

UNIVERSIDADE DE BRASÍLIA
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Engaging Politics: Political Participation in Brazil and
Sweden, predicted by Stereotypes about Parliamentarians,
Political Education and Behavioral Contagion

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Brasilia - DF
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
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
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
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
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With deserved respect,

Professor Joakim Ekman, *Filosofie Doktor*, from
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work, could not be present to the doctoral defense, for
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People respond in accordance to how you relate to them. If you approach them on the basis of violence, that's how they'll react. But if you say, 'We want peace, we want stability', we can then do a lot of things that will contribute towards the progress of our society.

Nelson Mandela

Interview for The reader's Digest, 2005

For Renan Monteiro Carneiro,

My son, I am doing what I do the best, study
and research, believing in the utopia of
leaving you a world better than the one I live
in. I would like to ask you, when deciding the
paths you will follow, to do what you do the
best, believing in the utopia of leaving a
better world for your children.

Your loving father,
Thiago Lopes Carneiro

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Summary

Summary	I
List of Tables	V
List of Figures	VII
Resumo	IX
Abstract.....	XI
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1. The Focus of this Study	2
1.2. Study Objective and Relevance	8
Chapter 2: Literature Review	11
2.1. Political Participation	11
2.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Political Participation	12
2.1.2. Downturn or mutation of Political Participation?	14
2.1.3. Concept of Political Participation in this study	17
2.1.4. Antecedent Variables of Political Participation	25
2.2. Stereotypes about Parliamentarians	28
2.2.1. Relations among concepts	29
2.2.2. Stereotypes as a system to classify groups	30
2.2.3. Stereotypes about Parliamentarians in, Prejudice and Discrimination out ..	34
2.2.4. Can stereotypes predict behavior?	35
2.2.5. Measuring stereotypes	36
2.3. Political Education.....	38
2.3.1. Does Education predict the Political Participation?	39
2.3.2. Political Education formally included in the School Curriculum	41
2.3.3. Political Education or Political Socialization?	44
2.4. Behavioral Contagion.....	46

2.4.1. Le Bon's Ideas	46
2.4.2. Recent Theoretical Advances.....	52
2.4.3. Behavioral Contagion as approached in this study	57
2.5. Researching in Different Cultures	59
2.5.1. What is Culture?	59
2.5.2. Cross-cultural Studies in Social Psychology	61
2.5.3. Interpreting Cross-Cultural Statistics	64
2.5.4. Unpacking Culture	68
2.5.5. Political Culture.....	70
2.5.6. Relevant considerations for this study.....	73
2.6. Characteristics of the Political Context of Brazil and Sweden.....	74
2.6.1. Organization of Political Institutions.....	75
2.6.2. Education and income distribution.....	77
2.6.3. History of Democracy in Brazil and Sweden	80
2.6.3.1. Brazil	80
2.6.3.1.1. Recent political activity	86
2.6.3.2. Sweden	93
2.6.3.3.1. The Riksdag and the Swedish democracy	95
2.6.3.3.2. Recent political activity	97
2.6.4. Comparing the two countries.....	100
2.7. Methodological Considerations	103
2.7.2. Considerations on Reliability	104
2.7.3. Implications for this study	107
2.8. Theoretical Model and Research Objectives	109
Chapter 3: Method	111
3.1. Stage 1: Delphic Panel.....	111
3.1.1. Participants.....	113

3.1.2. Procedures	113
3.2. Stage 2: Back-translation	114
3.3. Stage 3: Data collection and Analyses.....	115
3.3.1. Data collection	115
3.3.2. Participants and Missing Imputation.....	116
3.3.2.1. Power analysis.....	117
3.3.3. Analyses	118
3.3.3.1. Exploratory Factor Analysis	118
3.3.3.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis.....	119
3.3.3.3. Multiple Regression	121
3.3.3.4. Structural Equation Modeling.....	121
Chapter 4: Results	123
4.1. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses (EFA and CFA).....	123
4.1.1. Political Participation	124
4.1.2. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians	137
4.1.2.1. Critical Information on Parliamentarians	138
4.1.2.2. Behavior Prediction.....	146
4.1.2.3. A General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians.....	152
4.1.3. Political Education	155
4.1.4. Behavioral Contagion	161
4.2. Variables' mean differences between Brazil and Sweden	164
4.3. Relationships among variables (Stepwise Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Modeling)	167
4.3.1. Political Disillusion	170
4.3.2. Pre-Political Engagement.....	173
4.3.3. Institutional Participation.....	176
4.3.4. Political Consumerism	178

4.3.5. Labor Union Strikes	181
4.3.6. Street Demonstrations.....	183
4.3.7. Violence Legitimacy.....	185
4.3.8. Overview of SEM results	187
Chapter 5: Discussion.....	191
5.1. General Remarks on Factor Structure	191
5.2. Understanding Political Participation: the Contribution of each Independent (Exogenous) Variable.....	194
5.2.1. The effect of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians	194
5.2.1.1. Critical Information	195
5.2.1.2. Behavior Prediction.....	199
5.2.3. Political Education	203
5.2.4. Behavioral Contagion	207
5.2.5. Party Preferences and Demographic Characteristics.....	213
5.3. The Different Types of Political Participation	214
5.4. Cultural Differences and Similarities	220
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions	225
6.1. Limitations and Solutions	226
6.2. Research Agenda	228
6.3. Implications for Democracy.....	229
References	231
Appendices.....	289
Appendix I.....	291
Appendix II.....	299
Appendix III.....	347
Appendix IV	349
Appendix V	351

List of Tables

1. Categories of political participation according to Ekman e Amnå (2012).....	21
2. Categories of political participation as proposed in this study	22
3. Comparison between the organization of political institutions in the investigated countries.....	76
4. Comparison of indicators of education, income and quality of life in the countries surveyed.....	78
5. Non-Participation (Political Attitudes) in Brazil and Sweden: EFA results.....	124
6. Political Participation (Past Behavior) in Brazil and Sweden: EFA results.....	125
7. Participation and Political Disillusion in Brazil and Sweden: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.....	128
8. Discriminant Validity, based on the Five Factor Model. Bold values indicate the Average Extracted Variance (Rho_{vc}).....	131
9. Political Participation and Political Disillusion, Final Model: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity.....	134
10. Participation and Political Disillusion: Test of Equivalence.....	137
11. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians (Critical Information): EFA Results.....	139
12. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Critical Information, in Brazil and Sweden: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.....	141
13. Discriminant Validity for Critical Information factors. Bold values indicate the Average Extracted Variance ($Rhovc$); values in the ladder represent the square covariance between factors.....	142
14. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Critical Information: Tests of Equivalence..	143
15. Critical Information: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity.....	146
16. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians (Behavior Prediction): EFA Results.....	147
17. Parliamentarians' Behavior Prediction: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.....	148
18. Parliamentarians' Behavior Prediction: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity.....	149

19. Discriminant Validity for Behavior Prediction factors. Bold values indicate the Average Extracted Variance (Rhovc); values in the ladder represent the square covariance between factors.....	151
20. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Behavior Prediction: Test of Metric Equivalence.....	151
21. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.....	152
22. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity.....	155
23. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians: Test of Metric Equivalence.....	155
24. Political Education: EFA Results.....	156
25. Political Education: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.....	158
26. Political Education: Test of Metric Equivalence.....	160
27. Behavioral Contagion: EFA results.....	161
28. Behavioral Contagion: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.....	162
29. Behavioral Contagion: Test of Metric Equivalence.....	164
30. Goodness of Fit for prediction models on Political Disillusion.....	171
31. Goodness of Fit for prediction models on Pre-Political Engagement.....	175
32. Goodness of Fit for models on Institutional Participation (2nd order factor)....	177
33. Goodness of Fit for models on Political Consumerism.....	179
34. Goodness of Fit for models on Participating in Labor Union Strikes	182
35. Goodness of Fit for models on Participating in Street Demonstrations.....	184
36. Goodness of Fit for models on Political Violence Legitimacy.....	186
37. Summary of SEM models – predicting Political Participation factors and standalone items.....	188
38. New categories for Political Participation.....	218

List of Figures

1.1. Reproduction of figure in Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008, p. 456), crossing the scores of institutional collectivism practices (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004) and the interpersonal trust score (Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman & Luijkx, 2004).....	7
2.1. Democratic Party’s advertisement against, with an iconic representation of “noseband vote” (voto de cabresto).....	83
2.2. Chances of winning presidential elections in Brazil, considering the three preferred candidates. Source: pollingdata.com.br, which compiled results from several election polls.....	92
2.3. Hypothesized relations between the variables of the study	110
4.1. Participation and Political Disillusion factor structure for Brazil - <i>Final Model</i>	135
4.2. Participation and Political Disillusion factor structure for Sweden - Final Model	136
4.3. Critical Information factor structure for Brazil, with Second-Order Factor.....	144
4.4. Critical Information factor structure for Sweden, with Second-Order Factor.....	145
4.5. Behavior Prediction factor structure for Brazil.....	149
4.6. Behavior Prediction factor structure for Sweden.....	150
4.7. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians – Brazil.....	153
4.8. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians – Sweden	154
4.9. Political Education One-Factor Structure for Brazil.....	159
4.10. Political Education One-Factor Structure for Sweden.....	159
4.11. Behavioral Contagion factor structure - Brazil.....	162
4.12. Behavioral Contagion factor structure - Sweden.....	163
4.13. Explaining Political Disillusion in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	171
4.14. Explaining Political Disillusion in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	172
4.15. Explaining Pre-Political Engagement in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	174

4.16. Explaining Pre-Political Engagement in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	175
4.17. Explaining Institutional Participation in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	177
4.18. Explaining Institutional Participation in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	178
4.19. Explaining Political Consumerism in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	180
4.20. Explaining Political Consumerism in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	181
4.21. Explaining participation in Labor Union Strikes in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	182
4.22. Explaining participation in Labor Union Strikes in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	183
4.23. Explaining participation in Street Demonstrations in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	184
4.24. Explaining participation in Street Demonstrations in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	185
4.25. Explaining Political Violence Legitimacy in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	186
4.26. Explaining Political Violence Legitimacy in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.....	187

Resumo

O objetivo geral desta pesquisa foi comparar a influência de Estereótipos sobre os Parlamentares, Educação Política e Contágio Comportamental sobre a Participação Política entre Brasil e Suécia, para construir um modelo teórico-explicativo e oferecer evidências de validade. A tipologia de Ekman e Amnå (2012) embasou o uso de um conceito abrangente de Participação Política, que varia da não participação, passando pela atenção (*stand by*) até a participação manifesta. Estereótipos sobre parlamentares foram definidos em duas esferas: Informação Crítica a que os eleitores prestam atenção e Predição de Comportamento, i.e., como os eleitores pensam que os parlamentares se comportam. Educação Política se refere ao quanto cada esfera da vida de uma pessoa contribui para sua aprendizagem política. Itens de Contágio Comportamental aferiam a influência do participante sobre outros e a influência exercida por outros sobre ele/ela. O questionário foi elaborado através do Painel Delfico, conduzido simultaneamente com especialistas brasileiros e suecos, tendo o inglês como língua comum. O questionário resultante foi retro-traduzido para o Português Brasileiro e Sueco. Estas duas versões foram administradas aos participantes, via internet. Participaram 984 brasileiros, 37,4% do sexo feminino e com idade média de 43,95 anos (DP 15,64). Suecos totalizaram 879, sendo 46,5% mulheres e a idade média foi de 49,57 anos (DP 16,64). Análises Fatoriais Exploratórias e Confirmatórias foram realizadas. Médias das respostas de participantes brasileiros e suecos foram comparadas através de teste-t. Empregou-se a Modelagem de Equações Estruturais (MEE), precedida de regressão múltipla exploratória, a fim de determinar como as variáveis independentes (exógenas) poderiam prever a Participação Política. Discutiram-se as implicações metodológicas. As equivalências de Estrutura Fatorial e Métrica foram alcançadas, entre Brasil e Suécia, para Participação Política, Estereótipos sobre Parlamentares e Contágio Comportamental. Os fatores de Educação Política não se mostraram consistentes, portanto seus itens foram considerados separadamente. Os testes-t indicaram que os brasileiros se envolvem em ação política mais frequentemente do que os suecos. Quanto aos Estereótipos, suecos percebem a Qualidade da Representação de seus parlamentares mais positivamente do que os brasileiros; a Corrupção, por outro lado, foi percebida como maior no Brasil. Suecos prestam mais atenção a informações críticas relacionadas a Partidos e Tendências de Representação dos parlamentares, enquanto os brasileiros se preocupam mais com Informações Pessoais do que os suecos. Os modelos de previsão SEM evidenciaram que, embora a corrupção seja uma preocupação primária para os brasileiros, ela não ajuda a prever Participação Política no Brasil, mas sim na Suécia. Embora suecos prestem mais atenção às diferenças entre Partidos e às Tendências de Representação, estes fatores tiveram maior importância para prever Participação Institucional no Brasil. Conclui-se que aquilo que é senso comum (como a corrupção no Brasil e diferenças entre partidos na Suécia) não ajuda a distinguir as pessoas que participam daquelas que não o fazem. Itens de Educação Política tiveram efeito muito pequeno. Contágio Comportamental desempenhou um papel central, a ponto de embaçar a fronteira entre ação política individual e coletiva. O engajamento político está, enfim, fortemente ligado ao envolvimento em uma rede politicamente ativa.

Palavras-chave: Participação Política, Estereótipos, Educação Política, Socialização Política, Contágio Comportamental, Parlamentares

Abstract

The general objective of this research was to compare the influence of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion on Political Participation between two countries (Brazil and Sweden) to build and offer evidence of validity for a theoretical-explanatory model. Ekman and Amnå's (2012) typology was the base for a comprehensive concept of Political Participation, as it ranges from non-participation, through attention (stand by) and manifest participation. Stereotypes about Parliamentarians were defined in two spheres: Critical Information to which voters pay attention and Behavior Prediction, i.e., how voters expect parliamentarians to behave. Political Education intended to assess how each sphere of a person's life contributes to his/her political learning. Behavioral Contagion assessed the influence the participant exerted on others and how much other people influenced him/her. The questionnaire was elaborated via Delphic Panel, ran simultaneously with Brazilian and Swedish experts, using English as a common language. The resulting questionnaire was back-translated to Brazilian Portuguese and to Swedish. These two versions were administered to participants through electronic formularies, distributed via internet. Participants from Brazil numbered 984, 37.4% women and the mean age was 43.95 (S.D. 15.64) years. Swedes numbered 879, 46.5% women and the mean age was 49.57 (S.D. 16.64) years. Exploratory and Confirmatory Analyses were performed, in order to determine Factor Structures and to evaluate their equivalence between the two countries. Means from the Brazilian and Swedish participants were compared through t-test. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), preceded by exploratory Stepwise Multiple Regression, was performed in order to establish how the independent (exogenous) variables predicted Political Participation. Methodological implications are discussed. Factor Structure and Metric equivalences were met for Brazil and Sweden, for Political Participation, Stereotypes about Parliamentarians and Behavioral Contagion. Political Education factors were not consistent, so its items entered the prediction models as standalones. T-tests indicated that Brazilians engage political action more often than Swedes. Regarding Stereotypes, Swedes perceive the Quality of Representation of their parliamentarians as better than Brazilians evaluate theirs; Corruption, on the other hand, was perceived as higher in Brazil. Swedes pay more attention to Critical Information related to the Parties and Representation Trends of parliamentarians, while Brazilians worry more about Personal Information than Swedes. The SEM prediction models evidenced that, though Corruption was a major issue to Brazilians, it did not help predict Political Participation in Brazil, but it did in Sweden. Though Swedes pay more attention to information about Parties and Representation Trends, these had greater importance to predict Institutional Participation in Brazil. It is concluded that commonsense information (such as Corruption in Brazil and Party differences in Sweden) does not help to tell the difference between those people who participate and those who do not. Political Education items had disappointingly low effect. Behavioral Contagion played a pivotal role on explaining Political Participation. "Being influenced" and "influencing others" was so importantly related to Political Participation that it is considered that the boundaries of individual and collective action are blurred. Engaging politics is, at last, strongly intertwined to being a part of a politically active network.

Keywords: Political Participation, Stereotypes, Political Education, Political Socialization, Behavioral Contagion, Parliamentarians

Chapter 1: Introduction

After a period when social scientists believed that people got disenchanted with democracy and became politically apathetic (Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 1995), Brazil is overwhelmed with demonstrations, in the year of 2013. Nearly two million individuals took on the streets of more than 400 cities protesting against the increase in bus fares, against political corruption, for freedom of speech, and a large list of claims (Estadão.com.br, 2013; Folha de S. Paulo, 2013a; G1, 2013; Leal, 2013). However, the apparent 'boom' of political participation in Brazil did not happen alone, neither in time, nor in space. In time, because the recent political demonstrations are linked to political movements started years before – e.g., Marches against Corruption (*Marchas contra a Corrupção*) and many other demonstrations promoted by *Movimento Passe Livre* (Zero Bus Fare Movement) (Colon & Moura, 2011; Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; Martins, 2012). And in space... political movements in many countries, organized by social media (or 'social networks' as the websites that enable massive communication among individuals are sometimes referred to) occurred all over the world. The Occupy Wall Street movement (in the United States and 82 other countries) was a reaction to the effects of the 2008 economic crisis, where protesters claimed for better distribution of wealth (López, 2011; Uchoa, 2013). The movements further known as Arab Spring (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 14 other countries) targeted the poly-decennial dictatorships that toughly repressed popular political movements (Bellin, 2012). In Stockholm, Sweden, a controversial police action resulted on the killing of an immigrant, stirring protests (which were often violent) against racism and discrimination, in May 2013. In Turkey, during the same month, 2.5 million individuals took to the streets to protest for greater freedom of speech (Kuymulu, 2013). Other protests took to the streets of Greece, Indonesia, India and other countries driven by economic reasons and for greater freedom of speech (The Economist, 2013c).

These huge demonstrations contrast the thesis of increased political apathy. Although this was the most prominent activity in the last decade, many other activities could be characterized as 'political participation' and have enticed attention from researchers (Anderson, 2010; Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Hooghe & Dejaeghere 2007; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). All those movements challenge researchers that try to scientifically describe and analyze them based on the literature. How could one compare the many forms of political actions emerging in the world, considering cultural, historical and institutional framework variations? Could the concept applied to a context be generalized to another context? As this is such a complex and varied phenomenon, any social scientist who dares studying it must have good focus. It implies selecting a 'slice of reality' that allows the collection of information to subsidize the empirical analysis without damaging the scope of the phenomenon of political participation. The focus of this study is henceforth explained, delimitating one among the many potential approaches on the subject.

1.1. The Focus of this Study

'Participation' and 'politics' are inseparable in origin. Historically, the election of political representatives was an alternative to direct democracy, where citizens discussed the city affairs directly in the public arena (Borba & Ribeiro, 2010; Friede, 2006). Therefore, the establishment of parliaments gave rise to a division of the roles assigned to citizens, whereas it created a class of representatives who were in charge of political activities, and another of represented individuals with the duty (under this study's scope) of monitoring and controlling the activities performed by the first ones (Borba & Ribeiro, 2010; Friede, 2006; Merkel, 2004). The representative/represented relation is, therefore, in the heart of the debate about political participation in contemporary societies (Merkel, 2004; Moisés, 2010; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008). Since the parliament is the functional substitute of the Greek Agora, and in an attempt to

understand the mobilization around collective interests at national level, the 'slice of reality' to be studied herein is the *political participation regarding the bodies of the National Legislative Power*.

The national Legislative Houses basically serve as arenas of negotiation among groups of supporters of the sectorial interests of the country (Lima & Santos, 2001; Ricci, 2003). Considering that the represented ones are in charge of monitoring and controlling representatives, the understanding of how electors 'read' the parliamentary activity is crucial. After all, while representatives handle everyday with political activities, becoming experts with jargons specific to their activities (Pereira & Mueller, 2000), the represented ones are at risk of becoming more and more alienated because of the difficulty in understanding the political language (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Henrique, 2010; Merkel, 2004).

It might be tempting to suppose that from now on we should focus our efforts on the investigation of forms to draw the attention of the represented ones to political activity as a whole, so they can receive and rationally analyze the political information available before making a decision (as proposed by Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; and Luskin, Fishkin & Jowell, 2002). But we will not do that. The permanent attention on political life could make full sense to social scientists, but not necessarily to those who invested time studying to become good dentists, bakers, electricians, computer programmers. After all, these people do not make their livelihood on discussing politics... and they can, on the other hand, enjoy the peace promoted by the Social Contract to engage in their professions, raise their children, or share good moments with friends (Baier, 1986; Silva, Goyeneche & Silva, 2009).

Carreirão (2002) points out the need for 'relaxing' the requirements of structuring the 'system of beliefs' of the electorate. On the other hand, it is important to analyze which are the best key informations to support the decisions of citizens who are not expert in politics (Arceneaux, 2008; Samuels, 1997; Samuels & Zucco, 2014).

Hence, it is supposed that citizens make their decisions without fully knowing details of political activity (Huckfeldt & Sprague 1995; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Samuels, 1997).

According to this proposition, the following research question was the starting point to this investigation: *how do individuals make decisions about political participation in the real context, in their everyday lives, based on the information they have about parliamentary politics?* To answer it, I have sought for psychological processes that could explain the citizens' perception about the parliament. I have focused on processes used almost unconsciously, i.e., individuals should be able of using them without having to reflect about it. The psychological processes selected to the analysis should summarize (at least hypothetically) a large number of information and political influences a given individual receives. Ultimately, these processes should be observable in different cultures so that, through comparison between countries, one can identify the relations between these psychological processes and the forms of political participation adopted by citizens.

Assuming that the Legislative Houses accommodate competing groups of interest, selecting psychological processes that approach the citizen's *reading* about the groups of representatives' behavior seems to be useful. The variables Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion proved to be suitable for that purpose. Firstly, the concept of Stereotypes has to do with the interpretation made about the behavior of a group. Political Education, in turn, comes as variable of analysis because it could have great influence on the interpretation of the behavior of people holding political offices – interfering also on the formulation of stereotypes. Finally, the Behavioral Contagion could be useful to explain how some politics-related beliefs and behaviors become 'common sense', as it can explain how they are multiplied and encourage action. The relation between these variables and the objective of this study are explained in details in Chapter 2, where the literature is reviewed.

The transnational comparative study was performed in order to check if the theoretical model built herein could be applied to different contexts, and still preserve the power of explaining the phenomenon of political participation. The comparison is even more relevant if contrasting countries are selected.

The decision for comparing Brazil and Sweden is explained by the contrasting representative/represented relation. Regarding trust in the political system, Brazilians complain about the malfunctioning of governmental institutions and the impunity of bad politicians (Moisés and Carneiro, 2008; Ribeiro, 2007). Moreover, Brazilian politics is marked by 'generalized' corruption, and it is hard to uphold the existence of 'good politicians' (Azevedo & Chaia, 2008; Cunha, 2006; Wallin, 2014). In Sweden, on the other hand, surveilling institutions are agile, and politicians involved with corruption are seldom re-elected, mainly because electors do not accept voting for them (Wallin, 2014). While the Swedish politicians are quite frugal regarding the use of public funds, Brazilian politicians are granted quotas for transportation and other expenses, which makes the parliament an expensive and ineffective institution, in Brazilians' opinion (Moisés and Carneiro, 2008; Wallin, 2014). Swedes highly trust their system, which enabled a Welfare State that promotes social equality and experiences low corruption (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Brazilians, in turn, distrust public institutions and even advocate for the paradoxal 'democracy without National Congress' (Moisés, 2008).

Regarding cultural differences, Brazil and Sweden stand in extreme opposition. To Singelis *et al.* (1995) and Triandis and Gelfand (1998), Sweden is an iconic example of Horizontal Individualism, meaning that Swedes value individual sovereignty while praise equality. Brazilians, in the opposite direction, are very dependent on others in their nuclear groups (e.g. family) and accept that social hierarchy is natural – then Brazil is an example of Vertical Collectivism.

Hofstede's (1980; 1991) findings are similar. In Sweden, being independent, equal rights, and individual empowerment are praised. Swedes are egalitarian, seek balance between family/work lives, and strive from dominance and competition, while

valuing solidarity. Sweden is then an Individualistic and Feminine society. Brazilians, oppositely, are loyal to their families in exchange for protection; they are intermediately guided to competition, and they respect hierarchy – as status symbols of power are very important in order to indicate social position. Brazil is, then, a Collectivistic / Power Distant society, with intermediate score in Masculinity.

These differences are reflected in political life. Swedes do not accept power distance with their representatives, while in Brazil it is taken as “natural”. Swedes’ preference for equality and individual sovereignty requires citizens to be self-sufficient and respect general rules. Brazilians act like they need protection from the “people outside family”, and it is expected that “outside people” are not to be trusted. Rules can be broken, when surviving “outside people” disloyalty is more important.

Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008) compared 45 countries, on interpersonal trust and civic involvement. They found that in countries with high interpersonal trust, people are more likely to engage into institutional collectivism practices, as they get greater social capital. In other words, they are more likely to trust people from outside their families (e.g. in neighbourhood or country level) and participate in institutions with community-oriented purposes or others, like political parties. Brazil and Sweden stand on very different positions, according to this comparison (Figure 1.1).

Brazil scores remarkably low in interpersonal trust (at the bottom of Figure 1.1), whereas Sweden scores very high. Regarding adhesion to institutional collectivism practices, Brazil again scores pretty low, while Sweden gets the highest score among the compared countries. This offers additional evidence that Brazil and Sweden are contrasting cases, making it a really valuable comparison. If results in this study are found to be valid to extremely contrasting cases, they might be useful to further research on other countries.




Figure 1.1. Reproduction of figure in Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008, p. 456), crossing the scores of institutional collectivism practices (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004) and the interpersonal trust score (Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman & Lujikx, 2004). Emphasis to Brazil and Sweden were added herein.

Such contrasts raise several questions. Are the Swedish parliamentarians perceived as ‘more honest’ than the Brazilian ones? And, regarding the quality of parliamentary work, is there any difference between the countries? Does the perception about politicians influence on the political engagement of electors?

Performing tests in such contrasting contexts could be useful to show which variable can better explain the political engagement.

1.2. Study Objective and Relevance

The general objective of the research proposed herein is as follows: *Comparing the influence of the variables Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion on Political Participation between two countries (Brazil and Sweden) to build and offer evidence of validity for a theoretical-explanatory model.*

The proposed research intends to contribute to the already existing literature on Political Participation (presented at Section 2.1) by submitting to empirical test the recent advances on the theoretical field. First, the concept of Political Participation has recently expanded to include newly found behaviors; the test of new a categorization is then tested via Factor Analysis. Moreover, the selection of independent variables is innovative; as such, empirical support is needed to state whether they can or cannot predict Political Participation. The comparison of the variables' factor structures and prediction power on two contrasting countries is useful to avoid limiting the study findings to one cultural context. Since culture shapes compatriots' preconceptions on politics, conclusions about one country are not directly replicable to other contexts.

The study is relevant in three perspectives: social, applied and academic. In the *social* perspective, the study is expected to identify the most effective psychological processes as predictors of political participation, in order to explain and help encouraging the increase of political action. In the *applied* perspective, it aims at providing feedback to institutions dealing with education, the media, and also the legislative houses, so they can develop strategies of education and communication to encourage political participation based on the psychological processes identified. In the *academic* perspective, it is a study oriented to produce innovative knowledge as no

empirical study to evaluate the relations between the variables proposed herein has been found.

Chapter 2 details the theoretical framework for the concepts of Political Participation, Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion. Moreover, it makes a deeper analysis on the concept of culture, since the study crosses different cultural contexts – if we consider, at least, that there are two 'national' cultures produced in different political contexts, which potentially affects, each in their specific way, the results of the empirical study proposed herein. Yet, Chapter 2 very briefly presents the recent political history of Brazil and Sweden, notably a selection of events that could be more influent on the variables of the study.

Chapter 3 presents the study method. A questionnaire was prepared using the Delphic Panel Technique, i.e., with the participation of Brazilian and Swedish experts. The final version of the questionnaire, in English, was translated into Brazilian Portuguese and Swedish in a process of back-translation. Data were collected through the web panel (distribution of the research through the Internet). Results are presented in Chapter 4 and discussed in Chapter 5. Remarks about the research are disclosed in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter presents the state-of-the-art of the literature about the criterion (endogenous) variable, Political Participation and also about antecedent (exogenous) variables, Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion. Since this is a transnational study, it presents the concept of culture and a discussion about how a research should be developed in different cultural contexts. Next, it discloses a brief summary of the political history of Brazil and Sweden and, finally, a theoretical model for the relationships between the variables that will be statistically tested.

2.1. Political Participation

*I refuse to live in a country like
this. And I am not leaving.*
Michael Moore, 2009

The history of political participation merges with that of democracy. The first experiences of democracy took place at the assemblies in Athens, through the voted deliberations in Esparta and in the Roman Republic. The common grounds of these experiences were the strict concept of citizenship (excluding slaves, women and men who had no land tenure) and the traits of direct democracy, since politics used to be restricted to a relatively short number of inhabitants in those cities (Macedo, 1995). Thus, the political system was much more accessible to those included in it; however, it co-existed with the exclusion of most of the population.

Between the 18th and the 19th centuries, the political philosophers supported the liberal state as a way to constitutionally limit the powers of the monarch; this, however, did not imply the implementation of a 'democracy.'

In the light of their historical experience, liberal political philosophers – e.g. Benjamin Constant – remained hostile to democracy, which would entail instability and disorder, thus showing the people's inherent inability of governing. Even Rousseau, who is typically associated with democracy, was not really in favor of modern democracy, i.e., representative democracy (Bresser-Pereira, 2011, p. 227).

The modern concept of democracy only emerged at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, when the first societies implemented the universal suffrage – although democratization has been reached through non-linear processes, with the eventual return of totalitarian regimes (Huntington, 1991, Merkel, 2004). The advance of democratization in western countries was followed by a change on the discourse of political philosophers supporting the extension of citizenship to groups excluded up to then (Bresser-Pereira, 2011, Canfora, 2006; Lipset, 1993).

Participation was reached thanks to the pressure of groups excluded from the political system (women, slaves, men with no land tenure) and granted by the elite when they perceived there was no threat in granting the poorest layers with the right to voting (Bresser-Pereira, 2011). Following this *zeitgeist* transition favoring democracy, notably universal suffrage and equal access to decision-making spheres, social scientists of several areas started investigating what favors and what hinders the full exercise of citizenship (Canfora, 2006; Lipset, 1993; Merkel, 2004).

2.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Political Participation

The theoretical perspectives on political participation started by focusing exclusively on the citizen's act of selecting the political elite members (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957; Schumpeter, 1942). Schumpeter, in particular, emphasized the conduction of politics by leaders elected by citizens, as if citizens should be active only during elections (Miguel, 2002; Mitchel, 1984; Teorell, 2006). The attention for political behaviors not exclusively related to elections was fostered after the publication of works by Almond and Verba (1963, 1980), Milbrath (1965), Verba and Nie (1972), and

Kaase and Marsh (1979). Since then, the thought about political participation has undergone an expansionist movement, as along the last 50 years new behaviors were investigated as exemplary political engagement (Teorell, 2006; Van Deth, 2001).

Engagement in community actions (Anderson, 2010), political consumerism (boycotts or *buycotts* - Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005), participation in organized social movements, participation in protests, organization of petitions or even getting involved in acts of political violence could also be considered to be forms of political participation (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Dalton, 2008; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Hooghe & Dejaeghere 2007; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighley, 1995; Paxton, 1999). The inclusion of these new behaviors expanded the concept of political participation (Berger, 2009) carries the risk of building a “theory of everything”. According to Van Deth (2001), political participation started comprising “virtually any kind of activity, except for the clearly private behavior” (p. 8).

Amnå and Ekman (2014) added that political participation theories can be classified on “pessimistic” and “optimistic” interpretations on *political passivity*. Some pessimists consider the lack of participation a threat to democracy (like Putnam, 1995). However, on the past two decades, optimistic interpretations on political passivity arose, as they regard “passive” citizens as people who are attentive to politics and may get in action when needed (e.g. Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2004). Some of these optimists consider passivity as an asset to democracy. Yet according to Amnå and Ekman (2014), the pessimistic interpretation that citizens pay attention to politics as they distrust their elites (Rosanvallon, 2008; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005) contrasts with the optimistic notion of monitorial citizens – those who critically observe the political context (Hooghe and Dejaeghere, 2007; Schudson, 1998).

Regardless the theoretical approach about political participation, Teorell (2006) points out that the question “which degree of participation should be considered satisfactory?” cannot be answered in absolute terms. The author proposes three core comparisons to understand if participation levels are higher or lower: a) to compare the

occurrence of different kinds of participation in the same political context; b) to compare the same kind of political participation in different contexts; and, c) to compare the same kind of political participation in the same context, at different historic moments.

In face of the arguments by Teorell (2006) this study proposes to compare a given set of behaviors of political participation in different contexts – namely, the two countries selected for the study: Brazil and Sweden. It aims at understanding which characteristics of both the individual and the context favor their participation, notably in actions targeted to influence the parliamentarians' decisions.

2.1.2. Downturn or mutation of Political Participation?

Robert Putnam (1995) started a comprehensive discussion about the downturn of political participation in the United States with his essay "*Bowling alone: America's declining social capital.*" Putnam emphasizes the drop of participation in elections, in political parties' activities, in the involvement with local committees or organizations, in demonstrations, additionally to increasing distrust of Americans in relation to their national government.

However, the thesis on political participation decay has been receiving reduced empirical support and it is criticized by authors who observe changes in the citizens' behaviors (Borba & Ribeiro, 2010; Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Dalton, 2008; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Hooghe & Dejaeghere 2007; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighley, 1995; Paxton, 1999; Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005). The empirical evidences of those studies go against the thesis of reduced engagement of citizens in politics.

Based on studies of the historical series of 70 countries, Inglehart and Catterberg (2002) point out that democracies surveyed had undergone a period of disenchantment, a 'post-honeymoon' effect, and later resumed their participation. Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007) investigate if citizens started adopting a posture of 'politics monitoring' and of getting involved with political actions at informal spheres,

which are less connected to democratic institutions. These authors identified that in fact the 'monitorial citizens', notably the younger ones, became more critical in relation to democratic institutions, and moved away from the organized political activity like trade unions and political parties. Hooghe and Dejaeghere emphasize that the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) do not fit into this profile since in those countries the 'post-modern' citizens still participate in political activities through trade unions and political parties, and feel integrated to the political system.

Borba and Ribeiro (2010) point out the migration of interests away from 'conventional' forms of participation (related to elections and party affiliation) towards 'non-conventional' forms (demonstrations, protests and strikes). Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2005) affirm that participants of public demonstrations are more likely to get involved in conventional political actions. Norris, Walgrave and Van Aelst's argument contradicts the thesis that demonstrations represented a feeling of distrust in the political system, and emphasize that those same citizens can present different forms of engagement (which is partially opposite to Borba and Ribeiro). Ekman and Amnå (2012), in turn, advocate that there was no effective decline in participation but, rather, a migration from 'manifest' forms of political participation (oriented to influence decisions made by political elites) to 'latent' forms of participation (paying attention to political activity or engaging in political activities that do not involve governmental institutions), which brings them closer to the thesis of 'monitorial citizens' by Hooghe and Dejaeghere (2007).

After the turn of millennium a wide array of studies identified a new trend. Citizens (notably the younger generations) started adopting a posture of being attentive politics and getting involved with political actions in informal spheres, less connected to political institutions, becoming 'monitorial citizens' (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007). Those youngsters prefer mobilizations with no hierarchical organization and that could be started and concluded with great flexibility (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002).

When it comes to the debate around the reduction or not of political participation, there is a high degree of disagreement among researchers about the meaning of ‘participation’ (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Berger, 2009) and about how to measure the phenomenon in a changing political world (Bollen, 1980; Diamond 1996; Huntington, 1991). Moreover, sometimes researchers fail when they restrict their conclusions about ups and downs of political participation to the countries where they perform their empirical investigations – in other words, they take the risk of showing off that decreased political participation is a global phenomenon, despite having investigated the matter only in their country or in a limited number of countries. The heart of the matter is the definition of clear parameters to compare and measure political participation in different countries, at different times (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Bollen, 1990).

In the historical perspective, talking about the increase or decrease of political participation implies comparing Moment A against Moment B (Bollen, 1980; Teorell, 2006). In this sense, it is risky to affirm that ‘manifest’ participation has decreased today. Furthermore, most countries have undergone democratic openness throughout the 20th century (Huntington, 1991; Samuels & Zucco, 2013), after periods when the rights to voting and freedom of speech were suspended (like Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Germany, Italy, Mozambique and others). Thus, one can hardly compare historic moments that are so different in terms of democratic freedoms (Bollen, 1990; Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008). Countries are apparently moving towards democratization; however, it is indeed possible that new totalitarian regimes may emerge – in other words, ‘democratization waves’ eventually bump into ‘reversal waves’ and history does not follow a linear path (Diamond 1996; Huntington, 1991).

Anyway, comparing political participation in different historic moments or countries demands clear definition of the phenomenon (Bollen, 1980). That definition must be applicable to different contexts under the historical and geographic perspectives (Seligson, 2002). Therefore, it is worth analyzing the definitions of political

participation in line with the theoretical perspective of this study, in order to establish the conceptual framework to be used at the empirical investigation.

2.1.3. Concept of Political Participation in this study

The work of defining the phenomenon of political participation in operational terms requires, initially, an effort to *comprise* all kinds of behavior that could be classified as such, rather than to *delimit* political participation and exclude what does not fit into this concept. In this light, the definitions proposed by Verba and Nie (1972), Milbrath and Goel (1977) and Kaase and Marsh (1979) - which are frequently referred to in the literature on this matter – are analyzed herein, highlighting the theoretical advances produced between the 1970s and the 2010s. These authors from the 1970s define political participation as:

Actions performed by private citizens more or less intensively oriented to influence the selection of rulers and/or their actions (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 2).

Actions performed by private citizens to influence on or support governments or politics. (Milbrath & Goel 1977, p. 2).

Any voluntary activity by individual citizens trying to directly or indirectly influence on the political decisions at different levels of the political system. (Kaase & Marsh 1979, p. 42).

Those definitions are centered on the citizens' influence over governmental decisions, leaving aside other types of participation. Classification should be diversified to comprise other types of participation than those related to the institutional political process (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Ekman & Amnå 2012; Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007).

Additionally to definitions, the categories created by authors in the 1970s should be understood to classify the existing types of political participation. Kaase and Marsh (1979) created a dichotomized classification of political participation divided into 'conventional' forms (voting, affiliating to political party, contributing to campaigns and

other forms of participation related to elections) and ‘non-conventional’ forms (protests, public demonstrations or takeover of buildings). However, in this classification even the ‘non-conventional’ forms are focused on influencing governmental decisions and, thus, are subject to the criticism by Ekman and Amnå (2012) and Brussino, Rabbia and Sorribas (2008). Moreover, although this classification has become fully accepted in the literature (according to Borba and Ribeiro, 2010), it generates a theoretical-methodological controversy which is hard to be solved.

Those ‘non-conventional’ forms of participation are defined in terms of behaviors that do not fit into ‘regulations, laws, rules and uses that govern political participation in a given regimen (Kaase & Marsh, 1979, p. 41). Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) have also contributed to the controversy when they decided to include a reference to the legality of political participation, which was then defined as

“Legal actions carried by private citizens more or less directly oriented to influence the selection of governors and/or their actions ” (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, p.2 – emphasis added to the word inserted to the previous definition by Verba & Nie, 1972).

When one highlights the duality between ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ actions, there is the risk of building dependence on the *status quo* and, thus, being subject to changing social constraints (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Sabucedo, 1984; Van Deth, 1986). In other words, political actions considered legal in some countries could be illegal in others (e.g., public demonstrations). Likewise, a political action could be either legal or illegal in the same country, depending on the historic moment being studied (like dictatorship or a democratic period). Therefore, the concept by Kaase and Marsh (1979) is not adequate to longitudinal or transnational studies, since legislation on political rights (notably freedom of speech) varies along time and between countries (Sabucedo, 1984). Even worse, it has the cumbersome effect of suggesting, by connotation of the terms selected, that ‘conventional’ type is more legitimate than the ‘non-conventional’ one (Van Deth, 1986). Thus, the ‘non-conventional’ category of

political participation comprises several political behaviors that should be better differentiated and characterized (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Van Deth, 2001).

Moving away from the 'vision of the problem' towards the 'vision of solution', it is worth analyzing the same literature in terms of progresses towards building consistent *categories* to the different forms of political participation, notably the cross-cultural perspective. In their classic study Verba and Nie (1972) identified four main forms of political participation among the United States citizens: a) voting; b) activism in electoral campaigns; c) involvement in cooperative activities (community); d) contacts initiated by citizens. It is a more complete and diversified classification than the focus on legality or 'conventionality', but it has not become hegemonic in literature (Borba & Ribeiro, 2010), as it would happen with Kaase and Marsh (1979).

Brussino, Rabbia and Sorribas (2008) applied questionnaires to youngsters in Córdoba (Argentina). Through cluster and factorial analysis, these researchers identified three categories of political participation: a) Political party/trade union participation; b) Community activities; and, c) Protest actions. The classification of Brussino, Rabbia and Sorribas (2008), therefore, escapes from the frivolous debate about legality/illegality, conventionality/non-conventionality, and legitimacy/illegitimacy of political actions. Thus, three categories were produced, which just gather and describe behaviors, without assigning them labels that depend on the *status quo* of the country and its historic moment.

Ekman and Amnå (2012) support that too much attention was attached to the *manifest* forms of participation (e.g., voting, participating in demonstrations, writing petitions), while researches usually disregard the *latent* forms (e.g., paying attention to the news about politics and discussing with friends). Metaphorically, they affirm that the underwater part of the iceberg is what is actually missed. The authors propose reorganizing the categories of political participation. The classification proposed by the Swedish authors builds a spectrum that starts with political disengagement, going through latent forms of participation and concluding in manifest forms, differentiating

individual and collective forms of action (please refer to [Table 1](#)). This study adopts the classification model proposed by Ekman and Amnå (2012), with some adjustments (please refer to [Table 2](#); changes *italicized*); therefore, each category elaborated by these authors is described below in details.

For Ekman and Amnå (2012), the forms of non-participation or disengagement could be characterized in terms of anti-political or apolitical attitudes. People with anti-political attitude practice active forms of disengagement (like manifesting their displeasure about politics or having an anti-political lifestyle), while people with apolitical attitude adopt passive forms of behavior, perceiving politics as something humdrum (Table 1). For this study, the names of subcategories were changed: more emphasis was assigned to the apolitical or anti-political posture, which could be read as “passive” and “active”, (Table 2). The example of social exclusion as driver of collective anti-political actions was withdrawn, as social exclusion could be a driver to active political participation (Duriguetto, Souza & Nogueira, 2009).

Table 1. Ekman e Amnå's (2012) Political Participation Framework.

	Non-participation (disengagement)		Civil participation (latent-political)		Political participation (manifest)		
	Active forms (antipolitical)	Passive forms (apolitical)	Social involvement (attention)	Civic engagement (action)	Formal political participation	Activism (extra-parliamentary political participation)	
						Legal	Illegal
Individual forms	Non-voting Actively avoiding reading newspapers or watching TV when it comes to political issues Avoid talking about politics Perceiving politics as disgusting Political disaffection	Non-voting Perceiving politics as uninteresting and unimportant Political passivity	Taking interest in politics and society Perceiving politics as important	Writing to an editor Giving money to charity Discussing politics and societal issues, with friends or on the Internet Reading newspapers and watching TV when it comes to political issues Recycling	Voting in elections and referenda Deliberate acts of non-voting or blank voting Contacting political representatives or civil servants Running for or holding public office Donating money to political parties or organizations	Boycotting, boycotting and political consumption Signing petitions Handing out political leaflets	Civil disobedience Politically motivated attacks on property
Collective forms	Deliberate non-political lifestyles, e.g. hedonism, consumerism. In extreme cases: random acts of non - political violence (riots), reflecting frustration, alienation or social exclusion.	"Non-reflected " non- political lifestyles	Belonging to a group with societal focus Identifying with a certain ideology and/or party Life-style related involvement: music, group identity, clothes, et cetera For example: veganism, right -wing Skinhead scene, or left -wing anarcho-punk scene	Volunteering in social work, e.g. to support women's shelter or to help homeless people Charity work or faith- based community work Activity within community based organizations	Being a member of a political party, an organization, or a trade union. Activity within a party, an organization or a trade union (voluntary work or attend meetings).	Involvement in new social movements or forums Demonstrating, participating in strikes, protests and other actions (e.g. street festivals with a distinct political agenda)	Civil disobedience actions Sabotaging or obstructing roads and railways Squatting buildings Participating in violent demonstrations or animal rights actions Violence confrontations with political opponents or the police

Table 2. Political Participation Framework, with adaptations for the present research (changes assigned in *italic*).

	<i>Non-participation Disengagement</i>		<i>Latent Participation (Pre-Political)</i>		<i>Political participation (manifest)</i>		
	<i>Antipolitical (Active forms)</i>	<i>Apolitical (Passive forms)</i>	<i>Attention (Involvement)</i>	<i>Action (Engagement)</i>	<i>Institutional political participation</i>	<i>Extra-institutional activism</i>	
						<i>Non-violent</i>	<i>Violent</i>
Individual forms	Non-voting Actively avoiding reading newspapers or watching TV when it comes to political issues Avoid talking about politics Perceiving politics as disgusting Political disaffection	Non-voting Perceiving politics as uninteresting and unimportant Political passivity	Taking interest in politics and society Perceiving politics as important <i>Reading newspapers and watching TV when it comes to political issues</i>	Writing to an editor Giving money to charity Discussing politics and societal issues, with friends or on the Internet Recycling	Voting in elections and referenda Deliberate acts of non-voting or blank voting Contacting political representatives or civil servants Running for or holding public office Donating money to political parties or organizations	Boycotting, boycotting and political consumption Signing petitions Handing out political leaflets <i>Civil disobedience</i>	Politically motivated attacks on property <i>Escracho – physically or morally attacking politicians</i>
Collective forms	Deliberate non-political lifestyles, e.g. hedonism, consumerism. In extreme cases: random acts of non-political violence (riots), reflecting frustration or alienation	“Non-reflected ” non-political lifestyles	Belonging to a group with societal focus Identifying with a certain ideology and/or party Life-style related involvement: music, group identity, clothes, et cetera For example: veganism, right –wing Skinhead scene, or left -wing anarcho-punk scene	Volunteering in social work, e.g. to support women’s shelter or to help homeless people Charity work or faith-based community work Activity within community based organizations	Being a member of a political party, an organization, or a trade union. Activity within a party, an organization or a trade union (voluntary work or attend meetings).	Involvement in new social movements or forums Demonstrating, participating in strikes, protests and other actions (e.g. street festivals with a distinct political agenda) <i>Civil disobedience actions</i>	Sabotaging or obstructing roads and railways Squatting buildings Participating in violent demonstrations or animal rights actions Violent confrontations with political opponents or the police

Regarding what Ekman and Amnå (2012) call “Civil Participation” (please refer to Table 1), it comprises behaviors that could be classified in terms of “Social Involvement” (typically oriented to *attention* to politics) and “Civic Engagement” (actions that produce political impact external to the context of governmental institutions, like voluntary social works). Among the adjustments proposed herein, the name of the category was changed to ‘Latent Participation (pre-political)’ complying with the terminology used by the Swedish authors, but inverting the emphasis placed to nomenclature (Table 2). The words ‘civil’, ‘civic’ and ‘social’ were excluded from the names of categories and subcategories – in this context, there is such a big semantic overlapping among the words that they could be considered to be interchangeable. Subcategories were renamed to ‘Attention (Involvement)’ and ‘Action (Engagement)’ so that emphasis is attached to terms that help differentiating these. Finally, the behavior ‘Reading newspapers and watching TV when it comes to political issues’ migrated from the subcategory ‘Action’ to ‘Attention’ as it is basically the consumption of political information.

The manifest Political Participation comprises the participation in the formal political system (actions compliant to the rules of political institutions) and the extra-parliamentarian participation, which was divided into legal and illegal forms of demonstration (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). Thus, the problematic duality between legality and illegality, which seemed to have been overcome (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008), has not been abandoned in the classification by Ekman and Amnå. Despite that, the classification allows a more sophisticated understanding of the phenomenon than the taxonomies proposed in the past. Adaptations proposed to this category aim at solving the issue of ‘legality’. The word ‘formal’ was replaced by ‘institutional’ in the subcategory that gathers behaviors that use the political system according to their rules – thus, avoiding a complex debate about the dialectics of formality or informality of the political action (Duriguetto, Souza, & Nogueira, 2009). The subcategory that

characterizes activism was renamed to “Extra-Institutional Activism” replacing the expression “extra-parliamentarian”, as activism could be oriented to influence non-parliamentarian institutions – e.g., bodies of the Executive or Judiciary Powers (Campilongo, 1994; Cittadino, 2004; Fuks & Perissinotto, 2006). Instead of classifying activism in terms of legality or illegality, it is proposed to differentiate violent and non-violent acts (Table 2). The behaviors classified by Ekman and Amnå (2012) remain unchanged, except for the item ‘Civil Disobedience’ as it is of non-violent nature (Silva, 1998) and the inclusion of *escracho* (public attacks to politicians – Mocca, 2005).

The conceptual framework outlined by Ekman and Amnå (2012) can provide a comprehensive overview on the types of political participation practiced in a nation, and allows for comparing countries and producing historical series. The changes proposed aimed at facilitating the application of the model, avoiding difficulties arising from classifying political action in terms of legality or illegality.

The classification by Ekman and Amnå (2012) was proposed in a theoretical perspective, based on the literature review, and it is being subjected to the first empirical tests; Amnå and Ekman (2014) have tested different degrees of “political passivity” (i.e., focused on the ‘Non-participation’ column); Talò and Mannarini (2014) have created a political participation scale¹; likewise, this study proposes a test to this classification.

Besides testing the verisimilitude of Ekman and Amnå’s (2012) classification, it is necessary to investigate which variables could determine the occurrence of each category of participation. Therefore, it is worth discussing theoretical considerations that point out the predictive potential of the other variables listed here.

¹ When the study by Talò and Mannarini (2014) was published, this study had already concluded the data collection stage. Therefore, it could not use the article as input to draft the questionnaire presented in this Thesis.

2.1.4. Antecedent Variables of Political Participation

What could explain the stronger tendency of some people toward participating in political activities? Information and cognition play a core role that should be deepened.

Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) note that the political system works well to well-informed citizens, while it is far from being democratic to uninformed citizens. Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell (2002) noted that, after receiving information from experts, the participants of a quasi-experimental program presented less extreme attitudes and more open to dialogue. Both studies conclude that well-informed citizens better enjoy the opportunities to operate the political system.

On the other hand, Lupia and McCubbins (2000) and Huckfeldt and Sprage (1995) establish that electors do not need to get an exhaustive amount of information to make a political decision. Moreover, sometimes information is not structured, as it could be generated by the mutual influence people practice. In opposition to the aforementioned authors, Lupia and McCubbins (2000) and Huckfeldt and Sprage (1995) do not start from the premise that “more information is better.” Instead of pursuing an ideal of ‘well-informed citizen’, these authors try to know reality as it is, i.e., how people seek for information about politics in their everyday lives.

Lupia and McCubbins (2000) argue that, either in the political arena or not, people usually have few information on the decisions they are about to make (corroborated by Carlin & Love, 2013; Druckman, 2001; Garzia, 2013; Henrique, 2010). Usually, people decide to pay attention to information that could serve as a shortcut to the decision, i.e., they prefer information that demands reduced effort of interpretation and analysis (corroborated by Huckfeldt & Sprage, 1995). The underlying questions are: ‘how much is the minimum amount of information enough to take a decision similar to a deeply informed decision?’ and ‘which information provides reliable shortcuts to decision?’

For Huckfeldt and Sprage (1995) the sources of political information are necessarily biased, and that bias is out of the control of the receiver. Furthermore, the information received more recently concurs with the information previously assimilated. The authors try to respond the question ‘how do information influence on the personal political preferences?’ investigating social learning and behavioral contagion. In that sense, Huckfeldt and Sprage (1995) support the need for observing the transmission of political information in a district, city or small regional circumscription – after all, what is most relevant to them is to understand the phenomenon of communication by word of mouth, which happens very discreetly.

In brief, while some researchers (from the school of Cambridge) argue that “more information is better”, other researchers (from the school of Michigan) support that people make decisions based on the poor information they have. It is worth mentioning that, according to the classification used in this study, the interest for political information fits into the subcategory ‘attention’, i.e., it is a form of latent participation. However, Ekman e Amnå (2012) state that latent forms of participation could lead to manifest forms. The authors argue for the need of outlining items to evaluate latent participation in combination with readiness for manifest political action.

Here, nonetheless, the selection of manifest forms of participation would depend on how citizens understand the information they get. Brussino, Rabbia and Sorribas (2008) explain how that would take place:

People can work both at electoral and non-electoral levels to promote their symbolic or material interests. Notwithstanding, due to resources available, the institutional context and the cognitive dimensions underlying the ‘political’ dimension, they would tend to conceive as ‘possible’, ‘legitimate’ or ‘effective’ only some of those specific practices, in detriment to others (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; p. 300).

In other words, the decision on the political action through which citizens expect to get the best results takes into consideration their concept of ‘political’. In that sense, the citizen’s interpretation about the behavior of governmental agent is a relevant

issue. In this study this phenomenon is translated in terms of stereotype (with no pejorative judgment, since *stereotype* could have either negative or positive bias on the target) as it could summarize several pieces of information about the politician, following the line of argument of Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) and Lupia and McCubbins (2000). Moreover, it is worth evaluating if the *political education* delivered to citizens in Brazil and Sweden contributes or not to nurture citizens attentive to politics and tending to act whenever necessary (Frazer, 2000; Henderson & Chatfield, 2011; Henrique, 2010; Mayer, 2011; Persson, 2012). Finally, the *behavioral contagion* will be discussed as the process through which beliefs and behaviors are transmitted in a crowd, leading the transformation of individual behavior into collective behavior (Cho & Rudolph, 2008; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998).

The next sessions deepen the debate about stereotypes about parliamentarians, political education and behavioral contagion. Then, the considerations about researches in different cultural contexts are presented, how are the two countries surveyed, and the processes of building democratic institutions and political participation in Brazil and Sweden are briefly depicted.

2.2. Stereotypes about Parliamentarians

Every day, citizens are exposed to an avalanche of political information. Newspapers, TV, radio, social media, blogs, websites, chats in bars, etc. A wide range of information could be used to understand the interaction of groups in the parliamentary arena: parties, interests of the sectors they represent, profession (previous to that as parliamentarian), political offices previously held, etc. (Carlin & Love, 2013; Druckman, 2001; Garzia, 2013, Kam, 2007, Koch, 2003, Pietryka & Boydstum, 2012). However, politically lay citizens, with short time to analyze information, may have to ignore several pieces of information and build their opinions based on the information they consider to be more relevant (Arceneaux, 2008; Druckman, 2001, Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Which information, then, do they consider to be relevant? To which conclusions does that information lead?

This study employs the concept of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians as it understands that stereotypes summarize a large amount of information about a group (e.g., parliament members) and could be useful to differentiate groups (e.g., members of different political parties); this is supported by the literature (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1997; Koch, 2003; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Schneider & Bos, 2011). Based on 'relevant' information, citizens can try to predict the behavior of parliamentarians (Arceneaux, 2008; Carlin & Love, 2013; Samuels & Zucco, 2013). Moreover, this study tests if citizens can select their form of political participation based on how they perceive the behavior of parliamentarians (Kinder & Sears, 1985; Sacchi, Carnaghi, Castellini & Colombo, 2013).

The exercise of applying stereotypes as independent (exogenous) variable of political participation implies a conceptual analysis to reconfigure its meaning. Next, attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination are distinguished to clarify the use of those concepts herein.

2.2.1. Relations among concepts

The concept of ‘stereotype’ has its origin in the concept of attitudes, prejudice and discrimination. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) understand “attitude” as *a long-lasting organization of beliefs and cognitions in general, endowed with emotional charge pro or against a defined social object which predisposes to an action that is coherent with the cognitions and affections related to that object*. These are ‘predispositions learned to favorably or unfavorably respond to a given object’ (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 6). The three elements underlined above are found in the tripartite organization proposed four decades before by Allport (1935), to whom Attitude bears:

- a) An *affective* (or evaluative) component that reflects if the person likes or dislikes an object or situation;
- b) A *cognitive* component which consists in the beliefs people have about an object or situation; and
- c) A *behavioral* component which represents the behavioral tendencies in relation to an object or situation.

When reviewing the literature, Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) point the inexistence of empirical evidence regarding a clear separation among the three abovementioned components; even Allport (1935) had affirmed that this is a ‘didactic’ division, since those components are in fact intertwined. However, even applying that tripartite and didactic division, Eagly and Chaiken (1998) point out that, *by analogy*, the stereotype corresponds to the cognitive component, while prejudice corresponds to the affective component and discrimination corresponds to the behavioral component (and Fiske, 1998 reaffirms it). In other words, up to now the attitudes towards a group could be described in terms of the following components: ‘stereotype’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’.

Prejudice and discrimination are concepts of intrinsically negative bias. These refer, respectively, to disliking, fearing, feeling anger or envying a group and acting in an aggressive way in relation to it (Brewer & Brown, 1998). The consulted literature does not even propose nomenclatures to express positive affections or behaviors in relation to a group. By extension, the concept of stereotype, previously considered to be neutral (Ryan, 2003), is implicitly 'contaminated' by such negativity, and is usually considered to be the baseline for prejudice and discrimination (like did, e.g., Allport, 1954; and Katz & Braly, 1933). The effect is that it contaminates, likewise, the researches about attitudes in relation to groups as it assumes that thoughts, affections and actions among groups always bear negative biases (Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995; Mackie, 1973; Ryan, 2003).

This study accepts the possibility of ambivalent attitudes in relation to groups (i.e., positive and/or negative) which contradicts the prevailing trend of studies in this area (Ryan, 2003; Ryan & Bogart, 2001). Therefore, the following paragraphs are devoted to: a) Dissociating 'stereotype' from the negative burden typically assigned to it; and, b) proposing alternative concepts to 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' to allow investigations about positive and negative behaviors in intergroup relations. Finally, it discusses the application of those concepts in the context of interaction between citizens and parliamentarians.

2.2.2. Stereotypes as a system to classify groups

The content of stereotypes may bear positive or negative valence (Cuddy *et al.*, 2009; Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995; Ryan & Bogart, 2001). It is a simple description of a group. Therefore, it works as a *schema* to classify people as belonging to this or that group (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Haslam *et al.*, 1997; Mackie, 1973; Torres, &

Neves, 2013). By the way, a *schema*² is nothing but that: a structured pooling of concepts 'used to represent events, a sequence of events, precepts, situations, relations and even objects' (Eysenck & Keane, 1994, p. 245).

The formulator (the one who creates the stereotype) assumes there are no significant differences between the members of the out-group³; in their view, a member of a group, in isolation, would behave like the remainder members (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Fiske, 1998). The formulator can use stereotypes to describe the common behavior of the members of an out-group like, e.g.: 'Japanese are organized', 'Mexicans add too much pepper in food' or 'Brazilians arrive late.'

For a long time in the 20th century, Social Psychology researchers have investigated stereotypes based on the assumption that these were 'inaccurate' or even 'fake' interpretations about groups, ethnics, gender, age, religions, etc. (Allport, 1954; Brigham, 1971; Hartley, 1946; Katz & Braly, 1933; Richter, 1956). Those researchers tried to demonstrate that individuals who based their perceptions on stereotypes often distorted reality. The out-group behaviors would always be construed in such a way as to prove stereotypes (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Richter, 1956). Stereotypes would be 'Siamese twins' of prejudice. Researchers felt obliged to produce knowledge about the matter; that knowledge would be used to deconstruct the stereotypes as they were 'evil' (Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995; Ryan, 2003). If researches could fulfill that objective, the individuals would no longer use stereotypes as the basis for their

² The notion of schema as organized structure of thought was introduced by Immanuel Kant, and further re-elaborated and introduced to psychology and pedagogy through the works by Frederic Bartlett and Jean Piaget (according to Duarte, Nunes & Kristensen, 2008).

³ Out-group is understood as the 'social unit with which the individual does not identify or to which he/she does not belong', and the in-group is exactly the opposite, i.e., the 'social unit with which the individual identifies or to which s/he belongs' (James, 1986). The terms out-group and in-group are used to respectively designate the group that formulates and the target-group of the stereotype, prejudice or discrimination.

interpretation about group behaviors and would 'see' the characteristics of individuals that used to be stereotyped (Ryan, 2003).

Jussim, McCauley and Lee (1995), in the countercurrent of that reasoning, answered the 'charges' (as they called it) that stereotypes would be something necessarily evil and unrealistic. They argue that the assumption that stereotypes are 'fake' and 'inaccurate' is a conceptually problematic one and is not empirically justified. Here it is worth summarizing those arguments, as they contradict the trend of some researches about stereotypes still in our days⁴.

Before rebutting the 'charges' Jussim, McCauley and Lee (1995) explained that one should distinguish the stereotypes of the 'all or nothing' type (according to which all members of a group are presumed to be equal) and the 'probabilistic' stereotypes (according to which some members are more and others are less 'typical' of a group). Thus, when one says that *stereotypes are factually incorrect* (first accusation), the affirmation is based on the 'all or nothing' type (e.g., 'Japanese are efficient'), which is demonstrated at the review by Ryan (2003). However, those authors claim to be unaware of any study on stereotypes where participants employ the 'all or nothing' type; participants usually employ the 'probabilistic' type. In other words, people usually accept that some members of a group can "break" the stereotype (e.g., there could be one inefficient Japanese person). So, stereotypes could effectively be factually right, provided these are grounded on information that properly describes the target-group and accept exceptions.

The authors use the same argument to refute the accusation that *stereotypes are irrationally resistant to new information*. If valid stereotypes are of the 'probabilistic' kind, so it would not be irrational if such stereotype resisted to the confrontation with an atypical member of the group. After all, if the information about the group remains valid,

⁴ The study will not present all arguments used by the authors. For further details, please read the original text. The chapter referred herein is available at <http://psycnet.apa.org/books/10495/>.

there is no sense in disregarding it just because you suddenly knew someone different (Ryan & Bogart, 2001).

Jussim, McCauley and Lee (1995) consider the criticisms to stereotypes made by Levine and Campbell (1972, as quoted by Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995) to be more 'sophisticated'. Those critics advocate for the idea that stereotypes: a) *are exaggerations about the true intergroup differences*; b) *are ethnocentric*; and c) *assume genetic origins to intergroup differences*. Jussim, McCauley and Lee (1995) argue there is no empirical evidence to any of the three criticisms, which should be managed as hypotheses to be tested. Finally, there is the criticism that stereotypes establish *unrealistic vision of the out-group homogeneity*, i.e., out-groups are perceived as less diverse than what they effectively are (as supported by Richter, 1956). According to Jussim, McCauley and Lee (1995), it should also be considered to be a hypothesis to be tested, as one cannot say it is a proven fact (this idea is supported by Mackie, 1973 and Ryan, 2003).

For Jussim, McCauley and Lee (1995) there is no functional difference between stereotype and other kinds of categorization. It is a cognitive need, required to deal with the large amount of information about people (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). After all, handling information about each individual in isolation would demand a huge capacity of processing and storage from memory; on the other hand, human cognition tends to work with simplifications of reality (Allport, 1954; Fiske, 1998). Categorization allows the formulation of expectations about the object being categorized, driving the agent's behaviors (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Ottati & Lee, 1995).

In different situations, stereotypes bear a kernel of truth (Ottati & Lee, 1995) or reach high degrees of consensus (Haslam *et al.*, 1997), except for those created to endorse prejudices and discrimination (Allport, 1954; Cuddy *et al.*, 2009; Ryan & Bogart, 2001). That makes sense as stereotypes fit into several models used in social psychology to explain the cognitive processes.

This study is interested in verifying if participants are sensitive to the variability of the group of parliamentarians. It aims at evaluating which *critical information* participants use to differentiate parliamentarians, as well as what participants expect from parliamentarians, using a measure of *behavior prediction*. Considering that stereotypes bear probabilistic nature, it makes sense asking how often participants pay attention to each piece of critical information and in the participants' view, which proportion of parliamentarians behave according to some descriptions presented (*behavior prediction*). By testing those measures and the categories of political participation disclosed in the previous section, we aim at evaluating if there is any link between the interpretation about parliamentarians and the political actions undertaken by citizens.

2.2.3. Stereotypes about Parliamentarians in, Prejudice and Discrimination out

When the stereotypical description is judged as 'good' or 'bad', we are entering the affective sphere. Although Eagly and Chaiken (1998) affirm that prejudice corresponds to the affective component of attitude, it should be noted that prejudice refers only to negative affections in relation to a group. The literature referred to herein does not present any words to define positive affects in relation to a group leaving no other option than using this underlined expression.

While it might be accepted that there is prejudice against any group, the concept imbues the existence of a relation of power where one group subjugates other group (Rottenbacher, Espinosa & Magallanes, 2011). Usually the prejudiced individual holds a position of power over the object of prejudice – after all, the behavioral component 'discrimination' (which also bears negative sense) occurs when the agent has the conditions to oppress the target (Bohmer & Briggs, 1991; Brewer & Brown,

1998). Therefore, if there is prejudice (in *strictu sensu*, negative affections in relation to the group) from the elector against parliamentarians, the first is disadvantaged as they cannot humiliate or subjugate the later (i.e., they could not 'discriminate') except under extremely atypical and historically relevant conditions (Van der Hulst, 2000).

The study of stereotypes about parliamentarians should accept the ambivalence of attitudes; therefore, there is no use in approaching prejudice and discrimination herein. What is relevant to this study is to understand how stereotypes could be useful to classify parliamentarians (serving as a schema) to predict their behaviors and to guide the interaction between represented individuals and representative.

Likewise, an alternate concept to 'discrimination' should be proposed, as the study does not aim at investigating the oppression exercised by electors on the parliamentarians. Here comes the question: which behaviors could electors assume in face of beliefs and affections regarding parliamentarians? Protesting, voting, lobbying, commenting on newspapers, using political violence or even distrusting politics as a response to parliamentarians are some examples of the behaviors categorized by Ekman and Amnå (2012) as *political participation*. Therefore, this study intends to verify how stereotypes about parliamentarians are related to the categories of political participation preferred by citizens.

2.2.4. Can stereotypes predict behavior?

According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), attitude results from an interaction of beliefs about a behavior with the evaluation of the result to be achieved. The intention of acting results from the confrontation of the individual's attitudes with their subjective rules (established by what the individual believes to be the social rule and his/her motivation to being adjusted to it). Behavior can take place as a result of the intention to act. However, the relation of causality between attitudes (including stereotypes and

affects) and behavior is very fragile as one single behavior is also influenced by many other factors (LaPiere, 1934; Neiva & Mauro, 2011). Then, additionally to investigating if stereotypes about parliamentarians could predict or not the occurrence of given categories of political participation, it is also important investigating other variables that could predict behaviors of political participation. Next, we discuss how stereotypes could be measured to be applied to the objective of this study. The influence of other variables on political participation will be discussed further.

2.2.5. Measuring stereotypes

Recalling the example of 'political information avalanche', the choice for the variable 'stereotypes' can be explained now. Instead of investigating if citizen is exposed to all types of political information available (Colling, 2007; Haslam *et al.*, 1997; Lyons & Kashima, 2003; Macedo & Baccega, 2012; Rosa, 2012; Rottenbacher, Espinosa & Magallanes, 2011), for parsimony this study investigates what citizens decide to receive (what is the critical information) and how they appraise parliamentarians (how the participant predicts parliamentarians' behavior).

Some indications point out that stereotype-based classification can be useful to understand the parliamentary politics. People capable of identifying the difference between parties can recognize, with higher probability of success, stereotypic or counter-stereotypic information in the experimental context, but could also be misled as they trust in stereotypes (Arceneaux, 2008; Carlin & Love, 2013; Koch, 2003; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Samuels & Zucco, 2013). In other words, if a left-wing Socialist candidate employs arguments that do not fit in his/her stereotype (e.g., advocating non-intervention of the State on economy,), electors recognize the disparity and point out that 'there is something wrong' in that discourse (Kinder & Sears, 1985; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Sacchi, Carnaghi, Castellini & Colombo, 2013).

On the other hand, trusting in stereotype as a cue to construe a political fact could lead citizens to make mistakes in face of counter-stereotypic actions – as illustrated by the episode when the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* [Workers' Party] (PT, which has strong links to trade unions) in Brazil proposed a minimum wage lower than that proposed by the opposition – *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* [Brazilian Social Democracy Party] (PSDB), which surprised citizens who believed the contrary would happen – PT would establish a minimum wage higher than PSDB would (Samuels & Zucco, 2013). Other studies also point out the risk of exaggeratedly trusting in stereotypes (Arceneaux, 2008; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994). The evaluation of misleading potential, like the abovementioned, extrapolates the objectives of this study. However, it intends to observe if some pieces of information monitored by participations could be associated to higher or lesser degree of political engagement (considering Ekman & Amnå's framework).

Analogous to the formulation of stereotypes by individuals, this study proposes the comparison of stereotypes formulated about parliamentarians in two countries, namely Brazil and Sweden. At collective level, the Brazilian and Swedish citizens may differ regarding *critical information* perceived by participants and the *prediction of behaviors* of parliamentarians.

This study on stereotypes in politics brings about other questions. Could formal education influence on the citizens' appraisal of parliamentarians (including stereotypes about them)? Could the stereotypes disseminated in an in-group (here, citizens) become collective political action? In this sense, the next sessions approach political education and behavioral contagion.

2.3. Political Education

*We can only transform humanity
and create a happier more
compassionate world through
education.*

Tenzin Gyatso (Dalai Lama)
on twitter, 06.01.2014

As this is a study that approaches stereotypes as a form of appraising the parliamentary politics, it presumes education plays a significant role. After all, the way how citizens are educated is presumably the ground for their understanding about their country's politics (Benevides, 1996). Education can bring important effects on the citizens' understanding about politics which, in turn, influences on the elaboration of stereotypes about politicians. Education can also have direct effect on the political participation – this, however, is a quite controversial subject in literature.

The link between education and politics was broadly discussed in the fields of philosophy and pedagogy, which could have definitely influence the *zeitgeist* in this sense. Since the sophists Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the organization of the *polis* (City-State) was articulated to the *paideia* - an ideal view of education to form citizens (Galston, 2001; Oliveira, 2008). According to the reviews by Oliveira (2008) and Gondim and Rodrigues (2010), Kant underlined that education predominantly contributes to the moral constitution of the person as an autonomous and equal being before the society. That thought became common sense among thinkers of the Modern Age - John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas, Hilary Putnam, Noam Chomsky, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Benevides (1996) emphasizes that the implementation of a citizen-forming education builds up an amazing political inversion: it is an initiative by the State 'but aims at strengthening the people in face of the State, rather than the contrary' (p. 228).

John Rawls (2000) argues that education plays a core role to train citizens to the public debate, recognizing themselves and the others as rational, equal and free

individuals (Gondim & Rodrigues, 2010; Gamarnikow, 2013). Paulo Freire (2001) believes that education holds a crucial role to raise individuals' awareness about their political reality and historical moment. According to him, education should place the individuals as persons that puts themselves in face of reality in an autonomous and free way (argument that approximates Freire to John Rawls) and that is continuously involved in the political domain. According to Ignacio Martín-Baró (1996⁵), education must contribute to make individuals aware about their condition of oppressed being, so to respond to unfair situations and become protagonists of their histories (Martín-Baró, 1996; Schlösser, 2013). Anísio Teixeira (1936) criticizes the 'patronizing' education focused on preparing the governed ones to obey, in opposition to the elites who are trained to govern (Benevides, 1996).

Although, as aforementioned, the *zeitgeist* is favorable to accepting the inextricable connection between education and politics, the empirical studies diverge on the topic. Therefore, it would be relevant to discuss how this relation has been tested and its findings.

2.3.1. Does Education predict the Political Participation?

The argument that education has positive impacts on the political participation was subjected to countless empirical studies (e.g., Berinsky & Lenz, 2011; Børhaug, 2008; Henderson & Chatfield, 2011; Henrique, 2010; Mayer, 2011) – this means affirming that, as individuals progress in scholarship, greater are their chances of

⁵ This text is a posthumous translation of a conference by the author delivered in 1985. Martín-Baró was a psychologist and Jesuit priest, activist in defense of Human Rights and Social Justice in El Salvador. He became an influent academic in Latin American countries and headed the department of Psychology and Education at the *Universidad Centroamericana* "José Simeón Cañas" (UCA). He was killed by the El Salvador Armed Forces soldiers on November 16, 1989, charged with being a Communist-terrorist that supported guerrillas of resistance against the government (Oliveira & Guzzo, 2013).

getting interested in participating in the political life of their countries (Elkins, 2000; Verba, Scholzman & Brady, 1995; Wachelke & Hammes, 2009). However, there is no consensus about how education influences participation (Frazer, 2000; Mayer, 2011; Persson, 2012) or even about if there is any causal relation between both (Berinsky & Lenz, 2011; Kam & Palmer, 2008).

The arguments that support the relation between education and political participation indicate multi-causality. Advances in education levels facilitate the development of cognitive skills required to understand relevant political information (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Frazer, 2000; Galston, 2001; Oliveira, 2008; Henrique, 2010; Hooghe, & Dassonneville, 2011; Michaud, Carlisle, & Smith, 2009); and the development of civil skills in the school environment facilitates political engagement (Pring, 1999; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995), and also the attention on political institutions, the distribution of power and the opportunities to participate (Emler & Frazer, 1999). Moreover, 'increased scholarship affects several psychological variables, among which are political efficacy, political interest, civil obligations and political sophistication' (Elkins, 2000, p. 115) and others directly related to political participation like intention to vote, declared interest for politics and for debating politics with family and friends (Emler & Frazer, 1999).

Other studies, however, indicate no causality relation between education and participation. Education would be a proxy measure of other variables that could explain participation (Kam & Palmer, 2008; Kam & Palmer, 2011; Persson, 2012). For Kam and Palmer (2008) the factors that lead individuals to pursue higher education level (characteristics of their parents, individual skills and other predispositions) could also lead them to participate in politics. Therefore, those authors define education as a criterion (endogenous) variable in their empirical test. Results support the hypothesis that political participation does not result from education itself, but from other variables – like mimicking the example of parents who appraise education as much as political

participation, or the better social positioning enabled by education, which increases the chances of interaction with other political actors. This issue became a disputation arena with Mayer (2011) and Henderson and Chatfield (2011), who pointed methodological flaws in Kam and Palmer's (2008) work. Persson (2012), when comparing Swedish students taking junior high school (equivalent to secondary education in Brazil), university students and those who decided for vocational training, concluded that differences in terms of political participation can be found among students even before they join each education modality.

Other studies feed the debate either supporting the proxy effect (Berinsky & Lenz, 2011; Highton, 2009) or the causal effect of education on the political participation (Dee, 2004; Sondheimer & Green, 2010). In brief, one could say that, considering the current state-of-the-art, there is no consensus about the relation between those variables.

However, this study does not intend to discuss the *causality* or *proxy effect* between education (as the reached educational level) and participation, as the test of this hypothesis requires longitudinal data. On the other hand, as this study intends to perform a transnational comparison, other aspects of that relation could be observed even if these are not enough to establish if the effect is causal or proxy.

2.3.2. Political Education formally included in the School

Curriculum

Typically, scientific education is not focused on forming citizens (Freire, 2001) and, therefore, the relation with political participation probably is an indirect one. This brings about a debate around the relevance of having in school curricula a specific subject on political education (Emler & Frazer, 1999; Frazer, 1999; Parry, 1999).

Finkel and Smith (2011) report that the participants of the Kenyan National Civic Education Programme – NCEP became opinion leaders, and disseminated their knowledge through the social media. Groves (2011) noted that the adoption of Paulo Freire's pedagogy by Spanish teachers, early in the 1970s, have encouraged teachers to act in a political way and prepare their students (specially adults) to participate in the Spanish politics (Groves, 2011).

In Brazil, the closest and most recent experiences of insertion of politics at school in Brazil were the disciplines *Organização Social e Política Brasileira* (Social Organization and Brazilian Politics) and *Educação Moral e Cívica* (Civic and Moral Education). These disciplines were implemented during the 1964-1985 military dictatorship (by Decree-Laws issued in 1968 and 1969), with a blatant intention of preventing alleged social disorder risks to the Brazilian society. Values such as nationalism, seen as love of country and obedience to its rulers were placed as these disciplines' main purpose (Menin, 2002). In 1996, these two disciplines were removed from schools curricula by the new *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação* (Law of Education Guidelines and Bases), under the justification that they were impregnated with a "negative character of indoctrination" (Menezes & Santos, 2002). The re-insertion of politics in elementary and secondary schools faces resistance of those afraid of the indoctrination return.

Børhaug (2008) evaluated the results of the political education curriculum through interviews with Norwegian students, and concluded that students are oriented to identify which party is better in line with their ideological standing. This works as a training of voters, but has some constraints since it does not encourage students to assume a critical posture before the political system of the country.

Nevertheless, the incentive to critical posture among students is object of another irresolute discussion. According to Parry (1999), education could serve to *reproduce* socially established practices and values or to redress practices and values,

correcting flaws perceived by previous generations (corroborated by Paulo Freire, 2001). As Parry says, the imbroglio emerges when we perceive that some adults want their children to challenge the values in force, while others fear the dismantling of traditions. Parry suggests that schools should be free to outline their political education curriculum (either to preserve or to challenge traditions) and parents should decide on the kind of education that will be provided to their children.

Frazer (2000) reports that the British Government plan of introducing citizenship-oriented education at schools brought about the antipathy from both the right and left wings. The opposition's arguments show that 'politics is optional' and individuals were not obliged to be familiar with governmental institutions. Moreover, political activity involves contact between groups that support opposite ideas, and little is known about people's preparedness to manage this reality (Emler & Frazer, 1999). As Frazer (1999) explains:

Yet, 'politics' is non-optional. [The right and left wings] must be prepared to defend their individual and collective rights to follow their own ways of life, to claim when necessary recognition of their social and political identities. Such claims involve encountering fellow citizens (or subjects) who are 'strangers' both in the sense of being not of ones hitherto acquaintance, and also (much of the time) 'different' with different voices, different values, ways of life and modes of conduct. (...)

[To deal with these differences] would involve education in the structures of power – both formal political institutions and arrangements, and the informal. (Frazer, 2000, p. 100)

The main dilemma is the co-existence of the desire of having impartial political education, and the recognition that, when put in practice, it will not be impartial (Parry, 1999, Frazer, 1999). Moreover, the results achieved by political education models may vary according to context and historical nuances like, e.g., greater interest of students for politics during periods of crisis (Davies, 1999).

However, it is important to admit the existence of regularities resulting from public policies on education in each country. Even if students are not presented to a

discipline about politics, the political debate in classrooms could produce noticeable effects in terms of political behavior. In a transnational comparison, the differences resulting from education are expected to be detectable. Therefore, the use of that variable in a model of empirical test could explain relevant aspects of the different political participation between countries.

On the other hand, caution is needed to prevent assuming the causal relation between education and political participation in the light of the considerations by researchers that identify a proxy effect. Among others, it must be taken into account the possibility that political education does not take place exclusively through formal school education, but also through other institutions or social networks in which the individual participates. One can assume that institutional frameworks and opportunities of building of social networks vary between the countries studied, thus reinforcing the interest in comparing them.

Adopting an extended perspective of the word 'education', to comprise also learning in non-school environments (family, friends, groups, churches, associations, communities, newspapers, TV programs, etc.), is necessary to understand where people usually learn about politics. Even more, when it comes to political education in non-school environments, there is a thin line between education and political socialization.

2.3.3. Political Education or Political Socialization?

Additionally to school, other institutions could foster political participation – working place, church, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, political parties, etc. (Kam & Palmer, 2008; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000). Usually, the political culture is built in informal debates, at the spheres of collective decision or discussion with political opponents (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Wyatt, Katz,

& Kim, 2000). As the same individual may participate in several spheres, it is unlike that one can clearly establish the contribution by each activity on their political view (Luskin, Fishkin & Jowell, 2002). Therefore, researchers today face the challenge of studying several contexts simultaneously to evaluate how these influence one another (Amnå, Ekström, Kerr, & Stattin, 2009)

For the purposes of this study, political socialization is understood in terms of *learning about politics out of the context of formal education*. 'Formal education', in turn, is understood as the *acquisition of knowledge by citizens at schools and higher education institutions that are part of the educational system of the country*. This study tries to identify if the political education of participants takes place at spaces of formal education or out of it (through political socialization) to compare the contribution of each context to the political participation.

Some authors consider the school environment as a room of political socialization as important as other spaces (Dudley & Gitelson, 2002; Jennings, Stoker & Bowers, 2009; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995; Pring, 1999). However, this investigation insists on the differentiation between formal education and other forms of socialization. If on one hand the causal relation between formal education levels and political participation is being challenged, on the other hand the specific curricula on politics could prevent students from remaining ignorant of this matter (Frazer, 2000).

This study intends to evaluate, based on participants' self-perception, the contribution provided by each context to their knowledge about politics (regardless if the school or other areas of life). Testing the correlation among that self-perception and other variables allows checking if given contexts, in given countries, favor different kinds of political participation.

2.4. Behavioral Contagion

*La politique est une religion
remise sur ses pieds⁶*
Serge Moscovici, 1985

The classic work by Gustave Le Bon (2008 [1895]), *The Crowd: a study of the popular mind* is considered to be an important milestone in the understanding of collective action. His work is appraised for the plausible description of the processes of collective action and decision and, at the same time, criticized for the pessimistic and even anti-democratic bias of the author's rationale (Consolim, 2008; McGuire, 1987; Moscovici, 1985).

This section discusses studies about the behavior of crowds and individuals organized in collective actions. It starts by Le Bon's work, discussing his contributions to the phenomena of collective action, the criticisms to his work, and the theoretical consequences to recent researches. The decision for starting with such a controversial work is due to its influence on further theories. Moreover, the study on behavior of crowds is not consolidated under a prevailing theory, although the following theories share a large common ground.

2.4.1. Le Bon's Ideas

Le Bon (2008) starts *The Crowd* by asserting that, underlying the apparent causes of the great changes of civilization, there is a deep change in peoples' ideas –

⁶ Literally translated, Moscovici affirms that 'politics is a religion back to its feet', which cannot be directly translated into English. In a semantically sensitive translation, Moscovici means that 'politics is a new form of religion' or, in other words, that 'politics was built on the same place previously occupied by religion, using the same foundations (its 'feet')'.

their opinions, concepts and beliefs. The author notes that, by the time he was writing the book, crowds were becoming aware of their huge power, as a consequence of the 'dissemination of some ideas gradually implemented in spirits' (p. 21). He adds that, prior to such awareness-building, civilizations were created and sustained by a small intellectual aristocracy, but 'never by crowds' (p. 23).

Adopting a really pessimistic tone, Le Bon affirms that crowds are impulsive, little skilled to reasoning, but very skilled for action; moreover, crowds have power only to destroy, never to build. The author suggests that powerful leaders (Le Bon uses the expression 'lords of the world', p. 24) bear instinctive knowledge about the crowds' souls, being capable of mastering them and leading them to a stated objective.

The main criticism to the thesis of crowds' irrationality is due to the clear intention of Le Bon of condemning popular movements, democratic institutions and collective aspirations (Margot-Duclos, 1961, quoted by McGuire, 1987). Jesus (2013) affirms that 'this outdated racist vision of the masses could be one of the explanations to the malaise caused by the discussion about crowds to this date, and to the lack of researches applied to the Brazilian reality' (p. 500). Zimmermann (1992) affirms that the unsustainable defense by Le Bon regarding the Anglo-Saxon superiority in relation to the 'Latin race', merely due to hereditary factors, provided arguments to several researchers and politicians of anti-democratic tendency.

Reading the *The Crowd* demands from readers a sharp relativism to acknowledge that what seems strange in the book is rooted in the *zeitgeist* of the time when it was written (McGuire, 1987). In fact, Le Bon's ideas were not dissonant to the ideas of other thinkers late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century, like Hippolyte Taine (1885), Herbert Spencer, Friedrich Nietzsche and Gabriel Tarde (Jesus, 2013; McGuire, 1987; Miguel, 2002; Nye, 1973. Zimmermann, 1992). The common ground shared by those authors is that they were influenced by social Darwinism, which proclaimed that some human beings had benefited from better

genetic evolution or gains at social level, and they should build the driving elites of society (Consolim, 2008; Miguel, 2002; Ribeiro, 2001). The authors were notably concerned about the 'mass uprisings' that would establish 'immoral' equality and annihilate the respect to 'natural' hierarchy (Miguel, 2002). In a more sophisticated way, Max Weber presents the unavoidable emergence of professional politician as something necessary to the efficiency of bureaucracy (Borchert, 2003). According to Joseph Schumpeter (who refers to Le Bon), masses cannot define what is the common good, neither select their representatives in a rational way; therefore, the elites should compete for the vote of citizens in a game that will decide which leader will prevail (Miguel, 2002).

Despite criticisms, the issues raised by Le Bon fostered the outlining of hypotheses to be subjected to scientific tests along the 20th century. Some researchers provided continuity to the aristocratic ideas of Le Bon's, but it also others objected that reasoning and tried to provide more 'impartiality' to his analysis (Jesus, 2013; McGuire, 1987; Nye, 1973; Sandoval, 1997; Zimmermann, 1992). Subsequent scientific findings support and refine the author's concepts. However, no study disclosing vehement and firm refusal to the phenomena described by Le Bon could be found. Considering its importance, the main concepts outlined by the author should be briefly stated.

Le Bon uses the term 'the mind of the crowds' to emphasize that crowds behave very differently from the sum of individual behaviors. Furthermore, crowds are not limited to a random agglomerate of people; their collective 'mind' is what enables them to be identified as a crowd.

Le Bon formulates a *law of mental unit of crowds* pointing out that under specific conditions the conscious personality of individuals disappears; their feelings and ideas are oriented to the same direction. Thus, a psychological crowd is assembled:

The disappearance of conscious personality and the convergence of feelings and thoughts to the same direction, first traits of the crowd about to get organized, sometimes do not imply the simultaneous presence of several individuals on the same site. Thousands of individuals spread over can, in a given moment and

under the influence of violent feelings, emerged from an important national happening, for example, acquire characteristics of a psychological crowd. Any chance that gathers them is enough (...) to [converse into] the specific form of acts of crowds [emphasis added] (Le Bon, 2008, p. 30).

The explanation for intellectually different persons to gather around a collective mind is, according to Le Bon, the similitude of their instincts, passions, feelings including their moral, affections, antipathies, and political and religious beliefs. That could explain, for example, the flood of rejection that led crowds to fight for the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Melo in 1991, as demonstrators had deep antipathy for him due to the failure of his economic plans and the scandalous cases of corruption during his mandate (Bertoncello, 2009; Bethell, 2008; Borges Filho, 2010; Gohn, 2009). In May 2013, in Sweden, a wave of violent demonstrations after the killing of an immigrant with indications of police brutality and racial prejudice (Hansson, Cars, Ekenberg & Danielson, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014). In June 2013, demonstrators all over Brazil joined demonstrators in São Paulo asking for reduction of bus fares, criticizing the brutal police repression, and the biased coverage of the 'mainstream media' against demonstrations (Damasceno, 2013; Lima, 2013; Vion-Dury, 2013).

In the examples above there were great national happenings that confronted the crowds' beliefs, mobilizing individuals towards collective action. Sweden is a peculiar case, as in the first sight the episode is not qualified as a great national happening. However, as Le Bon explains, much more intensively than statistic data, an image or some words can give rise to a crowd:

The facts themselves do not affect the popular imagination, but the way they are presented. By condensation, if I could say that, the facts should produce an impacting image capable of fulfilling and afflicting the soul. (Le Bon, 2008, p. 70).

So, the conditions surrounding the death of the immigrant may have changed that episode, which is statistically insignificant, into a 'great happening' to immigrants living in Sweden (this idea is corroborated by Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014). Similarly,

the dissemination of shocking images of the demonstrations in São Paulo through the social media may have contributed to the assembling of a nationwide psychological crowd (corroborated by Damasceno, 2013; Fernandes, 2013; Lima, 2013; Ranthum, 2013).

Le Bon also emphasizes that the core ideas of a people are slowly and consistently changing; in that sense, revolutions express the abandonment of old beliefs on behalf of new ones, marking moments of important change and consolidation of a new vision of world. This corroborates the reasoning of Bertonecelo's (2009) who affirms that the huge public demonstrations for direct elections in Brazil (*Diretas Já* in 1983 and 1984) had an effect of a rite of passage, expressing the refusal to the discourse that supported the military dictatorship that started with the military coup in 1964, and paving the way to the throbbing democratic beliefs.

Not only context-related factors can explain the assembling of the soul of crowds. Le Bon lists three potential causes that lead to the assembling of a psychological crowd, related to human characteristics:

- a) The author considers *suggestibility* as the main cause. According to him, individuals in crowd are in a state quite similar to hypnosis, and easily act on suggestions of others. The individual loses consciousness of their acts and is guided by the streaming flow created by the others.
- b) The *feeling of invincible power* resulting from the fact of being part of a group that is numerically large. Crowd becomes anonymous and irresponsible, and individuals give in to some instincts that, in other times, would be promptly curbed.
- c) *Mental contagion* comes from the hypnotic effect of participating in a crowd. There 'every act is contagious; and contagious to the point of leading individuals to easily sacrifice their personal interest on behalf of the collective interest' (p. 35).

Le Bon's arguments regarding *suggestibility* are quite controversial due to their links to hypnosis (Consolim, 2008; Jesus, 2013; McGuire, 1987; Nye, 1973). Recent researches do not approach the notion of hypnosis, but point out that, in a group, people tends to repeat the behavior of someone who serves as a model, with reduced self-criticism (Aarts, Gollwitzer & Hassin, 2004; e Bono & Ilies, 2006; Cacioppo & Hawley, 2009; Dik & Aarts; 2007; Freedman & Perlick, 1979; Krassa, 1988). The *feeling of invincible power* is corroborated by Reicher (2008). The empirical verification of these arguments should be done through experimental tests or qualitative approach, as survey-type researches on this topic could be biased by social desirability (Pasquali, 2010).

The concept of *mental contagion* provides relevant insights to the objectives of this study. This study keeps distance from the author's pessimism, in an attempt to understand contagion in a non-pejorative sense. It is indeed worth questioning if there is a multiplying effect that could increase the chances of an individual to participate in a collective action – even if by imitation of friends or other close persons. It is possible that feelings shared during a great national happening can mobilize crowds to a demonstration or any other form of political action. The example provided by someone else's behavior could make an individual move from intention towards action. Rather than 'mental contagion', this study employs the expression 'behavioral contagion' which emphasizes the imitation of actions and reduces the terminological ambiguity (Nicol, 1995), avoiding the unproductive debate around a dualistic (mind-body) or a monist (only body) concept of human being (Ryle, 1951).

Cialdini and Trost (1998) raised an interesting question: after all, why should individuals accept the influence of others? In a naïve perspective, being 'victim' of influence apparently brings no gains; however, the authors support there are indeed effective gains. In the first place, the influenced ones have their uncertainty about the

behavior to be adopted in a given situation reduced, thus gaining their acceptance as a member of a group. The raising of the influenced ones' self-esteem also works as a way of compensation for the agreement to the objectives of the influencer or group (corroborated by Simon *et al.*, 1998; and by Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013).

Sandoval (1997) critically says that Sociology started from the assumption that individuals would be passively guided by the ideologies of the dominant class, through the learning of social rules and values, while Social Psychology – as a legacy of Le Bon – placed the collectivity under suspicion. In the psychological interpretation, the individuals' creativity would be inhibited thus leading them to conformism in exchange for their acceptance by the group. Sandoval emphasizes that both sociology and psychology presuppose the individuals' irrationality in their contact with social environment. Still according to him, the study of political behavior used to refuse the individual's capacity of being an agent in the political setting.

Concluding in an optimistic tone, Sandoval (1997) observes a change of the researchers' focus which is now addressed to understand individuals as social actors and how they articulate it with collective action. McGuire (1987) suggests the possibility of developing a pro-social version of the psychology of crowds, i.e., it could accept situations of mass behavior where participants are aware about their actions and deliberately make the decision of participating or not in the crowd. In this sense, the study will now analyze the recent theoretical advances and, then, will delimit how the subject will be approached herein.

2.4.2. Recent Theoretical Advances

Most of the times, the aristocratic bias of Le Bon is refused by the researchers after him (Jesus, 2013; McGuire, 1987). However, many subsequent theories still considered the irrational motivation – with new outlines – as a component of the

behaviors of crowds. McGuire (1987) explains that Freud (1921), in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* replaced the 'hypnotic state' of Le Bon's crowd for impulses of the libido driven by the identification with the collective; Wilfred Trotter (1921), in *Instincts of the herd in peace and war* replaces the crowd's suggestibility for the aggregation instinct of the herd, affirming that individual rationality could be considered to be an impairment to the herd integration; William McDougall (1927), in *The group mind* points out telepathy (which lacks empirical verification) and collective consciousness of big groups, emphasizing that individuals renounce their cognition and control of actions when they are in a group; Neil Smelser (1965), in *Theory of collective behavior* efforts to keep distance from Le Bon, but corroborates that collective behavior is moved by 'general beliefs' of hysterical nature and, therefore, suggestible; Serge Moscovici (1985), in *L'age des foules* (Age of Crowds) admits that collectivity overcomes the individual's rationality, and says that Le Bon's theory is uncomfortable to modern readers but, nonetheless, that he had anticipated the theoretical advances noted in the 20th century.

Jesus (2013) classifies the post-1950 advances around four major modern theories: theory of deindividuation; theory of social identity; theory of convergence; and, emerging norms model.

The *theory of deindividuation* suggests that individuals become more uninhibited and impulsive when mixed to the group, thus building a sense of anonymity (Diener, 1980; Festinger, Pepitone & Newcombe, 1952; Reimann, & Zimbardo, 2011). Reicher (2008), on the other hand, disagrees with the explanation about anonymity and suggests that the sense of empowerment and identification with the group rules explain the individual's behavior in the crowd.

The *emergent norm model* (Turner, 1964, as quoted by Jesus, 2013) establishes that crowds get organized around shared social cognitions, preserving the individual traits. Norms emerge from symbolic interactions among the parties involved,

just like the roles of leaders and followers that also emerge. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) also add that little is known about how norms are built, but note that sanctions spontaneously practiced by the group members can lead individuals to non-selfish objectives and facilitate cooperation.

The *theory of social identity* (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) assumes that people share beliefs and feelings with the group, and get committed to the collective action. The existence of out-groups⁷ (like the police in confrontation with crowds) and of discourses formulated by representative members of the in-group ends up by building the notions of 'we' in contrast to 'they' (Drury & Reicher, 1999). That is how sympathy with the group is built, notably when collective identity is more prominent than the personal identity (Simon *et al.*, 1998; Turner, Brown & Tajfel, 1979). For Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013), when the experience of deprivation or injustice of the group becomes important to the individual, the motivation for protesting raises.

The *theory of convergence* assumes that people wanting to be part of a crowd decide to abandon the cognition and behaviors that clash with the majority. This argument is based on Festinger's (1975) theory of cognitive dissonance. According to that theory, in face of two incompatible beliefs of the same relevance, the individual tends to select one and reject the others and, after selecting one (usually the majority's thinking, in this case), seeks for reasons to justify the selected belief and reasons to disqualify the belief that was rejected.

While the theory of deindividuation supports Le Bon's theory on the irrationality of the crowd, the theories of social identity and convergence acknowledge that individuals *decide* for participating in the crowd and perform cognitive evaluations on that participation. The theory of emergent norm avoids the discussion about

⁷ Here, for clarification purposes, is repeated the concept of out-group: 'social unit with which the individual does not identify or to which he / she does not belong', and the in-group is exactly the opposite, i.e., the 'social unit with which the individual identifies or to which he / she belongs' (James, 1986).

rationality/irrationality and suggests a 'natural path' to crowds, resulting from the symbolic interaction of individuals (in the cognitive plan, emphatically).

Additionally to the theories pointed out above by Jesus (2013), there are the experimental studies on *Goal Contagion*. Dik and Aarts (2007) argue that, when an individual A *infers* the effort of B towards an objective, that facilitates the occurrence of A's behavior towards the same (inferred) objective. That is what authors call *Goal Contagion*. The authors concluded that objectives-oriented activities can be transmitted from a person to another during every day social interactions, in a careless way (corroborating Bargh, Gollwitzer, LeeChai, Barndollar & Trötschel, 2001).

For its positive bias on the study of influences among members of the same group, the work by Gomes and Maheirie (2011) is worth of mentioning. Through interviews, the authors have investigated the influence exercised among participants of the *Movimento Passe Livre* (Zero-Fare Movement) in Florianópolis. They conclude that participants are mutually influenced, build friendly relationships and match militancy and everyday activities with friends. Moreover, some of the respondents reported that their parents, teachers and friends serve as models of political activity (corroborating McClurg, 2003; and McFarland & Thomas, 2006). The movement participants feel happy for being part of something that goes beyond them, 'participating in the lives of other people, changing subjects and contexts, bearing meaning, taking their creation and themselves to the world' (Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; p. 370). Therefore, the study points out the effect of the collectively organized political participation on the psychological constitution of the individual; it highlights that individuals *assign conscious meaning* to what he/she does as member of the group (corroborated by McClurg, 2003).

The empirical evidences for the behavioral contagion are found in scattered studies. Typically with the use of experimental methodology, the behavioral contagion is related to laughing at a joke (Freedman & Perlick, 1979), expressing positive or

negative emotions (Bono & Ilies, 2006) or formulating opinions (Krassa, 1988), getting involved with criminal or risky activities (Jones & Jones, 1995), even solitude (Cacioppo, & Hawkey, 2009), but literature is not limited to these examples. Evidences on the implication of contagion on the political participation have been also identified through researches like, e.g., those performed by Djupe and Grant (2001), McClurg (2003), McFarland and Thomas (2006).

Participation in the same community or organized movement seems to strengthen the links between members and facilitate contagion (Djupe & Grant, 2001; Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; Harrigan, Achananuparp & Lim, 2012; Jones & Jones, 1995; McClurg, 2003). By investigating processes of contagion with the use of spatial econometric methods in a geo-coded dataset, Cho and Rudolph (2008) affirm that one can intuitively imagine that neighbors positively influence one another on behalf of the engagement in a political action...

However, what surely is not intuitive neither obvious is that this dissemination process exists regardless our measures of social involvement, political engagement, interpersonal trust, [education, income, age], race and gender. (...) In brief, social context is relevant, regardless the variable included in or excluded from our model (Cho & Rudolph, 2008; p. 286).

The several concepts created by each theoretician referred to in this section show the same way: individuals tend to adjust their behaviors according to the surrounding crowd or group either for political actions or in other areas of life. Each theory proposes a different explanation to the same behaviors; these explanations are not mutually exclusive, but reveal the different potential views on a given episode of collective action, either spontaneous or organized. Therefore, it is worth defining how the “behavioral contagion” phenomenon will be approached in this study.

2.4.3. Behavioral Contagion as approached in this study

For the present study, Behavioral Contagion is understood as *the influence exerted from one individual to another, either by encouraging, convincing or by following other people's examples*. It is here investigated without Le Bon's aristocratic bias. This contagion – whether of cognitive, affective or instinctive nature – can be considered an important element to understand the collective action, notably to explain the recent episodes of crowds assembled with notable degree of spontaneity and, many times, without any well-defined leadership. Nonetheless, beyond the popular demonstrations on the streets, behavioral contagion can be important and required to other forms of collective action, with different degrees of organization like engaging in community works with political implications (Djupe & Grant, 2001), donate cash to or vote for a candidate (Shachar & Nalebuff, 1999), run to a political office (Matland, 2005; Matland & Studlar, 1996) or just to increase the chances of getting involved into new opportunities of political actions (Cho & Rudolph, 2008; Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; McClurg, 2003; McFarland & Thomas, 2006).

Behavioral Contagion blurs the boundaries between individual and collective behaviors (Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). That is supported by the criticism by Cho and Rudolph (2008) on the 'individualistic school', highlighting that political participation should be understood in the light of collectivities (corroborating Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; and Moscovici, 1985). Behavioral contagion would be minimally required to enable the organized political action – after all, political actions take place mainly through the mobilization of collective interests, seldom by an individual's interest in isolation.

In brief, the purpose is to evaluate if when an individual A observes individual B participating in a political action, the changes for A to participation in the same action can vary. Furthermore, possibly a larger number of politically active individuals close to A could lead him to even higher chances of participation. In essence, questionnaire

items regarding behavioral contagion in this study aim at assessing if ‘influencing people’ or ‘following the influence of someone’ increase or not the chances for the individual to get engaged in a political action.

This study is not aimed at developing neither an experiment nor a qualitative investigation and, thus, it cannot evaluate the degree of rationality of the political actions object of the investigation. The answer to the questionnaires items is inexorably subjected to cognitive filters (Caprara *et al.*, 2000; Pasquali, 2010); thus, it would be naïve to expect a participant to impartially answer items intended to measure to which extent their decision of participating in a collective action was irrational. Rather, the study aims to evaluate if the participant finds in their social network examples of persons engaged in political actions.

2.5. Researching in Different Cultures

The nature of man is always the same; it is their habits that separate them.
Confucius, 4th a.C.

Researches on Social Psychology directly or indirectly handle with the phenomenon of culture (Smith & Bond, 1999; Torres & Neves, 2013). Even when a study focuses on the population of one single country, unique traits of that nation hinder data collection instruments and procedures from other countries to be directly 'translated' to it (Smith, Fischer, Vignoles & Bond, 2013). Considering the stated intention of comparing behaviors of citizens in two countries (Brazil and Sweden) in this research, it is worth making some remarks about the important role played by culture.

The next subsections present a brief analysis of the concept of culture, followed by some considerations about cross-cultural researches. Then relevant aspects of the culture of each country which could impact this study are described.

2.5.1. What is Culture?

The concept of culture has brought about - and still brings about - intensive discussions in the field of social sciences (notably anthropology, which is considered to be the science of Culture - Geertz, 1973; Murdock, 1932; White, 1959). Researchers that review literature are careful about proposing a definitive concept (Keesing, 1974; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). Laraia (1997) states that understanding the concept of culture will be 'a perpetual theme of the restless human reflection' (p. 65).

The classical definition of Culture denotes the opposition to the idea of biological transmission of given human characteristics. Edward Tylor (1920 [1871]) defined culture as 'that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals,

law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society' (p.1). This definition leaves a strong imprint on the learning nature of culture and its social transmission, in opposition to the transmission through biological mechanisms (Laraia, 1997; Murdock, 1932; White, 1959; Wright, 1998).

The sharing/dissemination of 'cultural things' is considered to be a core element to understand cultures, and it receives attention and support by many authors (Heller, 1995; Keesing, 1974; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Laraia, 1997; Tylor, 1920; White, 1959), and this could be considered an harmonic understanding in the study of cultures.

The *harmonic understandings*, listed up to now, point out that culture:

- a) Refers to human capacities transmitted through learning rather than just by biological mechanisms (Keesing, 1974; Laraia, 1997; Murdock, 1932; Tylor, 1920; White, 1959);
- b) Is adaptive and dynamic, reaffirmed and rebuilt through the experience of the encultured ones (Geertz 1973; Keesing, 1974; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Laraia, 1997);
- c) Is shared, disseminated or transmitted (the term varies depending on the author) in public spaces (Heller, 1995; Geertz, 1973; Laraia, 1997; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber & Chen, 2009; Tylor, 1920);
- d) Tells the encultured ones which events are interconnected (Geertz, 1993; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Smith *et al.*, 2013).

In an attempt to find converging aspects among the different studies, *culture* is defined herein as follows: *a system of knowledge and beliefs made up by symbols, rules, language and habits historically constituted and socially shared*. Such definition certainly disregards several cultural elements approached by the aforementioned researchers, but it is enough to discuss the variables investigated in this study.

Thus, could we say that the findings of this research will explain the cultural differences between Brazil and Sweden? That is not so simple and is the topic approached in the next section. Beyond conceptual considerations, Social Psychology researchers accumulate theoretical and methodological recommendations to approach cross-cultural issues (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 1998; Smith *et al.*, 2013). The next section discusses the advances made and their relevance to this study.

2.5.2. Cross-cultural Studies in Social Psychology

For Social Psychology, culture is a phenomenon that comprises all others - in other words, all phenomena studied in this field of knowledge are closely linked to culture (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, 1998; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). The main contribution expected from cross-cultural studies in social psychology is the identification of the dimensions in which cultural groups vary (Soares, Farhangmehr & Shoham, 2007). Those studies seek universalisms comparing the meaning of the concepts studied and how these are manifested in each nation (Smith *et al.*, 2013).

The phenomena referred to be autochthon (i.e., specific to a culture) can be expressed at different degrees of intensity in different cultural contexts (Smith & Bond, 1999; Torres & Neves, 2013). The discovery of related or *quasi*-equivalent phenomena between cultures allows extracting, from particular cases, evidences of universalism of the psychological concepts studied. According to the terms coined by Pike (1967, quoted by Smith *et al.*, 2013 and by Harris, 1976) it is about extracting evidences of 'Etic' phenomena from 'Emic' studies. It is worth explaining those terms.

Pike created the terms 'Etic' and 'Emic' by analogy to the fields of Phonetics and Phonemic, which try to track the sounds universally produced by the human beings and the sounds typical to a given idiom, respectively. So, Pike's 'Etic' refers to the study of *universal* cultural phenomena (by analogy to the term *PhonETICs*) that can be

found in different cultures, while 'Emic' (by analogy to *PhonEMIC*) refers to *specific traits of a people* (Smith *et al.*, 2013; Harris, 1976).

Here mention should be made to two examples. Hofstede and Bond (1988) found an *emic* trait of Chinese people: the long-term view that was even called Confucianism as it would be related to the thinker Confucius (*Kung Fu Tzu*). This trait, which had not been identified in previous studies – as these did not include China – drew the authors' attention and raised questions about if it would be typical just to the Chinese or if it would be manifested in other peoples (an *etic* question) in further studies (Chen & Chung, 1994; Franke, Hofstede & Bond, 1991; Johnson & Lenartowicz, 1999; Yeh & Lawrence, 1995). Likewise, the curiosity about forms of informal influence like the "Brazilian way" ("jeitinho brasileiro", an *emic* phenomenon) motivated Smith, Huang, Harb e Torres (2012) to make a comparison between similar behaviors observed in other cultures like the *pulling strings* (in England), the *wasta* (in Lebanon) and the *guanxi* (in China). Similarities and differences are found among the four cases, pointing out that informal influence is common in those cultures (therefore, is an indication of an *etic* phenomenon), although being manifested differently in each country.

Smith, Fischer, Vignoles and Bond (2013) disclose the care required when performing cross-cultural studies due to the nuances of the cultures studied that put researcher on a kind of 'sandy' soil. The interpretation of the studied phenomenon can be contaminated by the researcher's pre-concepts based on his/her own culture. According to Smith *et al.* (2013), this kind of mistake is called 'imposed *etic*', i.e., the researcher presumes that an *emic* trait of his/her culture is an *etic* phenomenon and tries to measure it in other cultures without any adjustment. Thus, the comparability between cultures depends on strict attention to the nuances of each people being studied.

The validity of a cross-cultural study also depends on the clear distinction between the levels of individual and national analysis to avoid hypotheses from being tested at a level while, in fact, they refer to other (Smith *et al.*, 2013). When analyzing data, cross-cultural researchers should avoid making inferences with the vice of *ecological fallacy*, i.e., assign to an individual a characteristic found in his/her group (Gelfand, Erez & Aycan, 2007; Smith & Bond, 1999). In practice, it is about paying attention to the fact that individuals participate in different ways in their culture (Keesing, 1974; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Laraia, 1997). For instance, if the United States bear the trait of individualism and Guatemala is marked by collectivism, it does not mean that any single American individual is more individualist than any Guatemalan individual.

To avoid vices during the application of questionnaires to different cultures, Smith, *et al.*, (2013) recommend a careful translation of the research instruments. It should undergo a back-translation, i.e., after the first translation into the target language (e.g., from German to Burmese) the instrument should be 'de-translated' to the original language (from Burmese to German) to check if the meaning of all items remain unchanged (Brislin, 1970). At the same time, the procedure should consider the semantic specificity of the languages involved, what means to avoid literal translation and privilege the translation into *something that expresses the same meaning in each culture* (Smith *et al.* refer to it as 'decentralized translation', as it cannot be made by one single translator). In practical terms, it means paying attention to the different meanings of the same expression in the different languages involved. For instance, in English 'to kick the bucket' means 'to die'; if its literally translated into Portuguese, '*chutar o balde*', Brazilians would understand the same expression as 'to be revolted'. So, the best translation into Portuguese would be '*bater as botas*' (literally, 'to bump the boots') even if the literal interpretation makes no sense.

Cross-Cultural Psychology has advanced through the gradual shaping of concepts through empirical tests and comparison of cultural differences (Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Smith *et al.* 2013). Next subsection discusses the specific usage of statistics to assess cross-cultural differences. The following considerations seem to be relevant in the present context, as those analyses are not common in other fields of expertise.

2.5.3. Interpreting Cross-Cultural Statistics

Advances in statistical techniques allowed a very strict evaluation of measure equivalence across cultures. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), processed through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), is useful to verify *Factor Structure, Metric and Scalar Equivalence* among different cultural groups (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2009; Brown, 2006). CFA tools allow the introduction of constraints (like forcing factor loadings and items' intercepts to be equal across groups) for comparison. These procedures are meant to ensure that variables are useful to compare the groups enrolled.

Factor Structure Equivalence is found when the same factor structure offers good fit for each group (i.e., Brazilians and Swedes, here) separately and also on a simultaneous test. In this simultaneous test, two covariance matrices are created, and Goodness-of-Fit indices indicate how well the estimates are adjusted to both, simultaneously (or, if there are more groups, Goodness-of-fit indicates the good adjustment to all covariance matrices).

Metric Equivalence indicates that items have identical relationships with factors in all cultural groups; this allows the researcher to *infer* that scale points have the same meaning among groups (Smith, Fischer, Vignoles & Bond, 2013). To perform this test, factor loadings are constrained to be equal across groups, by indicating this desired

constraint on any SEM software. This is considered a rigorous test on the majority of comparisons (Hair *et al.*, 2009). Therefore, it is usually enough to demonstrate *partial* metric equivalence, given by the existence of at least two equivalent factor loadings for each factor (Brown, 2006; Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Hair *et al.*, 2009). Chi-square and CFI discrepancies (ΔX^2 and ΔCFI) are usually considered the main indicators of equivalence. Non-significant ΔX^2 (considering the chi-square table) is usually considered to indicate equivalence across groups (Hair *et al.*, 2009). When ΔCFI remains below 0.01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2000), this is an evidence of equivalence.

Scalar Equivalence refers to the situation where the scores can be directly compared between two or more cultural groups. Scalar Equivalence cannot be tested directly, because the researcher does not have access to measure the real expression of the factor (Smith *et al.*, 2013). To perform this test, the intercepts of each item for the comparison group(s) is constrained to be equal to the reference group. The evidence of Scalar Equivalence also considers ΔX^2 or ΔCFI .

Metric and Scalar Equivalence are very rigorous tests (Brown, 2006; Hair *et al.*, 2009, Thompson, 2004). Smith *et al.* (2013) warn that very few cross-cultural studies tested these levels of equivalence. On Metric Equivalence, Thompson (2004) states that, in practice, researchers usually hope that the same constructs are measured across groups but do not expect factor loadings pattern to be completely invariant. Scalar Equivalence is the most difficult to establish (Smith *et al.*, 2013), as intercept constraints actually narrows group responses to very strict limits. It is actually to be criticized that the use of rigorous interpretation parameters for Scalar Equivalence may make cross-cultural comparisons unfeasible, as it is expected that, on realistic collected data, people from different cultures use scales points somewhat differently. Scalar Equivalence is often disregarded (Smith *et al.*, 2013); its seldom demonstration

might be considered an evidence of its oversensitivity (see words of caution by Brown, 2006; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Bermúdez, Maslach & Ruch, 2000).

Chi-square and CFI discrepancy tests (ΔX^2 and ΔCFI) are usually regarded in the search of Metric and Scalar Equivalence evidences. Chi-square tests, however, are oversensitive to sample size, and there is little agreement among researchers on the adequacy of using it (Bollen, 1989; Brown, 2006; Byrne and Campbell, 1999; Hayduk, 1987; Scott-Long, 1983). Therefore, ΔX^2 may lead to reject good models, especially on large samples (Caprara *et al.*, 2000). The use of $\Delta CFI < 0.01$ threshold has not still reached agreement (Brown, 2006). Caprara *et al.* (2000) considered that strict cutoffs of CFA tests of equivalence might be oversensitive, as tests with the Big Five personality test showed adequate Factor Structure Equivalence and differences among countries could be actually an effect of cultural differences. The effect of cultural differences is also accepted by Byrne and Campbell (1999) and Olatunji *et al.* (2009), who also reported negative results on equivalence tests. These authors consider that it seems reasonable that factor loadings vary across those different populations. Thompson (2004) states that, if constrained model's Goodness-of-Fit is inside the acceptance parameters, it is a good evidence of Metric Equivalence.

Smith *et al.* (2013) explain that the interpretation of cross-cultural data sometimes involves handling with non-equivalent results. In practical terms, to this study it means that different factor structures⁸ can be found in each country observed. The interpretation of those non-equivalent results forces researchers to decide for one of the three methodological options:

- a) To consider that different structures indicate measurement bias, so they should not be used;

⁸ Pooling of the questionnaire items calculated through statistical analyses that summarize a construct or variable investigated (Thompson, 2005).

- b) To assume that non-equivalence (“the bias”) is of some relevance, because it shows that cultures operate differently. Therefore ‘bias’ becomes a variable of interest. This can offer insights into how the context influences psychological realities;
- c) To assume that any bias found is a kind of evidence of the existence of cultural differences.

The first methodological option is excessively strict as it implies discarding virtually all the content researched. Boehnke *et al.* (2014) warn that, when using the criterion of strict equivalence between the cultures investigated,

fairly narrow kernel of a psychological construct will be included in cross-cultural research, namely, the one for which semantic identity can be proven via showing the equivalence of covariances (Boehnke *et al.*, 2014, p. 1658 a).

Consequently, the researcher fails in finding ‘emic’ aspects, i.e., disregards the cultural differences. Cross-cultural research abounds in non-equivalent results (please refer to Rossier, 2014; Spencer, Fitch, Grogan-Kaylor & Mcbeath, 2005) or, on the other hand, partial equivalences are found (Hui & Triandis, 1983; Smith *et al.*, 2014).

The third methodological option is pretty much lenient and could lead to conclusions about Emic phenomena without a deep analysis. This study decided to consider, in the light of the second option, that non-equivalence is indeed important and should be observed as an indication of cultural differences; however, it recognizes that a binational study cannot draw assertive conclusions about the typical cultural features of the phenomena studied. Sound and consistent conclusions about cultural differences are only achievable through the replication of studies in several countries (like Caprara *et al.*, 2000; Olatunji *et al.*, 2009), which could not be done here. On behalf of the originality of this Doctoral Thesis, we tried to investigate unexplored relations between the variables selected, using a questionnaire designed exclusively for this study. Therefore, the conclusions of this research are expected to foster new

cross-cultural studies about political participation, stereotypes about parliamentarians, political education and behavioral contagion, to observe the consistence of differences found regarding such phenomena herein.

And that brings up a new question: How could culture be translated into empirically relevant variables? Those variables should allow benchmarking the people's studies, in exercises to simplify reality. If culture resembles a 'package' that wraps virtually everything, it should be 'unpacked' (Smith & Bond, 1999).

2.5.4. Unpacking Culture

The complexity of culture-related phenomena is in direct opposition to the inexorable need of defining the research focuses. Unavoidably, researchers will disregard some important element, on behalf of parsimony (Briley, Morris & Simonson, 2000). As culture is an extremely broad phenomenon to be scientifically investigated (Soares, Farhangmehr & Shoham, 2007), it should be *unpacked*, i.e., researchers should identify constructs related to behavior, like beliefs, values, motivation etc. (Smith & Bond, 1999) to enable the research. Such constructs should be quantifiable so to allow placing an individual in a 'universal' dimension, i.e., whose validity is not restricted to his/her cultural group (Thomas, 2008; Torres & Neves, 2013).

It cannot be pointed with absolute certainty who would have pioneered the culture unpacking. Among the oldest ones, Kluckhohn (1951) proposed a differentiation between objective culture (concrete objects produced by the group like flags, jars, clothes) and subjective culture (traditional ideas and values transmitted among members). Hall (1966; 1998) proposed the analysis of differences based on four principles: a) *time*; b) *space*; c) *context*; and, d) regarding the *message flow*.

Studies that delimit variables for scientific investigation purposes have provided relevant contributions to identify cultural differences (Soares, Farhangmehr & Shoham,

2007) as they enable operating the concept of culture to study attitudes and behaviors (Smith, Dugan & Trompenaars, 1996). The most prominent examples of unpacking in literature are the works by Geert Hofstede and Shalom Schwartz (quoted by Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Briley, Morris & Simonson, 2000; Oyserman & Sorensen, 2009; Smith, Fischer, Vignoles & Bond, 2013; Soares, Farhangmehr & Shoham, 2007; Thomas, 2008; Torres & Neves, 2013).

Hofstede (1980; 1983; 1984a; 1984b; 1991; 1993) identified cultural variations in the dimensions Masculinity/Femininity, Avoidance of Uncertainties, Distance of Power and Individualism/Collectivism, additionally to the Chinese Confucianism discovered by Hofstede and Bond (1988), as mentioned in the previous section. The Individualism/Collectivism axis produced a multitude of subsequent studies, and it is probably the most used dimension in social psychology to analyze cultural differences (Gelfand, Erez & Aycan, 2007).

Schwartz (1992; 1994), in turn, identified 56 values categorized in 10 motivational types that are organized in four basic values. Inglehart and Welzel (2010) categorized countries according to their position on a scatter plot which crosses two axes (or dimensions). The first is the *traditional versus secular values* dimension, which represents the extent to which one country's people have replaced religion-based traditions by science and rational thinking. The second axis represents the *survival versus self-expression values*, i.e. to which extent one country's people worry about physical and economic security or to subjective well-being and tolerance. Additionally to the consistency acknowledged, similarities between Schwartz's, Hofstede's and Inglehart and Welzel's findings could point out the existence of systems of common meaning between different cultures (Smith *et al.*, 2013; Torres & Neves, 2013).

The abovementioned studies proposed several concepts (dimensions) to analyze culture. The works by Hofstede and Schwartz are especially influential regarding the use of *surveys* to measure cultural differences, having influenced the subsequent

studies in Social Psychology both in theoretical and methodological terms. Researchers trying to unpack culture have identified and systematized dimensions that enabled searching for universal characteristics of humanity, with large replication in further studies (Schwartz, 2011; Smith & Bond, 1999).

Culture unpacking is also subject to criticisms. Briley, Morris and Simonson (2000) warn that cultures cannot be simply limited to a combination of dimensions, as this would strongly disregard their complexities. Gelfand, Erez and Aycan (2007) point out that efforts to unpack culture in organizational behavior researches have focused virtually exclusively on the Individualism/Collectivism axis; the same authors highlight the need for seeking new variables to produce new advances on unpacking of culture. The criticism by Briley, Morris and Simonson (2000) points out that unpacking could lead to neglect some important aspects of culture.

Gelfand, Erez and Aycan (2007) and Oyserman and Sorensen (2009) suggest expanding the approach of unpacking so it can reach a wider variety of situations. This study accepts the unpacking as a valid and very useful methodological proposal to compare cultural differences. Both unpacking and other different approaches (like ethnography, for instance) are subject to limited scope due to the choices that researchers must make to delimit their studies. So, instead of ruling over a technique due to its limitations, it starts from the assumption that different techniques could supplement one another – after all, despite the clear difference in terms of generalization and deepening of data, ethnography can raise questions to be explored through the unpacking, and vice-versa.

2.5.5. Political Culture

The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963) is considered to be the pioneer work in the study of political culture (Capistrano & Castro, 2010, Henrique, 2013;

Kuschnir & Carneiro, 1999). Almond and Verba classified societies following three kinds of political culture: parochial, subjection or participant. The *parochial* political culture would be characteristic to simple societies with incomplete differentiation between religious and political structures, and of low level of political and associative participation. The political culture of *subjection* would happen in societies where citizens do not feel to be apt to participate, and leave decisions to the centralizing administrative apparatus. Finally the political culture of *participation* would characterize the systems that integrate conscious individuals, somehow linked to the political system and willing to participate. This classification was subject to severe criticisms by anthropologists that highlighted the need for more careful theoretical formulations about political culture.

According to Kuschnir and Carneiro (1999), Almond and Verba (1963) have classified societies according to their proximity or not to the democratic political culture (or civic culture) of the western society. Moreover, Almond and Verba tried to '[on one hand] reinforce and justify the understanding of the supremacy of the North-American society as a model to be followed [in opposition to the Soviet socialism] and, on the other hand, to promote and justify the North-American politics (...)' (Castro, 2000, p. 17, as quoted by Borba, 2005, pp. 148-149). This strongly normative and ethnocentric appeal found in the works by Almond and Verba (1963), as well as others that followed them in the study of political culture, eventually removed anthropologists from this debate (Borba, 2005; Capistrano & Castro, 2010; Jackman & Miller, 1996; Kuschnir & Carneiro, 1999). Almond and Verba (1980) were responsive to the criticism, and diminished their work's prescribing character.

Therefore, the studies about political culture remained limited to the scope of political science (Kuschnir & Carneiro, 1999). However, there are no apparent reasons for the debate about its results to remain restrict to that discipline, or to abandon the efforts to understand it (Fuks, Perissinoto & Ribeiro, 2003; Inglehart, 1988; Jackman &

Miller, 1996). The study of political culture should serve as an analytical tool to research beliefs, values and identities of different groups existing in the society, in order to explain the political behavior of individuals (Borba, 2005; Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1996; Lane, 1992). The political culture analysis should consider the relation between citizens and the institutional and historic context where they are formed, including several determinants of the public support to the form of political organization in the societies studied (Capistrano & Castro, 2010; Jackman & Miller, 1996; Kuschnir & Carneiro, 1999).

Several works investigate the link between political culture and trust in democratic institutions, in face of the cultural tradition (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Henrique, 2010 and 2013; Hibbing & Patterson, 1994; Moisés, 2008; Patterson, 1968; Putnam, Leonardi, Nanetti, & Pavoncello, 1983; Rennó, 2001; Van Der Meer, 2010). Those studies bear a prescriptive trait as they search for solutions to the crisis of distrust in the Legislative Power (Henrique, 2013; Teorell, 2006), to the point of a significant share of citizens advocate for a paradoxal 'democracy without National Congress' (Moisés, 2008, p.31), or of mistrusting other public institutions (Fuks, Perissinoto & Ribeiro, 2003; Mishler, & Rose, 2005; Putnam, 1996).

It should be recognized that those studies about political culture help understanding the problems found in the relation between representatives and represented ones, with the ultimate purpose of improving the performance of institutions. In conclusion, the attempt to understand several political cultures should avoid the ethnocentric (to assume that the practices of a nation should be 'copied' by other nations) and prescriptive character, recognizing that there is no "*one best way*" to the effective functioning of democracies.

Up to now, this study has discussed the concept of culture, the required care for cross-cultural research, the unpacking of culture (changing it into empirically measurable dimensions) and the tendencies of studies about political culture. Those

considerations are important to define the decisions on the investigation being outlined. The next section summarizes the implications of the past theoretical remarks about the subject studied herein.

2.5.6. Relevant considerations for this study

In face of the abounding understandings about what is culture and how it could be studied, some considerations should be made regarding the study proposed here. As explained in the Section 2.5.4, when ‘unpacking culture’, one cannot, *a priori*, state that the investigated variables are cross-cultural dimensions to the point of being used to unpack the culture of both selected countries. However, this initial incursion is necessary to build a reasonably consistent measure that could be tried in other countries. The purpose here is to compare variables that could be related to behavior (political participation).

At the same time, stereotypes could be viewed as cultural products and as ‘culturally produced syntheses about a specific group (for this study, about parliamentarians of their countries). In other words, stereotypes are built, rebuilt and become common through sharing (term employed by Heller, 1995) or dissemination (term used by Laraia, 1997) at public spaces (Geertz, 1973) just like the other cultural codes (Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995). Therefore, these could be observed as part of the knowledge system (term used by Keesing, 1974) of a given culture, configuring relevant indications about the culturally built form how people relate to their parliamentarians.

If each individual knows only part of their social codes (as stated by Keesing, 1974 and Laraia, 1997) and if education and socialization are means for cultural transmission, the efficiency of that transmission should be evaluated. The study is

focused on learning how social codes about politics are transmitted and if that influences political participation.

As culture is a phenomenon that comprises all the others (Smith *et al.*, 2013) the variables in this study are not only influenced by culture, being integral part of it. Due to the cross-cultural nature of this study, participants are expected to provide different answers, to the point that it will be possible to assemble groups according to nationality. These differences can provide indications about the interference of cultural elements on the variables selected to the study.

This study does not intend to make an exhaustive cultural mapping, or searching for correlations between cultural traits and the variables of interest listed in the previous sections. It aims at identifying differences and similarities with comparative tests *among the variables already listed* and the demographic data surveyed through questionnaire.

On the other hand, this investigation cannot avoid describing the historical process of the social-political-cultural constitution of the Brazilian and Swedish peoples. To avoid the risk of faulty generalization or *imposed etic*, the cross-national research should start with, at least, reasonable knowledge about the history of each country and their main sub-cultural dimensions like, for example, the existing political conflicts. In the next section, the socioeconomic differences between Brazil and Sweden are explained, with a brief summary of their histories, which must be considered when regarding the response to the items of this research.

2.6. Characteristics of the Political Context of Brazil and Sweden

Summarizing the information that characterizes the political context of the countries selected implies electing some pieces of information that are presumed to be

more relevant to the objectives of the research. The following section is a summary of the political context of Brazil and Sweden, noting that it is not an exhaustive analysis.

2.6.1. Organization of Political Institutions

This analysis starts by describing Brazil and Sweden, regarding their political institutional arrangement (Table 3). Brazil is organized in the *Republican* Form of Government, *Presidential* System, *Federate* Form of State, the national parliament has a *bicameral* structure, and voting is mandatory. Sweden differs in all items, being a *Parliamentarian Monarchy* in a *Unit State*, *unicameral* parliament and *voluntary* voting. A common ground between both countries is the tripartite division of powers: Executive, Legislative and Judiciary.

The Brazilian deputies and the Swedish *Riksdag*⁹ members hold 4-year mandates. In Brazil, all members of the Chamber of Deputies are replaced through elections at every four years; the same happens to the *Riksdag* members in Sweden. The senators in Brazil hold 8-year mandates, with alternate renewal of one third and two third in every election. Table 3 summarizes these data.

Both countries have a multiparty system, which is entailed from the configuration of their electoral rules (as explained by Chauhan, 2013; Duverger, 1980; Enander, 2013; Fleischer, 2004; Nicolau & Schmitt, 1995; Tella, 2010). The number of political parties represented in the parliament illustrates the fragmentation of political party organization in both countries and the laxness of electoral laws regarding the creation of new parties (Duverger, 1980; Tavares, 1994). Roughly comparing, one could say that between these countries, the Brazilian law allowed the entry of larger

⁹ "*Riksdag*" means, in a free translation, 'the meeting of kingship' or 'meeting of nobles'. The parliament acquired democratic traits early in the 20th century, as further explained in this chapter, being not restricted to the nobility. However, the name remained and started referring to the national parliament. It can also be written *Riksdagen*, which means '*The Riksdag*', i.e., the suffix '-en' corresponds to the definite article ('the', in English).

number of political parties in the national parliament (18 being the higher amount, at the Chamber of Deputies), while in Sweden eight parties entered the parliament.

Table 3. Comparison between the organization of political institutions in the investigated countries.

	Brazil	Sweden
Form of Government	Republic	Monarchy
Government System	Presidential	Parliamentary
Form of State	Federate (26 States and one Federal District)	Unit (21 counties with administrative autonomy)
Division of Powers	Executive, Legislative and Judiciary	Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
Parliament	Bicameral (Chamber of Deputies and Federal Senate)	Unicameral (Riksdagen)
Membership	513 Deputies and 81 Senators	349 members
Parliamentary Mandate	Deputy: 4 years Senator: 8 years	Members: 4 years
Suffrage	Universal and mandatory	Universal and voluntary
Number of political parties holding a seat in the parliament as of 2014	House of Representatives: 18 Federal Senate: 15	Total: 8

This table was prepared based on a compilation of information from official websites of the parliaments and electoral authorities of the countries:

Brazil:- www.camara.leg.br | www.senado.leg.br | www.tse.jus.br

Sweden: <http://www.val.se> | <http://www.riksdagen.se>

The larger number of political parties participating in elections with real chances of achieving a seat in the parliament, for some political science researchers (e.g., Carreirão, 2002; Dalton & Anderson, 2011), is an indication of poor political party organization, thus increasing the complexity of the parliamentarian game and, therefore, reducing the possibility of the lay voter to understand how politics work in their countries. However, in a different light, the fragmentation of political parties'

organization could show and represent the several political trends found in the country (Kinzo, 2004; Nicolau & Schmitt, 1995; Sáez & Freidenberg, 2002). In countries with reduced number of political parties, those trends could be hidden under the same party label. The latter would be the case for the United States of America (USA) where there are two prevailing parties in the federal arena (Republicans and Democrats); nonetheless, they comprise several trends and political tensions internally (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Duverger, 1980; Embaixada Americana, 2008).

As this is a study about *stereotypes about parliamentarians*, the political party could be considered to be a critical information (or not) to identify the opposing sub-groups in the plenary (Arceneaux, 2008; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Carreirão, 2002; Huckfeldt & Sprage, 1995). That is why the items about 'critical information about parliamentarians' (one of the measures of stereotypes) should enable comparing the importance of political parties against other information that citizens could receive about the parliamentarians. It allows assessing if voters perceive or not any difference between the parties. If voters pay less attention to parties, it is worth checking which other piece of information they use to understand the parliament organization.

Additionally to the organization of political institutions, the social-economic indicators could offer an overview on the problems faced and the political priorities of each country. The next section analyzes the main indicators and briefly compares the countries surveyed.

2.6.2. Education and income distribution

Every year, the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme - UNDP, 2013) calculates the Human Development Index (HDI) based on an inventory of questions about health (measured by life expectancy), education (according to the average years of schooling of people of more than 25 years old and the expectation for

children to conclude school) and income (according to the per capita Gross National Income on the purchase power). Put simply, the HDI provides an overview on the quality of life in a given region, based on the aforementioned aspects. The index ranges from zero to one; the closer to one, the better are the living conditions. In 2013's Human Development Report (UNDP, 2013) the HDI of 186 countries was evaluated: the index ranged from 0.304 (Nigeria) to 0.955 (Norway). For comparison purposes, results are organized in the form of a ranking, although the ranking of a country does not allow, *per se*, any qualitative inference about the lives of citizens.

Brazil and Sweden widely differ, regarding HDI. As shown in Table 5, Sweden reports better conditions of health, education and income than Brazil. The Nordic country is close to the highest score in the scale and is ranked in 7th. Brazil is ranked in 85th (Table 4).

Table 4. Comparison of indicators of education, income and quality of life in the countries surveyed

Indicators*	Brazil	Sweden
Human Development		
2013 HDI SCORE (ranking for 186 countries)	0.730 (85 th)	0.916 (7 th)
Income Inequality		
Gini score [year of measurement] (ranking among 156 countries)	54.7 [2009] (144 th)	25 [2000] (3 rd)
Education		
Average score in the 2012 PISA (ranking among 65 countries)	391 (58 th)	478 (38 th)

* This table was made based on information available at the websites of the rankings organizers. The name of each indicator and the website addresses to access the documents that served as input to this table are as follows:

HDI – Human Development Index measured by the United Nations (UN). Available at:
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/>

Gini – developed by the Italian Statistician Corrado Gini is calculated by the World Bank. The UN uses the Gini index measured by the World Bank to adjust the HDI calculation. Source:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

PISA - Programme for International Student Assessment, measured by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): <http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-i.htm>

The Gini (named after the Italian statistician Corrado Gini) is calculated by the World Bank. An important limit of the Gini is that it is not measured at regular intervals, resulting in a table made up with data measured in different years among countries. However, the World Bank database is the only one open to the public and, despite that limitation, it is used by the UN to adjust the HDI calculation. The Gini measures income inequality (Gini, 1921); ranges from zero (no inequality) to 100 (full inequality).

PISA, in turn, is made up by several scores calculated by the Programme for International Student Assessment. Its evaluations take place at every three years and comprise three areas of knowledge (reading, mathematics and sciences) and every edition of the program put more emphasis to one of those areas (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2013). The 2012 edition, used in the table, placed more emphasis on mathematic and was applied in 65 countries. Students that complete 15 years old participate in the program.

Regarding the Gini, Sweden is ranked the third country with less inequality, while Brazil reports high inequality. In terms of education, pursuant to the PISA index, Sweden is also in a much better position than Brazil (Table 4).

The discrepancy among the HDI, Gini and PISA indices of both countries can serve as useful inputs to understand the results to be collected. If significant differences between both countries are identified to stereotypes about parliamentarians, political education, behavioral contagion and/or political participation, the relation between these and the aforementioned socioeconomic indicators will be evaluated. It is worth mentioning this is a first comparative incursion between these countries; thus, the merit of these inferences would be to raise questions to be deeply investigated in further studies.

The characteristics of Brazil and Sweden presented above provide an overview of the context-related differences of their citizens' living conditions. Such differences can directly or indirectly influence on the responses to the questionnaire – and this

should be verified in the empirical test. The historical context of both countries is analyzed next, in face of its importance to understand the current institutional organization and the conditions for popular participation.

2.6.3. History of Democracy in Brazil and Sweden

Despite the existing controversies about the concept of *Democracy*, the two countries selected currently present the traits of a Democratic State of Law (Bresser Pereira, 2011; Duverger, 1980; Merkel, 2004; Moisés, 2010): universal suffrage, assurance of civil rights, freedom of speech and of association (including the creation of political parties) and constitutionalism (the State abides by the rules imposed in a Constitution prepared by representatives of the people). In this current configuration, these countries are described as democracies, in spite of the differences in their institutional organization (Bethell, 2008; Diamond, 1996; Huntington, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1999; Scobbie, 2010; Scott, 1988). However, their histories present differences that deserve attention.

The construction of democracy followed different paces in Brazil and Sweden, and it was determined by pressures of sectors of the society that gained political power in different moments (Huntington, 1991). The following sections approach the paths followed by each country. Moreover, it discusses the latest political movements that could have influenced the political participation today in the two selected countries.

2.6.3.1. Brazil

Brazil remained colony of the Portuguese crown since it was discovered in 1500. To escape from Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion in Portugal, the Portuguese Royal Family moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, transferring the Portuguese Empire headquarters to that city, bringing in its ships all the administrative paraphernalia and

government staff. That had relevant impact on the emergence of political institutions in Brazil, which were firstly administered by the Portuguese crown (Bethell, 1985, Gomes, 2007). In 1921 the King D. João VI went back to Portugal, leaving his son D. Pedro I as the Regent Prince of Brazil (Bethell, 1985; Gomes, 2010).

In 1822, the Portuguese bourgeoisie pressured the crown to return Brazil to its status of colony. José Bonifácio, who was very influent in the politics by that time, believed that continuing monarchy would be the only way for maintaining social stability and the unity of Brazil during the transition to an independent State. He was concerned about the attempts of Portugal to impose commercial and political restrictions to Brazil. Bonifácio advised D. Pedro I to disobey the orders issued by Portugal (Bethell, 1985). On September 7, 1822, D. Pedro I received documents from Lisbon revoking his acts as Regent Prince and accusing his supporters of treason (Bethell, 1985). On that day, Pedro I declared independence from the Portuguese crown. The advices of José Bonifácio and the pressure exercised by the Brazilian aristocracy that wanted to preserve the commercial autonomy they had conquered have contributed to the declaration of independence (Gomes, 2010).

Even after the declaration of independence on September 7, 1822 the constructing of political institutions and democracy in Brazil ran a long way. The Empire of Brazil – instituted by D. Pedro I – counted on a political class drastically divided about how the independent country should be governed (Bethell, 1985). Through all this pressure, D. Pedro I instituted the first constitution of Brazil in 1823, providing for the creation of the Senate (50 lifetime members selected by the Emperor) and the House of Representatives (100 member elected indirectly for 4-year mandates). The criteria of income for active electoral capacity (the power of voting) and passive (the right of being candidate) kept the power restricted to aristocracy (Gomes, 2010).

Although Brazil has flourished in the second half of the 19th century, the tensions between aristocracy and the emperor did not cease. Succeeding Pedro I,

Pedro II affirmed that slavery was a national shame, and sustained his intention of abolishing it (Barman, 1999). His daughter Isabel – who eventually assumed the Empire Regency when Pedro II had to leave for medical care – took that responsibility for herself (Gomes, 2013). In May 1888, taking advantage of the political effervescence about the topic, she signed the Golden Law [*Lei Áurea*] that abolished slavery in Brazil. Farmers considered that act a seizure of their ‘goods’ (the slaves) and started supporting the movements for the republic (Barman, 1999). The overthrow that overturned the Empire and instituted the Republic was headed by the military, supported by the rural aristocracy, and took place on November 15, 1889 (Bethell, 1985; Gomes, 2013).

On the first anniversary of the Republic Proclamation, a Constituent Assembly was established and defined the independence between the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Powers (during the Empire times, the three powers were subjected to the crown). The lifelong mandates of senators were replaced by 9-year mandates, and the number of seats for Deputies would be defined according to the population of each State, with at least four deputies to the smallest States. The 1891 Constitution ensured the secret optional male vote for those of more than 21 years old, excluding beggars, illiterates, soldiers and congregants of monastic orders (Gomes, 2013). In practice only 2.2% of the Brazilian population were entitled to voting (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE], 2013).

Law No. 426 of December 7, 1896 granted voters the option of publicly expressing their votes, and defined that fiscals should give voters a receipt stating on whom they had voted. That was used by the farmers to control the vote of their employees, what was then named “*voto de cabresto*” (“noseband vote”, see [Figure 2.1](#)) (TSE, 2013). That ensured the alternation of military and land owners in the Presidency of the Republic until the apogee of the 1930 revolution. The period started in 1894 (first election after the Republic Proclamation) was named as ‘Old Republic’, ‘Age of Dark’ or

'milk and coffee politics' as the power was alternated by coffee growers from São Paulo and milk producers from Minas Gerais (Bethell, 2008; Fleischer, 2004; TSE, 2013). During the Old Republic, the political parties were considered to be inefficient and unnecessary; thus, they were not mentioned in legislation.



Figure 2.1. Democratic Party's advertisement, with an iconic representation of "noseband vote" (*voto de cabresto*).

The year of 1930 was the apex of several pressures for reforms in the Brazilian state. Among the claims that would speed up revolution, one could mention the moralization of elections, with mandatory secret universal voting, including women's vote. The revolution that brought Getúlio Vargas to the power took place. In 1932, Vargas enacted an electoral code that established secret and universal ballot (including women), but still left aside beggars, illiterates and military (garrisons – Bethell, 2008). For the first, time there was a reference to the possibility of political

parties registering their candidates to run to elections. The 1934 constitution would enforce these rights, but kept illiterates severed from electoral participation (TSE, 2013).

The new rules were valid to the 1933 Constituent Assembly election. However, no presidential election happened in Brazil until 1945. Since 1930, Getúlio Vargas headed the Provisional Government that promised reforms to expand social rights and consolidate democracy. In 1934, through indirect elections, the National Congress members granted Vargas an additional four-year mandate. In 1937 Vargas got the support of the military to cope with a threat of overthrow and made himself a coup which would keep him on the Presidency until 1945 (Camargo, Hippolito, D'Araújo & Flaskman, 1986). Still in 1937, Vargas closed the National Congress and imposed a new constitution whereby the Executive Power would have total control and appoint interveners to the federate states. Political parties were extinguished and there would be no new elections until a new military coup in 1945, which forced Vargas to resign. José Linhares, president of the Federal Highest Court by the time, assumed the interim presidency, and called elections in December 1945. Elected with the support of Getúlio, Eurico Gaspar Dutra took office in January 1946.

Getúlio Vargas remained very influent on the Brazilian political arena, and was elected Senator in 1946, without even deciding to run. In 1950 he was elected President of the Republic. His mandate ended on August 24, 1954 when, once again pressured by the military to resign, he killed himself in Palácio do Catete (the president's official residence). His gesture caused great national commotion. Historicists point out that Vargas' suicide hampered the organization of the military that would still try to avoid (in 1955) Juscelino Kubitschek to take office and João Goulart to take on the presidency (in 1961) (Bethell, 2008). The military coup would be successful in April 1964.

Soon after the coup, on April 9th the “supreme command of the revolution” issued the Institutional Act No. 1, an instrument that had no constitutional ground, concentrating power in the hands of the Executive power, persecuting dissidents and starting the cassation of mandates of parliamentarians that opposed to the regimen. Two days later, General Castelo Branco was elected through indirect voting in the National Congress (Bethell, 2008). During the military regimen (from 1964 to 1985), presidential elections were indirect (the National Congress members voted for president) and the electoral rules changed every election, so that winners would always be the parliamentarians from the party that supported the regimen (*Aliança Renovadora Nacional – Arena*) who would surely elect presidents allied to the military (Fleischer, 2004; TSE, 2013).

Subsequent institutional acts authorized the Executive to decree the Congress recess (which was closed throughout the year of 1966), to govern through decrees and to censor the media. Political parties were dissolved in October 1965. One month later, a supplementary act established new rules to organize political parties, allowing the assembling of only two parties: the *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA, the party that supported the regimen) and the *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB) that offered weak opposition (Bethell, 2008).

Popular demonstrations early in the 1980s drove the ‘*Diretas Já*’ movement, that claimed for the passing of the Proposal of Constitutional Amendment ‘Dante de Oliveira’ (named after the deputy who proposed it), which would reestablish the direct ballot for choosing the President of the Republic. Demonstrations became more frequent and gathered more people every month – there were nearly 50 mass rallies in several Brazilian cities, most of which gathering more than 30,000 people; the major ones took place in Rio de Janeiro (1 million people) and in São Paulo (1,5 million) (Bethell, 2008; Bertonecelo, 2009). In April 1984, the Amendment Proposal was defeated due to a maneuver of the military government, which did not allow the

Amendment supporters to attend the plenary to vote for it (Bethell, 2008). However, the movement for direct elections had already driven a wedge among the government supporters in the parliament, who started influencing the scenario for political openness (Bertoncelo, 2009; Fleischer, 2004, TSE, 2013).

In 1985, the civilian Tancredo Neves was elected President of the Republic through indirect voting. Tancredo deceased soon after the election; his substitute, José Sarney, was tasked of organizing a new constitution (enacted in 1988) and the first direct presidential elections after the military regimen, which happened in 1989 (Bethell, 2008; TSE, 2013). Since then, the presidential and parliamentarian elections have taken place regularly, and this would be called a period of democracy consolidation in Brazil (Bethell, 2008).

Some researchers (Bethell, 2008; Fleischer, 2004; Linz & Stepan, 1999) consider that democracy in Brazil has effectively occurred only in the period between the dictatorships (from 1945 to 1964) and after the political openness in 1985. In that sense, the Brazilian democratic experience is historically short, which could have impacts on the country's political culture (Moisés, 1992; Moisés, 2008; Ribeiro, 2007). There has been little trust in political institutions, a trend towards detachment and anti-political postures (Baquero, 2001; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Sallum Júnior, Graeff & Lima, 1990; Shildo, 1990).

2.6.3.1.1. Recent political activity

Focusing on the period from the 1980s until today, three main popular political activities should be highlighted: The Diretas Já! movement (1983 and 1984), the Impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello (1992) and the demonstrations of June 2013.

The Diretas Já! movement, briefly described in the previous section, became a relevant hallmark of political participation in Brazil. It was of utmost relevance to the

closure of a 21-year period of military dictatorship with fierce repression against freedom of speech and association, and of presidents elected indirectly by a National Congress with clearly weakened opposition (Kinzo, 2001). By that time, the public opinion detached from hegemonic news agencies, which had a pro-regimen bias and reduced the importance of demonstrations (Miguel, 2001; Palha, 2011). Demonstrations increased, pressuring for a change in the media speech, which started supporting direct elections (Bertoncelo, 2009). The campaigns for direct elections for president produced a memory of political power of the masses that resulted in a significant change on the Brazilian government regimen (Bertoncelo, 2009; Montes & Meyer, 1984). Bertoncelo (2009) emphasizes that the campaign for 'direct' elections served as a rite of passage representing the de-constructing of symbolic standards that sustained the political structure until those days.

The perception of the capacity of changing government through mass movements was reinforced in 1992, in the episode of the Impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Melo (Bertoncelo, 2009; Borges Filho, 2010; Gohn, 2009). First president democratically elected after the military regimen, Fernando Collor de Melo took office in a time when the country was experiencing uncontrolled inflation (84% per month, reaching 2,000% a year). On his first day as president, Collor decreed wage freeze and seizure of savings accounts as some measures to control inflation (Sallum Júnior & Casarões, 2011; Silveira, 2013). That package of economic measures, named Collor I, was a disaster and it was followed by plan Collor II, which set out prices freeze and was another failure. Those fiascos drastically brought Collor's popularity down (Bethell, 2008). The then Minister of Economy, Zélia Cardoso de Mello, who designed the first plans, was replaced by Marcílio Marques Moreira, who conceived the Plan Marcílio, that matched high interest rates and restrictions to the public budget (Silveira, 2013).

Inflation remained uncontrolled and things got worse to the president: corruption scandals destroyed his weak remaining popularity (reaching meager 9% of popular approval); additionally to the increasing opposition he faced in the National Congress (Bethell, 2008; Sallum Júnior & Casarões, 2011). Without support, Collor faced an impeachment process that would culminate on the night of September 29, 1992 during a busy plenary session of the Chamber of Deputies. With 441 ayes, 38 nays, 1 abstention and 23 absentees, the Chamber passed the investigation of liability crimes attributed to Collor (Câmara dos Deputados, 2012). In the Senate, the impeachment was passed on December 30, by 76 ayes and 3 nays.

In the night when the impeachment was voted at the Chamber of Deputies, the lawn in front of the National Congress was crowded with the '*caras-pintadas*' ('painted-faces'): youngsters (mostly university students) that painted their faces with the colors of the Brazilian flag and black (symbolizing their disapproval at the president), chanting watchwords (Borges Filho, 2010; Gohn, 2009). That was the apex of several demonstrations for ethics in politics and the removal of Collor, catalyzed by the dissatisfaction with the economic measures adopted in his mandate (Bethell, 2008). According to Bethell (2008), 'for the very first time in the history of the Republic a president was removed from his office through legal and constitutional means and, for the first time, without the direct involvement of the military' (pp. 254-255), which could have contributed to strengthen the image of popular power against government. The '*caras-pintadas*' stood for an aesthetic movement for ethics in politics, and have symbolically stamped an impression on the popular memory (Borges Filho, 2010). This record would represent the popular power, notably the university youth's power of organization to express their disapproval in relation to rulers (Gohn, 2009).

In June 2013, university students in São Paulo, mainly the members of the *Movimento Passe Livre* [Zero-Fare Movement] (MPL) started several protests against the increase of bus fares from R\$ 3.00 to R\$ 3.20 (Pires, 2013). They were fiercely

repressed by the police, while media coverage was frankly against the demonstrations (Damasceno, 2013; Lima, 2013; Vion-Dury, 2013). Demonstrators started to criticize the media to the point of expelling or attacking journalists who were covering the marches (Fernandes, 2013; Ramos, 2013; Ranthum, 2013).

Throughout the month, there were many other confrontations among demonstrators, the police and the media (Andrade, Affonso & Bianchi, 2013; BBC Brasil, 2013; Favero & Diniz, 2013; G1, 2013; Guimarães, 2013; Paes & Antunes, 2013; UOL Notícias, 2013). The debate moved away from the R\$ 0.20 raise on the bus fare, towards the curtailment of freedom of speech (Carta Capital, 2013, Macedo, 2013), thus forcing attenuation of police action and of the media discourse (Fernandes, 2013; Ranthum, 2013; Secco, 2013; Spigariol, Shiomoda, Felizatte & Bonici, 2013). The contrast between the social media stories (usually supporting demonstrations) and the discourse of the 'mainstream media' (usually contrary to demonstrations) sparked the required tension to spread the demonstrations all over the country (Damasceno, 2013; Fernandes, 2013; Ranthum, 2013; Lima, 2013).

New items were incorporated to the agenda of claims, like the end of secret voting for parliamentarian decisions; rejection of the Constitution Amendment Proposal (PEC, in Portuguese) 37, that was known as 'PEC of impunity'; continuity to the projects on Political Reform (changes to the electoral rules); public transport improvement; increased investments in public education and health; more transparency in public expenditures and punishment to politicians involved in embezzlement of public funds; rejection of police violence, among others (Abreu & Medeiros, 2013; Ranthum, 2013). The items related to transparency and punishment of politicians involved with corruption had also been claimed by the Marches against Corruption in 2011 and 2012 (Colon & Moura, 2011; Diário do Nordeste, 2011; Estadão.com.br, 2011; Lima, 2012; Martins, 2012).

The number of demonstrators grew day after day, in more and more cities, reaching its apex on June 20th (Estadão.com.br, 2013; Folha de S. Paulo, 2013; Leal, 2013). The response by the governmental agencies lagged behind the increased number of demonstrations (Chagas, 2013; Instituto Humanitas Unisinos, 2013; Moraes, 2013; Ranthum, 2013). Nonetheless, several measures were announced. As Ranthum (2013) summarizes:

(...) the mayor of São Paulo decided to reject the increase of R\$ 0.20. Coincidentally, in that same day the mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes also decided to withdraw the increase on bus fares in the city. Other 15 cities, among which Goiânia and Cuiabá, have also reduced the bus fares.

After the bus fare reduction in several capitals, the focus moved to the federal government and the National Congress. (..). On the 21st, the President of the Republic made a statement to the nation which, *per se*, deserved an analysis. In the statement Dilma expressed support to demonstrations and showed some harmony to the movement that is still taking the streets (...) In brief, the President condemned violence in demonstrations, urged the 'heads of other powers' to 'add efforts' and signalized some actions, among which the elaboration of the National Urban Mobility Plan and the proposal of allotting 100% of the oil resources for education (Ranthum, 2013).

The Brazilian demonstrations apparently outline a systematic progression of the intended democratic objective. *Diretas Já!* aimed at establishing democratic rules to vote for the chief of the State (Bertoncello, 2009; Camargo, Hippolito, D'Araújo & Flaskman, 1986; Montes & Meyer, 1984); the *caras-pintadas* have impeached an elected president in rejection to corruption and inefficient economic measures (Baquero, 2001; Borges Filho, 2010; Sallum Júnior & Casarões, 2011; Silveira, 2013). From *Diretas Já* to the impeachment of Collor the political participation and public contempt have been significantly expanded (Bethell, 2008; Kinzo, 2001). On the other hand, these episodes have not produced long-lasting effects on the democratic institutions that remain hostage to the vulnerability of their legitimacy (Baquero, 2001).

The demonstrations in June 2013 urged ethical work of rulers and the due use of public funds; moreover, the latter took freedom of expression to a new level, causing

changes to media discourse and police repression (Leal, 2013; Ranthum, 2013; Spigariol, Shiomoda, Felizatte & Bonici, 2013; Terra Notícias, 2013; Vion-Dury, 2013).

If culture is made up through sharing (Smith *et al.*, 2013) and the demonstrations serve a ritualistic effect (Bertoncelo, 2009; Montes & Meyer, 1984), then June's demonstrations could indeed be considered a relevant episode to the Brazilian political culture. These also offer a cue about the importance of sharing to build mass movements, reinforcing the need for this empirical research to investigate the effect of behavioral contagion suggested by Le Bon (2008) for political participation.

The 2014 elections were preceded by heated discussions on the Internet, strong engagement of candidates' supporters and debates on TV (Castro, 2014; Martín, 2014; Missau Ruviano & Missau Ruviano, 2014). Eleven parties presented candidates, with Dilma Roussef (Workers' Party, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT) Aécio Neves (Social Democracy Party, *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*, PSDB) and Eduardo Campos (Socialist Party, *Partido Socialista Brasileiro*, PSB) with the most feasible chances of winning (Barcellos, 2014; G1, 2014; Limongi & Guarnieri, 2014).

On August 13th, Eduardo Campos died as his airplane crashed in the city of Santos, from the state of São Paulo. His associate Marina Silva, formerly a PT member, became the head candidate for presidency (Balzaretto, Silva, Rech, & Da Sois, 2014; Limongi & Guarnieri, 2014). Silva, Roussef and Neves took turns on voters' preference (see Figure 2.2). It was considered the most disputed elections in the last 20 years in Brazil (Bentes, 2014; Richard, 2014). The voters' engagement on political discussions was remarkable, so that some friendships were menaced political disagreement, which was not "normal" for the Brazilian standards (Castro, 2014; Martín, 2014; Missau Ruviano & Missau Ruviano, 2014).

Dilma Roussef was reelected by a narrow advantage against Aécio Neves, who disputed the second round with her (Bentes, 2014). The parliament composition represents marginal advantage to Roussef, though parties that supported her during

elections are not really faithful to her policies (Lima, 2014; Neher, 2014). Marina Silva, who supported Neves at the second round, announced that she would try to found a new party and leave PSB (Lima & Frota, 2014). Aécio Neves promised to make a hard opposition (UOL, 2014).




Figure 2.2. Chances of winning presidential elections in Brazil, considering the three preferred candidates. Source: pollingdata.com.br, which compiled results from several election polls.

Protesters dissatisfied with Rousseff’s reelection claimed military intervention and wrote an online petition to the government of the United States of America, asking President Barack Obama to intervene in Brazil – which was regarded as an attempt to revive the military dictatorship (Costa, 2014). A major corruption scandal involving the state-owned Petrobrás is pointed as evidence of bad public management and motivates requests of impeachment against Rousseff (Alencar, 2015). Brazil faces economic slowdown, and recession is a major preoccupation to the re-elected president; moreover, the choice of a right-wing economy minister, Joaquim Levy, displeased politicians and voters who support PT (Rizério, 2015). The beginning of her

new mandate is evaluated as a very delicate situation to president Rousseff and to the country (Alencar, 2015).

2.6.3.2. Sweden

The rise of Sweden as a unified country and the delimitation of its territory have gone through different movements of tribes that lived in the region and fought for land (Barnes, 2003). Between the 8th and the 11th century, the territory currently occupied by Sweden was the home of the Vikings who invaded and inhabited countries northward Europe but, nonetheless, did not establish a unified State (Grimberg, 1935). Eric, the Winner (Erik Segersäll) is considered to be the first king of Sweden, welcomed by the Svear and Götar peoples that lived around the current Stockholm; his reign lasted from 970 to 995 (Lindkvist, 2003).

Feudalism and slavery were not developed in Sweden like in the continental Europe. From the 11th to the 15th centuries, farming by free farmers prevailed (Grimberg, 1935). Birger Jarl (who governed the peoples in that region between 1248 and 1266) is pointed out as the responsible for the creation of the first national laws of Sweden, while the reforms promoted by him favored the unification work performed by his successors (Lindkvist, 2003).

In 1435, the first meeting of kingship (*Riksdag*) was held, attended by nobility, clerics and the bourgeoisie in the city of Arboga, to offer opposition to the restrictions imposed by King Erik XIII, which damaged imports, exports and the interests of the Church. The meeting would lead to the ousting of King Erik, and the taking over by the leader of the opposition to the king, Engelbrekt Engelbretsson, as provisional regent (Grimberg, 1935; Orrman, 2003). Then, Sweden would face nearly one century of political instability with a weakened monarchy, with alternating regents chosen by the representatives of the *Riksdag* (Schück, 2003). In 1523, the elected king Gustav Vasa I came into power. From 1527 on, convened by Gustav Vasa I, the kingship meeting

(*Riksdag*) included representatives of farmers that occupied the lands granted by the reign, thus building up a “4-layer” representation: kingship, Church, bourgeoisie and peasants (mainly owners of small lands) (Scott, 1988). This would be the embryo of the Swedish parliament. The next subsection deepens the discussion on this topic.

In the 17th century, Sweden emerged as an imperialist power, taking over parts of the lands from Russia, Poland and Lithuania washed by the Baltic Sea, additionally to Finland, which had been dominated late in the 16th century. The Swedish territorial expansionist campaign was weakened by the defeat for the Russian army, in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, and another defeat for Norway in 1716. Throughout the 13th century, Sweden failed to keep the territories external to the Scandinavian Peninsula. In 1809, after being defeated by Russia, Sweden lost the territory that today houses Finland (Grimberg, 1935; Scott, 1988).

In 1814, King Charles XIII signed the Kiel Treaty with the ally Napoleon Bonaparte, whereby Sweden would attach Norway to its territory, in exchange for lands conquered in Germany. Norway tried to reestablish itself as a sovereign State, but was defeated in a confrontation with Sweden in July 1814. That would be the last time that Sweden got involved in an armed conflict. Norway remained subordinated to Sweden until 1905 (Grimberg, 1935; Scott, 1988).

In the 19th century, Sweden experienced expressive population growth and modernization of agriculture through government-sponsored initiatives. The weakening of agriculture in neighboring countries increased the importance of the Swedish agriculture. Nonetheless, the turn to the 20th century marked the beginning of industrialization in the country (Gustavson, 1986). Still in that period the country experienced intensive migration of rural populations to urban areas, where popular movements started claiming the expansion of political rights (Chauhan, 2013; Enander, 2013).

The expansion of political rights should be explained associated to the history of the *Riksdag* – which would further become the Swedish parliament, keeping the same name until these days. The next section deepens this historical view focusing on the modern age of the parliament, in an attempt to understand the building of the Swedish democracy.

2.6.3.3.1. The Riksdag and the Swedish democracy

Although Sweden is now considered to be a democracy, the preservation of monarchy in the country could bring about some doubts about the scope of the Swedish political rights (Hoppe, 2001). On the other hand, the history of the *Riksdag* accompanies the reduction of the Monarch powers and the building of the Swedish institutional framework, as well as the expansion of the political rights of the Swedish citizens (Scott, 1988).

Between the 16th and the 19th centuries, the *Riksdag* experienced empowerment in face of the weakened Monarchs, and lost power to strengthened Monarchs. Throughout that period, the permanence of a Monarch in power largely depended on the approval of the *Riksdag* members; crisis periods were followed by coups against the Monarch or the election of a temporary regent among the nobility members (Schück, 2003; Scobbie, 2010; Scott, 1988).

From 1844 to 1859 King Oscar I carried out several liberal reforms like the introduction of free enterprise (1846), equal rights to inheritance for men and women (1845), rights for divorced women (1858), religious freedom (1860) and autonomous local governments (1862). When his son Charles XV took the government, the power had been largely transferred to the *Riksdag*. In 1866, the four-layer representation (nobility, Church, bourgeoisie and peasants) was abolished and replaced by a bicameral parliament. The High Chamber members were elected through indirect voting, resulting in a membership virtually exclusively of big land owners, big industry

and trade entrepreneurs. The Low Chamber members were elected through direct voting, and voters were men with assets, thus giving advantage to farmers. Disagreements between members of both chambers regarding the army organization and the taxes levying, took Sweden to a political slowdown period that would last until early in the 20th century (Enander, 2013).

The right to voting was extended to all men in 1909 and to women in 1919, in response to popular pressures for equalitarian vote (Sveriges Riksdag, 2012; Tilton, 1974). The right to run for elections had already been granted to all citizens qualified for voting and, therefore, in the 1921 elections five women won seats (Scott, 1988). By that time many other popular movements (mainly linked to independent religious groups and trade unions) claimed for the adoption of democratic principles (Chauhan, 2013).

The parliamentary system was most welcomed, and ministries were established, reporting directly to the parliament. Gustav V, the Sweden King by that time, unsuccessfully tried to appoint a First Minister opposite to most of the parliament in 1917; in response, the great majority of the parliament made him backtrack (Scobbie, 2010). The parliament command was then assigned to Nils Éden, who started several reforms that reduced the Monarchy's chances of intervening on the parliament decisions (Chauhan, 2013; Tilton, 1974).

In 1974 a new constitution comes into force, reestablishing the unicameral system, with 349 seats, and institutionalizing the parliamentary system (Sveriges Riksdag, 2012). The king could no longer get involved with political activities; his role is strictly ceremonial, as the head of state. The parliament members elect a speaker that, in turn, indicates the Prime Minister (*Statsminister*). The Prime Minister is in charge of assembling the government team (Scobbie, 2010). That is the current regimen, which could be considered to be a democracy in face of its political decision-making process, universal suffrage, and free candidacy for political offices (Lindvall & Rothstein, 2006).

2.6.3.3.2. Recent political activity

Similarly to its Scandinavian neighbors Norway, Denmark and Finland, Sweden is considered to be country of stable democracy and economy. Such stability is directly reflected on the quality of life and well-being of its citizens (Bergman, 2011; Calmfors, 2012; Eger, 2010; The Economist, 2013a). The Swedish economic model is considered to be very successful, attracting the interest of countries wanting to 'learn' from Sweden, like the United States (Bergsten, 2013) and England (The Economist, 2013b). Economy grows in good pace since 1968, having suffered the last economic crisis in 1991, and resisting to the economic crises that affected the USA and the European Union since then (Bergman, 2011; Calmfors, 2012). The Swedish Welfare State undergoes efficient adjustments due to the domestic and international economic pressures, which guarantees its force (Bergsten, 2013; Chung & Thewissen, 2011; Hofstad, 2013). The national policies on education and health, passed and sustained with the support of the majority of political parties, have enabled matching the partial privatization of services with state cost-sharing and, therefore, citizens can freely decide for the services they consider to be the best (Bergsten, 2013; Calmfors, 2012).

However, some economic problems afflict Sweden. The Swedish Crown has kept strong quotation, thus creating difficulties for exports; economy experiences slowdown since 2013 and the unemployment among the youth increases (Davidsson & Marx, 2013; Lorentzen, Angelin, Dahl, Kauppinen, Moisio, & Salonen, 2014; The Economist, 2013d).

Immigration seems to be the matter with greater capacity of mobilizing citizens in Sweden. The extreme-right political parties have accused government of keeping very flexible immigration policies, and of granting asylum to a large number of refugees, thus creating demand for jobs (Hirvonen, 2013; The Economist, 2013d). Moreover, the country experienced a wave of protests flared up by violent episodes involving racism and xenophobia (Malmberg, Andersson, & Östh, 2013), although most

of the public opinion in Sweden remains favorable to the inclusion of immigrants in social programs (Artiles & Meardi, 2014).

In May 2013, several violent protests were started in the district of Husby, Stockholm, after the publicizing of an episode where the local police invaded the apartment of a 69 years old immigrant and killing him. There were controversial versions about the reasons why the police invaded the apartment, and about the episode itself (The Local, 2013a). The blog *Megafonen* described the episode by emphasizing the police brutality, linking it to racist feelings, as the district is inhabited mainly by immigrants (Malmberg, Andersson & Östh, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014; The Local, 2013b).

The riots started on May 19th, spreading to other districts in Stockholm and to other cities on the following days (Deutsche Welle, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014). Peace was restored on May 28th (The Huffington Post, 2013). During the period of conflict, comments were posted at the Internet either supporting or rejecting the Husby youth, disclosing the public opinion division and the different political views on the migratory affair (Hansson, Cars, Ekenberg & Danielson, 2013; Hirvonen, 2013).

The episode put light on the discussion about the effective access of immigrants to public services, racial discrimination and youth unemployment, notably regarding Muslim immigrants (Hansson, Cars, Ekenberg & Danielson, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014). According to Hirvonen (2013), that reaction against the immigration of Arab or Islamic refugees is translated in the terms '*Islamophobia*' (used by supporters of the Swedish openness to immigration, pointing out the irrationality of rejecting immigrants), by contrast with the pejorative 'EuRabbia' (contraction of Europe and ARabbia, in reference to the 'settlement' of Europe by Arab immigrants, this term is used by those against opening the country to immigration).

Beyond the prejudice issues, the debate around immigration brings questions about the limits of the successful Swedish Welfare State. Opponents to the opening to

immigration say that the Swedish economy already suffers setbacks considering that benefits like unemployment protection are extended to immigrants (Eger, 2010; Davidsson & Marx, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014). Affirming to be favorable or against immigration is now a core point to define the political positioning of parties in Sweden, as it instills the issue of state funds allotment in social wellbeing (Eger, 2010).

At the parliament arena, the Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti*) had dominated the Swedish political system for a long time. In recent elections, however, the formation of a Centre–right coalition (*Allians för Sverige, or simply ‘the Alliance’*) has entailed a change in Swedish politics (Svallfors, 2011). To describe the present situation, a brief background is called for.

The Swedish elections in 2010 entailed something of a disaster for the Social Democrats. The once dominant party was defeated for the second time in a row by the remodeled ‘new Moderates’ (*De Nya Moderaterna*, a neo-liberal/conservative party) and the Center–right coalition ‘the Alliance’ (Svallfors, 2011) headed by former Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (in office from 2006 to 2014). After two years of internal instability, the Social Democrats leadership was attained in 2012 by former trade union leader Stefan Löfven, which resulted in a temporal boost of support for the Social Democrats.

The Center-right coalition headed by Reinfeldt included the Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*), the Center Party (*Centerpartiet*), and the Liberal People’s Party (*Folkpartiet*). In the 2014 elections, this ruling coalition came to an end, and the Social Democrats tried to form a new minority government, with the help of the Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*), leaving the Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*) out in the cold (Pollard & Johnson, 2014).

However, the right-wing anti-immigration Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna, SD*) did very well in the 2014 elections, and emerged with almost 13 per cent of the votes as the third largest party in the Swedish parliament

(BBC, 2014a; Hirvonen, 2013). In December 2014, together with the Alliance parties, SD defeated the budget proposed by the Löfven government, causing him to call for extraordinary elections, to be held on 22 March 2015 (Olsen, 2014). In the end, the Alliance parties struck a deal with the Social Democrats, which made it possible for the minority government to remain in power (Dickson & Senero, 2014). There will be no elections until the regular four years have passed; but the situation remains somewhat uneasy.

2.6.4. Comparing the two countries

The former section briefly presented the institutional framework, political history and recent activities in both countries studied. One should recognize that the institutional framework imposes some constraints that should be considered in the research; however, the investigation about causality between the institutional framework and the variables listed herein exceeds the objectives of this study.

In Brazil, the political institutions emerged as a *prêt-à-porter* solution brought by the Royal Family that was escaping from Napoleon. After independence, Brazil became an Empire with a parliament assembled according to the Portuguese experience (Bethell, 1985; Gomes, 2010). The transition to republic was surrounded by convulsions of the elite of land owners and dissatisfaction of the military (Bethell, 1985; Gomes, 2013). The right to voting was limited, notably during the Vargas and the Military dictatorship times, resulting in reduced democratic experience for Brazil (Bethell, 2008; Fleischer, 2004; Linz & Stepan, 1999). For the last 25 years, Brazil has attempted to consolidate its democracy and, at the same time, the governmental institutions are little trusted by citizens who, to a large extent, show anti-political attitudes (Baquero, 2001; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Sallum Júnior, Graeff & Lima, 1990; Shildo, 1990).

Sweden did not experience being a colony, nor extensive feudalism or slavery. The emergence of the *Riksdag* is connected to the opposition of bourgeois and farmers against the King, claiming for the establishment of a decision-making instance that has been gradually empowered (Enander, 2013). Most of the kings needed the nobility support to remain on the throne, which resulted in frequent removals of Monarchs who many times have not passed the throne to their heirs (Schück, 2003; Scobbie, 2010; Scott, 1988). The discontinuity of the royal lineage may have been a major factor to strengthen the parliament and build the Swedish democracy in parallel to monarchy (Tilton, 1974). Having built a renowned model of Welfare State, Sweden is now experiencing a political division regarding the migratory issue and the maintenance of state investments on policies focusing on Social Welfare (Eger, 2010; Davidsson & Marx, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014).

Popular demonstrations unveil the dissatisfaction with the poor quality of public services and restrictions to freedom of speech in Brazil (Abreu & Medeiros, 2013; Ranthum, 2013), and with sharing benefits of a Welfare State with immigrants in Sweden (Eger, 2010; Hirvonen, 2013; Schierup, Ålund & Kings, 2014). However, although the street demonstrations express strong discontentment, these are just the tip of icebergs, as Ekman & Amnå (2012) stated. Maybe each nation employs different forms of conversing discontentment into political action, notably when it comes to refer it to the parliamentarian arena.

This study aims at investigating those differences, without disregarding their contexts. Up to now, it has presented the theoretical frameworks about the variables investigated, i.e., Political Participation (the dependent/ endogenous variable), as well as Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion (the independent / exogenous variables). The concept of culture and the caution required when carrying out a cross-national research was discussed. Finally, political institutions in Brazil and Sweden were described, as well as their socioeconomic

indicators and political history. Then, this content is articulated as a proposal of research establishing the links between those variables and objectives, which are to be investigated, that allow for exploring the differences between both countries.

2.7. Methodological Considerations

This study was based on the wide assessment of each variable. Ekman and Amnå's (2012) framework on Political Participation intends to comprise the whole spectrum, from Non-Participation, through Latent to Manifest Participation, with 42 different behaviors originally cataloged. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians items intended to embrace the most relevant Critical Information on parliamentarians (considering those which voters pay attention to) and the most relevant typical politicians' behaviors (for the Behavior Prediction scale). Political Education and Socialization encompassed very different contexts where people can learn about politics. Behavioral Contagion is a complex construct, and the items created tried to represent a few of the most important social influence trends.

This endeavour of "painting a landscape picture" of the studied phenomena posed difficulties for the study. First, because politics is not always considered an interesting issue to keep people answering long questionnaires (Carneiro & Torres, 2012; Pasquali, 2010). Therefore, in spite of the interest to ask many questions to assess each variable, the number of items was forced to be as few as possible.

Second, when those items are submitted to Factor Analysis, those "landscape scales" suffer from a trade-off issue known as the *Bandwidth-Fidelity Dilemma* (Cronbach, 1990; Cronbach & Gleser, 1965; Hogan & Roberts, 1996). Putting it simple, to achieve high Fidelity (assessed by "reliability" indices like Cronbach's Alpha or Jöreskog's Rho, for example) it is necessary to ask several questions on the same construct; however, due to limited time, achieving high fidelity implies shortsighting the phenomena (i.e., reducing bandwidth) (Vasilopoulos, Cucina & Hunter, 2007). Metaphorically, instead of landscapes, one will paint close portraits to achieve fidelity. On the opposite direction, to widely explore constructs on length-limited surveys, it is

necessary to compromise fidelity. Understanding the implications of this dilemma requires a deeper comprehension of reliability mechanics.

2.7.2. Considerations on Reliability

It is necessary to emphasize the difference between the reliability of measures and internal consistency reliability. Internal consistency reliability indicates that a set of items tap *the same underlying concept* (Hair *et al.*, 2009; Pasquali, 2012; Tremblay, 2001). Reliability of measures concerns its utility on predicting the criterion variable, as discussed ahead.

Challenging the connotative interpretation of the commonly used short term “reliability”, statistical reliability does not mean that measures accurately represent phenomena as they really appear in nature (Boyle, 1991). The numbers don’t remember where they come from, i.e., statistics softwares will not have access to reality to check if measures are good (Cohen, 1990). Softwares “consider” that the dataset contains all the available information about the studied universe. Hence, buzzwords should be used with care, to avoid being trapped on misconceptions.

Tremblay (2001) explains the Bandwidth-Fidelity Dilemma as he sheds light on what affects internal consistency reliability:

- a) *The similarity of the content of the items.* It is possible to increase reliability by writing items that are very similar to each other. The resulting factor will reach a very high alpha. However, these very redundant items will only predict a very narrow range of behaviors (they will have a low criterion validity). Not-so-similar items may increase the prediction obtained from a scale.
- b) *The number of items.* Tremblay states that it is a classical test theory principle that internal consistency increases as the number of items

increases, assuming that they all assess the same construct. Commonalities among items are considered additions of evidence (therefore, by inference, it is claimed that they add consistency) (Boyle, 1991; Pasquali, 2012). On the other hand, items' peculiarities are averaged out (Tremblay, 2001).

- c) *The number of dimensions underlying the measure.* Multiple dimensions tend to reduce the scale's internal consistency. If more than one factor is found in Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), the items should be split according to the dimensions they represent.

In a harder criticism, Hattie (1985) asserts that a one-dimensional scale is not necessarily reliable, internally consistent or homogeneous, even if a high Cronbach's alpha is found (corroborated by McDonald, 1981). The similarity of items may increase internal consistency indices (as they consider items inter-correlations), but it is not enough to demonstrate the existence of an underlying dimension (Boyle, 1991).

Boyle (1991) and Cattell (1982) state that rephrasing the same question several times may result on a "bloated specific factor", i.e., a group of items that give the impression of a substantive factor, despite its lack of practical significance. Both authors sustain that high internal consistency (or internal homogeneity) can be antithetical to high validity. Cattell (1973) suggests that item diversity is crucial to enable the sampling of a wide range of behaviors, thus allowing participants to respond to items that represent various expressions available in life. High internal homogeneity (hence, high alphas) can be regarded as evidence of redundancy or narrowness of a scale (Boyle, 1991, McDonald, 1981).

In practical terms, internal consistency reliability indices (like Cronbach's alpha or Jöreskog Rho) do not indicate if *items* are reliable. They indicate that, if you put two or more items together, *their resulting compound* will represent a functional aggregation of the original items (Hair *et al.*, 2009; Pasquali, 2012). This aggregation

could then be used as a substitute of the items, to make statistical tests simpler. To achieve “real” reliability, it is a pre-requisite that the original items are precise and valid.

There is another tricky buzzword that may lead to misconceptions. When combining items into factors, researchers usually name “error” the part of variance that remains unshared among items. It would be more precise to name it “unique factors” (as Pasquali, 2012) or “uniqueness” (as Brown, 2006). The whole item’s measure is a composition of their “uniqueness” (their peculiarity that is usually discarded on factor analysis) and their commonalities (their shared variance with other items). Therefore, if an item does not share variance with other items, it does not mean that it is unreliable. It just means that it is a standalone item. Trying to assess this sole item’s internal consistency would be nonsense, as internal consistency is an attribute of *item compounds* (such as factors). If a standalone item is precise and valid (considering its adequate wording), its uniqueness should not be treated as “error”, as its whole variance may be considered for hypotheses testing. Items in factors, otherwise, have their unique variances ignored.

Reliability of the measures, differently from internal consistency, refers to the possibility of predicting the dependent (endogenous) variable (Tremblay, 2001, corroborated by Boyle, 1991 and Hogan & Roberts, 1996). Measures (factors or standalone items), if reliable, will add significant prediction power to the statistical test. Tremblay (2001) refers to this prediction augmentation as Incremental Validity. Putting it in a simple example, if measures are added into a stepwise multiple regression, the addition of explained variance for each item or factor may be considered an evidence of incremental validity. If the addition of a new item is not accompanied by a relevant increase on explanation, either the item is redundant with other tested measures (it should hence be submitted to factor analysis) or its measure is probably unreliable. Boyle (1991) adds that this increase of criterion variable prediction is an advantage of scales with “moderate to low homogeneity”, as they maximize the breadth of

measurement. Moreover, Boyle asserts that reduced item homogeneity facilitates the maintenance of validity across different cultures, as broader measures may reduce the chance of measurement errors due to cultural differences.

Tremblay's (2001) argument on incremental validity neglects, however, some possibilities:

- a) If a given item does not add variance explanation, it is possible that it is still reliable, and the negative result is actually the correct result.
- b) If the newly added item adds a good piece of variance explained, it is still possible that it is a "wrong" result, given by spurious correlations.

In both cases above, the solution is to discuss the theory support or the logics of the hypothesized correlations (Brown, 2006; Cohen, 1990; Hair *et al.*, 2009). Likewise, the quality of item's wording should be debated (especially regarding its precision). Reliability of measures is also evaluated by the avoidance of errors Type I and Type II (Cohen, 1992) and the significance of prediction indicators (correlations, covariances, etc.).

The reliability of the measures depends on the interpretation of the actual meaning of the statistical results, considering its non-numeric qualities – theoretical or logical support, precision of items (Boyle, 1991; Cohen, 1990; Tremblay, 2001). According to Cattell (1973), to obtain a broad but valid, behaviorally based rather than semantically based scale, the researcher has to sift hundreds of items to find those with high validity despite their high diversity.

2.7.3. Implications for this study

Boyle (1991) and Tremblay (2001) assert that for exploratory research it is recommended to go for more bandwidth at the cost of lowering internal consistency.

For this study, Cronbach's alpha and Jöreskog's Rho above 0.60 were accepted, considering that this is an exploratory study (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Farid, 2014). Factors with internal consistency below 0.60 were considered unacceptable for analysis.

Factors with low internal consistency (below 0.60) should be "disentangled", i.e., its items should become standalones. Standalone items enter Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Models disputing variance with factors and other variables (e.g., Age, Gender, Education Level, etc.). If they have significant participation on models, they are kept; otherwise, they are removed – just as it happens with factor scores entering these statistical tests.

The mainstream literature (e.g. Hair *et al.*, 2009; Marôco, 2010; Pasquali, 2012) suggests that if the mean of correlations between items lays below 0.50, that is an evidence of bad convergence. The same parameter is applied to the Average Variance Extracted (Rho_{vc} , or Rho for convergent validity) on Confirmatory Factor Analysis. However, Boyle (1991, supported by Kline, 1979) suggests that the mean of correlations among items stay between 0.30 and 0.70, to avoid too low convergence (hence an evidence of bad consistency) or too high convergence (an evidence of bloated factor, with redundant items). These parameters were adopted for the present study. The operationalization of these implications is presented in the following Method and Results Chapters.

2.8. Theoretical Model and Research Objectives

The dependent (endogenous) variable in this study was established, Political Participation, as well as the three independent (exogenous) variables whose influence will be tested: Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion. Such influence will be observed by means of exploratory empirical testing.

The purpose of this study is to describe these variables in Brazil and Sweden, for comparison purposes. Why is this comparison so important? Because stereotypes, political education and behavioral contagion may be relatively stable inside one country, as citizens are subject to the same context. Comparing stereotypes that Brazilians create about their parliamentarians with stereotypes about Swedish parliamentarians may enlighten traces about Emic or Etic nature of phenomena. The same goes for political education and behavioral contagion. Research can only identify what is typical of a culture when cross-cultural comparisons highlight what is different (Smith *et al.*, 2013).

For these reasons, the choice of Sweden as a case study takes place primarily by their contrasting characteristics with Brazil. As explained, the historical processes of the two countries led to two very different forms of democracy functioning, and the issues that mobilize citizens are very different. The Swedish political system does not seem to suffer a crisis of legitimacy such as that of the Brazilian system. The Swedish political system appears to be stable, and political movements are not directed to question the system structures, but to which group should be given more power, within the rules established (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Wallin, 2014).

Given the purpose of the study, the scheme in [Figure 2.3](#) is proposed as a bottom line. This organization was developed *a priori*, before starting data collection.




Figure 2.3. Hypothesized relationships between the study variables.

The test of the relationship between the variables will be conducted according to the following specific objectives:

1. To identify the factor structure of the variables;
2. To evaluate factor structure equivalence and metric equivalence;
3. To calculate differences in means between the factors observed in Brazil and Sweden;
4. To test the influence of stereotypes about parliamentarians, political education and behavioral contagion on the categories of political participation. This includes the verification of possible mediation among Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion.

The objectives above will be pursued in a study divided into three stages. These steps will be explained in Chapter 3: Method.

Chapter 3: Method

The empirical investigation was carried out in 3 stages. First, a questionnaire was elaborated in English, with the use of a Delphic Panel gathering Brazilian and Swedish experts onto the task, so the questions would be valid for both contexts. Then, the questionnaire underwent a decentralized back-translation, resulting in Brazilian Portuguese and Swedish versions. Lastly, data was collected with the use of web panels on the Internet, and statistical tests were applied to assess the differences between the two countries.

3.1. Stage 1: Delphic Panel

The intent of the Delphic Panel is to engage experts into the construction of instruments to be used for data collection (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). In order to reach this goal, it is necessary to ensure the experts' exemption until the end of this stage - for this reason, the judgment of each panelist is not displayed to others (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Powell, 2003). This procedure seeks the experts' 'pure opinion', that is, without the informal influence that can occur in a synchronous meeting, like a focus group (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). This is a recommended procedure when there is little prior empirical evidence about the investigated phenomena (Powell, 2003), which is the present study's case. Also, it helps to overcome geographical distances at low cost (Jones, Sanderson & Black, 1992; Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004), such as the 10,000 km between Brazil and Sweden. On cross-country studies, it is recommended that the constructs formulation be conducted by a group of people from the nations involved (Bohenke *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, this Delphic Panel convened Brazilian and Swedish experts into collaboration, which allowed constructing a questionnaire with items representing both cultures.

Although Delphic Panel traditionally starts with an open-ended questionnaire, it is acceptable to use a literature-review-based structured questionnaire at the first round (Brooks, 1979; Custer, Scarcella & Stewart, 1999; Cyphert & Gant, 1971; Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). A questionnaire draft was elaborated by this research's author. Items related to dependent (endogenous) variable, Political Participation, were taken from previous researches (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2009; Carneiro & Torres, 2012; Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna & Mebane, 2009; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005).

Ekman and Amnå's (2012) framework does not contain questionnaire items, but its taxonomy cites various behaviors that can be converted into items – which in this case was made. Items referring to Non-Participation and to independent (exogenous) variables, Stereotypes on Parliamentarians; Political Education and Behavioral Contagion, were sparsely found in previous studies. Therefore, issues frequently found on previous researches were transformed into items. Non-Participation items reflected already reported negative attitudes (Anderson, 2010; Azevedo & Chaia, 2008; Caprara, *et al.*, 2009; Gomes, 2010; Miguel, 2003; Zimmerman & Zahniser, 1991).

For Stereotypes, items were created considering what is the possible *critical information* on parliamentarians and what are commonly *predictable behaviors* of parliamentarians (Arceneaux, 2008; Blanc-Noel, 2013; Carlin & Love, 2013; Garzia, 2013; Golebiowska, 2003; Koch, 2003; Jorge, 2003; Kam, 2007; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Moisés, 2008; Rahn, 1993). Items on Political Education aim to assess how each context contributes to the learning by participants on the subject (Amnå, Ekström, Kerr & Stattin, 2009; Castro, 2010; Resende & Dionísio, 2005; Wyatt, Katz & Kim, 2000). As for the Behavioral Contagion, the created items sought to assess if the participant exerted influence on others or if he/she followed someone else's influence (Caprara *et al.*, 2009; Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; Jesus, 2013; Le Bon, 2008; Moscovici, 1985; Zimmerman & Zahniser, 1991). Items were based on the cited studies, but their

wording was adapted to maintain harmony between different items and to adjust them to question headings. Delphic Panel experts were allowed to add new items and to criticize the whole questions wording and structure.

3.1.1. Participants

Twelve Brazilian and nine Swedish experts accepted the invitation to participate on the Delphic Panel. All of them are social science researchers, on politics-related fields, mostly master-degreed, PhD Students or PhD Professors. They had published studies on political issues or were working on research programs. A summary of their experience is presented on [Appendix I](#).

3.1.2. Procedures

The Delphic Panel's number of rounds is not previously determined, and it depends on the achievement of agreement among experts. Nevertheless, 3 to 5 iterations (rounds) are usually enough, since it has to be considered that "perfect agreement" is uncommonly obtained (Stewart *et al.*, 1999; Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This study's Delphic Panel required three rounds. Experts could not have access to each other's comments and they were given one week to report their feedback. Warranting anonymous answers is essential to achieving Delphi's purpose (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Powell, 2003; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). On the first round, the questionnaire draft (written in English, containing 87 items) was sent to Brazilian and Swedish experts by e-mail, simultaneously. Using a standardized form, experts could change question headings, add new items, assign items to be removed, change the item wording or add a relevant comment to it. The processing of the feedback was a craftwork analysis, as it was necessary to deal with very different, sometimes contradictory suggestions. At

the second round, the newly processed questionnaire (containing 96 items) was presented to experts, with emphatic instructions to indicate items for removal. The resulting questionnaire was more consistent, and smaller – 68 items. A third round was held, with the possibility to re-include some essential items that could have been unfairly removed. The final English version (with 74 items) was achieved (see Appendix II). It was the raw material for the next stage: back-translation.

3.2. Stage 2: Back-translation

Back-translation was employed to ensure the same interpretation of items by Brazilian and Swedish citizens, considering cultural and linguistic differences (Brislin, 1970). Translators were explicitly instructed to perform a decentralized translation, i.e., to use expressions that express the meaning of the item according to the cultural nuances of each country (as explained in Section 2.5.2). For the present research, the procedure occurred according to the following steps:

- a) The Delphic Panel's final questionnaire (written in English) was translated to Brazilian Portuguese and to Swedish, by professional bilingual translators.
- b) The translated (Brazilian / Swedish) versions were then back-translated to English, by other two professional bilingual translators. These "back-translators" did not have access to the original English version.
- c) Three Brazilian Portuguese native-speakers and three Swedish native-speakers played the role of translation judges. Judges did not have access to the translated version (Brazilian / Swedish version); they had access only to the original English version and to the back-translated English version. By comparing differences between these two English versions, they pointed items that needed correction.

- d) The judges' feedbacks were then presented to the Brazilian and the Swedish revisers (also native-speakers, chosen among the Delphic Panel experts). Revisers had access to all versions, and implemented the corrections the judges demanded to the Brazilian and Swedish versions.
- e) The revised Brazilian and Swedish versions were then presented to the professional back-translators. The cycle then re-started from step "b".

It took three back-translation rounds for each version (Brazilian / Swedish) to achieve acceptable quality, considering the judges' opinions. The last Brazilian and Swedish versions were then presented to the judges, who demanded minor corrections to revisers. After those last revisions, Brazilian and Swedish versions were considered approved for data collection (see [Appendix II](#), for the final translated versions).

3.3. Stage 3: Data collection and Analyses

3.3.1. Data collection

Brazilian and Swedish questionnaires were inserted into data collection web panel platforms (websites that offered resources to build data-collection forms). Both platforms were chosen for their respect to participants' privacy (SurveyMonkey and Solvero's Nebu). In Brazil, the link to the questionnaire was distributed through social media (Facebook paid advertisement and Twitter) and multi-thematic mailing lists. In Sweden, the questionnaire was distributed, a Swedish research company, to a randomized list of participants. Data collection occurred in the year 2014, between June 25 and August 31 in Brazil, and between August 05 and August 18 in Sweden.

In both countries, the informed consent was presented prior to the questionnaire, and it was necessary to agree with those terms before proceeding.

Informed consent emphasized that the participant's privacy was going to be preserved and that the participant could leave the questionnaire at any time. The uncompleted questionnaires were not considered into analysis.

3.3.2. Participants and Missing Imputation

Under a tolerance threshold of up to 10% of missing answers, 984 Brazilians were considered for analysis. The mean age was 43.95 (S.D. 15.64), and 37.4% are women. Regarding educational level, 71.3% had completed University Education, from which 48.5% were post-graduated.

After removing the ones above the 10% threshold, 879 Swedish participants were considered for analysis. Swedish participants were 49.57 years old on average (S.D. 16.64), and 46.5% were women. On education, 27.9% had completed University Education, from which 5.1% were post-graduated.

Swedish sample was achieved considering age, education and regional distributions to be similar to the Statistiska Centralbyrån's 2013 summary of population¹⁰. People from the lower-educated cohort (incomplete elementary school) were under-represented; considering that participation was voluntary, this indicates that the questionnaire might be too sophisticated for people at this education level. Brazilian sample fetched the same criteria (age, education and regional distribution), considering the most recent population statistics from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics] (IBGE)¹¹ and Tribunal Superior

¹⁰ Retrieved from: <http://www.scb.se/en /Finding-statistics/Statistics-by-subject-area/Population/Population-composition/Population-statistics/Aktuell-Pong/25795/Yearly-statistics--The-whole-country/26040/>

¹¹ Retrieved from: <http://www.ibge.gov.br/apps/populacao/projecao/index.html>

Eleitoral [Election Superior Court] (TSE)¹², but it resulted in an over-representation of Center-West region and highly educated voters (48,5% had completed university, against 5,27% as predicted by TSE).

This study did not have the intention to achieve a precise representation of each country population, though. Yet, data collected should be enough to run statistical analysis for testing interactions among variables. At first sight, for the adequate use of Factor Analysis, it is recommended that the sample contains 10 to 20 participants per questionnaire item (Pasquali, 2012; Thompson, 2005); so, in Brazil this ratio represented 16.4 participants per factorable item and in Sweden this ratio was 14.6. However, a more precise assessment of the sample size adequacy is given by Power Analysis.

3.3.2.1. Power analysis

Statistical Power assessment is useful for avoiding the risk of rejecting erroneously the alternative hypothesis (H_1) (Type II error, or " β ") (Mayr, Erdfelder, Faul & Buchner, 2007) or accepting a false null hypothesis (H_0) (Type I error, or " α "). In practical terms, Power Analysis indicates if the sample size was adequate or not for the employment of the statistical analyses like Multiple Regression or Structural Equation Modeling (Cohen, 1992; Mayr, Erdfelder, Faul & Buchner, 2007). Assessed **Power (1 - β) over 0.80** indicates that the risk of Type II error is removed satisfactorily (Cohen, 1992). For the calculation of statistical power, it is necessary to establish a set of parameters according to the type of test to be performed (in the present study, Multiple Regression and Goodness of Fit, a criterion for Structural Equation Modeling - SEM):

¹² Retrieved from: <http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/estatistica-do-eleitorado-por-sexo-e-faixa-etaria>

- Effect size (calculated in terms of probability of H_0): 0.15 for Multiple Regression; 0.30 for SEM.
- Maximum Tolerance to Type I error: $\alpha = 0.01$.
- Sample size: 984 participants in Brazil, 879 in Sweden.

The actual effect size of phenomena usually cannot be estimated beforehand, so it is necessary to follow the *rule-of-the-thumb* from similar studies. Effect sizes mentioned above were the commonly recommended conventions to each statistical technique, considering a “medium” effect size (Cohen, 1992). The risk of Type I error is tolerated up to 1% ($\alpha = 0.01$), which is rigorous but recommended when multiple tests are made upon the same data, yet according to Cohen. Degrees of freedom and number of predictors (also required parameters) can vary, according to each test design. Power Analyses results are presented and discussed together with Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) results.

For the given parameters, the Power obtained was of 1.00 for the Multiple Regression. For the CFAs, power ranged¹³ from 0.96 to 1.00, and from 0.91 to 1.00 for the SEMs. Therefore, it was considered that the sample sizes supplied fairly well the power estimates recommended in the literature. The specific sample for the CFAs and SEMs are presented in the respective tables, in the Results Chapter.

3.3.3. Analyses

3.3.3.1. Exploratory Factor Analysis

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to the examination of patterns or relationships in a large set of variables in order to decide if they can be condensed into

¹³ Power for Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) may vary according to the number of degrees of freedom in each model. For this reason ranges are presented here.

factors (latent variables) (Hair *et al.*, 2009). A set of indicators are used to ensure that factors are consistent - they are summarized in [Appendix III](#). Principal Axes Factoring (PAF) was employed to estimate the factor structure, combined with Oblimin rotation. Horn's (1965) Parallel Analysis was performed in order to confirm if the Factor Structure found is not an effect of random correlations (Hayton, Allen & Scarpello, 2004; Thompson, 2005).

This study employed EFA as a preliminary analysis, in order to identify the factor structures that should be tested with CFA. Hence, EFA results are shortly presented and discussed; Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), which provides a more sophisticated evaluation, deserved greater attention.

3.3.3.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis

On Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), a good factor structure is achieved when a good fit is reached and construct validity is demonstrated. Goodness-of-Fit indices ($\chi^2/d.f.$, RMSEA, SRMR, CFI, TLI, see details on [Appendix IV](#)) usually punish the presence of items that do not contribute to their factors – and the researcher is usually forced to remove those items or to find its correct place into the factor structure (Brown, 2006; Hair *et al.*, 2009; Thompson, 2005). Construct validity, in turn, is composed by:

- a) *Convergent Validity*: indicates that different items of theoretically similar or overlapping constructs are indeed interrelated (Brown, 2006). As explained in Section 2.7.3, this study adopted the parameter of Average Variance Extracted (Rho_{vc}) between 0.30 and 0.70 (Boyle, 1991; Kline, 1979).
- b) *Discriminant Validity*: indicates that items of theoretically distinct constructs are not highly intercorrelated (Brown, 2006). It is evaluated by comparing the extracted variance with the square construct correlations. If extracted variance is higher than the square structure correlations, it is an evidence of

discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair *et al.*, 2009). In addition, small or statistically nonsignificant factor covariances are usually not problematic and are typically retained in the solution (i.e., they provide evidence that the discriminant validity of the factors is good). However, if factor correlations exceed 0.80 or 0.85, there is evidence to question that the latent factors represent distinct constructs, thus indicating poor discriminant validity (Brown, 2006).

Low discriminance indicates the need of forcing the reduction of the number of factors or gathering them on a Second-Order Factor. Factors with low Convergent Validity ($Rho_{vc} < 0.50$) may be kept unchanged, for this study, if the same factors pass the Discriminant Validity test or if the Second-Order Factor solution is admissible.

It is also important that factor structures allow comparisons between Brazilians and Swedes. For the present study, it is considered satisfactory that *Factor Structure Equivalence* is found between Brazilian and Swedish participants, regarding the adequacy of Goodness-of-Fit indices (Brown, 2006; Caprara *et al.*, 2000). Metric Equivalence tests are reported, also considering the adequacy of Goodness-of-Fit as enough evidence (Thompson, 2005). The finding of $\Delta CFI < 0.01$ was considered additional evidence of equivalence; however, the significance of ΔX^2 was disregarded, for its known oversensitivity to large samples (see [Section 2.5.3](#)).

Scalar Equivalence is disregarded, especially considering that no transformations were made onto data to reduce skewness nor were outliers removed. These are considered sources of equivalence weaknesses (Byrne & Campbell, 1999; Canel-Çınarbaşı, Cui & Lauridsen, 2011), but they were not changed, since the use of the rawest data possible was fetched.

3.3.3.3. Multiple Regression

After factor structures were defined by CFA, factor scores (mean of composing items of each factor) were calculated. The effect of Independent variables' scores (Stereotypes, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion) on Political Participation (dependent variable) was tested through Stepwise Multiple Regression. This was used only as an interim analysis; therefore, its results are presented in Appendices and will not be discussed. Structural Equations Models started by reproducing Multiple Regression results.

3.3.3.4. Structural Equation Modeling

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) examines the inter-relations *structures* given by a series of multiple regression equations. These equations describe all relationships among constructs (i.e. latent variables, or factors) enrolled (Hair *et al.*, 2009). Criteria to accept a structural equation model as valid are similar to CFA, and they are presented in [Appendix IV](#).

The main difference between SEM and CFA is that CFA is intended to identify good-fitted factor structures, while SEM is applied to test causal relationships among independent (exogenous) and dependent (endogenous) variables (Bollen, 1998; Hair *et al.*, 2009; Hu & Bentler, 1999). So, factors found in CFA are now tested under causal models, graphically represented by a path diagram.

Considering that SEM is strictly missing-unfriendly, Multiple Imputation (Allison, 2003; Brown, 2006; Schafer & Graham, 2002; Wolf, Harrington, Clark & Miller, 2013) was used to estimate the missing data. This approach uses all available data (both missing and missingless cases). It is similar to the use of Maximum Likelihood to produce parameter estimates, but with some improvements. The imputation method is based on iterated linear regressions in which each variable with missing data is

regressed on other observed variables. The main advantage of this method is to prevent underestimates of variances and overestimates of correlations among the variables, produced by classical techniques, such as mean or regression imputation (Allison, 2003). Multiple Imputation solves those problems by introducing random variation into the process (Brown, 2006).

Chapter 4: Results

As discussed before, the Delphic Panel achieved a reasonable agreement on questionnaire adequacy for both Brazilian and Swedish contexts. Back-translation provided Brazilian Portuguese and Swedish with items with similar meanings.

The following results start with a variable-by-variable explanation of Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses' (EFA and CFA) conclusions. Secondly, relationships among variables, calculated by Stepwise Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), are presented. Chapter 5 discusses these results as enlighten by theory. Conclusion remarks are presented into Chapter 6.

4.1. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses (EFA and CFA)

For each variable (Political Participation, Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion), Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was employed prior to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). EFAs' empirically defined factors were then submitted to CFA. Item-factor relationships were graphically represented into the software AMOS (version 21.0.0), which calculates Goodness of Fit indices to evaluate the quality of that structure. CFA allows the evaluation of Factor Structure and Metric Equivalence, to ensure that indicators are useful to the comparison of different countries.

The following sub-sections show conclusions for each variable, starting from the dependent (endogenous) variable, Political Participation. Independent (exogenous) variables factor structures are subsequently presented.

4.1.1. Political Participation

The two sets of Political Participation items (political attitudes and past behavior) were separately tested into Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Results for Brazil and Sweden were slightly different, as shown in [Tables 5 and 6](#).

Table 5. Non-Participation (Political Attitudes) in Brazil and Sweden: EFA results.

Items	Factor Structure Coefficients ("loadings")	
	Brazil (KMO = 0.71)	Sweden (KMO = 0.74)
	Factor: Non-Participation	Factor: Non-Participation
PP.atd.09 We could live pretty well without politicians.	.638	.732
PP.atd.08 It is necessary to build a new society, with none of the current political institutions	.594	.643
PP.atd.05 It is a waste of time to follow the news when it comes to politics	.585	.632
PP.atd.02 My vote does not matter to improve the situation of [Brazil / Sweden]	.426	.494
PP.atd.12 NGOs and companies always have better performance than the government to serve to citizens' interests	.253	.387
<i>PP.atd.06 Voters can influence parliamentarians' decisions during their mandate</i>	*	-.330
PP.atd.01 I avoid discussing politics	.404	.282
<i>PP.atd.04 The press distorts what happens in National Congress (or equivalent)</i>	*	.271
<i>PP.atd.03 Blank or null votes express the voters' dissatisfaction with our country's politicians</i>	.307	*
PP.atd.07 It is legitimate to use violence as a form of protest **		
PP.atd.11 I intend to vote again for the same party as I voted in the last election **		
PP.atd.10 My lifestyle choices represent my political point of view (songs I hear, clothes I wear, hairstyle, etc.) **		
Cronbach's Alpha:	0.65	0.69
Eigenvalues:	2.48	2.79
Cutoff Eigenvalue (Parallel Analysis):	1.14	1.07

* Coefficients under 0,250 were suppressed. It is considered that these items had acceptable coefficients (loadings) in only one of the countries. Items loaded on two factors had their lower loads suppressed. Items that loaded on differently between countries are presented in *italic*.

** These Political Attitudes items had very low factor coefficients (under 0.25) in both countries; they were, therefore, removed from analysis.

Table 6. Political Participation (Past Behavior) in Brazil and Sweden: EFA results.

Items	Factor Structure Coefficients (“loadings”)*					
	Brazil (KMO = 0,86)			Sweden (KMO = 0,88)		
	Factor 1: Action	Factor 2: Attention	Factor 3: Pre-Political Engagement	Factor 1: Action	Factor 2: Attention	Factor 3: Pre-Political Engagement
PP.beh.10 I have participated in events organized by political parties	,795			,580		
PP.beh.13 I have handed out political leaflets	,692			,671		
<i>PP.beh.05 I have participated in institutional meetings (forums, seminars, public hearings) about political issues</i>	,557				,440	
<i>PP.beh.01 I have contacted parliamentarians directly (by meeting, telephone or through the Internet)</i>	,421				,554	
<i>PP.beh.04 I contacted the written press, radio or TV station to communicate something politically important</i>	,381				,491	
PP.beh.09 I have participated in street demonstrations	,340			,562		
PP.beh.08 I took part in strikes organized by labor unions	,332			,392		
PP.beh.07 I took part in discussions about political issues		,617			,438	
PP.beh.02 I have used social networks on Internet (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, others) to engage into political action		,607			,542	
<i>PP.beh.06 I signed petitions on public issues</i>		,603				,377
PP.beh.03 I looked up for information about the performance of parliamentarians		,545			,522	
<i>PP.beh.12 I have chosen or refused products for political, ethical or environmental protection reasons</i>		,356				,489
PP.beh.11 I have helped an association not linked to parties or government (labor union, social minority organization, church, NGO etc.)			,722			,663
PP.beh.14 I have worked as a volunteer (for my kids school church neighbourhood other)			,622			,470
Cronbach's Alpha:	0,77	0,72	0,66	0,73	0,71	0,63
Eigenvalues:	4,56	1,40	1,25	4,78	1,42	1,16
Cutoff Eigenvalue (Parallel Analysis):		1,06			1,10	

* Coefficients under 0,250 were suppressed. Items loaded on two factors had their lower loads suppressed. Items that loaded on different factors between countries are presented in *italic*.

Political attitudes items were organized on an one-factor structure, named Non-participation, with acceptable Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Cronbach's alpha (α)

indices for both Brazil (KMO = 0.71, α = 0.65) and Sweden (KMO = 0.74, α = 0.69). Two items had weak loadings in Sweden (PP.atd.01 and PP.atd.04), but as they helped improving Cronbach's alpha, they were kept. Three items (PP.atd.07; PP.atd.11; PP.atd.10) were removed from analysis, as they did not reach acceptable loadings (> 0.25) for both Brazil and Sweden.

Past behavior items analyses resulted in a three-factor structure, for both countries (see [Table 6](#)). Considering Ekman and Amnå's (2012) adapted framework, factors were named Action, Attention and Pre-Political Engagement. Factors did not correspond exactly to the theoretical prediction (they were somewhat different from the columns at [Table 2, in section 2.1.3](#)). The three-factor structure was consistent for Brazil (KMO = 0.86, Cronbach's alphas of 0.77, 0.72 and 0.66) and for Sweden (KMO = 0.88, Cronbach's alphas of 0.73, 0.71 and 0.63). Putting it simple, these factors had enough consistency to be used as substitutes to their respective questionnaire items, making easier the interpretation of results.

There was, however, a notable mixture of items between "Attention" and "Action" in the two countries, and "Pre-Political Engagement" was also different between Brazil and Sweden. Those differences in factor structures indicate that, in Brazil, behaviors like participating in institutional meetings (PP.beh.05), contacting parliamentarians (PP.beh.01) and contacting the press (PP.beh.04) are more typical of people who are engaged on Institutional Participation. In Sweden, these same behaviors are typical of people who pay Attention to politics. Pre-Political Engagement in Sweden gathered more behaviors (PP.beh.06, PP.beh.11, PP.beh.12 and PP.beh.14) than in Brazil (PP.beh.11 and PP.beh.14).

Differences between Brazilian and Swedish factor structures could make it difficult to establish comparisons. In Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), an equivalent factor structure was fetched. Three concurrent CFA models were necessary to find it.

CFA started by reproducing the common item-to-factor relationships in Brazil and Sweden found in EFA (Tables 5 and 6). Three *scenarios* were designed to perform this test: a) Brazil only, b) Sweden only, and c) Simultaneous test (Brazil and Sweden where the fit is calculated considering both countries at the same time). Non-common items were hence removed from this first CFA model, which was named “Minimal Model” (see Model A in Table 7). Besides removing the non-common items, other items were removed from the Non-participation factor to improve Goodness-of-Fit.

Non-participation factor was reduced to a three-item factor (PP.atd.05, PP.atd.08 and PP.atd.09). Given that any trial to re-insert items to Non-Participation resulted on the reduction of internal consistency, this three-item factor solution was admitted as the best possible. The resulting factor was renamed “Political Disillusion”, as its items represent carelessness for politics, however without suggesting action. All other political attitude items were removed from analysis.

Regarding past behavior items, the removal of items reduced the scope of factors. Moreover, the following items were removed from the Minimal Model:

- a) PP.beh.01. I have contacted parliamentarians directly (by meeting, telephone or through the Internet).
- b) PP.beh.04. I contacted the written press, radio or TV station to communicate something politically important.
- c) PP.beh.05. I have participated in institutional meetings (forums, seminars, public hearings) about political issues.
- d) PP.beh.06 I signed petitions on public issues.
- e) PP.beh.08. I took part in strikes organized by labor unions.
- f) PP.beh.12. I have chosen or refused products for political, ethical or environmental protection reasons.

Table 7. Participation and Political Disillusion in Brazil and Sweden: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
A) "Minimal Model" Based on common item-to-factor relationships between countries. Redundant items were removed from Non-Participation to improve fit	Brazil	186.12	38	4.90	.063	.057	.93	.90	.94	.99	.01
	Sweden	121.24	38	3.19	.050	.049	.96	.94	.96	.99	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	307.36	76	4.04	.040	.045	.95	.92	.95	1.00	.01
B) "Four-Factor Model" Important items were re-inserted	Brazil	504.11	115	4.38	.059	.050	.91	.88	.92	.99	.01
	Sweden	442.40	115	3.85	.057	.051	.92	.89	.92	.97	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	946.51	230	4.12	.041	.051	.91	.89	.92	.99	.01
C) "Final Model" Second-order factor for Institutional Participation was introduced	Brazil	574.11	120	4.78	.062	.054	.89	.86	.91	.98	.01
	Sweden	488.52	120	4.07	.059	.054	.91	.89	.92	.96	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	1062.63	240	4.43	.043	.054	.90	.87	.91	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.

These items, however, were considered too theoretically relevant to be suppressed. They refer to behaviors which importance is mentioned in several studies (Amnå, Ekström, Kerr & Stattin, 2009; Bertonecelo, 2009; Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Dalton, 2008; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Gomes & Maheirie, 2011; Hansson, Cars, Ekenberg, & Danielson, 2013; Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005). Additionally, PP.atd.07 (“It is legitimate to use violence as a form of protest”) was the only measure available for political violence. The exclusion of those items could limit the interpretation of subsequent analyses to a very narrow range of political behaviors. It was decided, then, to bring them back in, at the risk of lowering Goodness-of-Fit.

In other words, the insertion of non-common item-to-factor connections could be statistically interpreted as a distortion to the organization of items. Nonetheless, since Brazilians and Swedes act differently when it comes to politics, it is worth the risk: Goodness-of-Fit indices (which provide a general evaluation of model’s quality) may weaken, but the re-inserted items add important information to this research’s purposes.

The items PP.beh.08 (“strikes”) and PP.beh.12 (“political consumerism”) did not settle in any factor, and PP.beh.09 (“street demonstrations”) had to be moved out of “Action” for the achievement of acceptable fit. Item PP.atd.07 (“political violence”) was also kept as a standalone. A *Four-Factor Model* was met, achieving good fit in all three scenarios (see Model B in [Table 7](#)).

It was then necessary to test if factors found were indeed different, or if there was a “hidden” major factor connecting some of them. It is said that factors converge when their items are strongly interconnected. This connection strength must resist to the test of discriminance, that is, items from one factor should not be “attracted” to other factors. If factors stay clearly separate, it is said that they are convergent and discriminant, that is, they actually represent distinct facts in the real world. However, if

two or more factors are “attracted” to each other, it means that they are part of a bigger phenomenon – the hidden factor (technically speaking, a “second-order factor”).

That *Four-Factor Model* was submitted to tests of Convergent and Discriminant Validity. Convergent validity is met when factor’s Average Extracted Variance (or Rho for Convergent Validity, Rho_{vc}) is above 0.30. Discriminant Validity is found when the square covariances among factors remain below each factor’s Rho_{vc} . On the contrary, square covariances above factors’ Rho_{vc} indicate the possible existence of a second-order factor (Hair *et al.*, 2005; Marôco, 2010).

Square covariances between Attention and Action stood above these factors’ Rho_{vc} , indicating low discriminance (see [Table 8](#)). These factors were hence grouped into a second-order factor, named Institutional Participation. The “*Final Model*” is presented in [Figures 4.1 and 4.2](#). The inclusion of a Second-order factor slightly compromised Goodness-of-Fit (see [Model C in Table 7](#)). However, this solution was kept, because it solves the low discriminance Attention and Action. Adequacy of RMSEA, SRMR and AGFI indicate that the model is parsimonious (unnecessary estimations were removed). CFI and TLI below threshold indicated that some relationships among variables (paths in the diagram) were forcedly omitted (Brown, 2006).

Table 8. Discriminant Validity, based on the Five Factor Model. **Bold** values indicate the Average Extracted Variance (Rho_{vc}); values in the ladder represent the square covariance among factors and/or standalone items. Values in *italics* indicate low discriminance (they are above Rho_{vc} for each factor).

	Political Disillusion	Pre-Political Engagement	Attention	Action	PP.atd.07 Violence	PP.beh.08 Strikes	PP.beh.09 Demonstrations	PP.beh.12 P. Consumerism
Rho_{vc}	.408	.512	.405	.422				
Political Disillusion								
Pre-Political Engagement	.004							
Attention	.078	.194						
Brazil Action	.036	.203	<i>.548</i>					
PP.atd.07 Violence	.029	ns*	.023	.008				
PP.beh.08 Strikes	ns*	.032	.048	.123	.026			
PP.beh.09 Demonstrations	ns*	.058	.144	.160	.068	.168		
PP.beh.12 P. Consumerism	.012	.137	.160	.044	ns*	.014	.032	

* Not significant, removed from model.

Table 8 (cont.). Discriminant Validity, based on the Five Factor Model. **Bold** values indicate the Average Extracted Variance (Rho_{vc}); values in the ladder represent the square covariance among factors and/or standalone items. Values in *italics* indicate low discriminance (they are above Rho_{vc} for each factor).

	Political Disillusion	Pre-Political Engagement	Attention	Action	PP.atd.07 Violence	PP.beh.08 Strikes	PP.beh.09 Demonstrations	PP.beh.12 P. Consumerism
Rho_{vc}	.472	.496	.361	.448				
Political Disillusion								
Pre-Political Engagement	.017							
Attention	.006	.303						
Sweden								
Action	.004	.230	.533					
PP.atd.07 Violence	.096	ns*	.026	.036				
PP.beh.08 Strikes	ns*	.040	.044	.096	.017			
PP.beh.09 Demonstrations	ns*	.144	.281	.325	.044	.123		
PP.beh.12 P. Consumerism	.017	.176	.176	.044	ns*	.008	.053	

* Not significant, removed from model.

The examination of Modification Indices indicated that covariance between the uniqueness of “Attention” and “Political Consumerism” (standalone item) had been omitted (cov = 0.35 for Brazil; cov = 0.40 for Sweden). This suggests that people who are attentive to politics are likely to engage into Political Consumerism. Other omitted connections suggest (possibly cultural) differences between Brazil and Sweden. For Brazil, discussing politics (uniqueness [uniq] of PP.beh.07) was negatively related to the Political Disillusion factor (cov = -0.20). For Sweden, handing out political leaflets (uniq.PP.beh.13) is negatively connected to the uniqueness of “Attention” (cov = -0.52); but in Brazil it was connected to participating in events organized by political parties (uniq.PP.beh.10) (cov = 0.42). For Brazil, the feeling that following the news is a waste of time (uniq.PP.atd.05) is negatively connected to “Attention” (cov = - 0.39). Most of those connections are made between different factors, then complicating interpretation and the calculation of factor scores.

The addition of those omitted paths to the model could improve fit ($X^2/d.f.$ = 3.17; RMSEA = 0.034, SRMR = 0.048; CFI = 0.94; TLI = 0.92; AGFI = 0.94 for the simultaneous scenario). However, it was decided to keep them omitted, so the model would be easier to interpret and also to put to test on Multiple Regression and SEM. It has to be considered that EFA showed different factor structures for Brazil and Sweden. Differences may reflect Brazilians’ and Swedes’ different political mindsets or context-dependent issues (such as the engagement on massive political action in Brazil, in 2013, for example). The internal consistency and convergence of the factors were satisfactory (Table 9). The Final Model (Model C in Table 7) was then tested for factor structure equivalence and metric equivalence.

Table 9. Political Participation and Political Disillusion, *Final Model*: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity

	Brazil		Sweden	
	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	> 0.60	> 0.30	> 0.60	> 0.30
Political Disillusion	.66	.41	.72	.47
Pre-Political Engagement	.68	.52	.66	.50
2 nd order factor: Institutional Participation	.85	.74	.84	.73
Attention	.73	.40	.69	.36
Action	.78	.42	.80	.45

Regarding equivalence, the achievement of acceptably fitted models on all three scenarios (each country separately and simultaneously, see Table 7) is an evidence of *Factor Structure Equivalence* (Brown, 2006; Hair *et al.*, 2009; Thompson, 2005).

A *Metric Equivalence* test was performed by constraining factor loadings so they were equal between Brazil and Sweden. A significant chi-square difference between constrained and baseline model was found ($p < 0.001$), but it was disregarded, for its known oversensitivity (see Section 2.5.3). Considering Goodness-of-Fit, the constrained model was acceptable, regarding RMSEA, SRMR and AGFI. CFI and TLI deterioration made these indices distant from their respective cutoffs (Table 10); nonetheless, it must be recalled that fit was intentionally compromised with the re-insertion of important items. Thus, considering that CFI and TLI were already compromised on the baseline model, and that RMSEA, SRMR and AGFI had slight deterioration, evidence of *Metric Equivalence* was found. Also, $\Delta CFI = -0.09$, below the 0.10 cutoff, offered additional evidence of equivalence.



Brazil




Figure 4.1. Participation and Political Disillusion factor structure for Brazil - *Final Model.*



Sweden




Figure 4.2. Participation and Political Disillusion factor structure for Sweden - *Final Model.*

Table 10. Participation and Political Disillusion: Test of Equivalence.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	$\Delta\chi^2$ (*)	ΔCFI^*
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>p > 0.05</i>	<i>< 0.01 </i>
Unconstrained	Brazil #Sweden	1062.63	240	4.43	.043	.0539	.901	.874	.911		
Metric Equivalence: Constrained factor loadings	Brazil = Sweden	1151.01	250	4.60	.044	.0566	.892	.868	.907	<i>p < 0.001</i>	<i>- .009</i>

* Compared to the Unconstrained model

Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion are the independent (exogenous) variables, i.e., those variables that may explain what leads people into Political Participation. Their factor structures are presented on the following three subsections.

4.1.2. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians

The items from Stereotypes about Parliamentarians (the first exogenous, independent variable) were presented to participants in two groups: a) Critical Information – participants were asked to which information they usually paid attention, when watching parliamentarians discuss some important subject; and b) Behavior Prediction – participants informed how big a share of parliamentarians usually behaved as described on the list of items. These two groups were separately submitted to EFA; it was not considered to test them altogether, as they are different dimensions, with different natures (information relevance *versus* described behaviors). EFA could then mix those two types of items into a non-interpretable solution. After deciding the factor structures, however, a general CFA model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians was

made. On CFA, the risk of mixing items is absent, as the researcher can decide which items compose each factor.

4.1.2.1. Critical Information on Parliamentarians

Critical Information resulted in different arrangements between Brazil and Sweden, even though Parallel Analysis recommended a two-factor structure for both countries (Table 11). The Swedish factor structure was clearly a two-factor compound, with fairly good consistency (KMO = 0.87, Cronbach's alphas of 0.88 and 0.77, all loadings above 0.55). The first factor was named Party-Oriented View, as it gathered items related to traditional party information. The second factor was named Representation Trends, as it mostly encompassed items related to the politician links to groups of interest he/she tended to represent.

Brazilian factor structure for Critical Information was a bit more complex, but also with good consistency (KMO = 0.88, Cronbach's alphas of 0.88, 0.84 and 0.62, all loadings above 0.533). The first factor structure obtained was a three-factor compound, with the third factor's Eigenvalue (1.02) marginally below the cutoff Eigenvalue estimated by Parallel Analysis (1.07). The first factor was mostly similar to the Swedish Party-Oriented View (the only different item was ST.inf.04 - His/her area of expertise...) and Representation Trends was also mostly similar. The remarkable difference is that two items migrated, creating a "Personal Information" composite, the third ("new") factor. Personal Information assessed if participant was attentive to the politician gender and religion. Forcing a two-factor solution (as recommended by Parallel Analysis) resulted in the maintenance of "Personal Information", and all other items grouped on the first factor (thus making a mix of Party-Oriented View and Representation Trends). This solution makes it nearly impossible to establish a comparison with the Swedish solution, and it precludes telling apart those two relevant constructs. The two-factor compound reduced, hence, the possible explanations on

participant's view about parliamentarians. Therefore, the Brazilian three-factor solution was kept. These factor structures were submitted to CFA.

Table 11. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians (Critical Information): EFA Results

Items	Factor Structure Coefficients ("loadings")*					
	Brazil (KMO = 0,88)			Sweden (KMO = 0,87)		
	Factor 1: Party- Oriented View	Factor 2: Politician History	Factor 3: Personal Info	Factor 1: Party- Oriented View	Factor 2: Politician History	Factor 3: Personal Info
ST.inf.02 If he/she is left-winged or right-winged	.841			.821		
ST.inf.03 If he/she represents the governing party(ies), the opposition or a neutral position	.772			.824		
ST.inf.01 His/her political party	.700			.836		
ST.inf.10 His/her former political positions (ex.: Minister, Secretary etc.)		.700			.551	
<i>ST.inf.04 His/her area of expertise (ex.: environment, foreign affairs, economic development, human rights etc.)</i>		.671		.592		
ST.inf.09 If he/she has been involved in scandals		.619			.457	
ST.inf.05 The groups of interest in which he/she takes part (labor unions, entrepreneurs associations, environmental protection institutions, farmers associations etc.)		.608			.498	
ST.inf.06 If he/she represents some minority (ex.: indians/native people, immigrants, gays/LGBT, disabled people etc.).		.422			.586	
<i>ST.inf.07 His/her religion</i>			.807		.649	
<i>ST.inf.08 The parliamentarian's gender (male/female)</i>			.533		.558	
Cronbach's Alpha:	.88	.84	0.62	.88	.77	
Eigenvalues	1.16	1.11	1.02	4.56	1.37	
Cutoff Eigenvalue (Parallel Analysis)		1.07			1.08	

* Items loaded on two factors had their lower loads suppressed. Items that loaded on different factors between countries are presented in *italic*.

CFA started with a dilemma: which factor structure to test? The Brazilian three-factor, or the Swedish two-factor solution? Both were tested. Table 12 presents a Goodness-of-Fit comparison between those two models. Just like Political

Participation, each factor structure was tested in three scenarios: one for Brazil, one for Sweden and one with the two countries simultaneously.

For all models, the item ST.inf.09, “[I pay attention...] if he/she has been involved in scandals”, though important, had to be removed for the achievement of acceptable fit. For subsequent analyses, the evaluation of corruption henceforth relied on the “corruption” factor, explained on the next section. Also, the item ST.inf.04, “[I pay attention to...] His/her area of expertise (...)”, was removed. This item had loaded differently on Brazilian and Swedish EFA structures, and it badly compromised fit, especially for the Swedish group. Its removal was considered acceptable, as other items covered information’s on parliamentarians’ “résumé”.

The first two-factor structure resulted on unacceptable RMSEA and chi-square over degrees of freedom ratio (Model A in [Table 12](#)). After removing ST.inf.07 (“religion”) and ST.inf.08 (“gender”) from the Representation Trends factor, [acceptable](#) Goodness-of-Fit was achieved for a new model (see Model B in [Table 12](#)). CFI, TLI and AGFI were excellent for all *scenarios*. The three-factor models had poorer RMSEA and $X^2/d.f.$ ratio, but were still acceptable, considering that all other indices were pretty good. It is actually possible to choose between both factor structures, regarding their adequate Goodness-of-Fit. The three-factor structure was chosen, as it provides more information: ST.inf.07 and ST.inf.08 are kept, as they compose the “Personal Information” factor. This factor could be useful to predict one or more Political Participation factors – which indeed it was, as presented on [Section 5.2.1.1](#).

Table 12. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Critical Information, in Brazil and Sweden: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.

Model*	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	χ^2 / d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)**	Type I error alpha
	<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
A) 2 factors Considering the Swedish factor structure in EFA (ST.inf.07 and ST.inf.08 loaded on Representation Trends)	Brazil	228.98	19	12.05	.106	.057	.94	.91	.89	.99	.01
	Sweden	140.97	19	7.42	.086	.049	.96	.94	.93	.99	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	369.95	38	9.73	.069	.057	.95	.92	.91	1.00	.01
B) 2 factors Considering the Swedish factor structure in EFA (removed ST.inf.07 and ST.inf.08)	Brazil	24.66	8	3.08	.046	.015	.99	.99	.98	1.00	.01
	Sweden	37.80	8	4.73	.065	.031	.99	.98	.96	.99	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	62.47	16	3.90	.040	.015	.99	.98	.97	1.00	.01
C) 3 factors Considering the Brazilian factor structure in EFA	Brazil	87.49	17	5.15	.065	.029	.98	.97	.95	.99	.01
	Sweden	81.99	17	4.82	.066	.031	.98	.96	.95	.99	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	169.48	34	4.98	.046	.029	.98	.97	.95	1.00	.01
D) Second-order factor is introduced	Brazil	105.53	18	5.86	.070	.037	.97	.96	.95	.99	.01
	Sweden	119.91	18	6.66	.080	.046	.97	.95	.94	.99	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	225.45	36	6.26	.053	.037	.97	.95	.95	1.00	.01

* None of the models contained items ST.inf.04 and ST.inf.09, as they compromised fit.

** Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.

There was evidence of low discriminance between Representation Trends and Party-Oriented View in Brazil (see Table 13). In Sweden, the same happened between Representation Trends and Personal Information (Table 13). This can be explained under the light of EFA's decision process. It loaded Representation Trends and Personal Info items on the same factor, in Sweden. In Brazil, when a 2-factor structure was forced on EFA, Personal Information remained intact and all other items loaded on a general "politicians' résumé" factor. This might be an effect of cultural differences, as discussed on Section 5.2.1.1. Anyway, for both countries, a hidden (second-order) factor could be underlying this proximity among factors.

Table 13. Discriminant Validity for Critical Information factors. **Bold** values indicate the Average Extracted Variance (Rho_{vc}); values in the ladder represent the square covariance between factors. Values in *italics* indicate low discriminance (they are above Rho_{vc} for each factor).

		Party-Oriented View	Representation Trends	Personal Information
Brazil	Rho_{vc}	0.715	0.524	0.507
	Party-Oriented View			
	Representation Trends	0.6561		
	Personal Information	0.1936	0.3249	
Sweden	Rho_{vc}	0.746	0.469	0.43
	Party-Oriented View			
	Representation Trends	0.4624		
	Personal Information	0.1681	0.5776	

A Second-Order Factor model was tried (Model D in Table 12; Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Chi-square ratio laid out of recommended parameters. RMSEA was acceptable for Brazil, marginally bad for Sweden and good for the simultaneous scenario. Chi-square and RMSEA maladjustment is attributed to the increase of model complexity. On the other hand, SRMR, CFI, TLI and AGFI stood comfortably inside parameters, indicating that the existing paths truly contribute to the model. At last, there is enough evidence of Second-Order Factor model adequacy. Furthermore, the introduction of the

second-order factor allows a more parsimonious explanation, concerning the extent of attention the participants pay to information about parliamentarians. A low score on that “Critical Information” factor would indicate that the participant usually ignores information about politicians; on the opposite direction, a high score would indicate that the participant really tries to understand the politician’s profile.

The well-fitted Second-order factor model (Model D in Table 12) on the simultaneous scenario is an evidence of *Factor Structure Equivalence*. When factor loadings were constrained to be the same for both countries, all Goodness-of-Fit indices remained inside the acceptance parameters (except chi-square, which was already out of parameters on the baseline model – see Table 14). This is considered enough evidence of *Metric Equivalence*, as explained at Section 3.3.3.2. The CFI deterioration (ΔCFI) was -0.003, inside 0.01 cutoff criteria – hence, an additional evidence of Metric Equivalence. Chi-square discrepancy test ($\Delta\chi^2$) showed significant deterioration, but it was disregarded - as explained on Section 2.5.3, this is an oversensitive test, and it tends to reject even good models. In conclusion, Metric Equivalence was achieved, considering the evidence of good fit, as previously explained.

Table 14. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Critical Information: Tests of Equivalence.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / \text{d.f.}$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	$\Delta\chi^2 (*)$	ΔCFI^*
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>p > .05</i>	<i>< 0.01 </i>
Unconstrained	Brazil ≠ Sweden	225.45	36	6.26	.053	.0366	.971	.955	.946		
Metric Equivalence Constrained factor loadings	Brazil = Sweden	254.28	43	5.91	.051	.0414	.968	.958	.948	<i>p < 0.001</i>	-0.003

* Comparing to the Unconstrained model.




Figure 4.3. Critical Information factor structure for Brazil, with Second-order factor (Model D in Table 12).




Figure 4.4. Critical Information factor structure for Sweden, with Second-order factor (Model D in Table 12).

Internal consistency (Jöreskog's Rho column in Table 15) was good for all factors, for both countries (ranging from 0.60 to 0.90). Convergent validity as met for all factors (see Rhovc columns at Table 15).

Table 15. Critical Information: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity

	Brazil		Sweden	
	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	> 0.60	> 0.30	> 0.60	> 0.30
Critical Information (Second-Order)	.83	.62	.82	.60
Party-Oriented View	.88	.71	.90	.75
Representation Trends	.78	.54	.75	.50
Personal Information	.66	.51	.60	.43

4.1.2.2. Behavior Prediction

The composition of the Behavior Prediction factor was exactly the same for Brazil and Sweden, with very good factorability (KMO = 0.91 for both countries, see Table 16). A two-factor solution was met, just as recommended by Parallel Analysis. The first factor was named Quality of Representation, as it grouped items that evaluated parliamentarians' work, with a *positive* trend. Cronbach's alpha for this factor was 0.89 for Brazil and 0.91 for Sweden; very good in both cases. The second factor was named Corruption, as it grouped items that clearly described politicians' dishonest actions. Cronbach's alpha for this factor was acceptable for Sweden ($\alpha = 0.74$), but low for Brazil ($\alpha = 0.56$). This inflicted the decision to keep the Corruption factor or to force a one-factor solution for Brazil.

Table 16. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians (Behavior Prediction): EFA Results

Items	Factor Structure Coefficients (“loadings”)*			
	Brazil (KMO = 0,91)		Sweden (KMO = 0,91)	
	Factor 1: Quality of Representation	Factor 2: Corruption	Factor 1: Quality of Representation	Factor 2: Corruption
ST.beh.08 They create laws beneficial to the country (They adopt laws beneficial to the country)	.786		.780	
ST.beh.11 They work for a fairer income distribution among [Brazilians/Swedes]	.751		.617	
ST.beh.05 They make good use of budget to improve services (schools, hospitals, police) for the people	.740		.743	
ST.beh.06 They accomplish the promises they make while in electoral campaign	.705		.714	
ST.beh.09 They do a good job on representing [my country]	.699		.753	
ST.beh.12 They represent their constituents	.690		.766	
ST.beh.01 They represent my interests as a citizen	.677		.740	
ST.beh.04 They contribute for the sustainable development	.641		.697	
ST.beh.07 They behave coherently to their parties	.565		.542	
ST.beh.03 They help their own friends and family to achieve important positions (they practice nepotism)		.653		.890
ST.beh.02 They favor companies over the interests of citizens		.508		.692
ST.beh.10 They use public money for their private interests		.487		.443
Cronbach's Alpha:	.89	.56	.91	.74
Eigenvalues	5.13	1.55	5.96	1.41
Cutoff Eigenvalue (Parallel Analysis)		1.10		1.10

* Items loaded on two factors had their lower loads suppressed.

It was decided to keep the Corruption factor, considering that it is extremely important to assess participants' impressions on the parliamentarians' behavior – using a “positive” and a “negative” evaluation factor would certainly be more useful than just using a single-factor evaluation. This factor structure was then submitted to CFA, as explained below.

CFA started by reproducing the two-factor structure found with EFA. The examination of Modification Indices and Standardized Residual Covariances suggested the exclusion of these items, in order to improve Goodness-of-Fit:

- a) ST.beh.02 They favor companies over the interests of citizens
- b) ST.beh.06 They accomplish the promises they make while in electoral campaign
- c) ST.beh.07 They behave coherently to their parties
- d) ST.beh.09 They do a good job on representing [my country]

Re-insertion attempts for these items have failed, as they unacceptably compromised fit. An adequate two-factor model for Brazil and for Sweden was found (see [Figures 4.5 and 4.6](#)). Goodness-of-Fit indices showed that the model is strongly consistent, as RMSEA and SRMR were far below and CFI, TLI and AGFI were far above the cutoff criteria for Brazil, Sweden and for the Combined model (see [Table 17](#)). Chi-square over degrees of freedom ratio was also very adequate in all three conditions.

Table 17. Parliamentarians' Behavior Prediction: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	34.07	13	2.62	.041	.022	.99	.98	.98	.99	.01
Sweden	37.84	13	2.91	.047	.020	.99	.98	.97	.99	.01
Brazil and Sweden Simultaneously	71.91	26	2.77	.031	.020	.99	.98	.98	1.00	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.

“Quality of Representation” factor showed very good internal consistency ([Table 18](#)) and convergence for Brazil (Jöreskog’s Rho = 0.84; Rhovc = 0.51) and for Sweden (Jöreskog’s Rho = 0.86; Rhovc = 0.56). “Corruption” also showed very good internal consistency and convergence for Sweden (Jöreskog’s Rho = 0.81; Rhovc =

0.68), but acceptable consistency (Jöreskog's Rho = 0.62) and convergence (Rhovc = 0.48) for Brazil.

Table 18. Parliamentarians' Behavior Prediction: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity

	Brazil		Sweden	
	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	> 0.60	> 0.30	> 0.60	> 0.30
Quality of representation	.84	.51	.86	.56
Corruption	.62	.48	.81	.68




Figure 4.5. Behavior Prediction factor structure for Brazil.




Figure 4.6. Behavior Prediction factor structure for Sweden.

It is noteworthy that there is a negative covariance between the two factors, which emphasizes that they have opposite trends – Quality of Representation stands for a positive evaluation of parliamentarians' behaviors, Corruption stands for a negative evaluation. This negative covariance had a considerable value (-.40 for Brazil, -.55 for Sweden), but discriminance validity test showed adequate separation between

these two factors (see Table 19 and Figures 4.5 and 4.6). Hence, it would be inadequate to test a second-order factor.

Table 19. Values in *italics* indicate low discriminance (they are above Rho_{vc} for each factor).

		Quality of Representation	Corruption
		<i>.514</i>	<i>.480</i>
Brazil	Quality of Representation		
	Corruption	.160	
		<i>.563</i>	<i>.681</i>
Sweden	Quality of Representation		
	Corruption	.302	

Table 20. Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Behavior Prediction: Test of Metric Equivalence.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	$\Delta\chi^2$ (*)	ΔCFI^*
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>p > 0.05</i>	<i>< 0.01 </i>
Unconstrained	Brazil #Sweden	71.91	26	2.77	.031	.0205	.990	.984	.976		
Metric Equivalence, Constrained factor loadings	Brazil = Sweden	106.61	31	3.44	.036	.0258	.984	.978	.971	<i>p < 0.001</i>	<i>-.006</i>

* Comparing the Unconstrained model.

The well-fitted model on the simultaneous scenario suggests *Factor Structure Equivalence* between Brazil and Sweden (Table 17). Constraining all factor loadings to be equal for both countries resulted on a still adequate model (see Constrained Factor Loadings model in Table 20). Chi-square deterioration ($\Delta\chi^2$) was significant ($p < 0.001$), but it was disregarded for its known oversensitivity. Enough evidence of *Metric Equivalence* was found, since Constrained Factor Loadings model achieved good fit. CFI deterioration ($\Delta CFI = -.006$) was below the 0.01 threshold, which was considered an additional evidence of *Metric Equivalence*. The achievement of Factor and Metric

equivalences indicates that these items' compounds are adequate to comparative test between Brazil and Sweden.

4.1.2.3. A General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians

After solving the factor structure for Critical Information and Behavior Prediction, a general model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians was made (see [Figures 4.7 and 4.8](#)). The General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians achieved excellent fit on all scenarios: Brazil, Sweden and Combined models (see [Table 21](#)). Power Analysis indicated that it is highly unlikely to commit Type II error. The Corruption Factor showed little improvement on Internal consistency and Convergent validity at the general model (see [Table 22](#)).

The simultaneous model's very good fit indicates *Factor Structure Equivalence*. When all factor loadings were constrained to be equal for Brazil and Sweden (see [Table 23](#)), all Goodness-of-Fit indices were comfortably adjusted to parameters. CFI deterioration ($\Delta CFI = -0.005$) laid inside the 0.01 threshold, offering additional evidence of Metric Equivalence. Chi-square resulted significant ($p < 0.001$), but it was disregarded, for its oversensitivity. At last, the General Model for Stereotypes about Parliamentarians was considered satisfactory for the subsequent analysis.

Table 21. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	234.67	85	2.76	.042	.039	.97	.97	.96	.99	.01
Sweden	245.80	85	2.89	.046	.041	.97	.96	.95	.99	.01
Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	480.48	170	2.83	.031	.039	.97	.97	.95	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.



Brazil





Figure 4.7. General Model for Stereotypes about Parliamentarians – Brazil.



Sweden




Figure 4.8. General Model for Stereotypes about Parliamentarians – Sweden.

Table 22. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians: Internal Consistency and Convergent Validity

Stereotype Component	Factor	Brazil		Sweden	
		Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc	Jöreskog's Rho	Convergent Validity Rhovc
	<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	> 0.60	> 0.30	> 0.60	> 0.30
Critical Information	Critical Information (Second-Order)	.83	.63	.82	.61
	Party-Oriented View	.88	.71	.90	.75
	Representation Trends	.78	.54	.75	.50
	Personal Information	.66	.51	.60	.43
Behavior Prediction	Quality of Representation	.84	.52	.86	.56
	Corruption	.63	.49	.81	.68

Table 23. General Model for Stereotypes on Parliamentarians: Test of Metric Equivalence.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	$\Delta\chi^2$ (*)	ΔCFI^*
	<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	< 0.07	< 0.08	> 0.92	> 0.92	> 0.90	$p > 0.05$	< 0.01
Unconstrained	Brazil (baseline)	480.48	170	2.826	.031	.0388	.973	.966	.955		
Constrained factor loadings	Brazil	543.58	182	2.987	.033	.0428	.968	.963	.952	$p < 0.001$	-.005

* Comparing to the baseline model - Brazil

4.1.3. Political Education

Seven items in the questionnaire asked participants where they had learned about politics. This is actually a self-evaluation on how much each sphere of their lives had contributed to their understanding about politics. The main purpose was to compare Formal Education (learning about politics at school) with socialization

(learning from friends, workmates etc.), to answer the question: which of these have greatest impact on Political Participation?

EFA results surprisingly added family education to Formal Education items (learning at School and at University), for both Brazil and Sweden (see Table 24). The Socialization factor was sufficiently consistent for Brazil and Sweden (Cronbach's alpha = 0.65 in both countries). This Formal (+Home) Education factor achieved acceptable Cronbach's alpha for Brazil (0.63) and but low for Sweden (0.53). Also, Eigenvalues for Formal (+home) Education in Sweden (0.98) was below recommended by Parallel Analysis (1.07).

Table 24. Political Education: EFA Results

Items	Factor Structure Coefficients ("loadings")*			
	Brazil (KMO = 0,79)		Sweden (KMO = 0,80)	
	Factor 1: Socialization	Factor 2: Formal (+home) Education	Factor 1: Socialization	Factor 2: Formal (+home) Education
PE.06 ... from friends	.709		.693	
PE.04 ... from coworkers	.649		.710	
PE.05 ... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member	.473		.795	
PE.07 ... on your own (reading books, newspapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc.).	.364		.414	
PE.01 ... at school (primary school - 1st grade, or high school - 2nd grade)		.695		.876
PE.02 "...at University"		.524		.545
PE.03 ... from your family		.454		.552
Cronbach's Alpha:	.65	.63	.65	.53
Eigenvalues	2.70	1.08	2.74	.98
Cutoff Eigenvalue (Parallel Analysis)		1.03		1.07

* Items loaded on two factors had their lower loads suppressed.

In order to perform CFA, the Swedish factor structure was kept unchanged, as it was directly comparable to the Brazilian one. Also, it would be primarily relevant to maintain these two factors separate (instead of forcing a one-factor solution), as they are useful to compare the influence of different learning contexts on Political Participation. The two-factor structure was tested in CFA. Goodness of Fit indices indicated adequate fit for all scenarios (Model A in [Table 25](#)). However, improvements were needed, concerning low internal consistency and convergent/discriminant validity.

At CFA, *Formal (+Home) Education* had low internal consistency and low convergence for Brazil (Jöreskog's $Rho = 0.55$; $Rho_{vc} = 0.29$) and Sweden (Jöreskog's $Rho = 0.50$; $Rho_{vc} = 0.25$). *Socialization* showed adequate internal consistency and acceptable convergence (Jöreskog's $Rho = 0.67$; $Rho_{vc} = 0.35$ for Brazil; Jöreskog's $Rho = 0.68$; $Rho_{vc} = 0.42$ for Sweden), after PE.07 ("...on your own [...]") was made a standalone item, for the improvement of the factor's internal consistency. Low convergence compromised discriminant validity, which was also low for both countries (square covariance between factors of 0.50 for Brazil, 0.61 for Sweden, above factors' Rho_{vc}). Attempts to improve Formal (+Home) Education internal consistency, by removing weakly loaded items, failed.

Considering Formal (+Home) Education's low internal consistency and convergence (Jöreskog's Rho below 0.60; Rho_{vc} below 0.30) for Brazil and Sweden, additionally with its low eigenvalue for Sweden, this factor was disentangled, and its items were considered standalones. It was considered that all three contexts grouped under this factor were empirically too different to be considered in the same compound. In other words, this factor was not consistent enough to function as a substitute of its items; therefore, for further analyses items will be considered separately.

Table 25. Political Education: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / \text{d.f.}$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
A) Two-Factor, Removed PE.07	Brazil	51.84	12	4.32	.058	.033	.96	.93	.97	1.00	.01
	Sweden	55.80	12	4.65	.064	.036	.95	.92	.96	1.00	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	107.64	24	4.48	.043	.036	.96	.93	.96	1.00	.01
B) One Factor	Brazil	23.93	8	2.99	.045	.021	.98	.96	.98	1.00	.01
	Sweden	34.53	8	4.32	.061	.027	.97	.93	.96	1.00	.01
	Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	58.46	16	3.65	.038	.027	.98	.94	.97	1.00	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.



Brazil




Figure 4.9. Political Education One-Factor Structure for Brazil (Model B in Table 25).



Sweden




Figure 4.10. Political Education One-Factor Structure for Sweden (Model B in Table 25).

A final model for Political Education was tested, with Socialization factor alone (Model B in Table 25, Figures 4.9 and 4.10). CFI, TLI and AGFI indicated very good fit to all scenarios, as did SRMR (below 0.030). RMSEA was pretty good for Brazil (0.045) and simultaneous (0.038), and acceptable for Sweden (0.061). Socialization's internal consistency slightly improved (Jöreskog's Rho = 0.67; Rho_{vc} = 0.41 for Brazil; Jöreskog's Rho = 0.69; Rho_{vc} = 0.43 for Sweden). The Discriminance Validity test was ignored, since this is a one-factor solution.

The simultaneous scenario's good fit (Model B in Table 25) indicates *Factor Structure Equivalence*. When factor loadings were constrained to be equal between groups, $X^2/D.F.$ ratio slightly improved, as the addition of degrees of freedom (the denominator) was not accompanied by a big rise on chi-square (Table 26). This difference was not significant ($p = 0.244$). This may be explained by the "small" size of the model, as it is a one-factor solution with 3 items (hence there are not many factor loadings to constrain). Other Goodness-of-Fit indices shortly rose, as an effect of the chi-square ratio increase, which is regarded as good evidence of *Metric Equivalence*. The CFI variation ($\Delta CFI = -0.001$) presented extra evidence. At last, this one-factor solution is statistically adequate.

Table 26. Political Education: Test of Metric Equivalence.

Model	Scenario	X^2	d.f.	$X^2/d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	ΔX^2 (*)	ΔCFI^*
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>p > .05</i>	<i>< 0.01 </i>
Unconstrained	Brazil #Sweden	58.46	16	3.65	.038	.027	.979	.944	.969		
Constrained factor loadings	Brazil = Sweden	61.29	18	3.40	.036	.028	.978	.949	.971	$p = .244$	-.001

* Comparing to the Unconstrained Model.

4.1.4. Behavioral Contagion

Behavioral Contagion items intended to assess how much the participants followed someone else's influence or tried to influence others into Political Participation. It also assessed how many people close to the participant were usually engaged on Political Participation. EFA returned a one-factor structure for both countries (see Table 27), just as recommended by Parallel Analysis. It is fairly consistent (KMO = 0.74, Cronbach's alpha = 0.71 for Brazil; KMO = 0.78, Cronbach's alpha = 0.77 for Sweden).

Table 27. Behavioral Contagion: EFA results.

Items	Factor Structure Coefficients ("loadings")	
	Brazil (KMO = 0,74)	Sweden (KMO = 0,78)
	Factor: Behavioral Contagion	Factor: Behavioral Contagion
BC.01 I usually try to convince friends to participate in political action	.72	.70
BC.04 I am encouraged by people close to me to participate in politics.	.62	.81
BC.02 I understand the politics of my country better than most of my friends	.54	.61
BC.03 I pay attention to the opinion of friends who are more politically active than I am	.52	.63
BC.05 How big a share of your friends/relatives usually take part in political activities (approximately)?	.46	.43
Cronbach's Alpha:	.71	.77
Eigenvalues:	2.31	2.63
Cutoff Eigenvalue (Parallel Analysis):	1.04	1.04

The one-factor structure was confirmed at CFA. However, the item BC.02 "I understand the politics of my country better than most of my friends" was removed (Figures 4.11 and 4.12). It was intended to assess if knowing about politics had something to do with influencing people or following their influence (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, Fishkin & Jowell, 2002). This item dramatically compromised fit.

Theoretical reasons why this item dropped out of the factor are discussed on [Section 5.3.4](#).

This factor structure without BC.02 achieved very good fit in all scenarios (Brazil, Sweden and Combined, see [Table 28](#)), notably an almost perfect fit for Sweden. Power Analysis strongly removed the possibility of Type II error. Behavioral Contagion showed acceptable internal consistency (Jöreskog's Rho = 0.67 for Brazil, 0.75 for Sweden) and Convergent Validity (Rho_{vc} = 0.35 for Brazil, 0.44 for Sweden). The Discriminant Validity test was ignored, as this is a one-factor structure.

Table 28. Behavioral Contagion: Goodness-of-Fit indices and Power Analysis.

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	< 0.07	< 0.08	> 0.92	> 0.92	> 0.90	> 0.80	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	9.64	2	4.82	.062	.022	.99	.96	.97	1.00	.01
Sweden	2.49	2	1.24	.017	.011	.99	.99	.99	1.00	.01
Brazil and Sweden simultaneously	12.12	4	3.03	.033	.022	.99	.98	.98	1.00	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.





Figure 4.11. Behavioral Contagion factor structure - Brazil.



Sweden




Figure 4.12. Behavioral Contagion factor structure - Sweden.

Simultaneous scenario's good fit (Table 28) indicates *Factor Structure Equivalence*. Factor loadings were constrained to be equal for both countries, to perform the *Metric Equivalence* test. It was found that the item BC.03 ("I pay attention to the opinion of friends who are more politically active than I am") compromised equivalence, thus it was left unconstrained. According to Hair *et al.* (2009), Metric Equivalence test is actually rigorous, and demonstrating partial equivalence – by constraining at least two items per factor – is adequate. All constrained model's Goodness-of-Fit indices were comfortably adjusted (see Table 29), suggesting Metric Equivalence. The significant result of Chi-square deterioration (ΔX^2) was unheeded for its oversensitivity. CFI deterioration ($\Delta CFI = -0.01$) offered additional evidence of equivalence. Therefore, partial Metric Equivalence was met for Behavioral Contagion.

Table 29. Behavioral Contagion: Test of Metric Equivalence.

Model	Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	χ^2 /d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	$\Delta\chi^2$ (*)	ΔCFI^*
<i>Acceptance Criteria:</i>		--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>p > 0.05</i>	<i>< 0.01 </i>
Unconstrained	Brazil ≠ Sweden	12.12	4	3.03	.033	.0216	.994	.982	.983		
Metric Equivalence Constrained factor loadings	Brazil = Sweden	27.59	6	4.60	.044	.0346	.984	.968	.976	<i>p < 0.001</i>	<i>-.010</i>

* Compared to the Unconstrained model

Behavioral Contagion’s one-factor structure gathered items on influencing others, following others’ influence and the amount of politically engaged people nearby the participant. It can be regarded as a measure of how much the individual is integrated to a politically active network.

4.2. Variables’ mean differences between Brazil and Sweden

As Factor Structure Equivalence and Metric Equivalence were demonstrated on CFAs, differences between Brazil and Sweden can now be assessed. Factor scores were calculated, considering the factor structure for each variable, as explained on the previous section. This research’s variables are henceforth referred to as compounds of their factor structures and standalone items. Independent samples t-test was conducted to compare means between Brazil and Sweden.

Regarding Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, there is no significant difference on the general attention Brazilians ($M=4.61$, $SD=2.37$)¹⁴ and Swedes ($M= 4.59$, 2.69)

¹⁴ Mean and Standard Deviation. Scores range from zero to 10; the same goes for their means.

pay to the Critical Information, considering its second-order factor scores; $t(1861.59)=0.17$, $p=0.866$ ¹⁵. However, they differ on the specific factors. Swedes ($M=5.96$, $SD=3.04$) pay more attention than Brazilians ($M=5.63$, $SD=3.34$) to Party-related information (considering Party-Oriented View factor score); $t(1860.35)=2.20$, $p=0.028$. Otherwise, Brazilians ($M= 5.64$, $SD=3.01$) pay more attention to Representation Trends than Swedes ($M= 4.07$, $SD=2.59$); $t(1858.83)= -12.06$, $p < 0.001$. Participants from both groups seldom pay attention to Personal Information, but Brazilians ($M= 2.52$, $SD=2.81$) do that more often than Swedes ($M= 1.93$, $SD=2.28$); $t(1844.63)= 5.00$, $p < 0.001$.

Quality of Representation is close to the mid-point of the scale in Sweden ($M= 4.68$, $SD=1.77$), which is significantly higher than the low quality perceived by Brazilians ($M= 2.02$, $SD=1.36$); $t(1642.36)= 36.05$, $p < 0.001$. Corruption, on the other hand, is perceived as higher in Brazil ($M= 7.41$, $SD=2.24$) than in Sweden ($M= 4.08$, $SD=2.62$); $t(1737.21)= 29.22$, $p < 0.001$.

Socialization is a more important locus of political learning for Brazilians ($M= 4.09$, $SD=2.43$) than for Swedes ($M= 3.72$, $SD=2.24$); $t(1858.77)= 3.41$, $p = 0.001$. Swedes ($M= 5.10$, $SD=3.13$) are more likely to learn about politics in elementary or secondary education than Brazilians ($M= 3.05$, $SD=3.15$); $t(1839.39)= 14.04$, $p < 0.001$. On the other hand, Brazilians ($M= 5.27$, $SD=3.41$) give more importance to the learning of politics at the University than Swedes ($M= 4.12$, $SD=3.29$); $t(1184)= -5.48$, $p < 0.001$. On what concerns the importance of learning politics from the family, participants from Brazil ($M= 4.81$, $SD=3.27$) and Sweden ($M= 4.79$, $SD=2.93$) do not significantly differ, $t(1860.98)= 0.13$, $p = 0.899$.

The *loci* of political learning on the previous paragraph had moderate to low importance, when regarding their means. Learning politics on one's own (reading

¹⁵ Number in parenthesis represent the degrees of freedom, followed by the result of t-test and significance (p-value).

books, newspapers, Internet, watching TV, radio. etc.) had bigger importance for both groups, with Brazilians ($M= 7.89$, $SD=2.61$) giving it more importance than Swedes ($M= 7.25$, $SD=2.60$); $t(1839.15)= -5.31$, $p < 0.001$.

Regarding Behavioral Contagion as a measure of belonging to a politically engaged network, Brazilians ($M= 4.01$, $SD=2.14$) are significantly more involved than Swedes ($M= 2.49$, $SD=1.97$); $t(1859.13)= 15.95$, $p < 0.001$. Effects of Behavioral Contagion and the other aforementioned variables on Political Participation are discussed on the next section.

Political Disillusion is below the midpoint for both groups, but Brazilians ($M= 3.19$, $SD=2.75$) are more disillusioned than Swedes ($M= 2.60$, $SD=2.23$); $t(1843.48)= 5.09$, $p < 0.001$. Participants from Brazil ($M= 1.90$, $SD=3.07$)¹⁶; more often than those from Sweden ($M= 0.60$, $SD=1.95$), engaged in street demonstrations; $t(1687.83)=11.04$, $p < 0.001$. The same goes for the involvement in labor union strikes (Brazil: $M= 1.09$, $SD=2.48$; Sweden: $M= 0.25$, $SD=1.15$; $t[1417.22]= 9.55$, $p < 0.001$). Political violence legitimization was remarkably low in both countries, but it received greater support in Brazil ($M= 1.49$, $SD=2.85$) than in Sweden ($M= 0.75$, $SD=1.90$); $t(1726.70)= 6.67$, $p < 0.001$.

Pre-Political Participation (volunteering for a non-governmental association, neighbourhood or kids school, for example) was more frequent in Brazil ($M= 4.22$, $SD=3.63$) than in Sweden ($M= 2.45$, $SD=3.19$); $t(1860.48)= 11.16$, $p < 0.001$. Brazilians ($M= 5.27$, $SD=4.28$) and Swedes ($M= 4.98$, $SD=4.43$) do not differ on the engagement on Political Consumerism; $t(1821.52)= 1.41$, $p = 0.158$.

When it comes to Institutional Participation, as assessed by the homonym Second-Order Factor, Brazilians ($M= 3.11$, $SD=2.29$) are more often engaged than Swedes ($M= 1.46$, $SD=1.70$); $t(1799.64)= 17.79$, $p < 0.001$. Brazilians are more

¹⁶ Original scale for past behavior concerning Political Participation ranged from “zero” to “5 or more times”. It was converted to a zero to 10 scale, in order to enable comparison with other scales on this study.

attentive (assessed by the “Attention” factor score, Brazil: $M= 5.64$, $SD=3.04$; Sweden $M= 2.73$, $SD=2.49$; $t[1846.80]= 22.71$, $p < 0.001$), and more active than Swedes (as assessed by the “Action” factor score, Brazil: $M= 1.82$, $SD=2.31$; Sweden $M= 0.85$, $SD=1.67$; $t[1783.51]= 10.45$, $p < 0.001$).

These results present a first overview on political thinking differences between Brazil and Sweden. The understanding of these variables relationships is crucial to the comprehension of their systemic functioning in both countries.

4.3. Relationships among variables (Stepwise Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Modeling)

After defining factor structures (as explained in [Section 4.1](#)), factor scores were calculated. These factor scores were submitted to Stepwise Multiple Regression, to test which predictor (exogenous) variables (Stereotypes on Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion) could better predict Political Participation (the criterion, endogenous variable). Relationships found through Stepwise Multiple Regression were further tested under Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).

Stepwise Multiple Regression results are briefly mentioned here, as they were a preliminary stage and they are strongly redundant with the SEM analyses. Why, then, the two statistical techniques were used? Why not rely on one of them?

Stepwise Multiple Regression is useful to perform a first exploratory approach. In practical terms, all exogenous variables are inserted into that Regression, and only those with significant prediction effect over the endogenous variable are kept. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), on the other hand, demands theoretical support or previous empirical evidence – therefore, it is not an adequate tool for exploratory testing. For this reason, Stepwise Multiple Regression was performed to provide the

first empirical evidence. Exogenous variables that “survived” Stepwise Regression then entered the first model for the SEM analysis.

SEM provides deeper and more rigorous analyses, as it discloses a number of additional indicators (such as Goodness of Fit and Modification Indices - Hair *et al.*, 2009; Marôco, 2010). Through the examination of Modification Indices and covariances’ significance, it is possible to identify relationships among exogenous variables that have impact on the prediction of the endogenous variable. It is also possible to test mediation between exogenous variables, and the quality of explanation is assessed by Goodness-of-Fit indices. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) usually results on more parsimonious models than Multiple Regression, as non-significant covariances are removed from the models, as well as exogenous variables with low prediction power.

Factors and standalone items for Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Political Education and Behavioral Contagion entered the Stepwise Multiple Regression as predictor (exogenous) variables. Demographic information - gender, age, education (highest school level achieved), party membership, sympathy with a party, party rejection, political orientation (left-wing or right-wing), and wealth (assessed by the possession of goods, see Appendix III) also entered the regression as predictor variables.

Regarding Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, Critical Information is a second-order factor, composed by Party-Oriented View, Representation Trends and Personal Information. It was considered that either the first-order factors or the second-order factor could help explain each type of Political Participation differently. Hence, the second-order factor and the first-order factors entered the Stepwise Multiple Regression concurrently, so this exploratory test could indicate if each type of Political Participation is better explained by the whole compound (the second-order factor) or specifically by some of its components (first-order factors).

It was also serendipically found that the items for the Socialization factor (from Political Education), though positively inter-correlated, had different effects over variables when inserted on SEM models to explain Political Participation. How did it happen? Through the examination of Modification Indices, it was observed that two items from the Socialization Factor could have opposite and significant effects on the explanation of some types of Political Participation. For example, when used to predict Pre-Political Engagement in Sweden (presented in [Section 4.3.2](#)), learning from coworkers had negative effect while learning from friends and members of associations had positive effect over the dependent variable. Participation on Labor Union Strikes in Brazil (subsection 4.3.5) was predicted, at the SEM model, solely by learning from members of an association, regardless the other items on the Socialization Factor (actually, this sole item removed all other variables that entered the SEM model).

For this reason, a second set of Stepwise Regression was made, entering the Socialization Factor concurrently with its composing items. Changes observed were brought to the SEM models. Results presented in this section come from this “second-round” Stepwise Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).

The following subsections are organized according to the Political Participation factors and standalone items. Stepwise Multiple Regression results are presented in [Appendix IV](#). Structural Models to explain each of these participation types are presented. Independent (exogenous) variables in the following SEM models were those that remained from Stepwise Multiple Regression. Concurrent models were built for each dependent variable (types of Political Participation). Criteria used to compare concurrent models were the improvement of prediction (given by the determination index, R^2), Goodness-of-Fit and significance of covariances and regression weights. Models in this section are the ones that presented the best convergence of the aforementioned criteria. All covariances and regression weights presented for the

following models are significant, considering $p < 0.05$. Also, Goodness-of-Fit indices for all models were found adequate – for this reason, this issue will be shortly commented.

4.3.1. Political Disillusion

Political Disillusion negatively covariates with the perception of Quality of Representation (cov = -0.25 in Brazil; cov = -0.22 in Sweden). This negative covariance is also present on both countries, regarding the Party-Oriented View (cov = -0.29 in Brazil; cov = -0.27 in Sweden - [Figures 4.13 and 4.14](#)). Other independent variables were differently allocated to each country's models.

Education Level (assessed as demographic input) had significant negative effect (cov = -0.20) on Political Disillusion in Brazil. Regarding the positive effect of Age (cov = 0.25), it indicates that older Brazilians are more disillusioned than the younger ones. Perceptions over parties add relevant evidence. Party Rejection had positive effect (cov = 0.08), while Party Membership (cov = -0.09) and Party Sympathy (cov = -0.16) had negative effect on Political Disillusion in Brazil. These party perception items partially mediated the Stereotypes about parliamentarians' factors: Quality of Representation was mediated by all three items, while Party-Oriented View was mediated by Party Sympathy, as shown in [Figure 4.13](#). The total of Political Disillusion's explained variance in Brazil was $R^2 = 0.33$.

In Sweden, differently, two other Stereotypes factors entered the model, with positive effects on Political Disillusion: Personal Information (cov = 0.19) and Corruption (cov = 0.47). Party Membership partially mediated the relationship between Party-Oriented View and Political Disillusion, with also a negative effect on the later ([Figure 4.14](#)). The total of Political Disillusion's explained variance in Sweden was $R^2 = 0.46$. Both Brazilian and Swedish models to explain Political Disillusion achieved acceptable fit ([Table 30](#)).

Table 30. Goodness of Fit for prediction models on Political Disillusion.

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
Acceptance Criteria	--	--	between 1 and 5	< 0.07	< 0.08	> 0.92	> 0.92	> 0.90	> 0.80	fixed at .01
Brazil	388.79	112	3.47	.050	.065	.94	.93	.94	.99	.01
Sweden	212.34	97	2.19	.037	.045	.98	.97	.96	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.




Figure 4.13. Explaining Political Disillusion in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.




Figure 4.14. Explaining Political Disillusion in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

4.3.2. Pre-Political Engagement

Behavioral Contagion played a core role on predicting Pre-Political Engagement, both in Brazil (cov = 0.51) and Sweden (cov = 0.46). There was a significant difference on this type of political action according to gender¹⁷. Women are more likely to Pre-Political Engagement than men (cov = 0.12 in Brazil; cov = 0.07 in Sweden). On the other hand, men are more likely to try to convince others to engage political action (cov = -0.30 in Brazil; cov = -0.16 in Sweden). Learning about politics from members of an association had positive effect on Behavioral Contagion (cov = 0.42 in Brazil; cov = 0.43 in Sweden). This is the common ground on both models (Figures 4.15 and 4.16). They had well-adjusted fit indices (Table 31).

In Brazil, Party Sympathy positively covariates with Behavioral Contagion (0.20) and attention to Personal Information (cov = 0.17), but it had a negative effect on Pre-Political Engagement (cov = -0.12). Attention to Personal Information (cov = 0.32) had positive effect on Behavioral Contagion, producing a mediated effect on the dependent variable. The Perception of good Quality of Representation had a direct negative effect (cov = -0.08). The total of explained variance for Pre-Political Engagement in Brazil was $R^2 = 0.27$ (Figure 4.15).

Whereas in Brazil, Quality of Representation (from Stereotypes about Parliamentarians) had negative impact on Pre-Political Engagement, in Sweden perceived Corruption played the same role (cov = -0.10). The total of explained variance for Pre-Political Engagement in Sweden was $R^2 = 0.23$ (Figure 4.16).

¹⁷ Gender was codified as 1 = men, and 2 = women. Therefore, positive covariance indicates female prevalence, negative covariance indicates male prevalence.



Brazil





Figure 4.15. Explaining Pre-Political Engagement in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.



Sweden




Figure 4.16. Explaining Pre-Political Engagement in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

Table 31. Goodness of Fit for prediction models on Pre-Political Engagement

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	334.82	98	3.42	.050	.070	.93	.92	.94	.99	.01
Sweden	96.51	32	3.02	.048	.035	.97	.95	.96	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.

4.3.3. Institutional Participation

In both Brazil and Sweden, Institutional Participation (considering the second-order factor, that comprises Attention and Action, as explained in [Section 4.1.1](#)) is predicted by the Critical Information (second-order factor from Stereotypes about Parliamentarians), mediated by Behavioral Contagion. In Sweden, however, three more variables had significant prediction power towards Institutional Participation. Party Membership had a positive effect ($cov = 0.27$), partially mediating the effect of Behavioral Contagion ($cov = 0.43$); hence, being a member of a party helped engaging into political participation in Sweden. On the other hand, the lower the perceived Quality of Representation, the greater the chances of engaging into institutional political action ($cov = -0.16$). Learning politics alone helped participation, however mediated by Behavioral Contagion ($cov = 0.30$). Both Brazilian and Swedish models achieved good fit (see [Table 32](#)).

In both countries ([Figures 4.17 and 4.18](#)), a relevant share of variance was explained by the independent variables that entered the model (Brazil: $R^2 = 0.83$; Sweden: $R^2 = 0.80$). Regarding the first-order factor on the dependent (endogenous) variable, relevant shares of variance were also explained for Attention (Brazil: $R^2 = 0.87$; Sweden: $R^2 = 0.81$) and Action (Brazil: $R^2 = 0.62$; Sweden: $R^2 = 0.66$).

It is noteworthy that Party Membership, Quality of Representation and learning politics alone were important independent variables in Sweden, but they did not have a significant role in Brazil. This might indicate cultural differences, to be discussed on Chapter 5. Though some variables related to education (Education level, PE.01, PE.02, PE.04, PE.05) entered the Stepwise Multiple Regression models ([Appendix IV, Tables IV.5 and IV.6](#)), at the Structural Equation Modeling they were removed, as they seriously downturned fit and had no relevant contribution on Institutional Participation prediction.

Table 32. Goodness of Fit for models on Institutional Participation (2nd order factor)

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
Acceptance Criteria	--	--	between 1 and 5	< 0.07	< 0.08	> 0.92	> 0.92	> 0.90	> 0.80	fixed at .01
Brazil	746.77	182	4.10	.056	.047	.93	.91	.91	.94	.01
Sweden	569.56	165	3.45	.053	.048	.93	.92	.92	.91	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.




Figure 4.17. Explaining Institutional Participation in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.




Figure 4.18. Explaining Institutional Participation in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

4.3.4. Political Consumerism

On Political Consumerism, the common ground between Brazil and Sweden is that Behavioral Contagion had direct positive effect (Brazil: $cov = 0.34$; Sweden: $cov = 0.25$) and that men are a little more likely to engage in this type of action (Brazil: $cov = 0.12$; Sweden: $cov = 0.10$). Other variables entered the model differently (Figures 4.19 and 4.20).

In Brazil, Education had a positive direct effect on Political Consumerism (cov = 0.16), while Party-Oriented View had positive effect, mediated by Behavioral Contagion (respectively, cov = 0.48, Behavioral Contagion's explained variance: $R^2 = 0.28$). Quality of Representation had a small negative effect (cov = -0.08). Total of variance explained for Political Consumerism was $R^2 = 0.16$ in Brazil.

In Sweden, Party-Oriented View (cov = 0.11) and perceiving parliamentarians Corruption (cov = -0.18) had direct impact on Political Consumerism. Regarding Political Orientation¹⁸, left-winged citizens were more likely to engage Political Consumerism. Total of variance explained for Political Consumerism in Sweden was $R^2 = 0.18$. All Goodness-of-Fit Indices showed model adequacy, for both countries (see [Table 33](#)).

Table 33. Goodness of Fit for models on Political Consumerism

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	359.51	87	4.13	.056	.073	.94	.93	.94	.99	.01
Sweden	225.28	52	4.33	.062	.060	.95	.94	.94	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.

¹⁸ Assessed by the item 73 on the questionnaire ([Appendix II](#)) "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?" Participants answers were recoded to a range from zero (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Hence, negative covariance indicate left-wing prevalence, while positive covariance indicate right-wing prevalence.





Figure 4.19. Explaining Political Consumerism in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.



Sweden




Figure 4.20. Explaining Political Consumerism in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

4.3.5. Labor Union Strikes

Questions in the present research had little prediction impact over participation on Labor Union Strikes (Brazil: $R^2 = 0.10$; Sweden $R^2 = 0.05$ – [Figures 4.21 and 4.22](#)). In Brazil, the item “learning from members of an association” solely accounted for all

explained variance (cov = 0.31). In Sweden, Behavioral Contagion (cov = 0.13), attention to Personal Information (cov = 0.13) and the perception of parliamentarians' Corruption (cov = 0.09) had positive and direct impact. Calculation of Goodness of Fit does not apply to the Brazilian model, as it is just-identified (there is only one possible solution, as there are no degrees of freedom on the model); hence, it is considered "perfectly fit". The Swedish model was adequate, according to model fit indices presented in Table 34.

Table 34. Goodness of Fit for models on Participating in Labor Union Strikes

Scenario	X ²	d.f.	X ² / d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
Acceptance Criteria	--	--	between 1 and 5	< 0.07	< 0.08	> 0.92	> 0.92	> 0.90	> 0.80	fixed at .01
Brazil	.00	0	.00	.318	.000	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.01
Sweden	41.00	24	1.71	.028	.027	.99	.98	.98	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.




Figure 4.21. Explaining participation in Labor Union Strikes in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.




Figure 4.22. Explaining participation in Labor Union Strikes in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

4.3.6. Street Demonstrations

In Sweden, Behavioral Contagion (cov = 0.40) had positive direct impact on participation in Street Demonstrations. Additionally, Quality of Representation (cov = -0.13) had a negative direct impact, i.e., the perception of the bad quality of parliamentarians' work helps to explain the engagement on Street Demonstrations - in Sweden, $R^2 = 0.18$.

In Brazil, the same effects were observed for Behavioral Contagion (cov = 0.38) and Quality of Representation (cov = -0.07). However, other variables entered the model. Wealth (cov = -0.09) and Age (cov = -0.17) had negative direct effect, i.e., poorer and younger people are more likely to engage on street demonstrations, in

Brazil. The total of variance explained for participation on Street Demonstrations in Brazil was $R^2 = 0.19$. Both Brazilian and Swedish models were well fit (Table 35; see models in Figures 4.23 and 4.24).

Table 35. Goodness of Fit for models on Participating in Street Demonstrations

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	13.27	49	2.66	.041	.054	.97	.96	.97	.99	.01
Sweden	99.74	34	2.93	.047	.038	.98	.97	.97	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.





Figure 4.23. Explaining participation in Street Demonstrations in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.



Sweden




Figure 4.24. Explaining participation in Street Demonstrations in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

4.3.7. Violence Legitimacy

The perception that violence is a legitimate political action was explained, in Brazil, by Behavioral Contagion (cov = 0.23), a negative perception of Quality of Representation (cov = -0.15) and Age (cov = -0.21). Total of variance explained for Political Violence Legitimacy in Brazil was $R^2 = 0.12$.

In Sweden, the perception of parliamentarians' Corruption had positive effect. Party-Oriented View had negative direct effect on Political Violence Legitimacy (cov = -0.14). Attention to parliamentarians' Personal Information had positive effect (cov =

0.15). These two Critical Information factors were partially mediated by Behavioral Contagion (respectively, cov = 0.33 and 0.31). Behavioral Contagion (cov = 0.20) had positive direct effect on Political Violence Legitimacy. Total of variance explained for Political Violence Legitimacy in Sweden was $R^2 = 0.09$. Goodness-of-Fit indices were adequate for both countries (Table 36; see models in Figures 4.25 and 4.26).

Table 36. Goodness of Fit for models on Political Violence Legitimacy

Scenario	χ^2	d.f.	$\chi^2 / d.f.$	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	AGFI	Achieved Power (1 - β)*	Type I error alpha
<i>Acceptance Criteria</i>	--	--	<i>between 1 and 5</i>	<i>< 0.07</i>	<i>< 0.08</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.92</i>	<i>> 0.90</i>	<i>> 0.80</i>	<i>fixed at .01</i>
Brazil	134.53	42	3.20	.047	.066	.96	.95	.96	.99	.01
Sweden	97.67	48	2.04	.034	.037	.99	.98	.97	.99	.01

* Post-Hoc Power Analysis calculated with software G-Power (version 3.1.9), considering Effect Size = 0.30.




Figure 4.25. Explaining Political Violence Legitimacy in Brazil: Structural Equation Modeling results.




Figure 4.26. Explaining Political Violence Legitimacy in Sweden: Structural Equation Modeling results.

4.3.8. Overview of SEM results

As numerous models were presented in this section, [Table 37](#) summarizes the Structural Equation Models for each type of Political Participation.

Table 37. Summary of SEM models – predicting Political Participation factors and standalone items.

Dependent (endogenous) variable	Brazil		Sweden	
	Predicted by:	R ²	Predicted by:	R ²
Political Disillusion	Party-Oriented View (–) Quality of Representation (–) Party Membership (–) Party Sympathy (–) Party Rejection (+) PE.07. “on your own” (med) Age (+) Education (–)	.33	Party-Oriented View (–) Quality of Representation (–) Party Membership (–) Personal Information (+) Corruption (+)	.46
Pre-Political Engagement	PE.05. from members of association (med) Behavioral Contagion (+) Gender (women) Personal Information (med) Party Sympathy (–) Quality of Representation (–)	.27	PE.05. from members of association (med) Behavioral Contagion (+) Gender (women) Corruption (–)	.23
Institutional Participation	Behavioral Contagion (+) Critical Information, 2 nd order (med)	.83	Behavioral Contagion (+) Quality of Representation (–) PE.07. “on your own” (med) Party Membership (+)	.80
Political Consumerism	Behavioral Contagion (+) Gender (women) Party-Oriented View (med) Quality of Representation (–) Education (+)	.16	Behavioral Contagion (+) Gender (women) Party-Oriented View (+) Corruption (–) Left-Right, political orientation (left)	.18
Labor Union Strikes	PE.05. from members of association (+)	.10	Behavioral Contagion (+) Personal Information (+) Corruption (+)	.05

Table 37. Summary of SEM models – predicting Political Participation factors and standalone items.

Dependent (endogenous) variable	Brazil		Sweden	
	Predicted by:	R ²	Predicted by:	R ²
Street Demonstrations	Behavioral Contagion (+) Quality of Representation (–) Wealth (–) Age (–)	.19	Behavioral Contagion (+) Quality of Representation (–)	.18
Violence	Behavioral Contagion (+) Quality of Representation (–) Age (–)	.12	Behavioral Contagion (+) Party-Oriented View (–) Personal Information (+) Corruption (+)	.09

Notes:

(+) = Independent (exogenous) variable with positive effect on the dependent (endogenous) variable.

(–) = Independent (exogenous) variable with negative effect on the dependent (endogenous) variable.

(med) = Independent (exogenous) variable whose effect on the dependent (endogenous) variable is mediated by (an)other variable(s).

(women), (left) = for gender and political orientation (Left-Right), the word between parentheses translate the positive or negative covariance into its real-world meaning.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The items in the first draft of the questionnaire were based on previous literature, but the Delphic Panel participants had plenty of freedom to change them, since items should be suitable simultaneously for the Brazilian and Swedish contexts. Hence, after changes, the factor structure was unpredictable. Exploratory Factor Analysis was used to find non-predetermined factor structures and Confirmatory Factor Analysis was then employed to achieve comparability. Likewise, prediction models were freely tested with Stepwise Multiple Regression and improved with Structural Equation Modeling. Means for Brazilian and Swedish participants underwent t-tests for comparison.

This research results are discussed in the following four sections. First, general remarks on factor structures for the study of the selected phenomena; then, detailed examinations on CFA for each independent variable and their effect onto Political Participation; next, implications of this research findings to the Political Participation literature; finally, evidences of cultural differences retrieved from data.

5.1. General Remarks on Factor Structure

Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) presented differences between Brazil and Sweden. Those differences indicate cultural trends or context-specific issues. It is not a surprise, as these countries were chosen for their supposed contrasts (Bethell, 1985; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Schück, 2003; Scobbie, 2010; Scott, 1988; Wallin, 2014), and that the political scene is constantly changing. As explained on [Section 2.6.4](#), Brazil and Sweden currently deal with very different political demands, and this might influence the citizens either to stay attentive or to

engage on different types of action. Differences on factor structures do not seem to be a problem of measurement quality, but a reflection of real-world changes in course.

For illustration, if other countries were added to this study, one on a very stable moment and other close to a political revolution, it should be expected that factor structures would also be different. Why? Because when “monitorial citizens” get into action (a revolution could be a favorable moment), they mix “Attention” and “Action” behaviors, with implications on the factor structure. If citizens monitor without acting (supposedly on a very stable democracy), there might be a clearer separation between “Attention” and “Action” factors.

Brazil and Sweden are not living political system revolutions, nor serene stability. In both countries, people took the streets for different demands – bus fare reduction, freedom of speech and punishment to corrupt politicians in Brazil (Damasceno, 2013; Lima, 2013; Fernandes, 2013; Ramos, 2013; Ranthum, 2013); defense of immigrant rights in Sweden (Artiles & Meardi, 2014; Hirvonen, 2013; Malmberg, Andersson, & Östh, 2013), to name a few; recent elections were tense and intensely disputed, mobilizing voters around the political agenda of candidates, especially via social media discussions (BBC, 2014b; Castro, 2014; Christensen & Kolling, 2014; Johnson & Pollard, 2014; Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014; Martín, 2014; Missau Ruviano & Missau Ruviano, 2014). These events might have had different effects on the “mixing” of Attention and Action in the two countries, with reflections on EFA results. For example, in Sweden, participating in institutional meetings, contacting parliamentarians and contacting the written press were “mixed” with the Attention factor, while in Brazil attentive people were more likely to engage Political Consumerism.

The same reasoning is applied to the differences on Critical Information (from Stereotypes about Parliamentarians) factor structure on EFA results. Brazilians and Swedes employ distinct references to comprehend parliamentarians’ differences. The

parliamentarian's "Personal Information" factor (gathering gender and religion) was spontaneously found on EFA for Brazil, and it resisted the test of reducing the number of factors (see [Section 4.1.2.1](#)). It is understood that Brazilians either pay attention to Personal Information or to more "sophisticated" information, as Party-Oriented View and Representation Trends were strongly inter-correlated. Moreover, if the Personal Information factor was not found for the Swedish data, could it be specific of the Brazilian population? The answer to this question came with the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).

When Personal Information was inserted into the Swedish CFA model, Model Fit improved (comparing Model A and Model C on [Table 12](#)) – therefore, it was beneficial to keep it for Sweden, even if it was not present during EFA. Moreover, Personal Information had significant prediction power for Political Disillusion, Labor Union Strikes and Political Violence Legitimation in Sweden, an evidence of this factor's incremental validity.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) allowed the finding of equivalent factor structures for all tested variables, by forcing items to stay on specific factors or to remain as standalone items. This forced positioning of items produced valid models – otherwise Goodness-of-Fit would not reach acceptable parameters and equivalence tests would fail. Factor structure and metric equivalences allowed the comparison between the two countries.

As scales dealt very widely with the studied phenomena, bandwidth-fidelity trade-off became a relevant issue. Adding more items could help improving internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha and Jöreskog's Rho) and convergence (Rho_{vc}); however, it would make the questionnaire much longer, reducing the interest of participants to respond (Boyle, 1991; Tremblay, 2001).

Parameters adopted for internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha and Jöreskog's Rho above 0.60) and convergence (Rho_{vc} between 0.30 and 0.70) may be considered

low by the mainstream literature (Hair *et al.*, 2009; Marôco, 2010; Pasquali, 2012). However, CFA models showed adequacy, as Goodness-of-Fit indices are regarded – evidencing that factor structures were not distorted. When factors entered Structural Equation Models for predicting Political Participation, a relevant share of the dependent (endogenous) variable’s variance was explained (given by R^2 , see [Table 37](#)). The good prediction potential is a previously mentioned advantage of “low consistency” factors (Boyle, 1991; Tremblay, 2001).

5.2. Understanding Political Participation: the Contribution of each Independent (Exogenous) Variable

As each independent (exogenous) variable entered prediction SEM models, their contribution to explaining Political Participation is discussed. The following subsections approach theoretical implications of the relationships found in SEM models, considering differences between Brazil and Sweden.

5.2.1. The effect of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians

Though the items on Stereotypes about Parliamentarians were divided in two blocks, Critical Information and Behavior Prediction, there was no pre-conceived factor structure for them. Factor structures found with CFAs were compatible between the selected countries and allowed several comparisons, discussed below.

5.2.1.1. Critical Information

The second-order factor for Critical Information about parliamentarians was composed by Party-Oriented View, Representation Trends and Personal Information first-order factors. The general Critical Information measure offers an evidence of participants' sensitivity to the variability of parliamentarians. It is inferred that, if a participant ignores one type of information, that is not relevant to him/her to tell the difference of one politician to another. Hence, stereotypes supposedly work as *cues* to understand which groups are present at the parliament.

Institutional Participation in Brazil (Figure 4.17 and Table 37) was the only context where the second-order factor for Critical Information played a significant role. Its effect was mediated by Behavioral Contagion, which will be discussed in detail on Section 5.2.4. Nonetheless, in Brazil, the citizen's capacity to tell the difference among parliamentarians has an important effect to mobilize participants into Institutional Participation. There is previous evidence that Brazilians cannot easily understand their country politics and do not usually know the difference among parties and among politicians (Henrique, 2010). In Sweden, none of the Critical Information factors helped predicting Institutional Participation (Figure 4.18). There is previous evidence that Swedes understand the difference among parties (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Why, then, is Critical Information important in Brazil, but not in Sweden?

In Brazil, those who understand politicians' differences have an "advantage" to participate, if compared to those who see no difference (Henrique, 2010; Moisés, 2008). In Sweden, since most citizens understand party-related differences, that knowledge does not represent an advantage of "the more informed" over "the less informed" citizens, on what concerns Institutional Participation. The absence of Critical Information factors on the prediction of Swede's Institutional Participation indicates that some Swedes get engaged, other do not, when they regard politician's differences.

This is supported by the t-test results. Swedes, more often than Brazilians, pay attention to Party-related information. Brazilians, on the contrary, pay more attention to Representation Trends and Personal Information. This suggests that Brazilians, more than Swedes, need to rely on “additional information” about parliamentarians, since parties, government-opposition dichotomy, left and right wings do not provide enough information to tell parliamentary groups apart. Reliance on Representation Trends may actually indicate the need for less obvious, somewhat technical information, like the groups or minorities each parliamentarian represents and his/her former political positions (Carlin & Love, 2013; Garzia, 2013; Koch, 2003). This evidences that Brazilians do not see parties’ differences so clearly as the Swedes do (Kinzo, 2004; Sallum Júnior, Graeff & Lima, 1990). In a different manner, the reliance on Personal Information as a relevant cue indicates a lack of capacity to understand the political arena (Henrique, 2010; Samuels, 1997; Shildo, 1990). Since Brazilians relied more on Personal Information than Swedes, this reinforces the difficulty to understand Brazilian politics with “traditional” information – parties, government-opposition dichotomy, or right and left wings.

The Personal Information factor also played a relevant role in Sweden. Political Disillusion and support to Political Violence increased in the same direction as attention to Personal Information, i.e., a positive covariance was found (Figures 4.14 and 4.26). Under this perspective, attention to Personal Information antagonizes with pro-democratic behaviors. These Swedes seem to ignore the mainstream politics (as Party-related information and Representation Trends seem to be secondary to them), and choose to “break the social contract”, i.e., they engage into non-negotiating postures. This would explain, on the same way, why attention to Personal Information predicts participation on Labor Union Strikes – which intention is to force employers to negotiate.

In Sweden, both gender and religion are currently related to breaking the social contract. Feminist activism makes its points through intensively contesting actions (Cowell-Meyers, 2014; Wikstrom, 2014). Religion, on its turn, is related to the immigration of Muslims – which is the underlying motivation of 2013 riots, when the killing of an immigrant triggered violent protests (The Local, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e and 2014). In both cases, the fact that Personal Information entered the prediction models is an evidence of its incremental validity for assessing political opinion in Sweden. Moreover, this finding was only made possible through the cross-country comparison, as on the first look “Personal Information” seemed to be a Brazilian-specific factor.

Differently from Sweden, Personal Information in Brazil was associated with Pre-Political Engagement (Figure 4.15), mediated by Behavioral Contagion. This might reflect the insertion of churches into the political scene and gender-equality activism. In Brazil, churches are actively connected to the mainstream politics, especially the Christian Evangelicals (as Protestants are usually referred to in Brazil - Kleba & Wendausen, 2009; Montero, 2009; Oro, 2003). Likewise, feminist and gay-rights activism have gained importance on the recent years (Facchini, 2010). Often, these two themes are connected, as homosexual and feminist activism antagonize with Christian commonly spread beliefs (Natividade, 2010).

In both countries, Political Disillusion decreased as the citizen showed a Party-Oriented View, i.e., a negative covariance was found (Figures 4.13 and 4.14). This highlights that understanding the party-related differences helps preventing citizens to fall into hopelessness towards political institutions. Similarly, it helps preventing Swedes from supporting Political Violence (Figure 4.26).

Party-Oriented View had positive effects onto Political Consumerism (Figures 4.19 and 4.20), both in Brazil (mediated by Behavioral Contagion) and in Sweden (directly). This reflects the growing importance of parties with an environmental agenda (“green” parties, such as *Partido Verde* in Brazil or *Miljöpartiet* in Sweden), in both

countries, in opposition to “gray” parties, those friendly to big businesses (Breiting & Wickenberg, 2010; Dolezal, 2010). In Sweden, it was found that left-wing participants are more likely to engage Political Consumerism, which actually reflects the trend of environmental-friendly parties, as they usually oppose big businesses (Green-Pedersen, 2012; Holmberg & Hedberg, 2009). In Brazil, instead of the political orientation, the increase of Education Level positively predicted Political Consumerism. Therefore, use of consumption choices to pressure businesses seems to be related to the scientific knowledge provided by formal education.

It is remarkable that Critical Information factors had a relevant effect on some types of political participation, while it helped preventing Disillusion (in both countries) and violence (in Sweden), as there was a negative covariance with these. This highlights that the understanding of group differences is not necessarily attached to prejudice and discrimination (corroborating Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995; Mackie, 1973; Ryan, 2003). Party-Oriented View and the general Critical Information factors had a pro-democratic effect – hence, the ability to differentiate politicians based on these criteria produced a positive attitude towards politicians. Personal Information, on the contrary, was associated with Disillusion and Violence, unveiling a negative attitude. Generally speaking, Critical Information factors were indeed ambivalent, as explained in [Section 2.2.1](#). Moreover, they allow the identification of citizens’ trends to pro-democratic or antidemocratic behaviors.

The capacity of predicting the dependent (endogenous) variables (Political Participation factors or standalone items) is an evidence of Incremental Validity for the Critical Information factors. Future studies may explore more questions under the perspective that the attention to Critical Information represents the understanding of differences among parliamentarians, parties, and groups they represent. The introduction of this variable contributed to the increase of explained variance on prediction models.

Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, beyond Critical Information, also relates to how citizens try to predict the behaviors of their representatives. Therefore, the next section discusses the effect of Behavior Prediction onto Political Participation.

5.2.1.2. Behavior Prediction

Regarding citizens' expectations upon parliamentarians' behaviors in Brazil and Sweden, Quality of Representation was found to be better in Sweden, and Corruption was perceived as higher in Brazil. This finding actually supports previous studies on each country's political culture, as they indicate poor trust, high corruption and low perceived efficacy of political institutions in Brazil (Azevedo & Chaia, 2008, Cunha, 2006; Moisés, 2008; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Ribeiro, 2007) and high trust, low perceived corruption and good efficacy of Swedish political institutions (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Wallin, 2014). It is reasonable to infer that Swedes are more satisfied with their democratic institutions than Brazilians, which is also supported by the studies above.

With that in mind, Political Participation in Sweden was unexpectedly lower than Brazil, when means were compared. Brazilians were more engaged on Institutional Participation, also considering Attention and Action factors separately. Brazilians were also more active on Pre-Political Engagement, Labor Union Strikes and Street Demonstrations. Brazilians also showed greater Political Violence Legitimation and they were more disillusioned than Swedes.

This contrasts with the statements that Brazilians are apathetic and not interested on politics (Moisés & Carneiro, 2008) and that Swedes are "post-modern" citizens that feel integrated to the political system and participate in political activities through trade unions and political parties more than other countries (Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007). This brings back Teorell's (2006) question: "which degree of participation should be considered satisfactory?"

Revisiting prediction SEM models (summarized on [Table 37](#)), it was found that Political Disillusion in Sweden increases as perception of Corruption Increases and perception of Quality of Representation lowers. The same effect was found for Quality of Representation in Brazil, but perceived Corruption did not help predicting Political Disillusion there. The absence of the Corruption factor on the model indicates that Brazilians can get Disillusioned or not, notwithstanding how corrupt politicians seem to be.

For both countries, bad Quality of Representation is connected to Disillusion. Nevertheless, when the Swedish Institutional Participation prediction model is revisited ([Figure 4.18](#), or [Table 37](#)), it is found that citizens that perceive bad Quality of Representation are more likely to pay Attention and to get into Action (as the first-order factor names suggest). Consequently, it is true that dissatisfied citizens may get more interested on politics, in Sweden. It is suggested in previous research (Amnå & Ekman, 2014) that people get into action when they *distrust* people in power. The same effect was observed on other types of Political Participation in Sweden, like participating on Labor Union Strikes (where higher perceived corruption increased engagement, [Figure 4.22](#)), on Street Demonstrations (where lower Quality of Representation increased engagement, [Figure 4.24](#)) and Political Violence Legitimation (increased by perceived Corruption, [Figure 4.26](#)). Outlookting the Swedish data, Corruption had positive effect on social-contract-breaking attitudes (Political Disillusion and Political Violence Legitimation) and negotiation-breaking (Labor Union Strikes). The common ground among these is that people lost their faith on reaching agreements via “mainstream politics”.

Political Consumerism and Pre-Political Engagement underwent a reversed effect in Sweden: lower perceived Corruption increased engagement. The link between politicians' honesty (given by the reversed Corruption effect) and Political Consumerism is however difficult to explain. It challenges the argument of Stolle,

Hooghe and Micheletti (2005), as they state that Political Consumerism may be accompanied by disappointment with the mainstream politics. Corruption items suggest that parliamentarians make use of public money for private interests (ST.beh.10) and practice nepotism (ST.beh.03). When reading them reversely, it is possible to understand that citizens have greater chances to engage Political Consumerism as they see parliamentarians making good use of public resources and avoiding nepotism. Conceivably, “honest parliamentarians” serve as a good example of respect for the law and inspire citizens to engage Political Consumerism. This type of political action requires “honesty” from companies, as they would be punished (boycotted) for exploring slave labor, harming the environment or other easy-profit-driven strategies. The same reasoning could be applied to Pre-Political Engagement, as communitarian activity requires members to be honest, so the mutual trust encourages collective action (corroborating Realo, Allik & Greenfield, 2008).

In Brazil, differently, perceived Corruption and Quality of Representation did not have any effect on Institutional Participation (Figure 4.17) – in spite of that, a large share of variance was explained ($R^2 = 0.83$) by Critical Information and Behavioral Contagion, as discussed. Revisiting the other Political Participation prediction models, it was observed that bad Quality of Representation mobilized people to take the streets (Figure 4.23) and to support political Violence (Figure 4.25). On the same direction, low Quality of Representation is related to Pre-Political Engagement and to Political Consumerism in Brazil. For these last two types of participation, the effect was the opposite from that one found in Sweden: when politicians are “not doing a good job”, Pre-Political Engagement and Political Consumerism increased.

It is remarkable that, despite corruption being a very important issue on Brazilian politics (Bethell, 2008; Cinnanti, 2011; Henrique, 2013; Moisés, 1992), this factor did not enter any of the Brazilian prediction models. A careful interpretation must be held here. The absence of Corruption in the prediction models does not necessarily

indicate that Brazilians are insensitive to it – especially considering that Brazilians took the streets on Marches Against Corruption (Colon & Moura, 2011; Estadão.com.br, 2011; Lima, 2012) since 2011 and on June 2013 protests (Abreu & Medeiros, 2013; BBC Brasil, 2013; Ranthum, 2013). It might be the case that some Brazilians react to Corruption by engaging political action, others do not – hence, statistics become trendless, and no significant covariance is found. It is possible that the same trendlessness happened to other types of Political Participation in Brazil, but present results are not enough to uphold a steady conclusion.

It is interesting to observe, though, that Quality of Representation played a significant role on predicting participation in Brazil. Distrust in political institutions is usually associated to low participation, but it is admitted that some degree of dissatisfaction is necessary to mobilize citizens (Cinnanti, 2011; Lavallo & Vera, 2011).

Under another perspective, Corruption did not enter SEM models for Institutional Participation and Street Demonstrations in Sweden, too. Low Quality of Representation, instead, was a significant predictor. One possible interpretation is that corruption alone is not enough to explain citizens' dissatisfaction with politicians, but perceiving the low Quality of Representation may catalyze action, which adds evidences to Amnå and Ekman's (2014) findings.

At the end, these results left an open question: if Corruption is perceived to be lower in Sweden, what do Swedes “do right” and Brazilians “do wrong” when it comes to prevent it? Reexamining Teorell's (2006) question, the answer might not be “more participation is better”, but probably *how* people participate is important. This must be assessed through non-quantitative techniques. Wallin (2014) explored this matter by interviewing politicians, judges and public servants in Sweden. Interviewees frequently stated that it is important that the people trust the system, and therefore they are rigorous on the use of public resources and on being transparent and accountable. Interviewed citizens said that they pay politicians' salaries, so they expect a good work

to be done. This contrasts with Brazilians' reported hopelessness on fixing corruption, as they were resigned to the belief that corruption is an inevitable part of the political system (Henrique, 2013; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008).

5.2.3. Political Education

Exploratory Factor Analysis showed that Formal (and Home) Education composes a distinct sphere of learning politics from "Socialization plus learning alone". However, the first factor was not consistent for the use on further analysis. "Socialization", in turn, could be considered a factor with good internal consistency for the adopted parameters (Jöreskog's $Rho = 0.67$; $Rho_{vc} = 0.41$ for Brazil; Jöreskog's $Rho = 0.69$; $Rho_{vc} = 0.43$ for Sweden). Surprisingly, despite its items had been positively intercorrelated, it was finally found that item PE.05 ("... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member ") had direct effect onto engaging Labor Union Strikes in Brazil and indirect effect on Pre-Political Engagement in both countries, regardless the other items in that factor. This reinforces that the use of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was useful to prevent erroneous conclusions, as Modification Indices allow such in-depth, item-to-item verification, and that Goodness-of-Fit Indices do indicate the occurrence of problems in the model. This problem would hardly be found with the sole use of Multiple Regression.

At the end, no factors for Political Education were kept. As learning contexts seemed very distinct, the seven items for Political Education entered Stepwise Multiple Regression and SEM as standalones.

Comparison of means indicates that attaining elementary and secondary education levels have greater impact on the learning of politics in Sweden than in Brazil. When it comes to the contribution of University education, the opposite was

observed: Brazilians, more than Swedes, say that the University contributed to their learning of politics.

This indicates a difference between educational curricula policies in Brazil and Sweden. In Sweden, elementary and secondary schools must approach political issues in their curricula (Børhaug, 2008). As education is developed as a “ladder”, University education will not provide Swedes with the basics of political issues (they were provided in the previous steps). In comparison, Brazilian indoctrinating disciplines on the first and second grades (mentioned in Section 2.3.2) were not welcomed in times of democracy (Menezes & Santos, 2002; Menin, 2002), and to present day they were not reinserted. Hence, Brazilians did not learn much about politics at school, and they may be critical about their own indoctrinating education – which may be explored on further studies. Anyway, University gains importance to Brazilians’ political learning. Brazilian University students are usually involved in political action, such as June 2013 rallies and President Collor’s impeachment (Bethell, 2008; Gohn, 2009; Ranthum, 2013); University professors and students fought military dictatorship (Durham, 1998). Politics is not formally inserted on Brazilian University education, but the greater importance Brazilians gave to this locus of learning might be effect of actual political action initiated at the Universities and the personal initiatives of some professors to regard politics as an inevitable part of education (Demo, 2005).

There was no significant difference on the importance citizens of both countries gave to the learning of politics from their families. On both countries, learning politics alone (item PE.07 “...on your own”) had greater importance, having Brazilians found it more important than Swedes.

The contribution of these contexts to explaining Political Participation was disappointingly low. As Table 37 is examined, the only Political Education self-evaluative items that entered the models are PE.05 (“... from members of an

association / trade union / party in which you are a member”) and PE.07 [“... on your own (reading books, newspapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc.).”].

Item PE.05 had its effect onto Pre-Political Engagement mediated by Behavioral Contagion. Pre-Political Engagement is essentially a composition of volunteering and community-oriented action, usually organized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches, kids’ schools, or neighbourhood associations. This actually means that people who learn about politics at these places share experiences, exert influence onto each other mutually (Behavioral Contagion), and drive their action to the same places (Realo, Allik & Greenfield, 2008). In other words, item PE.05 is essentially attached to the membership to some community-driven organization, just as Pre-Political Engagement. The mutual influence (Behavioral Contagion) helps to turn “learning” into “action” (see [Figures 4.15 and 4.16](#)).

Item PE.05 was connected to participating in Labor Union Strikes, in Brazil – however, in this case, it had a direct effect ([Figure 4.21](#)). Similarly, this strong direct link is explained by the fact that both independent and dependent variables mention “labor union”. Therefore, learning about politics from other labor union members helped engaging this type of action. The absence of item PE.05 on the Swedish model for predicting Labor Union Strikes is thus surprising; however, it seems that in Sweden this type of participation is better explained by non-negotiation postures (as explained in [Section 5.2.1.1](#)) and by Behavioral Contagion.

Item PE.07 [“... on your own (reading books, newspapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc.).”] had mediated effect in the two models it participated. First, in Brazil, mediated by Party-Oriented View, it helped preventing Political Disillusion ([Figure 4.13](#)). It is clear that learning alone helped Brazilian citizens to understand the functioning of “mainstream politics”, (as concepts of left-right wings, government versus opposition and party differences are understood) and this had a “prevention effect” onto Political Disillusion, since a negative covariance was found.

In Sweden, learning alone was mediated by Behavioral Contagion when predicting Institutional Participation. This highlights that learning politics alone has a positive effect onto Behavioral Contagion (Figure 4.18), then with a positive effect onto Institutional Participation.

Other than items PE.05 and PE.07, the demographic item “Education” (last level of formal education achieved) entered two SEM models with significant effect, both for Brazil. The more educated Brazilians tend to be less Disillusioned (Figure 4.13), which represents an inversion on previous evidence. Henrique (2010) and Moisés and Carneiro (2008) had found that more educated Brazilians were the most dissatisfied with the functioning of democratic institutions. This reversion may have happened on recent years, and its explanation is challenging. As data collection took place four months prior to the elections, traditional media and social media were taken by intense political discussions (Castro, 2014; Christensen & Kolling, 2014; Nidecker, 2014), which might have influenced the more educated Brazilians to renovate their hopes on the democratic process.

Education attainment is also present at the Political Consumerism prediction model. The more educated Brazilians were more likely engaged to Political Consumerism (Figure 4.19). This might be a reflection of a better understanding of sustainability and sociological implications, as provided by formal education (Farias *et al.*, 2012; Milfont, 2010).

Generally speaking, Political Education had very little effect onto Political Participation. Item PE.05 was found important where the context of learning was also the context of participation (association, labor union, community). Item PE.07, the “learning alone” item, was important for predicting Political Disillusion in Brazil and Institutional Participation in Sweden. All other *loci* of political learning were excluded from SEM analyses – school, university, family, coworkers and friends. Education level predicted Political Disillusion and Political Consumerism in Brazil.

Why did the *loci* of political learning have such little effect, especially those related to formal education (school and university)? As discussed on [Section 2.3](#), there is previous evidence that Education does not significantly contribute to engaging political action (Kam & Palmer, 2008; Persson, 2012). The present study does not allow to firmly state whether the almost absence of formal education in the prediction models represents its ineffectiveness to create politicized attitudes or if it is just a trendless statistic. At the second situation, there is the possibility that education has effect for some participants to engage political action, but not to others. Putting it simple, if in a class half of the students engage political action, but the other half does not, no trend comes out from statistics. Moreover, Parry (1999) asserts that different types of education may result from different types of understanding about what should be the role of schools: to question society or to help keeping the traditions. These different political views may lead to different engagement attitudes, producing trendless statistics.

Qualitative studies are necessary to evaluate the effect of different educational curricula and different socialization contexts on forming more participation-prone citizens. This goes beyond the scope of this study, as an in-depth analysis of school programs and open-ended interviews would be needed to understand the phenomena.

5.2.4. Behavioral Contagion

Behavioral Contagion became a one-dimensional variable intended to evaluate how much the participants followed someone else's influence or tried to influence others into Political Participation, according to the t-tests. It mixes behaviors of influencing others (item BC.01, "I usually try to convince friends to participate in political action"), following the influence of others (items BC.03, "I pay attention to the opinion of friends who are more politically active than I am"; BC.04 "I am encouraged by people

close to me to participate in politics.”) and the size of the participant’s network [item BC.05, “How big a share of your friends/relatives usually take part in political activities (approximately)?”]. These items were intended to represent the influence phenomena described by Le Bon (2008) and the later literature in [Section 2.3.2](#).

The item BC.02 (“I understand the politics of my country better than most of my friends”) was intended to assess if the participant could have an important influence by his/her better knowledge about the country politics. However, this item was removed, as it did not make a reliable factor with the others. It can be understood by the removal of this item that knowledge does not significantly relate with influencing others or following influence. This actually finds support on Le Bon (2008), who asserts that the clairvoyance (i.e., intelligence) antagonizes the strong will, which is necessary to influence the crowd; the intelligent person is more likely to be doubtful and hesitant, while the person with strong, yet irrational conviction, exerts strong influence on the crowd.

As the items composing Behavioral Contagion represent both “influencing” and “being influenced”, the one-factor structure indicates that what is really important on this matter is *to be part of a politically active network*. After all, if a participant says that he/she exerts influence on others and are influenced by others, he/she is probably one node of a “web of influence”.

Gomes and Maheirie (2011) found evidences that mutual influence for political action is usually mixed to everyday activities, and that friends in *Movimento Passe Livre* (Zero Bus Fare Movement) serve as models of politically active people. While Le Bon describes the effect of that influence as an irrational “feeling of invincible power”, Gomes and Maheirie consider that participants consciously feel happy for being part of the group and fighting for a common cause. Regarding Gomes and Maheirie’s argument, the participation on a politically active group is a means of exerting influence onto others and being influenced by them. Therefore, the Behavioral Contagion factor

indicates that the participant is part of a politically active network (as a formal institution or built on informal relationships), and that people on this network mutually influence each other. Moreover, Gomes and Maheirie's findings challenge Le Bon's statement that strong will comes from irrational conviction of lowly-clairvoyant persons. Further qualitative studies are needed to deepen the evidences on the effect of intelligence over network influence (social capital, if you will), since no more studies were found exploring this link.

In its final compound, Behavioral Contagion had a strong positive effect on Political Participation. In all models on [Section 4.3](#) where this variable enters, it had the strongest direct covariance to the target type of Political Participation. It also had mediating effect on Political Education items (PE.05 and PE.07, as discussed on the previous Section) for both countries and on Critical Information factors (from Stereotypes about Parliamentarians) for Brazilians. As prediction models are regarded, it is evidenced that Behavioral Contagion provided the main contribution to the understanding of the selected Political Participation types. This highlights a strong Incremental Validity for this variable, even though it has a very simple factor structure.

Regarding prediction models for Pre-Political Engagement ([Figures 4.15 and 4.16](#)), Behavioral Contagion has a pivotal role, as it covaries with all other independent variables, except Quality of Representation (for Brazil) and Corruption (for Sweden). The learning of politics from members of an association, labor union or party is mediated by Behavioral Contagion, which emphasizes that the mutual influence is fundamental to change the learned knowledge into action. Moreover, concerning gender, in both countries women are more likely to engage this type of action (corroborating Ackelsberg, 2003; Burns, Schlozman & Verba 2001; Micheletti, 2003), though men play a significant role on convincing others to engage. In Brazil, though Behavioral Contagion covaried positively with Party Sympathy, the lesser participants were sympathetic to parties, the more they engaged into community-oriented activities.

Complementarily, attention to parliamentarians' Personal Information, mediated by Behavioral Contagion, resulted on likelihood to Pre-Political Engagement. Hence, Brazilians who avoid mainstream politics and integrate a network of influence may mobilize their communities, as they do not trust the capacity of politicians to solve their problems (Amnå and Ekman, 2014; Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005).

Behavioral Contagion was also pivotal for Institutional Participation. In Brazil, attention to parliamentarians' characteristics (Critical Information) seems to discriminate citizens who are prone to engage institution-oriented action. As this variable was mediated by Behavioral Contagion, it is understood that the network influence is needed to convert the knowledge about parliamentarians into action. In Sweden, citizens' dissatisfaction with Quality of Representation is already a direct Institutional Participation trigger. However, a greater effect is caused by Behavioral Contagion, as it helps converting the lone learning of politics (item PE.07) into action and, besides, offers explanation to the Party Membership, enhancing its effects onto participation. In other words, party membership may eventually occur to a person who already incorporates an influence network – perhaps as friends convince him/her to become a member, to improve chances of participating on specific events (Figure 4.18). In both Brazil and Sweden, Behavioral Contagion was important to convert beliefs into action (corroborating Cho & Rudolph, 2008; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Le Bon, 2008 and Moscovici, 1985).

As discussed on Section 5.2.1.1, Party-Oriented View had positive influence onto Political Consumerism. In Brazil, it was mediated by Behavioral Contagion, but in Sweden there was a simple covariance connection between these two factors. As Green Parties (*Partido Verde* in Brazil, *Miljöpartiet* in Sweden) may set an environmental agenda and other left-wing parties may deal with fair trade issues, Behavioral Contagion may help convert the *intention* into effective politically-oriented

consumption choices. After all, as a form of pressuring companies and governments, Political Consumerism (boycotts or buycotts) have to have wide adhesion.

Behavioral Contagion was a significant predictor of Labor Union Strikes engagement in Sweden (Figure 4.22), with a strong covariance with attention to parliamentarians' Personal Information. Behavioral Contagion might be related to touting colleagues into joining the strike, as massive participation is needed to make pressuring successful.

Differently from the aforementioned types of Political Participation, Behavioral Contagion predicted engagement into Street Demonstrations without mediation or covariation effects (Figures 4.23 and 4.24). This indicates that, for some people, social influence may function as the only reason to join Street Demonstrations. Negative Quality of Representation plays a secondary role in both countries, as well as age and wealth (which had negative effects) in Brazil.

Similarly, Behavioral Contagion had the strongest effect over Political Violence Legitimation in Brazil, separately from age and Quality of Representation (these two with negative effects). In Sweden, differently, Behavioral Contagion was related to both Party-Oriented View and Personal Information factors. Therefore, Behavioral Contagion is related to disappointment with the mainstream politics (as Party-Oriented View had negative effect onto Political Violence Legitimation) and the adoption of "non-negotiation" postures (related to the Personal Information factor, as explained in Section 5.2.1.1).

Several studies mentioned on Section 2.4 (e.g. Djupe & Grant, 2001; McClurg, 2003; McFarland & Thomas, 2006) showed evidences of Behavioral Contagion effects. It is interesting that Cho and Rudolph (2008) had stated that social dissemination is relevant, regardless other measures such as social involvement, political engagement, interpersonal trust, education, income, age, race and gender. Accordingly, this study found Behavioral Contagion as the strongest predictor of Political Participation.

The influence to join mainstream politics, suggested by this study's items on Behavioral Contagion, may be distanced from some specific contexts of political action. Future studies may add more items to this questionnaire, to explore additional forms of influencing others and being influenced. Moreover, if future studies investigate specific types of political action, items may receive specific wording in order to better predict each type of participation. For example, instead of BC01 be worded as "I usually try to convince friends to participate in political action", it could be rephrased on a study on Political Consumerism: "I usually try to convince friends to choose products under relevant ethical or environmental criteria". Nevertheless, presented findings support the strong effect of Behavioral Contagion onto Political Participation, making it worth to explore this variable and its implications.

As a matter of fact, Behavioral Contagion seemed to blur the boundaries between individual and collective political action (Carneiro, 2014; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). If political actions do take place by the mobilization of collective interests, can we expect to find truly individual types of political action? When political action is oriented to influence the parliament, to pressure companies to adopt environment-protecting practices or to forgo the exploration of slave labor, to negotiate wage raises with employers, etc., effectiveness come from collective action. Could voting be the paradigmatic action of individuals in isolation, or does the influence of his/her friends and relatives make voting a collective decision?

Survey-based research designs deal with the limit of using individuals' responses to infer collective processes (as criticized by Cho & Rudolph, 2008). This problem is actually difficult to solve, as surveys are not friendly to collective answering – many disadvantages would appear, such as risking participants' privacy and having answers reflecting the most influent participant's opinion. However, this research results demonstrated that it is actually possible to ask people about influencing and being influenced on an individually responded questionnaire. Moreover, there is strong

evidence of results validity; inferences made upon them bring relevant insights to how political action happens, and plenty of implications for future studies.

5.2.5. Party Preferences and Demographic Characteristics

The questionnaire included several items to assess the effect of demographic characteristics and party preferences on Political Participation. Those items entered the prediction models differently, according to the country and the type of participation under analysis.

Party preferences had a relevant effect on Political Disillusion for Brazilians. It can be depicted from [Figure 4.13](#) that party-sympathizers and party members are less Disillusioned (cov = -0.10 and -0.08, respectively). Those who reject parties are more likely to feel Disillusioned (cov = 0.10). Rejecting, being sympathetic or being a member of a party is related to the Quality of Representation – bad quality leads to rejection, good quality leads to sympathy or membership. In Sweden ([Figure 4.14](#)), only party membership had a significant effect on Disillusion, with negative orientation (cov= -0.08, just like Brazil). In Sweden it was not related to Quality of Representation, but actually to understanding the mainstream party politics – as party membership mediated to some extent the effect of Party-Oriented View factor.

Age had a relevant role only to some types of participation for the Brazilian participants. Older people are more likely to be disillusioned with politics ([Figure 4.13](#)) and youngsters are more likely to engage Street Demonstrations and to support Political Violence. These two are risky types of political actions, as in Brazil they face police repression, such as the recent episodes on June 2013 (Andrade, Affonso & Bianchi, 2013; Damasceno, 2013; Gohn, 2014). The greater disappointment of older people might indicate that politicians did not respond adequately to the trust they were given in the past (Henrique, 2010; Moisés, 2005).

Wealth, assessed via possession of goods, had negative impact on joining Street Demonstrations in Brazil. This indicates that poorer people were more likely to engage. The recent episodes of protesting were triggered by bus-fare raises and dissatisfaction with public services (Abreu & Medeiros, 2013; Gohn, 2014; Vion-Dury, 2013), which are mostly used by the lower classes in Brazil (Vasconcelos, 2012).

In addition to the discussion on what predicts Political Participation, it is necessary to explore how each category may differ. The next Section discusses how the portrayal of Political Participation in the present study contributes to literature on this matter.

5.3. The Different Types of Political Participation

As explained in Section 1.1, the focus for the present study is the *political participation regarding the bodies of the National Legislative Power*. Thus, this study is leaned to give greater importance to Institutional Participation, and other types are approached for comparison purposes. The fact that Institutional Participation became the most complex dimension (Attention and Action gathered at a second-order factor) did not happen by chance.

Moreover, most independent (exogenous) variables aimed the mainstream politics, especially Stereotypes about Parliamentarians. Perhaps “stereotypes about businessmen” could better predict Political Consumerism or adhesion to Labor Union Strikes, but when this research was planned, greater importance was given to the members of parliaments. Items’ wording for Behavioral Contagion were also trended to mainstream politics, as explained in [Section 5.2.4](#). Political Education items were suitable to many types of political action; however, as most of the questionnaire dealt with mainstream politics, participants probably interpreted, by context, that items were referred to parliament-related politics.

Probably for these reasons, the Institutional Participation factor had a greater amount of variance explained in prediction models for Brazil and Sweden ($R^2 = 0.83$ and $R^2 = 0.80$, respectively). Since Political Disillusion items also referred to mainstream politics, it may be considered as an opposition to Institutional Participation. Political Disillusion was satisfactorily predicted by the independent variables that entered the models ($R^2 = 0.33$ for Brazil, $R^2 = 0.46$ for Sweden). Other Political Participation types had lower extents of explained variance. Put in descending order: Pre-Political Engagement ($R^2 = 0.27$ for Brazil, $R^2 = 0.23$ for Sweden), Street Demonstrations ($R^2 = 0.19$ for Brazil, $R^2 = 0.18$ for Sweden), Political Consumerism ($R^2 = 0.16$ for Brazil, $R^2 = 0.18$ for Sweden); Political Violence Legitimation ($R^2 = 0.12$ for Brazil, $R^2 = 0.09$ for Sweden); Labor Union Strikes ($R^2 = 0.10$ for Brazil, $R^2 = 0.05$ for Sweden). This reinforces the argument that items' wording has to be closer to the type of participation under investigation. As participation in parliaments is the main interest for this study, independent variables were worded accordingly. It was useful to achieve a strong prediction of Institutional Participation, but other types of political action may demand different kinds of explanation.

Factor structure for Political Participation was consistent and equivalent between Brazil and Sweden. There are, however, opportunities for improvement. Adding items to each type of political participation could make factor structure better. Talò and Mannarini (2014), who also based their questionnaire on Ekman and Amnå's (2012) framework, used at least four items for each type of category investigated, achieving better factor consistency (Cronbach's alphas between 0.71 and 0.81). The trade-off between bandwidth and fidelity will still be an important issue, as this addition of items may reduce participants' interest to respond.

Additionally, the factor structure for Political Participation evidences that some types of political action may be different to the point that they do not form a continuum. Community-oriented action (named Pre-Political Participation herein) is different from

Political Consumerism, as they did not join consistently the same factor. Labor Union Strikes is different from Street Demonstrations, even though protesting could be a common ground between them. Present study's results do not allow to state that Pre-Political Engagement lies between Political Disillusion and Institutional Participation. Actually, the Institutional Participation factor sheltered Attention and Action behaviors according to a common target: the parliament / government issues. Differently from Ekman and Amnå's (2012) conception, Political Participation types might be distinguished according to the target in question: influencing the national parliament, improving community's quality of life (in the case of Pre-Political Engagement) changing companies' policies (in the case of Political Consumerism) or negotiating with employers (in case of Labor Union Strikes).

Considering this, it is suggested that Political Participation categories may be once again reframed. Ekman & Amnå's (2012) categories are rearranged in [Table 38](#). Political action categories are defined by the crossing of their targets (rows) with the continuum disengagement-attention-manifest participation (columns). As prior evidences and theoretical advances suggest (Anderson, 2010; Borba & Ribeiro, 2010; Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005; Talò & Mannarini, 2014), citizens may engage in different types of political action, since they are not exclusive – though it might be rare to find one citizen involved on all or several types at the same moment. The number of political targets (rows) is undetermined, as new targets may appear in the future. Finally, as Behavioral Contagion seems to blur the boundary between individual and collective action, those rows were removed.

For each target, political action can be classified as Disengagement (active and passive), Attention and Manifest Participation (Non-Violent and Violent). It is suggested that disengagement sub-categories be renamed. The passive political attitude can be regarded as “Unconcerned”, i.e., the citizen is careless for the political system. More

relevantly, the active forms of disengagement are suggested to be named “Antagonistic”, as these citizens might be not engaged on the mainstream political system, but they politicizedly engage alternative lifestyles. Antagonistic citizens are not careless about politics, but they strongly reject decisions in parliament and do something about it. It is the case of Hippies (which started by the rejection against war on Vietnam) and Anarchists (who reject the institutionalized state).

Table 38. New categories for Political Participation

Target	Disengagement		Attention	Manifest Participation	
	Antagonistic (Active forms)	Unconcerned (Passive forms)		Non-Violent Action	Violent Action
Influencing the Parliament	<p>Deliberate acts of non-voting or blank voting</p> <p>Deliberate antipolitical lifestyles, e.g. hippies, anarchists, or other groups that support alternatives to mainstream politics.</p> <p>Disaffection for politics</p>	<p>Non-voting</p> <p>Avoid talking about politics</p> <p>Perceiving politics as uninteresting and unimportant</p> <p>Political passivity</p> <p>“Non-reflected ” non-political lifestyles</p>	<p>Taking interest in politics and society</p> <p>Perceiving politics as important</p> <p>Reading newspapers and watching TV when it comes to political issues</p> <p>Identifying with a certain ideology and/or party</p> <p>Discussing politics and societal issues, with friends or on the Internet</p>	<p>Voting in elections and referenda</p> <p>Contacting political representatives or civil servants</p> <p>Running for or holding public office</p> <p>Donating money to political parties or organizations</p> <p>Signing petitions</p> <p>Handing out political leaflets</p> <p>Being a member of a political party</p> <p>Attending party meetings</p> <p>Civil disobedience</p> <p>Writing to press</p> <p>Demonstrating, protesting and other actions (e.g. music festivals with a distinct political agenda)</p> <p>Involvement in new social movements or forums</p>	<p><i>Escracho</i> – physically or morally attacking politicians</p> <p>Violent confrontations with political opponents or the police</p>
Changing companies' policies	<p>Defending companies' environment-harming policies and slave labor exploration</p>	<p>Buying products without considering environmental or slave-labor prevention criteria</p>	<p>Monitoring technological advances for sustainable development</p> <p>Monitoring companies' environment-harming policies</p> <p>Monitoring accidents with environmental impacts</p> <p>Monitoring companies which explore slave labor</p>	<p>Boycotting, boycotting</p> <p>Recycling</p>	<p>Politically motivated attacks on property</p> <p>Rescuing animals from labs</p> <p>Participating in violent demonstrations or animal rights actions</p>

Table 38. New categories for Political Participation

Target	Disengagement		Attention	Manifest Participation	
	Antagonistic (Active forms)	Unconcerned (Passive forms)		Non-Violent Action	Violent Action
Negotiating with Employers	Convincing coworkers not to be a member of Labor Union	Ignore Labor Union actions and information	Participating in Labor-Union discussions on e-groups Reading Labor Union newspapers and informative leaflets	Being a member of a Labor Union Labor Union Strikes Being a member of an accident-prevention committee	<i>Séquestration de patron</i> (bossnapping) ¹⁹ – Depriving the employer of his/her freedom until he/she decides to negotiate.
Improving Community's Quality of Life	Damaging public assets	Ignoring meetings organized by community's members	Observing community problems and needs	Belonging to a group with societal focus Giving money to charity Volunteering in social work, e.g. to support women's shelter or to help homeless people Charity work or faith-based community work Activity within community based organizations	Sabotaging or obstructing roads and railways Squatting buildings

¹⁹ As discussed by Hayes (2012).

Testing this suggested reframing would require the elaboration of a Political Participation inventory, i.e., a questionnaire with an extensive list of political behaviors, to verify the empirical factor structure. Moreover, cross-cultural research with the employment of CFAs proved to be useful to elaborate factor structures which are compatible to different contexts and to avoid the risk of creating a measure which is valid to only one country. Hence, it is recommended that future researches do country comparisons with this intent.

5.4. Cultural Differences and Similarities

Corruption was perceived as higher in Brazil, Quality of Representation better in Sweden, as results indicated. This difference was actually expected, as previous evidences indicated (Bethell, 1985; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Schück, 2003; Scobbie, 2010; Scott, 1988). However, a salient difference between Brazil and Sweden was the fact that Corruption did not influence any of the types of Political Participation in Brazil. But it did have predicting power for all tested types in Sweden, except Institutional Participation and Street Demonstrations.

On the contrary, Swedes did seem to pay more attention to the “mainstream politics” information, as their mean for Party-Oriented View was higher than in Brazil. However, the attention to Critical Information had significant impact to Institutional Participation in Brazil, not in Sweden. At last, Personal Information, a factor spontaneously found in Brazil, was relevant to predict Political Disillusion, Labor Union Strikes and Political Violence Legitimation in Sweden, while it could only predict Pre-Political Engagement in Brazil.

From the two paragraphs above, it may be deduced that, when it comes to Stereotypes about Parliamentarians, what is relevant to one country has greater effect on the other. It is not like these countries trade variables' effects as they trade

manufactured goods, though. Stereotypes about Parliamentarians may be more nearly related to the political culture than other independent variables assessed. Stereotypes, just as other cultural artifacts, are systems of shared beliefs (Geertz, 1973; Jussim, McCauley & Lee, 1995; Mackie, 1973; Ryan, 2003; Sacchi, Carnaghi, Castellini & Colombo, 2013; Smith *et al.*, 2013). What is commonsense to one country (such as Brazilian corruption) loses its power to differentiate citizens' attitudes and behaviors. However, in Brazil, where people more difficultly understand parliamentarians' differences (Henrique, 2010; Kinzo, 2004; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Sallum Júnior, Graeff & Lima, 1990), the Critical Information was relevant to tell the difference between Brazilians who engage Institutional Participation and those who do not.

Revisiting the theoretical model on [Section 2.7, Figure 2.3](#), it is possible to conclude that mediating effects of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians and Behavioral Contagion existed on the prediction models, but they operated differently in each country.

For Brazilians, Critical Information factors were mediated by Behavioral Contagion in predicting Political Participation, whenever these two variables entered the model together. In Sweden, when Critical Information factors were present at the SEM models, they had direct effect on Political Participation behaviors. Then, to Brazilians, it is not enough to know the parliamentarians' differences, but citizens have to be part of a politically active network to convert knowledge into action. Hence, in Brazil, Behavioral Contagion could mediate not only Political Education (as discussed on [Section 5.3.3](#)), but also the Critical Information set in Stereotypes about Parliamentarians.

Political Education standalone items, when present in SEM models, were mediated either by Stereotypes or by Behavioral Contagion, as shown at [Figure 2.3](#). The only exception was the adherence to Labor Union Strikes in Brazil, where a direct effect was observed. All other variables were removed from that model, so this item did

not have to compete for prediction power. As explained, there was a close connection between being a member of a Labor Union and learning politics from the other members.

Contrasting with Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008, see [Figure 1.1](#)), participation in Brazil was more frequent than in Sweden – except on Political Consumerism, where difference was not significant. This difference might be an effect of recent developments in both countries' political context, as explained in [Section 2.6.3](#), especially considering that Realo, Allik and Greenfield's (2008) based their research on metadata from studies published in 2004.

For both countries, Quality of Representation and Corruption (the two behavior prediction factors in Stereotypes about Parliamentarians) had direct effects on several Political Participation types. As citizens seemed to be mobilized by dissatisfaction with politicians, low Quality of Representation encouraged political action, while low Corruption discouraged. A reverse effect was observed on Political Consumerism in Sweden, where the lower perceived Corruption encouraged action. Curiously, these factors did not predict Institutional Participation in Brazil.

These results evidence that Brazilians and Swedes indeed rely on different mindsets to understand their political arena. Cultural differences may explain what becomes commonsense to one country or another. Swedes' Horizontal Individualism (Singelis *et al.*, 1995 and Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) is probably the ground for their low tolerance on corruption – i.e., parliamentarians are expected to respect laws as citizens do, as egalitarianism and solidarity are a core values (under Hofstede's 1980 concepts). Brazilians' Vertical Collectivism is related to their tolerance to social hierarchy, and it is understood that parliamentarians break rules when loyalty to their nuclear groups is more important. Moreover, in Brazil, voters may feel that they are part of groups to which some politicians represent leaders – then, breaking the rules in the benefit of “my group” is tolerable, while other groups' corruption is condemnable.

Moreover, Brazilians' great Power Distance (Hofstede, 1980) may be associated to their acceptance of politicians' (supposed) higher status and paralyzing distrust in institutions' capacity to fight corruption – as institutions lay outside Brazilians' radius of trust (Realo, Allik & Greenfield, 2008).

This might explain why Critical Information and Behavioral Contagion were the only variables that predicted Institutional Participation, while in Sweden Quality or Representation and Party membership gained importance, together with Behavioral Contagion and learning about politics alone. Quality of Representation, in the Swedish model, indicates that Swedes pay attention to parliamentarians' behaviors, reacting to “bad quality politicians” in the institutional field. Brazilians, otherwise, primarily care about which group is represented by the parliamentarian – therefore their greater attention to Critical Information. For this reason common prediction models were not essayed; the main contribution of the seemingly “incompatible” SEM models was to identify how Brazilian and Swedish mindsets differ.

Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Directions

As phenomena in present study were approached with a newly conceived questionnaire, there was a risk of exploring non-relevant variables or that the explored variables were context-specific (i.e., that they existed only in one country). Therefore, comparing countries with very different political traditions is useful to check if the studied topics are relevant phenomena and if they are present in more than one context. For these reasons, the finding of equivalent factor structures is a relevant indication that yes, the studied matters were present on both countries (so they are not context-specific). The relevance of the chosen independent variables was given by their prediction potential, with good shares of variance explained – especially to Institutional Participation, the main category of interest herein.

The main contribution of this research was to add empirical evidence to the theoretical approach on Political Participation, by exploring its factor structure with the comparison of two contrasting countries. Moreover, it provided evidence that the concept of Stereotypes can be used to describe parliamentarians, with relevant usefulness to predict participation. It was also found that Behavioral Contagion played a pivotal role on predicting participation, to the point that it is questionable whether strictly individual political action exists.

Since items in the Behavioral Contagion represent influence on other people and being influenced, it is evidenced that being part of a politically active network is basilar to political action engagement. Regarding previous studies, networks can be either formally constituted (Anderson, 2010) or ephemerally grouped, like those made upon internet summons (Brussino, Rabbia & Sorribas, 2008; Hooghe & Dejaeghere, 2007; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). Anyway, the examples of engaged friends and relatives work as an encouragement circle, admittedly necessary to face the risks of political action – which might have been exaggeratedly interpreted by Le Bon (2008) as the

“feeling of invincible power”. Political Education, in turn, had disappointingly low prediction capacity over political participation, which left open questions for practitioners and qualitative studies (see [Section 5.2.3](#)). These phenomena were not context-dependent (they are reasonably similar in Brazil and Sweden), and deserve better attention on future studies, in more countries, to make it possible to state whether they are or not Etic phenomena. The finding of Etic variables could be further used to establish comparisons among several countries. This research did a first step in that direction.

6.1. Limitations and Solutions

Researches are made with limited resources. It was not different with this one. The use of internet helped reducing costs to administer the survey, but it entailed limits for the selection of participants. The elaboration of a cross-cultural questionnaire on opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean imposed restrictions for qualitative approaches such as focus groups; the Delphic Panel was made as an alternative. Social desirability issues were faced on the elaboration of the questionnaire. At last, the intention of widely compassing the assessed variables carries the cost of lowering factors analyses internal consistency.

The present study's main limitation is related to the data collection on the internet. Only participants who have access to the internet were reached, and it is also necessary to be able to use the computer and to understand the survey questions without assistance. It is not possible to control the effect of participants' self-selection, i.e., the participant is actually going to participate or not - this may depend on his/her own interest on the study theme. Furthermore, the resulting samples are not accurate representations of the Brazilian and the Swedish populations, as some they are leaned to under-represent the lower educated cohorts; therefore, results in this dissertation

shed light on some psychological phenomena, but further studies, with representative samples, are required to describe how the Brazilian and Swedish populations behave.

As this survey is focused on the individual level, the interpretation of the cultural content sharing and collectively organized actions are restricted (according to the criticism of Cho & Rudolph, 2008; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; and Smith *et al.*, 2013). Solving this problem would require additional studies, with different methodologies. The solution for this problem would be to identify and contact groups that usually organize political actions (such as the study of Gomes & Maheirie, 2011) primarily through the use of qualitative techniques - such as interviews or ethnography - to observe how they operate. This greatly surpasses the resources available for the study – and it explains the choice for data collection through the internet, despite the limitations described herein.

Likewise, the option to conduct a Delphic Panel for the construction of the questionnaire is a means of dealing with resource limits for conducting qualitative inroads in the countries selected for the study. The Delphic Panel can be done via Internet, reducing travel costs for directly contacting people who are immersed in the culture of the selected countries.

Delphic Panel allowed the elaboration of a questionnaire considering Brazilian and Swedish culture simultaneously. This mitigated the risk of building imposed-etic questions, as it may happen when a questionnaire is written in one country and translated to others. Moreover, the decentralized back-translation procedure introduced the participation of translation judges and revisers, resulting on a very careful translation.

It is actually difficult to identify the reasons for response bias, especially on cross-cultural studies (Caprara *et al.*, 2000; Smith *et al.*, 2013). It could either be a result of acquiescence, cultural differences or actual construct manifestation differences (Byrne & Campbell, 1999). Moreover, Brazil is a presidential republic,

Sweden is a parliamentary monarchy, but it is really difficult to accurately assert to what degree this difference impacts their attitudes and behaviors. In the present study, important score differences were found between Brazilians and Swedes, as reported on Section 4.3, indicating that yes, actual construct differences may have influenced the way these two groups responded to the items. It is also plausible that cultural idiosyncrasies may have influenced participants' responses, since Brazilians and Swedes actually regard differently to their politicians and engage differently to political actions.

It is to be considered a positive quality of Political Participation scale that it asks for previous behavior, which is the closest proxy to the future behavior on a survey (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). In contrast, social desirability (Hair *et al.*, 2009; Pasquali, 2010; Viswanathan, 2005) was a critical concern, which led to the creation of political attitude items. Asking about delicate behaviors (like "how many times have you engaged into political violence?") could result on participants' avoidance to answer this and other questions. Also, it would be hard to ask about negative behavior occurrences (like "how many times have you avoided discussions on politics?"). Therefore, non-participation items represent attitudes towards politics (most of them with negative trend). Positively-trended items were inserted to avoid acquiescence or extreme responding biases (Pasquali, 2010, Viswanathan, 2005).

6.2. Research Agenda

The choice of two very contrasting countries was useful to submit the investigated variables to a strong test of resistance: Factor Structure Equivalence and Metric Equivalence demonstrated that the variables are not *Emic* phenomena to Brazil or Sweden. However, it is still early to state that factor structures found in this study are "universal", meaning that they would be found the same way in various different

countries (i.e., *Etic* phenomena). Future studies in other countries may replicate this investigation, again submitting participants' answers to Exploratory Factor Analyses, so factor structures are freely estimated, and to Confirmatory Factor Analyses, so cross-country compatible factor structures are fetched. This procedure would make these variables useful to culture unpacking (such as Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart & Welzel, 2010; Schwartz, 1994) on the political field.

Since Quality of Representation played a relevant role to the prediction of some types of Political Participation in Brazil, this factor should get better attention on future studies, applied to larger and better representative samples. In turn, trendlessness of Corruption in Brazil might be investigated under qualitative techniques, since its explanation is challenging under the light of previous researches that indicated the crucial role of this issue in Brazilian politics (Azevedo & Chaia, 2008; Cunha, 2006; Henrique, 2010; Moisés & Carneiro, 2008; Ribeiro, 2007). Corruption did not enter SEM models for Institutional Participation and Street Demonstrations in Sweden, too. This leaves open questions about how corruption is controlled, in the "micro" level, in both countries. How do people actually react to corruption? Are there groups that react and groups that do not react to corruption? What are the differences among them? How do they operate?

6.3. Implications for Democracy

On the practical realm, strategies for encouraging Political Participation must consider the stimulation of network influences, with the understanding that Behavioral Contagion may serve to improve engagement. For example, the invitation of citizens to watch a public hearing on a nation-wide interesting policy may benefit from incentivizing different interest groups to mobilize their networks into political discussions about the issue on debate.

Comprehending the mechanics of Stereotypes about Parliamentarians might be useful to encourage engagement. First, because the use of Critical Information factors to assess the understanding of parliamentarians' differences was a valuable strategy. In Brazil, the understanding of parliamentarians' differences, catalyzed by Behavioral Contagion, strongly predicted Institutional Participation. In both countries, Critical Information factors had relevant influence on engaging different types of political action. Therefore, providing people with clear and trustworthy information about parliamentarians may actually contribute to multiply the monitorial citizens and promptitude to act when necessary.

Second, dissatisfaction with Quality of Representation entices several types of political action, in both countries. In Sweden, Corruption makes people lose faith on mainstream politics. This poses the challenge of using that dissatisfaction as a push to political action, without steering into antidemocratic postures. Moreover, if satisfaction with the system is ever reached, how to keep citizens interested in politics?

The effect of Political Education on participation was up to a little extent, but there is a large field yet to explore on it. Parry's (1999) discussion about if students should be encouraged to question society or to keep traditions is still valid – after all, even “democratic traditions” may be questioned. However, under the light of this study's results, additional practical questions may be explored: how could Political Education curricula provide students with adequate tools for the understanding of parliamentarians' differences? How Behavioral Contagion can be explored on educational terms, so that students learn to organize collective action? This study demonstrated that these elements are important to make citizens more politically-prone, and it is valuable to use this knowledge to foster conscious actions.

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Appendices

Appendix I

Short description of Delphic Panel's participants' experience.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Sweden	1	Anders Linnhag	Riksdagen	Anders Linnhag is an economist with an M.A. from University of California at Santa Barbara. He has held various government positions and is currently working at the Research Service at the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagens Utredningstjänst - RUT). He has a deep interest in the Brazilian society, especially the economy.
Sweden	2	Henric Barkman	Karlstad Municipality	Henric Barkman is a PhD Candidate on Political Science at Stockholm University. His research concerns encompass methodology on social sciences, sustainable consumption, emerging forms of participation, such as lifestyle politics and culture jamming.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Sweden	3	Karin Hansson	Stockholm University	Karin Hansson has developed several studies on public decision making and electronic participation (e-participation) on political issues. She is currently a PhD student at Stockholm University.
Sweden	4	Magnus Boström	Örebro University	Magnus Boström is Sociology Professor at Örebro University. His research concerns politics in relation to transnational environmental and sustainability issues. Boström is also studying how various factors shape green consumerism and organized activism.
Sweden	5	Michele Micheletti	Stockholm University	Michele Micheletti is Political Science Professor at Stockholm University and currently the President of the Swedish Political Science Association. Her research regards collective action, multicultural democracy, political consumerism sustainable citizenship and other issues.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Sweden	6	Nils Gustafsson	Lund University	Nils Gustafsson is PhD in Political Science. His dissertation, "Leetocracy. Social network sites, political participation and inequality", dealt with how the use of social media (social network sites, blogs, microblogging services, etc.) changed political participation in Sweden.
Sweden	7	Sofia Josefine Palm	Stockholm Municipality	Sofia Palm is bachelor in Political Science and Sociology. She developed a study on the 2013 riots in Stockholm, at Uppsala University.
Sweden	8	Sven Oskarsson	Uppsala University	Sven Oskarsson is PhD in Political Science. His research interests concerns political behavior in Sweden, political tolerance in India, Pakistan and Uganda and the relationship between education and political participation, tracing the results of school reforms.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Sweden	9	Viktor Dahl	Örebro University	Viktor Dahl is PhD in Political Science from Örebro University. His research interest concerns the political socialization and unconventional political behavior. His dissertation was about young people's positive attitudes toward and involvement in illegal political activity.
Brazil	1	Ana Lúcia Henrique	Brazilian Chamber of Deputies	Ana Lúcia Henrique is a PhD student at the Federal University of Goiás (UFG) and a Brazilian visiting scholar at the University of Pittsburgh (USA). She has an MA in Political Science and Sociology (IUPERJ, 2009), BA degrees in Journalism (UFRJ, 1985) and Public Relations (IESB, 2007), as well as an MBA in Marketing Management (CEAG-FGV-SP, 1992).
Brazil	2	André Sathler Guimarães	Brazilian Chamber of Deputies	André Sathler Guimarães is PhD in Philosophy from University of São Carlos. He is a professor at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies' Legislative Master Program. He coordinates research programs on public management.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Brazil	3	Cristiano Ferri Soares de Faria	Brazilian Chamber of Deputies	Cristiano Faria is PhD in Sociology and Political Science from Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ) and Associate Researcher to Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, at Harvard University. He is the mastermind and manager behind e-Democracia, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies' social media for political participation.
Brazil	4	Igor Ribas Brandão	University of Brasília	Igor Brandão is a PhD Student on Political Science at University of Brasília and a visiting researcher at California Univesity. His research regards accountability, institutional development and public policies.
Brazil	5	João Luiz Pereira Marciano	Brazilian Chamber of Deputies	João Luiz Marciano is PhD in Information Sciences from University of Brasília. He is a professor at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies' Legislative Master Program. He coordinates research programs on education, traditional media and politics.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Brazil	6	Leandro Alves Carneiro	Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (Anatel)	Leandro Carneiro is a Political Science Specialist. He works on public policies implementation at the Brazilian Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (Anatel).
Brazil	7	Malena Rehbein Rodrigues	Brazilian Chamber of Deputies	Malena Rehbeins is a journalist and a PhD in Sociology and Political Science from Rio de Janeiro State University (Iesp/UERJ). She is a professor at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies' Legislative Master Program. Her main field of research is media and quality of democracy and digital democracy.
Brazil	8	Mariana Tanus Marques	Shell Brasil Petróleo	Mariana Marques is a Master Student on Political Science at University of Brasília. She works at the government relations department at Shell.
Brazil	9	Olavo Brandão Carneiro	Brazilian Federal Senate	Olavo Carneiro is a Social Science Doctorate Candidate at Rio de Janeiro Rural Federal University (UFRRJ), and he has a Master Degree on Sociology. His research regards interest representation (mainly on the rural business representatives) at the Brazilian National Congress. He works as a Senator adviser.

Table I.1. Experts who participated at the Delphic Panel

Country	#	Name	Institution	Short Résumé
Brazil	10	Pedro Lucas de Moura Palotti	National School for Public Administration (ENAP)	Pedro Palotti is a Political Science PhD student at University of Brasilia. He works as a Public Policies Specialist at the National School for Public Administration.
Brazil	11	Rayani Mariano	University of Brasília	Rayani Mariano is a master student on Political Science at University of Brasilia. She studies the Brazilian National Congress discussion on abortion.
Brazil	12	Thiago Moreira da Silva	University of Brasília	Thiago Silva is a Political Science PhD student at University of Brasilia. His research regards political behavior, voting and representation.

Appendix II

Delphic Panel final questionnaire version, in English, Portuguese and Swedish

This is the questionnaire version achieved at the end of Delphic Panel. This was the raw material for back-translation. Original (English) and Translated (Portuguese / Swedish) versions are presented. Variable codes for SPSS and AMOS were inserted after data collection, so the reader can keep track of variables' origins.

Home screen - Informed Consent

Thanks for your participation in this survey! It is a transnational study of people's views on politics in their countries. The study is part of the PhD project of Thiago Carneiro, a student of Social Psychology at the University of Brasilia, Brazil, in partnership with Södertörn University.

By participating in this survey, you agree that your responses are used for statistical analysis, together with the other participants' ones. As a result of this study, we calculate averages, percentages and other indicators on the general opinion of the participants.

You will not tell us your name and we will not use your answers to try to guess who you are. Your privacy will be preserved. Just want to know the general opinion of citizens on your country's politics.

All resulting reports will be made available in scientific publications and are intended to describe the expectations of society in relation to political institutions.

At any time, you can refuse to participate. If you do not reach the end of the questionnaire, we will consider that you no longer want to participate and therefore none of your answers will be used.

If you have questions about this research, please contact the responsible researcher at e-mail: <mail address> .

If you are interested in receiving the results of the study, let us know by writing to the e-mail address above.

By participating in this research, you will be contributing to the advancement of science in understanding the politics of his country. Please do not leave any item unanswered!

In order to have access to the research questions, please check the box below:

[] I have read and agree to the above terms

What is your opinion about the members of the [Swedish Parliament/Brazilian National Congress]?

<i>Stereotypes: Behavior prediction</i>														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	In your opinion, what do the parliamentarians really do? Tell us how big a share of them do the following:	None of them ▼				Some of them ▼				All of them ▼			I don't know
1	ST.beh.01	They represent my interests as a citizen	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
2	ST.beh.02	They favor companies over the interests of citizens	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
3	ST.beh.03	They help their own friends and family to achieve important positions (they practice nepotism)	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
4	ST.beh.04	They contribute for the sustainable development	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
5	ST.beh.05	They make good use of budget to improve services (schools, hospitals, police) for the people	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
6	ST.beh.06	They accomplish the promises they make while in electoral campaign	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
7	ST.beh.07	They behave coherently to their parties' declared ideology	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
8	ST.beh.08	They create laws beneficial to the country (They adopt laws beneficial to the country)	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
9	ST.beh.09	They do a good job on representing [my country]'s position on international matters.	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK
10	ST.beh.10	They use public money for their private interests	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK

Stereotypes: Behavior prediction															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	In your opinion, what do the parliamentarians <i>really</i> do? Tell us how big a share of them do the following:	None of them				Some of them				All of them				I don't know
			▼				▼				▼				
11	ST.beh.11	They work for a fairer income distribution among [Brazilians/Swedes]	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK	
12	ST.beh.12	They represent their constituents' interests	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK	
Open01. Is there anything else you want to add to this list? What do you think that parliamentarians usually do? [Free text answer]															

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Political Participation - Non participation attitudes															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Please, indicate how much do you agree with each of the following statements regarding politics	I completely disagree ▼											I completely agree ▼	I don't know
13	PP.atd.01	I avoid discussing politics	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
14	PP.atd.02	My vote does not matter to improve the situation of [Brazil / Sweden]	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
15	PP.atd.03	Blank or null votes express the voters' dissatisfaction with our country's politicians	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
16	PP.atd.04	The press distorts what happens in National Congress (or equivalent)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
17	PP.atd.05	It is a waste of time to follow the news when it comes to politics	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
18	PP.atd.06	Voters can influence parliamentarians' decisions during their mandate	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
19	PP.atd.07	It is legitimate to use violence as a form of protest	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
20	PP.atd.08	It is necessary to build a new society, with none of the current political institutions	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
21	PP.atd.09	We could live pretty well without politicians.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
22	PP.atd.10	My lifestyle choices represent my political point of view (songs I hear, clothes I wear, hairstyle, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
23	PP.atd.11	I intend to vote again for the same party as I voted in the last election	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	

Political Participation - Non participation attitudes															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Please, indicate how much do you agree with each of the following statements regarding politics	I completely disagree ▼										I completely agree ▼		I don't know
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
24	PP.atd.12	NGOs and companies always have better performance than the government to serve to citizens' interests												IDK	
Open02. What are your impressions on national politics? [Free text answer]															

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Political Participation – Past behavior									
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	How often have you done each of the following since 2010 (last election campaign for the national parliament)?	How many times?						I don't know
25	<i>PP.beh.01</i>	I have contacted parliamentarians directly (by meeting, telephone or through the Internet)	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
26	<i>PP.beh.02</i>	I have used social networks on Internet (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, others) to engage into political action	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
27	<i>PP.beh.03</i>	I looked up for information about the performance of parliamentarians	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
28	<i>PP.beh.04</i>	I contacted the written press, radio or TV station to communicate something politically important	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
29	<i>PP.beh.05</i>	I have participated in institutional meetings (forums, seminars, public hearings) about political issues.	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
30	<i>PP.beh.06</i>	I signed petitions on public issues	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
31	<i>PP.beh.07</i>	I took part in discussions about political issues	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
32	<i>PP.beh.08</i>	I took part in strikes organized by labor unions	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
33	<i>PP.beh.09</i>	I have participated in street demonstrations	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
34	<i>PP.beh.10</i>	I have participated in events organized by political parties	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
35	<i>PP.beh.11</i>	I have helped an association not linked to parties or government (labor union, social minority organization, church, NGO etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK

Political Participation – Past behavior									
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	How often have you done each of the following since 2010 (last election campaign for the national parliament)?	How many times?						I don't know
36	PP.beh.12	I have chosen or refused products for political, ethical or environmental protection reasons	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
37	PP.beh.13	I have handed out political leaflets	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
38	PP.beh.14	I have worked as a volunteer (for my kids' school / church / neighbourhood / other)	0	1	2	3	4	5 or more	IDK
Open03. Are you engaged in any other kind of political action? [Free text answer]									

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Party engagement			
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Question	Answer
39	<i>PartyMember</i>	Are you a member of a political party?	Yes / No
40	<i>PartySympa</i>	If not, do you sympathize with any political party ?	Yes / No
41	<i>SweParty / BraParty</i>	If yes (to any of the two above), which party ?	(Free text answer - optional answer)
42	<i>PartyReject</i>	Do you reject any political party?	No / Yes, one party / Yes, some parties / Yes, all parties
43	<i>Worked4Party</i>	In the last election, have you worked for the campaign of a candidate or a party?	Yes / No

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Behavioral Contagion															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Please tell us how well the following sentences describe you	This item does not describe me at all ▼											This item truly describes me ▼	I don't know
44	BC.01	I usually try to convince friends to participate in political action	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
45	BC.02	I understand the politics of my country better than most of my friends	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
46	BC.03	I pay attention to the opinion of friends who are more politically active than I am	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
47	BC.04	I am encouraged by people close to me to participate in politics.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Question	None of them ▼											All of them ▼	I don't know
48	BC.05	How big a share of your friends/relatives usually take part in political activities (approximately)?	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	IDK	

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Political Education / Political Socialization														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	We learn about politics in many ways on our life, with different people in different places. So, tell us how much have you learned about politics ...	I have learned nothing ▼										I have learned a lot ▼	I don't know
49	PE.01	... at school (primary school - 1st grade, or high school - 2nd grade)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
50	PE.02	... at the University (or other institution of Higher Education - 3rd grade)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
51	PE.03	... from your family	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
52	PE.04	... from coworkers	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
53	PE.05	... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
54	PE.06	... from friends	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
55	PE.07	... on your own (reading books, newspapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc).	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> Open04. Where else or from whom have you learned about politics? [Free text answer] </div>														

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Stereotypes - Critical information about parliamentarians															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	How often do you care about this information about parliamentarians who discuss matters of your interest?	Never											Always	I don't know
			▼											▼	
56	ST.inf.01	His/her political party	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
57	ST.inf.02	If he/she is left-winged or right-winged	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
58	ST.inf.03	If he/she represents the governing party(ies), the opposition or a neutral position	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
59	ST.inf.04	His/her area of expertise (ex.: environment, foreign affairs, economic development, human rights etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
60	ST.inf.05	The groups of interest in which he/she takes part (labor unions, entrepreneurs associations, environmental protection institutions, farmers associations etc)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
61	ST.inf.06	If he/she represents some minority (ex.: indians/native people, immigrants, gays/LGBT, disabled people etc.).	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
62	ST.inf.07	His/her religion	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
63	ST.inf.08	The parliamentarian's gender (male/female)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	
64	ST.inf.09	If he/she has been involved in scandals	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK	

Stereotypes - Critical information about parliamentarians														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	How often do you care about this information about parliamentarians who discuss matters of your interest?	Never ▼										Always ▼	I don't know
65	ST.inf.10	His/her former political positions (ex.: Minister, Secretary etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	IDK
Open05. Are there any other relevant characteristics about parliamentarians? Which ones? [Free text answer]														

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<i>Demographic information</i>			
#	<i>Variable code in SPSS and AMOS</i>	Question	Answer
66	<i>Gender</i>	Gender	[] Male / [] Female
67	<i>Age</i>	Age	I am _____ years old
68	<i>Education</i>	Education:	[] Incomplete elementary school [] Complete elementary school [] Incomplete high school [] Complete high school [] Incomplete university education [] Complete university education [] Post-graduated specialist [] Complete Master Degree [] Complete PhD
69	<i>City</i>	Where do you live?	[Please type the name of your city]
70	<i>Occupation</i>	What is your (main) job?	[Free text answer]
71	<i>RelateToParliament</i>	Is your profession directly related to the parliamentary activity?	[] Yes / [] No

Demographic information

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Question	Answer												
72	FormerlyCandidate	Have you ever been a candidate to public office?	[] Yes / [] No												
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Question	Extremely Left ▼				Center ▼			Extremely Right ▼				I don't know	
73	LeftRight	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	0	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	IDK	

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Please tell us, do you have any of the things below?	Answer
74		I own one or more...	
	lownComputer	Computer with access to the internet	[] Yes / [] No
	lownPhone	Cell phone or a tablet with access to the internet	[] Yes / [] No
	lownTV	Modern TV set (plasma, LCD or LED)	[] Yes / [] No
	lownCar	Car	[] Yes / [] No
	lownApart	Appartment of my own	[] Yes / [] No

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Please tell us, do you have any of the things below?	Answer
	<i>lownHouse</i>	House of my own	[] Yes / [] No
	<i>lownOffice</i>	Business office / store / workshop	[] Yes / [] No
	<i>lownStocks</i>	Shares of stock exchange	[] Yes / [] No
	<i>lownBoat</i>	Boat (for leisure only)	[] Yes / [] No
	<i>lownComp50</i>	Company with more than 50 employees	[] Yes / [] No

Brazilian version of survey's questionnaire

Tela inicial - Consentimento Informado

Agradecemos sua participação nessa pesquisa! Trata-se de um estudo transnacional da opinião das pessoas sobre a política em seus países. O estudo faz parte do projeto de doutorado de Thiago Carneiro, aluno de Psicologia Social na Universidade de Brasília, Brasil, em parceria com Södertörns Högskola, Suécia.

Ao participar dessa pesquisa, você concorda que suas respostas sejam usadas para análise estatística, junto com a dos outros participantes. Como resultado desse estudo, calcularemos as médias, percentuais e outros indicadores sobre a opinião geral dos participantes.

Você não nos dirá seu nome e não usaremos suas respostas para tentar adivinhar quem é você. Sua privacidade será preservada. Apenas queremos saber a opinião geral dos cidadãos sobre a política de seu país.

Todos os relatórios resultantes serão disponibilizados em publicações científicas e pretendem descrever as expectativas da sociedade em relação às instituições políticas.

A qualquer momento, você pode se recusar a participar. Se você não chegar ao fim do questionário, consideraremos que não deseja mais participar e, portanto, nenhuma de suas respostas será utilizada.

Caso tenha dúvidas sobre essa pesquisa, entre em contato com o pesquisador responsável no e-mail: <endereço de e-mail>

Se você tiver interesse em receber os resultados do estudo, informe-nos pelo e-mail acima.

Ao participar dessa pesquisa, você estará contribuindo para o progresso da ciência no entendimento da política de seu país. Por favor, não deixe item algum sem resposta!

Para poder prosseguir à pesquisa, marque:

[] Eu li e concordo com os termos acima

Qual a sua opinião sobre os membros do Congresso Nacional (Senadores e Deputados Federais)?

Estereótipos – Previsão de comportamento															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Em sua opinião, o que os(as) parlamentares realmente fazem? Diga aproximadamente quantos deles(as) fazem o seguinte:	Nenhum deles				Alguns deles				Todos eles				Não Sei
			▼				▼				▼				
1	ST.beh.01	Representam meus interesses como cidadão	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
2	ST.beh.02	Favorecem as empresas em detrimento dos interesses dos cidadãos	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
3	ST.beh.03	Ajudam seus amigos e familiares a alcançarem importantes cargos (praticam nepotismo)	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
4	ST.beh.04	Contribuem para o desenvolvimento sustentável	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
5	ST.beh.05	Fazem bom uso do orçamento para melhorar os serviços (escolas, hospitais, polícia) para as pessoas	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
6	ST.beh.06	Cumprem com as promessas que fazem durante a campanha eleitoral	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
7	ST.beh.07	Agem de forma coerente com a ideologia declarada de seus partidos	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
8	ST.beh.08	Criam leis benéficas para o país	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
9	ST.beh.09	Fazem bom trabalho representando a posição do Brasil em questões internacionais.	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
10	ST.beh.10	Usam o dinheiro público para seus interesses particulares	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	

Estereótipos – Previsão de comportamento															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Em sua opinião, o que os(as) parlamentares realmente fazem? Diga aproximadamente quantos deles(as) fazem o seguinte:	Nenhum deles				Alguns deles				Todos eles				Não Sei
			▼				▼				▼				
11	ST.beh.11	Trabalham por uma distribuição de renda mais justa entre os brasileiros	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
12	ST.beh.12	Representam o interesse de seu eleitorado	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	
Open01. Você gostaria de acrescentar algo a essa lista? O que você acha que os parlamentares geralmente fazem? [Resposta de texto livre]															

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Participação Política – Atitudes de não-participação														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Por favor, informe o quanto você concorda com as seguintes afirmações sobre política	Discordo totalmente										Concordo totalmente	Não Sei
			▼										▼	
13	PP.atd.01	Evito discutir política	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
14	PP.atd.02	Meu voto não tem importância para melhorar a situação do Brasil	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
15	PP.atd.03	Os votos em branco ou nulos expressam a insatisfação dos eleitores com os políticos do nosso país	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
16	PP.atd.04	A imprensa distorce o que acontece no Congresso Nacional	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
17	PP.atd.05	É perda de tempo acompanhar o noticiário sobre política	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
18	PP.atd.06	Os eleitores podem influenciar as decisões dos parlamentares durante seus mandatos	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
19	PP.atd.07	É legítimo usar a violência como uma forma de protesto	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
20	PP.atd.08	É necessário construir uma nova sociedade, sem nenhuma das instituições políticas existentes	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
21	PP.atd.09	Poderíamos viver muito bem sem os políticos.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
22	PP.atd.10	Minhas escolhas de estilo de vida representam meu ponto de vista política (as músicas que ouço, as roupas que visto, meu corte de cabelo, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
23	PP.atd.11	Pretendo votar novamente no mesmo partido que votei nas últimas eleições	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS

Participação Política – Atitudes de não-participação														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Por favor, informe o quanto você concorda com as seguintes afirmações sobre política	Discordo totalmente ▼										Concordo totalmente ▼	Não Sei
24	PP.atd.12	As ONGs e empresas privadas sempre funcionam melhor do que o governo para atender aos interesses dos cidadãos	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
Open02. Qual a sua impressão sobre a política nacional? [Resposta de texto livre]														

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Participação Política – Comportamento Passado

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Quantas vezes você fez o que está na lista abaixo desde 2010 (a última campanha eleitoral para o Senado e Câmara Federal)?	Quantas vezes?						Não Sei
			0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	
25	PP.beh.01	Entrei em contato diretamente com os parlamentares (em reuniões, por telefone ou pela Internet)	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
26	PP.beh.02	Usei as redes sociais na Internet (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, outras) para me envolver na ação política	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
27	PP.beh.03	Busquei informações sobre o desempenho dos parlamentares	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
28	PP.beh.04	Entrei em contato com a imprensa escrita, rádio ou televisão para divulgar algo de relevância política	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
29	PP.beh.05	Participei de reuniões institucionais (fóruns, seminários, audiências públicas) sobre questões políticas.	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
30	PP.beh.06	Assinei petições sobre questões públicas	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
31	PP.beh.07	Participei de discussões sobre questões políticas	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
32	PP.beh.08	Participei de greves organizadas pelos sindicatos laborais	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
33	PP.beh.09	Participei de manifestações nas ruas	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
34	PP.beh.10	Participei de eventos organizados por partidos políticos	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
35	PP.beh.11	Ajudei uma associação não vinculada aos partidos ou ao governo (sindicato laboral, organização social de minorias, igreja, ONG, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS

Participação Política – Comportamento Passado

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Quantas vezes você fez o que está na lista abaixo desde 2010 (a última campanha eleitoral para o Senado e Câmara Federal)?	Quantas vezes?						Não Sei
			0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	
36	PP.beh.12	Escolhi ou recusei produtos por motivos políticos, éticos ou de proteção ambiental	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
37	PP.beh.13	Distribuí panfletos políticos	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
38	PP.beh.14	Trabalhei como voluntário (para a escola de meus filhos / igreja / vizinhança / outros)	0	1	2	3	4	5 ou mais	NS
Open03. Você se envolveu em algum outro tipo de ação política? [Resposta de texto livre]									

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Engajamento com Partidos

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Questão	Resposta
39	<i>PartyMember</i>	Você é membro de algum partido político?	Sim / Não
40	<i>PartySympa</i>	Em caso negativo, você simpatiza com algum partido político?	Sim / Não
41	<i>BraParty</i>	"Se você é membro E/OU simpatiza com algum partido: qual é esse partido?"	(Resposta de texto livre - resposta opcional)
42	<i>PartyReject</i>	Você rejeita algum partido político?	Não / Sim, um partido / Sim, alguns partidos / Sim, todos os partidos
43	<i>Worked4Party</i>	Nas últimas eleições, você trabalhou para a campanha de um candidato ou partido?	Sim / Não

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Contágio comportamental

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Diga até que ponto as frases abaixo te descrevem	Este item definitivamente não me descreve											Este item realmente me define	Não Sei
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
44	BC.01	Eu costumo tentar convencer meus amigos a participarem das ações políticas	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	
45	BC.02	Entendo a política de meu país melhor do que a maioria dos meus amigos	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	
46	BC.03	Presto atenção à opinião de amigos que são mais ativos politicamente do que eu	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	
47	BC.04	As pessoas próximas a mim me encorajam a participar da política	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Questão	Nenhum deles											Todos eles	Não Sei
			0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%		
48	BC.05	Quanto de seus amigos/parentes costumam participar de atividades políticas (aproximadamente)?	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	NS	

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Educação Política / Socialização Política														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Aprendemos sobre política de muitas formas em nossa vida, com diferentes pessoas e em diferentes lugares. Então, diga o quanto você aprendeu sobre política...	Não aprendi nada										Aprendi muito	Não Sei
			▼										▼	
49	PE.01	... na escola (escola primária – 1º grau, ou ensino médio – 2º grau)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
50	PE.02	... na Universidade (ou outra instituição de Ensino Superior – 3º grau)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
51	PE.03	... com sua família	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
52	PE.04	... com colegas de trabalho	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
53	PE.05	... com membros de uma associação / sindicato / partido ao qual você é afiliado	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
54	PE.06	... com amigos	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
55	PE.07	... por conta própria (lendo livros, jornais, Internet, assistindo TV, ouvindo rádio, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
Open04. Onde mais ou com quem mais você aprendeu sobre política? [Resposta de texto livre]														

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Estereótipos – Informações críticas sobre os parlamentares														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Com que frequência você se importa com essas informações sobre os parlamentares que discutem assuntos de seu interesse?	Nunca ▼										Sempre ▼	Não Sei
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
56	ST.inf.01	O partido político dele/dela	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
57	ST.inf.02	Se ele/ela tem posicionamento de esquerda ou de direita	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
58	ST.inf.03	Se ele/ela representa o(s) partido(s) governante(s), a oposição ou uma posição neutra	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
59	ST.inf.04	A área de especialização dele/dela (por exemplo: meio ambiente, relações exteriores, desenvolvimento econômico, direitos humanos, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
60	ST.inf.05	Os grupos de interesse dos quais ele/ela participa (sindicatos laborais, associações de classe, instituições de proteção ambiental, associações de agricultores, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
61	ST.inf.06	Se ele/ela representa alguma minoria (por exemplo, povos indígenas, imigrantes, gays/LGBT, pessoas portadoras de necessidades especiais, etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
62	ST.inf.07	A religião dele/dela	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
63	ST.inf.08	O gênero do(a) parlamentar (se é homem/mulher)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
64	ST.inf.09	Se ele/ela se envolveu em algum escândalo	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS

Estereótipos – Informações críticas sobre os parlamentares														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Com que frequência você se importa com essas informações sobre os parlamentares que discutem assuntos de seu interesse?	Nunca ▼										Sempre ▼	Não Sei
65	ST.inf.10	Os cargos políticos anteriormente ocupados por ele/ela (por exemplo, Ministro(a), Secretário(a), etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS
Open05. Há alguma outra característica relevante sobre os parlamentares? Quais? [Resposta de texto livre]														

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Informações Demográficas			
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Questão	Resposta
66	<i>Gender</i>	Gênero	[] Homem / [] Mulher
67	<i>Age</i>	Idade	Tenho ____ anos
68	<i>Education</i>	Meu nível educacional é:	[] Ensino fundamental (1o grau) incompleto [] Ensino fundamental (1o grau) completo [] Ensino médio (2o grau) incompleto [] Ensino médio (2o grau) completo [] Ensino Superior incompleto [] Ensino Superior completo [] Especialização em nível de pós-graduação [] Mestrado completo [] Doutorado (PhD) complete
69	<i>City</i>	Onde você mora?	Informe o nome de sua cidade.
70	<i>Occupation</i>	Qual a sua (principal) ocupação / profissão?	(Resposta de texto livre)
71	<i>RelateToParliament</i>	A sua profissão está diretamente relacionada com a atividade parlamentar? Leve em consideração a atividade parlamentar do Congresso Nacional (Câmara dos Deputados e Senado Federal), da Assembléia Estadual, da Câmara Municipal e/ou da Câmara	[] Sim [] Não

Informações Demográficas			
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Questão	Resposta
		Legislativa do DF	
72	FormerlyCandidate	Você já se candidatou a um cargo político?	[] Sim [] Não

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Question	Extrema Esquerda					Centro			Extrema Direita		Não Sei	
			▼					▼			▼			
73	LeftRight	Nas questões políticas, as pessoas falam de “esquerda” e “direita”. De forma geral, como você classificaria seu ponto de vista nessa escala?	E5	E4	E3	E2	E1	0	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	NS

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Diga-nos se você possui algum dos itens abaixo...	Resposta
74		Eu tenho um ou mais...	
	<i>lownComputer</i>	Computador com acesso à Internet	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownPhone</i>	Telefone celular ou tablet com acesso à Internet	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownTV</i>	Televisão Moderna (plasma, LCD ou LED)	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownCar</i>	Carro	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownApart</i>	Apartamento próprio	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownHouse</i>	Casa própria	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownOffice</i>	Escritório / Loja / Oficina	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownStocks</i>	Ações da Bolsa de Valores	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownBoat</i>	Barco (apenas para lazer)	[] Sim [] Não
	<i>lownComp50</i>	Empresa com mais de 50 funcionários	[] Sim [] Não

Swedish version of survey's questionnaire

Hemsida - Informerat samtycke

Vi tackar för ditt deltagande i denna undersökning! Undersökningen avser en tvärkulturell studie om människors intryck av politiken i sina respektive länder. Studien bedrivs som en del i en doktorsavhandling av Thiago Carneiro, doktorand i socialpsykologi på Universitet i Brasília i Brasilien, i samarbete med Södertörns högskola.

Genom att delta i denna undersökning godkänner du att dina svar används för statistisk analys, tillsammans med andra deltagare. Med bakgrund i denna undersökning kommer vi att beräkna genomsnittsvärden, procentsatser och andra indikatorer om deltagarnas allmänna uppfattning.

Du behöver inte uppge ditt namn och dina svar kommer inte att användas för att ta reda på vem du är. Din personliga integritet kommer att respekteras. Vi vill helt enkelt veta din uppfattning om politiken i ditt land.

Samtliga rapporter kommer att tillgängliggöras i vetenskapliga publikationer, i syfte att beskriva samhällets förväntningar på sina politiska institutioner.

Du har rätt att sluta delta när du vill. Om du inte slutför enkäten, antas du inte längre vilja delta. Dina svar kommer följaktligen inte att beaktas.

Skulle du ha några frågor angående undersökningen, hänvisar vi till vår forskningsledare: <e-postadress>

Om du skulle vara intresserad av att erhålla resultaten från undersökning, meddela oss.

Genom din medverkan i denna forskning, bidrar du till ökad insikt i förståelsen av ditt lands politik. Var vänlig och besvara alla frågor!

För att fortsätta till undersökningen, kryssa i:

Jag har läst och accepterar dessa villkor

Vad är din åsikt om Sveriges riksdagsledamöter?

Stereotyper - Beteendeprediktion														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Enligt din åsikt, vad gör riksdagsledamöter egentligen? Uppge vilken andel av dem som gör följande:	Inga			Hälften av dem						Alla		Vet ej
			▼			▼						▼		
1	ST.beh.01	De företräder mina medborgerliga intressen	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
2	ST.beh.02	De gynnar företag framför medborgarnas intressen	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
3	ST.beh.03	De hjälper sina egna vänner och familjer så att de kan få höga positioner i samhället (de praktiserar nepotism)	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
4	ST.beh.04	De bidrar till en hållbar utveckling	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
5	ST.beh.05	De använder offentliga medel effektivt för att förbättra den offentliga servicen (skolor, sjukvård, polis) för folket	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
6	ST.beh.06	De uppfyller sina vallöften	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
7	ST.beh.07	De agerar i enlighet med sina partiers ideologier	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
8	ST.beh.08	De stiftar lagar som främjar landet	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
9	ST.beh.09	De företräder Sveriges ståndpunkter i internationella frågor på ett bra sätt	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
10	ST.beh.10	De använder offentliga medel för sina privata intressen	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE

Stereotyper - Beteendeprediktion

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Enligt din åsikt, vad gör riksdagsledamöter egentligen? Uppge vilken andel av dem som gör följande:	Hälften av dem											Vet ej
			Inga ▼	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	
11	ST.beh.11	De arbetar för en jämnare inkomstfördelning bland svenskar.	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
12	ST.beh.12	De representerar sina väljares intressen	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE
Open01. Finns det något mer du önskar tillägga till denna lista på vad riksdagsledamöterna vanligtvis gör? [Frivilligt svar]														

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Politiskt deltagande - Icke-deltagande attityder														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Var god ange i vilken grad du håller med om följande uttalanden om politik	Håller absolut inte med											Vet ej
			▼											
13	PP.atd.01	Jag undviker att diskutera politik	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
14	PP.atd.02	Min röst har ingen betydelse för att förbättra situationen i Sverige	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
15	PP.atd.03	Blanka och ogiltiga röster uttrycker väljarnas missnöje med vårt lands politiker	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
16	PP.atd.04	Pressen förvanskar det som händer i Riksdagen	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
17	PP.atd.05	Det är slöseri med tid att följa nyheterna om politik	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
18	PP.atd.06	Väljarna kan påverka riksdagsledamöternas beslut under deras mandatperiod	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
19	PP.atd.07	Det är legitimt att använda våld som en form av protest	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
20	PP.atd.08	Det är nödvändigt att bygga ett nytt samhälle, utan några av de befintliga politiska institutionerna	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
21	PP.atd.09	Vi skulle klara oss lika bra utan politiker	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
22	PP.atd.10	Mina beslut i livsstilsfrågor visar mina politiska åsikter (musik jag lyssnar på, kläder jag bär, frisyr etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
23	PP.atd.11	Jag avser att rösta igen på samma parti som jag röstade på i senaste valet	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE

Politiskt deltagande - Icke-deltagande attityder														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Var god ange i vilken grad du håller med om följande uttalanden om politik	Håller absolut inte med ▼										Håller absolut med ▼	Vet ej
24	PP.atd.12	NGO:er och företag uppnår alltid bättre resultat än regeringen när det handlar om att tillgodose medborgarnas intressen	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
Open02. Vad är dina intryck av svensk politik? [Frivilligt svar]														

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Politiskt deltagande - Tidigare beteende										
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Hur många har gånger du gjort följande, av det som framgår nedan, sedan 2010 (då senaste valet till Riksdagen ägde rum)?	Hur många gånger har du gjort detta?						Vet ej	
25	PP.beh.01	Jag har kontaktat riksdagsledamöter direkt (genom möten, telefon eller internet)	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
26	PP.beh.02	Jag har använt sociala medier (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube etc.) för att delta i politiska aktiviteter	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
27	PP.beh.03	Jag har sökt efter information om vad riksdagsledamöter har utträttat	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
28	PP.beh.04	Jag har kontaktat tidningar, radio eller TV för att kommunicera något politiskt viktigt	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
29	PP.beh.05	Jag har deltagit i konferenser, seminarier, föredrag eller offentliga utskottsfrågor om politiska frågor.	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
30	PP.beh.06	Jag har skrivit på namnsamlingar om politiska frågor	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
31	PP.beh.07	Jag har deltagit i diskussioner om politiska frågor	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
32	PP.beh.08	Jag har deltagit i strejker som organiserats av fackföreningar	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
33	PP.beh.09	Jag har deltagit i gatudemonstrationer	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
34	PP.beh.10	Jag har deltagit i evenemang organiserade av politiska partier	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
35	PP.beh.11	Jag har hjälpt någon organisation utan anknytning till partier eller regeringen (fackförening, social minoritetsorganisation, kyrka, NGO etc)	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	

Politiskt deltagande - Tidigare beteende										
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Hur många har gånger du gjort följande, av det som framgår nedan, sedan 2010 (då senaste valet till Riksdagen ägde rum)?	Hur många gånger har du gjort detta?					Vet ej		
36	PP.beh.12	Jag har valt eller undvikit produkter av politiska eller etiska orsaker eller av miljöskäl.	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
37	PP.beh.13	Jag har delat ut politiska informationsblad.	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
38	PP.beh.14	Jag har arbetat som volontär (för mina barns skola/kyrkan/grannskapet/andra sammanhang)	0	1	2	3	4	5 eller flera	VE	
Open03. Är du engagerad i någon annan slags politisk aktivitet? [Frivilligt svar]										

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Partiengagemang			
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Fråga	Svar
39	<i>PartyMember</i>	Är du medlem i ett politiskt parti?	[] Ja / [] Nej
40	<i>PartySympa</i>	Om inte, sympatiserar du med något politiskt parti?	[] Ja / [] Nej
41	<i>SweParty / BraParty</i>	Om du är medlem i och/eller sympatiserar med något parti: vilket?	[Fritext svar - frivilligt svar]
42	<i>PartyReject</i>	Förkastar du något parti?	Nej, jag förkastar inget / Ja, förkastar ett parti / Ja, förkastar några partier / Ja, jag förkastar samtliga partier
43	<i>Worked4Party</i>	Arbetade du i kampanjen för någon kandidat eller parti i det senaste valet?	[] Ja / [] Nej

==//==

Beteendespridning															
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Var god beskriv hur väl de följande meningarna beskriver dig	Den här beskrivningen stämmer inte alls överens med mig											Den här beskrivningen stämmer exakt överens med mig	Vet ej
			0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
44	BC.01	Jag försöker vanligen övertyga vänner att delta i politiska aktiviteter	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
45	BC.02	Jag förstår svensk politik bättre än de flesta av mina vänner	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
46	BC.03	Jag uppmärksammar åsikterna hos vänner som är mer politiskt aktiva än jag	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
47	BC.04	Jag uppmuntras av personer nära mig att delta i politiken	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Fråga	Inga av dem											Alla	Vet ej
			0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%		
48	BC.05	Hur stor andel av dina vänner /släktingar deltar vanligen i politiska aktiviteter (ungefärligen)?	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	VE	

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Politisk Utbildning / politisk socialisation														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Vi lär oss om politik på många sätt under vårt liv, av många olika personer på olika platser. Var god ange hur du har lärt dig om politik....	Jag har inte lärt mig något ▼										Jag har lärt mig en hel del ▼	Vet ej
49	PE.01	... i grundskolan eller på gymnasiet	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
50	PE.02	... på universitetet eller annan högre utbildning	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
51	PE.03	... av din familj	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
52	PE.04	... av arbetskollegor	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
53	PE.05	... av medlemmar i förening/fackförening/parti där du är medlem	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
54	PE.06	... av vänner	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
55	PE.07	... på egen hand (genom böcker, tidningar, internet, TV, radio etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
Open04. Var annars eller från vem/vilka har du lärt dig om politik? [Frivilligt svar]														

==//==

Stereotyper - Viktig information om riksdagsledamöter

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Hur ofta bryr du dig om följande information om riksdagsledamöter som diskuterar frågor som är av intresse för dig?	Aldrig											Alltid	Vet ej
			▼												
56	ST.inf.01	Hans/hennes politiska parti	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
57	ST.inf.02	Om han/hon ligger till vänster eller höger på den politiska skalan	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
58	ST.inf.03	Om han/hon tillhör några av regeringspartiena, oppositionen eller är neutral	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
59	ST.inf.04	Hans/hennes särskilda kunskapsområde (t.ex. miljö, utrikespolitik, ekonomisk utveckling, mänskliga rättigheter etc.)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
60	ST.inf.05	Intressegrupper som han/hon är engagerad i (fackföreningar, företagarsorganisationer, miljöorganisationer, jordbrukarsorganisationer etc)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
61	ST.inf.06	Om han/hon representerar någon minoritet (t.ex. ursprungsbefolkning, invandrare, homosexuella/HBT, funktionshindrade etc)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
62	ST.inf.07	Hans/hennes religion	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
63	ST.inf.08	Riksdagsledamotens kön (man/kvinna)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	
64	ST.inf.09	Om han/hon har varit inblandad i skandaler	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE	

Stereotyper - Viktig information om riksdagsledamöter														
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Hur ofta bryr du dig om följande information om riksdagsledamöter som diskuterar frågor som är av intresse för dig?	Aldrig Alltid											Vet ej
			▼	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
65	ST.inf.10	Hans/hennes tidigare politiska uppdrag (t.ex. minister, statssekreterare etc)	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	VE
Open05. Finns det några andra relevanta egenskaper hos riksdagsledamöter? Vilka? (Frivilligt svar)														

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Demografisk information			
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Fråga	Svar
66	<i>Gender</i>	Kön	[] Man / [] Kvinna
67	<i>Age</i>	Ålder	Jag är _____ år gammal
68	<i>Education</i>	Utbildning	[] Ofullständig grundskola [] Fullständig grundskola [] Ofullständig gymnasieutbildning [] Fullständig gymnasieutbildning [] Ofullständig universitetsutbildning [] Fullständig universitetsutbildning [] Fullständig masterutbildning [] Fullständig doktorsutbildning
69	<i>City</i>	Var bor du	Var god ange staden där du bor
70	<i>Occupation</i>	Vad är ditt (huvudsakliga) arbete?	(Fritext svar)
71	<i>RelateToParliament</i>	Är ditt yrke direkt relaterat till Riksdagens verksamhet?	[] Ja / [] Nej

Demografisk information			
#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Fråga	Svar
72	FormerlyCandidate	Har du någonsin kandidaterat till ett politiskt ämbete?	[] Ja / [] Nej

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Fråga	yttersta vänstern ▼				Mitten ▼			yttersta högern ▼				Vej ej
			V5	V4	V3	V2	V1	0	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	
73	LeftRight	När det gäller politik så talar man ofta om "vänster" och "höger". Var skulle du placera dina egna åsikter på denna skala, generellt sett?	V5	V4	V3	V2	V1	0	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	VE

#	Variable code in SPSS and AMOS	Kan du ange om du äger någon av sakerna nedan?	Svar
74		Jag äger en eller fler...	
	<i>lownComputer</i>	Dator med möjlig anslutning till internet	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownPhone</i>	Mobiltelefon eller surfplatta med möjlig anslutning till internet	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownTV</i>	Modern TV (plasma, LCD eller LED)	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownCar</i>	Bil	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownApart</i>	Egen lägenhet	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownHouse</i>	Eget hus	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownOffice</i>	Kontor/butik/verkstad eller liknande	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownStocks</i>	Aktier	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownBoat</i>	Båt (endast för fritidsändamål)	[] Ja / [] Nej
	<i>lownComp50</i>	Företag med fler än 50 anställda	[] Ja / [] Nej

Appendix III

Table III.1. Acceptance and interpretation parameters for Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) in this study.

Index name	Criteria	Notes	Theoretical Reference
KMO	> 0.70	Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test estimates the “factorability” of the covariance matrix. The more items share covariance, the closer KMO will get to 1, indicating that it will be easier to extract factors. KMO over 0.70 is considered to be “regular”; over 0.80, “good” and over 0.90, “excellent”.	Pasquali (2012)
Eigenvalues	Given by Parallel Analysis	Eigenvalues greater than 1 is a lower bound criterion for the first Factor Extraction. Parallel Analysis estimated the actual necessary Eigenvalues to accept the Factor Structure as empirically relevant.	Horn (1965). Pasquali (2012) Thompson (2005)
Factor Loadings (or Factor Structure Coefficients)	> 0.30	Factor loadings indicate the correlation between the item and the factor. Loadings above 0.30 are considered acceptable. However, Loadings above 0.25 were accepted if the item contributed for the improvement of Cronbach’s alpha and was considered highly relevant under the theoretical perspective.	Hair <i>et al.</i> (2009) Pasquali (2012)
Cronbach’s alpha	> 0.60	On exploratory research it is acceptable to keep factors with Cronbach’s alpha over 0.60. This was the criterion employed here, considering that factors’ consistency would be further tested on CFA.	Boyle (1991) Trenblay (2001)

Appendix IV

Table IV.1. Acceptance and interpretation parameters for Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)²⁰ in this study.

Index name	Criteria	Notes	Theoretical Reference
Chi-square / degrees of freedom ratio	χ^2 / d.f. between 1 and 5	Indicates “over-adjusted” or “under-adjusted” models. It also assesses the model parsimony.	Hair <i>et al.</i> (2009)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)	< 0.70	RMSEA evaluates how well the model fits to the population based on non-centralized χ^2 . It punishes the less parsimonious model, i.e., the one with more free parameters. RMSEA under 0.8 indicates reasonable fit; under 0.5 indicates good fit.	Brown (2006) Browne & Cudeck (1989) Byrne & Campbell (1999)
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)	< 0.80	SRMR is the average discrepancy between the observed correlation matrix and the matrix predicted by the model.	Brown (2006) Hu & Bentler (1999).
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	> 0.92	CFI evaluates the fit of a model in relation to a more restricted, nested baseline model (“null” or “independence” models). CFI under 0.95 can be accepted if other indices indicate good fit.	Brown (2006) Byrne & Campbell (1999)
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	> 0.92	TLI punishes the introduction of free parameters that do not contribute to the model fit.	Brown, T. (2006) Hu & Bentler (1999)
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI)	> 0.90	Goodness-of-Fit index, less sensible to the sample size than other indicators. AGFI tends to be conservative, i.e., it may eventually reject good models.	Hair <i>et al.</i> (2009) Bagozzi & Yi (1988)
Jöreskog’s rho	> 0.6	Jöreskog’s Rho (ρ) calculates the shared variance between items associated with the same factor. This represents the internal factor consistency, indicating how much of the latent factor is assessed by its items.	Jöreskog (1971) Marôco (2010) Fornell e Larcker (1981) Bagozzi & Yi (1988) Farid (2014)
Standardized Residual Covariances	< 4	Standardized Residual Covariances refers to the difference between observed covariance and adjusted covariance. Residuals over 4 indicate potentially unacceptable errors, and changes in model are recommended to improve Goodness-of-Fit.	Hair <i>et al.</i> (2005)

²⁰ CFI, TLI, SRMR and RMSEA parameters were primarily based on Hair *et al.*'s (2009) recommendations (p. 573), as they take into consideration the sample size and number of observed variables (questionnaire items). These authors emphasize that their guidelines are not to be taken as absolute rules.

Appendix V

Tables for Stepwise Multiple Regression, entering Political Participation factors and standalone items as dependent (endogenous) variables.

Table V.1. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Political Disillusion, considering Brazilian Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.		
Political Disillusion		0,499	0,249	0,242	35,832	0		
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression								
Variable Code	Variable Label	Unstandardized Coefficients	Std. Error	Stdized Coef.	t	95,0% Confidence Interval for B		
		B		Beta	Sig.	Lower Bound		
(Constant)		5,17	0,50	0,00	10,40	0,000	4,20	6,15
Score.PARTY	score Party-Oriented View	-0,16	0,03	-0,20	-6,24	0,000	-0,22	-0,11
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation	-0,33	0,06	-0,17	-5,54	0,000	-0,45	-0,22
Age	Age	0,04	0,01	0,21	7,18	0,000	0,03	0,05
Education	Education	-0,28	0,05	-0,17	-6,13	0,000	-0,37	-0,19
PartySympa	Do you sympathize with any political party?	-0,57	0,17	-0,10	-3,36	0,001	-0,90	-0,24
PartyReject	Do you reject any political party?	0,38	0,10	0,11	3,73	0,000	0,18	0,58
PE07	... on your own (reading books, newspapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc).	-0,09	0,03	-0,09	-2,87	0,004	-0,16	-0,03
PartyMember	Are you a member of a political party?	-0,74	0,26	-0,08	-2,83	0,005	-1,26	-0,23
LeftRight	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	-0,07	0,03	-0,06	-2,25	0,025	-0,13	-0,01

Table V.3. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Pre-Political Engagement, considering Brazilian Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
Variable Code	Variable Label	B	Std. Error	Standardized Coef.	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Pre-Political Engagement		0,292	0,085	0,084	23,139	0,000		
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression								
(Constant)		1,15	0,42	0,00	2,70	0,007	0,31	1,98
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,48	0,06	0,28	8,38	0,000	0,37	0,59
Gender	Gender	0,90	0,23	0,12	3,91	0,000	0,45	1,35
PE.05	... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member	0,11	0,03	0,11	3,29	0,001	0,05	0,18
PartySympa	Do you sympathize with any political party?	-0,61	0,23	-0,08	-2,61	0,009	-1,06	-0,15
Score.PERS	score Personal Info	0,11	0,04	0,09	2,77	0,006	0,03	0,19
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation	-0,19	0,08	-0,07	-2,35	0,019	-0,36	-0,03

Table V.5. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Institutional Participation (2nd order factor), considering Brazilian Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.		
Institutional Participation		0,684	0,467	0,462	85,343	0,000		
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression								
Variable Code	Variable Label	Unstandardized Coefficients		Stdized Coef.	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		-0,06	0,32	0,00	-0,19	0,849	-0,68	0,56
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,38	0,03	0,36	12,90	0,000	0,33	0,44
FE.05	... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member	0,13	0,02	0,21	7,37	0,000	0,10	0,17
PartyMember	Are you a member of a political party?	1,18	0,19	0,16	6,12	0,000	0,80	1,56
FE.07	... on your own (reading books, new spapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc).	0,09	0,02	0,10	3,75	0,000	0,04	0,13
score.ST.2nd.CRITICAL	score 2nd Critical Info	0,07	0,02	0,09	3,20	0,001	0,03	0,12
FE.02	...at university	0,05	0,02	0,09	3,05	0,002	0,02	0,09
FE.04	... from coworkers	-0,06	0,02	-0,08	-2,84	0,005	-0,10	-0,02
Gender	Gender	-0,30	0,12	-0,06	-2,63	0,009	-0,53	-0,08
PartySympa	Do you sympathize with any political party?	0,30	0,12	0,06	2,49	0,013	0,06	0,53
Education	Education	0,073	0,036	0,055	2,027	0,043	0,002	0,144

Table V.6. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Institutional Participation (2nd order factor), considering Swedish Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
Variable Code	Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coef.	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	Variable Label	B	Std. Error	Beta				
	Institutional Participation	0,701	0,492	0,487	105,181	0,000		
(Constant)		0,13	0,21	0,00	0,63	0,531	-0,27	0,53
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion (01 03 04 05)	0,38	0,02	0,44	15,61	0,000	0,33	0,43
PartyMember	Are you a member of a political party?	1,42	0,14	0,27	9,86	0,000	1,14	1,70
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation (01 04 05 08 11)	-0,12	0,02	-0,12	-4,90	0,000	-0,17	-0,07
PE.07	... on your own (reading books, new spapers, internet, watching TV, radio, etc).	0,07	0,02	0,10	4,00	0,000	0,03	0,10
PE.05	... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member	0,04	0,01	0,08	2,72	0,007	0,01	0,07
PE.02	...at university	0,04	0,02	0,07	2,76	0,006	0,01	0,07
PartyReject	Do you reject any political party?	0,11	0,05	0,05	2,19	0,029	0,01	0,21
PE.01	...at school (primary school - 1st grade, or high school - 2nd grade)	-0,03	0,01	-0,05	-2,06	0,040	-0,06	0,00

Table V.7. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Political Consumerism, considering Brazilian Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.		
Political Consumerism		0,350	0,123	0,117	22,799	0,000		
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression								
Variable Code	Variable Label	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coef. Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		-1,45	0,73	0,00	-1,99	0,047	-2,88	-0,02
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,39	0,07	0,20	5,90	0,000	0,26	0,52
Education	Education	0,39	0,08	0,15	5,03	0,000	0,24	0,54
Score.PARTY	score Party-Oriented View	0,15	0,04	0,12	3,50	0,000	0,07	0,24
Gender	Gender	1,08	0,28	0,12	3,94	0,000	0,54	1,62
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation	-0,24	0,10	-0,08	-2,53	0,012	-0,43	-0,06
FE.07	... on your own (reading books, new spapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc).	0,12	0,06	0,07	2,16	0,031	0,01	0,23

Table V.8. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Political Consumerism, considering Swedish Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
Variable Code	Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression Variable Label	B	Std. Error	Stdized Coef.	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	Political Consumerism	0,465	0,216	0,209	29,939	0,000		
(Constant)		1,62	0,84	0,00	1,92	0,055	-0,03	3,28
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,41	0,07	0,18	5,61	0,000	0,27	0,55
LeftRight	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	-0,37	0,06	-0,21	-6,68	0,000	-0,48	-0,26
PE.01	... at school (primary school - 1st grade, or high school - 2nd grade)	0,17	0,05	0,12	3,74	0,000	0,08	0,25
Score.CORRUP	score Corruption	-0,22	0,05	-0,13	-4,22	0,000	-0,32	-0,12
PE.07	... on your own (reading books, new spapers, Internet, watching TV, radio, etc).	0,21	0,06	0,12	3,65	0,000	0,10	0,32
Gender	Gender	0,73	0,28	0,08	2,65	0,008	0,19	1,28
Education	Education	0,23	0,10	0,07	2,37	0,018	0,04	0,42
Score.PARTY	score Party-Oriented View	0,10	0,05	0,07	2,04	0,041	0,00	0,19

Table V.9. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Labour Union Strikes, considering Brazilian Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B		
Variable Code	Variable Label	B	Std. Error	Standardized Coef.	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
	Labour Union Strikes	0,348	0,121	0,116	22,4	0,000			
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression									
(Constant)		0,76	0,25	0,00	3,06	0,002	0,27	1,24	
PE.05	... from members of an association / trade union / party in which you are a member	0,20	0,02	0,28	8,33	0,000	0,15	0,24	
PE.02	...at university	0,05	0,02	0,08	2,45	0,014	0,01	0,09	
PartySympa	Do you sympathize with any political party?	-0,40	0,16	-0,08	-2,55	0,011	-0,71	-0,09	
LeftRight	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	-0,07	0,03	-0,07	-2,36	0,019	-0,13	-0,01	
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,08	0,04	0,07	2,10	0,036	0,01	0,16	
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation	-0,12	0,06	-0,07	-2,09	0,037	-0,23	-0,01	

Table V.12. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Street Demonstrations, considering Swedish Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.		
Street Demonstrations		0,428	0,183	0,18	65,355	0,000		
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coef.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B			
Variable Code	Variable Label	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		1,04	0,21	0,00	4,86	0,000	0,62	1,46
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,32	0,03	0,33	10,57	0,000	0,26	0,39
LeftRight	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	-0,15	0,03	-0,19	-5,95	0,000	-0,20	-0,10
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation	-0,11	0,03	-0,10	-3,18	0,002	-0,18	-0,04

Table V.14. Stepwise Multiple Regression test for Political Violence Legitimacy, considering Swedish Participants.

Dependent (endogenous) Variable		R	R ²	Adjusted R ²	F-test (Anova)	Sig.		
Political Violence Legitimacy		0,295	0,087	0,08	11,876	0,000		
Independent (exogenous) variables that entered the Regression								
Variable Code	Variable Label	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coef.	t	Sig.	95,0% Confidence Interval for B	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
(Constant)		1,12	0,32	0,00	3,48	0,001	0,49	1,75
Score.QUAL	score Quality of Representation	-0,10	0,04	-0,09	-2,37	0,018	-0,17	-0,02
Score.BC	score Behavioral Contagion	0,17	0,03	0,18	4,91	0,000	0,10	0,24
Score.CORRUP	score Corruption	0,07	0,03	0,10	2,72	0,007	0,02	0,12
Score.PERS	score Personal Info	0,09	0,03	0,10	2,94	0,003	0,03	0,14
Score.PARTY	score Party-Oriented View	-0,05	0,02	-0,08	-2,31	0,021	-0,10	-0,01
LeftRight	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?	-0,06	0,03	-0,07	-2,19	0,029	-0,11	-0,01
PE03	... from your family	-0,04	0,02	-0,07	-1,97	0,049	-0,09	0,00