessa, Renato. 2015. *A Invenção Republicana*. 3ª ed. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.

Linklater, Andrew. 2016. "The 'standard of civilization' in World Politics". *Social Character, Historical Processes* 5, no. 2: 1-18.

Loriga, Sabina. 2011. *O pequeno X: da biografia à história*, translated by Fernando Scheibe. Belo Horizonte: Editora Autêntica.

Lynch, Christian Edward Cyril. 2012. "O Império é que era a República: a Monarquia Republicana de Joaquim Nabuco". *Lua Nova* 85: 277-312.

McNay, Lois. 2016. "Agency". In *The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory*, edited by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth, 39-60. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miskolci, Richard. 2013. *O desejo da nação: masculinidade e branquitude no Brasil de fins do XIX*. São Paulo: Annablume.

Mitzen, Jeniffer. 2006. "Ontological security in world politics". *European Journal of International Relation*s 12, no. 6: 341-370.

Needell, Jeffrey D. 1991. "A Liberal Embraces Monarchy: Joaquim Nabuco and Conservative Historiography". *The Americas* 48, no. 2: 159-179.

Neumann, Iver. 2014. "Status is cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian Russians seek great-power status". In *Status in World Politics*, edited by T. V. Paul, Deborah W. Larson and William C. Wohlforth, 85-112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nogueira, Marco Aurélio. 2000. "O Abolicionismo". In *Introdução ao Brasil. Um Banquete no Trópico, 2* organized by Lourenço Dantas Mota. São Paulo: Editora Senac São Paulo.

O'Hagan, Jacinta. 2007. "Discourses of Civilizational Identity". In *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations*, edited by Martin Hall and Patrick Jackson, 15-31. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

____. 2017. "The Role of Civilization in the Globalization of International Society". In *The Globalization of International Society* edited by Tim Dunne and Christian Reus-Smit, 185-203. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Oakley, Ann. 2010. "The social science of biographical life-writing: some methodological and ethical issues". *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 13, no. 5: 425-439.

Obregón, Liliana. 2006a. "Noted for Dissent: The International Life of Alejandro Álvarez". *Leiden Journal of International Law* 19, no. 4: 983-1016.

Obregón, Liliana. 2006b. "Completing Civilization: Creole consciousness and International Law in nineteenth-century Latin America". In *International Law and its Others*, edited by Anne Orford. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Osterhammel, Jurgen. 2009. *The Transformation of the World: a Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Paul, T. V., Deborah W. Larson and William C. Wohlforth. 2014. "Status and Order". In *Status in World Politics* edited by T. V. Paul, Deborah W. Larson and William C. Wohlforth, 3-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Payne, Geoff and Judy Payne. 2004. *Key Concepts in Social Research*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Peixoto, Renato Amado. 2011. "'Depois aconteça o que acontecer': por uma rediscussão do Caso Panther e da política externa de Rio Branco". *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 54, nº 1: 44-66.

Pereira, Paulo R. 2012. "Joaquim Nabuco e a concepção de sistema mundial e continental" in *Joaquim Nabuco na República* organized by Angela Alonso and Kenneth David Jackson, 149-162. São Paulo: Hucitec Editora.

Prado, Eduardo. 2003 [1893]. *A Ilusão Americana*. Brasília: Senado Federal.

Preuss, Ori. 2011. *Bridging the Island: Brazilians' Views of Spanish America and Themselves, 1865-1912*. Madrid: Iberoamericana Vervuert.

____. 2012. "Brazil into Latin America: The Demise of Slavery and Monarchy as Transnational Events". *Luso-Brazilian Review* 49, no. 1: 96-126.

Ré, Henrique Antonio. "Progresso e utopia no pensamento antiescravista de Joaquim Nabuco: influências da economia política francesa e das teorias racialistas". PhD thesis. Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Unicamp, 2009. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281079

Reis, João J. 2000. "Presença Negra: conflitos e encontros". In *Brasil: 500 anos de povoamento* organized by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Rio de Janeiro: [n.a.].

Renshon, Jonathan. 2017. *Fighting for Status: hierarchy and conflict in world politics*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Ricupero, Bernardo. 2018. "A República e a Descoberta da América: Nova Forma de Governo e Mudança Identitária no Brasil da Década de 1890". *DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais* 61, nº 1: 213-253.

Ricupero, Rubens. 2012. "Um doce crepúsculo: a diplomacia de Joaquim Nabuco" in *Joaquim Nabuco na República* organized by Angela Alonso and Kenneth David Jackson, 163-187. São Paulo: Hucitec Editora.

____. 2017. *A diplomacia na construção do Brasil (1750-2016)*. Rio de Janeiro: Versal.

Roberts, Brian. 2002. *Biographical Research*. Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Rustin, Michael. "Reflections on the biographical turn in social science". In *The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science*, edited by Prue Chamberlayne, Joanna Bornat and Tom Wengraf, 33-52. London and New York: Routledge.

Salgado Guimarães, Manoel Luís. "Nação e Civilização nos Trópicos: O IHGB e o Projeto de uma História Nacional". *Estudos Históricos* 1: 5-27.

Salles, Ricardo. 2012. "Nabuco e a 'Grande Era Brasileira'". In *Joaquim Nabuco na República* organized by Angela Alonso and Kenneth David Jackson, 112-145. São Paulo: Hucitec Editora.

____. 2014. "As Águas do Niágara. 1871: crise da escravidão e o ocaso saquarema". In *O Brasil Imperial*, vol. III organized by Keila Grinberg and Ricard Salles, 41-82. 2ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Salter, Mark. 2002. *Barbarians & Civilization in International Relations*. London, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.

Santos, Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. 2004. *O Brasil entre a América e a Europa: O Império e o interamericanismo*. São Paulo: Editora UNESP.

____. 2018. *Juca Paranhos, o Barão do Rio Branco*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

Schulz, Carl-Andreas. 2014. "Civilization, Barbarism and the Making of Latin America's Place in 19th-century International Society". *Millenium* 42, no. 3: 837-859.

Schwarcz, Lilia M. and Heloisa M. Starling. 2015. *Brasil: uma Biografia*. São Paulo: Companha das Letras.

Schwarcz, Lilia Moritz. 1999. *As Barbas do Imperador: D. Pedro II, um monarca nos trópicos*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

____. 1993. *O Espetáculo das Raças: cientistas, instituições e questão racial no Brasil 1870-1930*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

Silveira, Helder Gordim. 2003. *Joaquim Nabuco e Oliveira Lima: faces de um paradigma ideológico de americanização nas relações internacionais do Brasil*. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS.

Steele, Brent J. 2008. *Ontological Security in International Relations*. New York: Routledge.

Suzuki, Shogo. 2010. *Civilization and Empire*. London and New York: Routledge.

Topik, Steven C. 2009. *Comércio e canhoneiras: Brasil e Estados Unidos na Era dos Impérios (1889-97)*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. *Cosmopolis: the hidden agenda of modernity*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Towns, Ann. 2009. "The Status of Women as Standard of 'Civilization'". *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 4: 681-706.

____. 2010. *Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

____. 2014. "Carrying the Load of Civilization: The Status of Women and Challenged Hierachies". *Millenium* 42, no. 3: 595-613.

____. 2016. "Civilization". In *The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory*, edited by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth, 79-99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Viana Filho, Luís. 1985. *A Vida de Joaquim Nabuco*. Porto: Lello & Irmão – Editores.

Vieira, Marco. 2017. "(Re)-Imagining the 'Self' of Ontological Security: The Case of Brazil's Ambivalent Postcolonial Subjectivity. *Millenium* 46, no. 2: 142-64.

Vigezzi, Brunello. 2005. *The British Committee on Theory of International Politics (1954-1985): The Rediscovery of History*. Milan: Edizioni Unicopli.

Vilas-Boas, Sergio. 2014. *Biografismo: reflexões sobre as escritas da vida*. São Paulo: Editora Unesp.

Walker, Rob. 1992. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House.

Watson, Adam. 1992. *The Evolution of International Society*. London and New York: Routledge.
Weber, Max. 1978 [1922]. *Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Williams, Eric. 1994 [1944]. *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press.
Williamson, Edwin. 2009. *The Penguin of History Latin America*. 2nd edition. London: Penguin Books.
Zarakol, Ayse. 2010. "Ontological (In)security and the State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan. *International Relations* 24, no. 1: 3-23.
____. 2011. *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
___. 2017a. "Theorising Hierarchies: An Introduction" In *Hierachies and World Politics*, edited by Ayse Zarakol, 1-14. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
___. 2017b (Ed.). *Hierarchies and World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
___. 2017c. "States and ontological security: A historical rethinking". C*ooperation and Conflict* 52, no. 1: 48-68.